

STUDIES

IN

MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY
(1789—1945)

IN THREE PARTS

PART TWO

A

HISTORY OF EUROPE

From 1870 To 1920

**To the author's old students
and friends this book is
affectionately dedicated**

A HISTORY OF EUROPE

From 1870 To 1920

17

By

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P R E F A C E

The aim of this book is to provide a clear and comprehensive survey of the development of the main issues of the history of Europe from the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 to the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945. The narrative has been as intelligible and readable as possible, and is unencumbered with over-much detail.

The book has been purposely divided into three parts, viz.,

(i) History of Europe from 1789 to 1870 ;

(ii) History of Europe from 1870 to 1920 ; and

(iii) History of Europe from 1920 to 1945, with a view to effectively delineate the general trends and characteristics of each period separately, without, however, losing sight of the fact that they are just three stages in the march of the history of Europe since the French Revolution.

The book has primarily been designed for the use by advanced students of modern European history, preparing for the Master's degree or the I.A.S. and other higher competitive examinations, and is based on the author's experience in teaching Modern History to M.A. classes at the Panjab University for more than thirty years. A map-question being compulsory in the I.A.S. and other higher examinations, a number of important historical maps with explanatory notes have been included in the book under a separate section, which, it is hoped, will obviate the need of referring to historical atlases for the map-question.

History, happily, can never be like mathematics, an exact science in which a conclusion is either exactly right or wholly wrong. Historical judgments will always tend to be influenced by 'values', to which "different minds will attach a different qualitative scale." The present writer has ventured far beyond his basic tasks of narrative and description by drawing his conclusions from the facts which he has endeavoured to state accurately in the book. These conclusions must be left to the reader's judgment.

The author has drawn freely on standard works on the subject—very often he has even used their vocabulary for which he craves their author's and their publishers' indulgence. An indication of the authorities consulted can be had from the list of works included in the bibliography appended at the end of this book. This list serves another purpose as well,—the books mentioned therein can be gainfully used by those who are in quest of further information or discussion on the subject.

The author expresses his deep sense of indebtedness to his son, Praveen, Lecturer in History, Kirori Mal College (Delhi University), who has helped him immeasurably in the preparation of this work. He also wishes to express his sense of gratitude to Shri Manmohan Nanda, Manager of the Bookhive, for his enthusiastic co-operation throughout the entire production of this book.

Let the author conclude by quoting an observation by Flavius Arrianas which the former thinks, without being presumptuous, could as well be an observation made by himself on his present venture : "If anyone wonders why, after so many other histories have been written, I also should have had the idea of writing one, let him begin by reading through all those others, then turn to mine, and after that he may wonder if he will".

30/19, East Patel Nagar,
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June 2, 1975

R. R. SETHI

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It is most regrettable that quite a number of typographical errors have crept into the book. The reader's kind attention is drawn to 'Errata' at page 300.

Introductory

A. Characteristics and Fulfilments of the Post-Napoleonic Period

The final overthrow of Napoleon was the prelude to an entirely new era in the history of Europe and of the world. This era continued for almost precisely a century, until 1914, when it led Europe and the world into the Great War.

In its political evolution this age passed through three distinct phases : (i) the phase of conservative reaction from 1815 to 1848, during which the Continental monarchs and their ministers, who with the vital assistance of Britain had conquered Napoleon, dictated the terms of the Treaty of Vienna and erected a political system which for thirty-three years cast its awful shadow over Europe.

This phase was the age of Metternich, of "legitimacy." Its watchword was "stability and repose" ; its enemy was "revolutionary conspiracy" which larked behind every assertion of the doctrines of liberty and nationality ; its method was the congress of autocrats and their ministers which met from time to time to deal with the dread virus of revolution by "concerted intervention" ; its exponent, of course was the omnipotent Austrian Chancellor, Metternich, the bulwark of order ; (ii) "Today" Metternich once said I have to give my life to propping up the mouldering edifice." In 1848, the "annus mirabilis" (year of wonders) of the century, the mouldering edifice collapsed. It was succeeded suddenly, violently and inevitably by a phase (the second phase) of radical idealism in politics from 1848 until 1870, which was dominated by the principles of liberty and nationalism. This phase emerged, on the one hand, in the concrete political achievements of 1870-71—the inauguration of the national states of Germany and Italy which involved the

degradation of Austria and of France which had in the meantime reverted to a bastard imperialism, and it emerged, on the other hand, in an economic system and a social doctrine¹ which in the next phase (the third phase from 1870 to 1914) confused and stultified the political form which Europe had assumed. For this was the period during which the industrial development of Europe overran its social and political development, a period threatening economic anarchy owing to the vast, unprecedented production of the means and luxuries of life.

The problem of the distribution of this new machine-made wealth between the capitalist controller and the proletariat agent of production could not be adequately tackled by the traditional apparatus of the state, and there arose in an increasingly critical degree a conflict between the old political system and the demands of the new social democracy which was theorised in the doctrine of socialism and gradually in the extreme form of communism.

B. A Cycle of Wars From 1853 to 1870

After the Revolution of 1848 in France, Napoleon III a nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, became first President and then (in 1852) Emperor.

A megalomaniac, mixture of opposites, he was an admixture of several qualities—audacity, generosity, aspirations for human betterment and full of great idea and ideals. At the same time, ambitious, egoistic and given up to luxuries, and fantastic and grandiose schemes.

He set about rebuilding Paris, and changed it from a picturesque, insanitary, seventeenth century city into the spacious Latinised city of marble it is today. He set about rebuilding France and made it into a brilliant—looking modernised imperialism. He displayed a disposition to revive that competitiveness of the great powers which had kept Europe busy with futile wars during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Czar Nicholas I of Russia (1825—1855) was also becoming aggressive and pressing southward upon the Turkish Empire with his eyes on Constantinople.

1. The 1848 Revolution burst in France as a social revolution stimulated by the dire needs of the new proletariat. Metternich was never more wrong than when he exclaimed. "We stand today in the presence of another '93",

At the nineteenth century entered its second half, Europe broke out into a succession of wars. They were chiefly "balance of power" and ascendancy wars. In the Crimean War (1853—56), England, France, and Sardinia assailed Russia in defence of Turkey;² in 1859 came the Austro-Sardinian War which was unique in modern history inasmuch as it did not spring in part from mutual apprehension;³ in 1864 Bismarck fought the Danish War which renewed Germany's military reputation which had become tarnished, and added to Germany the flourishing province of Schleswig-Holstein.⁴ But the most important political effect of this war was that it directly brought in another war (the Austro-Russian War 1866) of which the purpose and result was the rejecting of Austria from the Germanic house-hold.⁵

Napoleon III was so ill advised as to attempt adventures in Mexico during the American Civil War; he set up an Emperor, Maximilian archduke of Austria there, and abandoned him hastily to his fate—he was shot by the Mexicans—when the victorious Federal government showed its teeth.

In 1870 came a long-pending struggle for predominance in Europe between France and Prussia. Prussia had long foreseen and prepared for this struggle and France was rotten with financial corruption. The Prussians were confident and prepared; the French were overconfident and unprepared.⁶

2. See Part I, pp. 278—284.

3. See Part I, pp. 236—237.

4. See Part I, pp. 261—263.

5. See Part I, pp. 263—266.

6. See Part I, pp. 266—277.

The Franco-Prussian War (1870-71)

The Franco-Prussian war initiated a new epoch in the history of Europe and the world. In the course of a short but violent conflict (227 days), there were introduced into the political society of the Continent two consolidated States—Germany and Italy—whose divided elements had played their great but discordant part in its evolution over a very large number of years.

On July 19, 1870 the chauvinists¹ of the Second French Empire led by the Duc de Gramont, led the reluctant Ollivier (President of the Cabinet) and the Emperor (Napoleon III) into a criminally foolish war with Prussia over the question of the succession to the Spanish throne:² Almost immediately the four south German States

1. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century the European Chancelleries turned hypnotized attention on the unification movements in Italy and Germany. Its motive power was the sentiment of nationalism. It should be borne in mind that no country escaped the impact of nationalism, not even those which like France and England had achieved national unity many centuries earlier. Whenever nationalism had already gained its immediate end of unification, it continued to exist under the name of patriotism. Patriotism and nationalism are so little differentiated that they reduce themselves pretty much to the same thing. In the nineteenth century nationalism (or patriotism) became a universal energy and like a wine too freely quaffed mounted, to the heads of all European peoples. In every European country could be encountered the phenomenon of the super-patriot (or super-nationalist). In Germany he was called pan-German, in Russia a pan-Slav, in England a jingo, in France a chauvinist. Under all these labels he exhibited the same mind. Joining with countrymen of the same disposition he constituted a band, small perhaps, but vociferous which caused much mischief by exciting to savage vociferation the corresponding bands in all the neighbouring countries. "They shook their fists and gritted their teeth at one another across the international boundaries and created a very dangerous condition of general nervous tension."

2. See Part I. pp. 266—70.

declared their solidarity with Prussia and France found herself at war with all of Germany.

From the outset it was apparent that Prussian efficiency was immeasurably greater than that of the rather shabby French. Moltke³ devised the strategy which was carried out by the German armies. During the month of August, a number of battles were fought near the Franco-German border, nearly all of them being Prussian victories. The decisive battle, however, was fought on September 2, just forty-five days after the commencement of hostilities, when Napoleon III and the army of Marshal MacMahon capitulated at Sedan to Moltke and Bismarck. On September 4, Leon Gambetta proclaimed the Third Republic of France and a provisional government took over power, calling itself the Government of National Defence. The Second French Empire thus came to an ignominious end. On September 20, the Italian army occupied Rome, which was declared the national capital of united Italy. The unity of Italy was now consummated.⁴ The States of the Church, the temporal dominion of the Pope, shrank to the walls of the Vatican and Lateran palaces. On January 18, 1871, the aged William I of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor in the *Salle deseslaces*, Hall of Mirrors in the palace of Versailles⁵ (in which on July 28, 1919 after the close of Great War the German representatives signed the Treaty of Versailles). On February 26, Adolphe Thiers signed the preliminaries of a humiliating peace. After much controversy these preliminaries were embodied in the final Treaty of Frankfurt, signed on May 10, 1871, and ratified by the National Assembly of France at Bordeaux by 433 votes to 98.

The Treaty of Frankfurt (May 10, 1871)

Under the terms of this Treaty France had to pay a war indemnity of five billion francs, that is two hundred million pounds sterling (£ 200,000,000)⁶ within three years and to support a German army of occupation which should be gradually withdrawn as the instalments of the indemnity were paid. Much more important was the cession by France to Germany of the province of Alsace and part of

3. Count Helmuth von Moltke (1800—91) in-charge of the Prussian army.

4. See Part I, p. 242.

5. See Part I, p. 271.

6. It was reckoned on the basis of the indemnity demanded by Napoleon of Prussia in 1807.

French Lorraine, including the important fortress of Metz. (Bismarck disapproved of part of this cession but for once was overruled.) Thus there was introduced into the European body a cancer which was to be an ever-present obstruction to the reconciliation between France and Germany, and contributed very greatly to the military competition which characterized Europe from 1871 to 1914.

The Misfortunes of France

In the course of eight months France ceased to be a great power. Shorn of her two frontier provinces, saddled with a huge war indemnity, stricken in the heart by the awful paroxysms of the communard revolution in Paris (March 18 to May 21, 1871)⁷ she faced a dismal and uncertain prospect, which was apparently to be determined by the intrigues of a group of selfish and intransigent factions -- Legitimists, Orleanists, Bonapartists, Moderate Republicans, Communists. The machinations of these factions was further confused by the strident clamour of a patriotic party for revenge against Germany. Trouble never comes alone but in battalions.

France on Her Way to Recovery

Despite the political chaos of France the danger of a passionate war of revenge was very real. The French army within three years had been amazingly purged, rehabilitated, and increased. In March 1875, a French law which strengthened the army and the movement of some French troops caused alarm in Berlin. The **Berlin Post** published a sensational article headed "War in sight." Bismarck and the Emperor were then urged by the militarists in Germany to seize the opportunity thus insolently offered by France to crush her irreparably by waging another war against her in which she should be "bled white"; but the pacific intentions of these two shrewd statesmen were reinforced by the threatening attitude of Russia and Britain⁸ and victorious Germany had her own internal problems.

7. The misfortunes of France did not end with the fall of its capital and the loss of its border provinces; the terrible drama of 1970 closed with civil war. It seems to be part of the normal order of French history that when an established government is overthrown and another is set in its place this second government is in its turn attacked by insurrection in Paris. It was so in 1793, in 1830, in 1848 and it was so again in 1870.

8. Both Prussia and Britain, though for different reasons, sounded a note of warning to Germany and asked her rather brusquely to keep her hands off France.

Despite the tragic omens during these years Imperial France—which had astonished Europe by its final exhibition of corruption and impotence—was transformed into the France of the Third Republic which amazed Europe by its power of recovery. To this the wisdom of Thiers, the folly of Comte de Chambord, the patriotism of Gambetta, and above all, the stolid virtues of the French peasantry contributed. In January 1872, the renunciation of Comte de Chambord weakened the Legitimist party. In January 1873, Napoleon III died utterly discredited. In September 1873, Thiers paid the last instalment of the indemnity. The last instalment was due in March 1875, but it was paid in September 1873. Largely owing to the thrift of her peasant population France paid the indemnity far more easily than Bismarck expected or desired, and on September 16, the last German soldier left French soil, that is, two years earlier than had been expected.

In February 1875, the new republican constitution (discussed below) was introduced and defended by Gambetta. In 1877, MacMahon seized the reins, but soon realized that reaction was impossible and France settled to her new republican regime.

Encouraged by Bismarck a renewed but isolated France set out to regain her position among the powers by acquiring a new colonial empire. By the Treaty of Bardo (signed May 12, ratified May 23, 1881), precisely ten years after the Treaty of Frankfurt, Ferry occupied Tunis "France" wrote the exultant Gambetta, "is resuming her place amongst the great powers",

The French Constitution of 1875

Salient Features.—By the laws of 1875 a legislature consisting of two houses, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, was established. The Senate was to consist of seventy-five life-senators elected by the National Assembly itself (to be replaced as vacancies occurred by nominees of the President) and of two hundred and twenty-five senators elected for nine years by panels of local government bodies in a fashion that made it certain that the villages and small towns would easily outvote the cities. One-third of the elective senators was to be renewed every three years.

The Chamber of Deputies was to be elected by universal suffrage for a four-year term,

The President was to be chosen for seven years by both Houses of Parliament sitting together to form a National Assembly. There was no vice-president, no succession provided by law. In case of a

vacancy in the presidency the National Assembly was to meet and elect a new President, generally within forty-eight hours.

The President had the right to initiate legislation, as had the members of the two Chambers, the duty to promulgate laws after their passage, to superintend their execution, the pardoning power, the direction of the army and navy, and the appointment of all civil and military positions. He might, with the consent of the Senate, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies before the expiration of its legal term and order a new election. But these powers were merely nominal, for the reason that every act of the President must be countersigned by a minister, who thereby became responsible for the act, the President being irresponsible, except in the case of high treason.

Comments on the Constitution

The Republican Constitution of 1875, which in substance governed France till 1940, when the Third French Republic gave place to the Vichy Government during the Second World War, was inspired by a lively horror of the evils which a despotism founded on a plebiscite had brought to France. Under the Constitution of 1875 the President of the Republic was elected by the vote of the two Chambers in joint session and not by a plebiscite of the whole people of France. Such a procedure was well qualified to shelter the country from the dangerous magnetism of sensational adventures. The Chambers did not elect superman; their choice fell upon the solid lawyer or man of business whose character and ability had proved themselves in the parliamentary arena. There were not in search of a force, but of a figurehead. "Ever since MacMahon failed in his attempt to turn the presidential office to the account of the monarchy, nothing had been more infuriating to a French President than the suspicion that he is seeking to make a policy of his own or to establish by speech or action a vital and independent contact with the mind of the country."

Parliamentary government, then, on the English model was the gift of the Constitution of 1875 to France. "The ministers are jointly and severally responsible to the Chambers for the general policy of the government and individually for their personal acts," says the law. The keys of authority were confided, not to the President, who was elected for seven years, but to a Cabinet responsible to the popular Chamber. France thus became for the first time, what England had been since the Glorious Revolution, a strict parliamentary democracy, "more parliamentary even, as the French contend, than England itself,

since, whereas at Westminster the Cabinet controls the Parliament, in Paris the relations are reversed."

The French President's position resembled that, of the constitutional monarch ; one of ceremonial representation of the state ; without real power other than that which might flow from his personality, his powers of suggestion or advice which the ministers might listen or not.

In short, in 1875 France had a constitution more democratic than that of England or the United States, in both of which the popularly elected Chamber encountered serious checks.

Significance of the Franco-Prussian War

The Franco-Prussian War inaugurated a period in a sense in which no other war since Waterloo had done. It was in a different class from the war of 1854, of 1859, of 1864, or of 1866.

The Franco-Prussian war brought about important and far-reaching results in its train :

(a) The war completed political unification of Germany under Prussian leadership for which Bismarck had waged three wars, and for which revolutionaries of 1848, thinkers and writers, poets, philosophers and historians had all in their different ways prayed or worked. (b) The war transferred from France to Germany the political ascendancy over Europe which the former, with only passing interruptions, had exercised for well beyond two centuries. (c) Alsace—Lorraine "Reichsland"—stood in the way of establishing friendly relations between France and Germany which was the most profound question for Western civilization during all the years from 1870 to 1914. Alsace-Lorraine remained throughout this period the unhealed wound in the side of France, from which it was torn. Frenchmen continued to dream of the recovery of the lost provinces as an end impossible perhaps of achievement—for there was no misjudgment now of the vast strength of Germany—but nevertheless and ardently to be desired. It was not a thing to be talked of, but it was a constant element in public feeling, a dominant motive in policy, a dark cloud full of menace for the future. In other words, the annexation of the provinces left in France a demand for vengeance which was not satisfied, and a sense of injury which was not relieved until more than forty years later a greater war restored the ceased lands to France. (d) This was brought about the end Bonapartism

(attachment to Bonaparte's dynasty or policy). In the disasters of the war Second French Empire fell to the ground which was the culmination of a general Imperial enfeeblement which had set in ten years earlier. (e) As a result of this War Italy had completed her unification by seizing the city of Rome, thus terminating the temporal rule of the Pope. The Pope had been supported there by a French garrison. This was withdrawn as a result of the battle of Sedan and the troops of Victor Emmanuel attacked the Pope's own troops, defeated them after a slight resistance and entered Rome on September 20, 1870. The unity of Italy was now consummated and Rome became the Capital of united Italy. (f) As a result of this War Russia tore up the Black sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856) which excluded her armaments from the Black sea. This unilateral abrogation of the Treaty by Russia was yet another serious blow to the "Concert of Europe" and was the prelude to an important political development in the tragic chaos of the Balkans⁹. (g) The War because of the singular completeness of the Victor's success (he not only won all his objects in six months but covered the whole of his military expenses by the war indemnity) gave the world a new conception of war's possibility as an instrument of policy under highly—organised conditions. (h) The War led speedily to the adoption of nation-wide military conscription by all powers because of the defeat of France's professional army by conscript reservists of Prussia, which was a triumph of a particular system.

9. See Part I pp. 297-93.

Europe in the New Era

A new era in the history of Europe was initiated by the Franco-Prussian War. Let us examine the condition of various countries of Europe, including Britain, during that era. (We have already examined under Chapter II the condition of France in that period).

Britain : Britain in the new era was growing in wealth, reaping the rich fruit of Cobdenite Policy. She had retreated within her own house from the freakish bluster of Palmerston, and her statesmen were engaged chiefly in attempting to set that house in better order. In 1867, Disraeli had taken the famous "leap in the dark", when by the Reform Act, he further democratized the franchise of 1832. In her materially splendid isolation, Britain enjoyed the spectacle provided by the two strangely contrasted, gladiators, Disraeli and Gladstone¹; she made *obiter dicta* (casual remarks) upon the affairs of Europe; she benevolently welcomed Germany and Italy into the comity of nations; she frowned on the chauvinist French; she deplored protected, and exploited Turkey; she detested and feared Russia; but for the rests she was content with her modest position as a little island lying off the coast of Europe, with a colonial empire several times the size of Europe and a

1. To understand the pre-eminence of Disraeli and Gladstone, one must appreciate the paramount interest which the English public took in Parliamentary proceedings. In the seventies of the last century, there were no film stars, no football champions, no speed supermen, no male or female orators, no tennis heroes for heroines even cricket did not attract much notice. The people's daily fluctuations of excitement of expectancy, of hero worship which are dissipated now over these and many other fields, were concentrated then upon the House of Commons. Parliamentary speeches were reported prominently and at length in all newspapers; they were read aloud and discussed in homes and public houses.

mission—in Gladstone's words—to carry "the light of civilization and the blessings that depend upon it to the more backward and less significant regions of the world". That mission involved her in an almost continuous succession of imperial wars, great and small, beyond Europe ; and brought her to the verge of armed conflict with Russia, France and Germany in turn. But for fifty eight years from 1856 to 1914, she contrived to maintain her imperial preserve isolated from the main policies of the Continental Powers. During the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, she began acutely to realize that such isolation, far from being splendid, was delusive and dangerous indeed, ultimately impossible. She then gradually reverted to that policy which had been the condition of her success as a colonizing Power, namely the maintenance of political equilibrium amongst the great Powers of Europe which gave her the balance of power, as the make-weight in their opposing combinations.

Germany²

In January 1871, through the agency of Bismarck the German Empire—"the most disturbing factor in the modern world" (Perris)—had come into existence. "By reason of its great and growing economic resources, its military might, its large population, its considerable strategic advantages in the new Europe of railways and heavy industries, Germany was the new colossus in Europe. Stretching in a continuous mass from the Vosges to the Vistula, and from the Baltic to the Danube, it pressed upon all its neighbours with relentless economic and political force.

Europe was thus confronted in 1871 with a great military empire, founded upon absolutist principles. The Emperor's power rested, like the Czar's, not upon the popular will, but upon the command of the army. In 1910, William II declared in a public speech "Looking upon myself as the instrument of the Lord, regardless of the views and opinions of the hour. I go my way" again. "There is but one master in this country—it is I and will brook no other."

The numbers of the army on a peace footing were fixed at one per cent of the population of Germany, at which they remained until 1911, when she finally set out to court "world power or decadence".

2. See Part I, Chapter XX and XXI.

Russia³

Russia appeared in the new era as an aggregation of semi-barbarous races, exploited by an irresponsible autocrat, who maintained himself by means of a predatory nobility, corrupt bureaucracy, a medieval church, and a professional army, whose training completely alienated it from the people from which it was recruited. This amorphous power was in hostile contact with Britain in its territorial expansion, endemically suspicious of Austria-Hungary, and bitterly hostile to Turkey for racial and religious reasons. With the new German Empire alone was Russia friendly for dynastic and diplomatic reasons and this friendship was to survive only till the Congress of Berlin (1878), after which the revival of French and the new orientation of German policy slowly but surely generated that massed antagonism at the two groups of European peoples, which inevitably resulted in the great cataclysm of 1914.

Austria—Hungary⁴

The patch-work empire of Francis Joseph entered the new era as a dual monarchy and remained under the domination of the inflexible and warlike Magyars until its dismemberment in 1919.

Italy⁵

The effacement of France in the Franco Prussian War was turned to good account by Italy which gained possession of Rome. The unity of Italy was now consummated and Rome became the capital of united Italy.

Europe in 1871

In 1871, Europe thus embraced three first class powers, Britain, Germany and Russia ; one anomalous power, the Dual Monarchy of Austria—Hungary, a precarious survival from the age of dynastic imperialism ; one temporarily degraded power, France ; one incipient power, Italy ; three decadent powers, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey ; and several nascent small powers in the Balkans and elsewhere. European society was then in an utterly unstable condition. Each of its separate State was internally in a different stage of evolution in terms of citizenship and the sanction of its sovereign authority. Britain was the most highly developed, whilst Russia was the least developed in this regard.

3. See Part I, Chapter XII and XXIV.

4. See Part I, Chapter XXIII.

5. See Part I, Chapter XIX,

Evolution and Nature of the European State System

With such a brief review of the condition of the countries of Europe in the new era let us turn to examine the evolution and nature of the European State system.

The two dominating forces acting on the mind of Europe during the nineteenth century had been Nationality and Liberty. For half a century after the French Revolution their respective influence was confused, as the words and actions of the leaders of 1848 show. But gradually thereafter these two forces became clearly distinguished. The idea of liberty became embodied in a doctrine of the state as the expression of the will of the majority of its members by the machinery of a constitution, which distributed political power with an increasing approximation to general equality—in short, the forms of democracy. On the other hand, the idea of nationality had earlier assumed the concrete form of the territorial state, self-contained within defined boundaries, which regulated the consolidated interests of its members.

Once the sovereign authority was clearly defined, the united energy of the national state was directed to the increase of its wealth and power. In so far as statesmen become occupied with the further development of this Leviathan—the territorial national state—they neglected two fundamental problems: The equitable distribution of political power and of wealth amongst its various classes and individuals; and the proper regulation of its relations with other national states. The neglect of the first of these problems gave rise to the new doctrine of socialism which from 1848, under the influence of Marx and Engels⁶ became necessarily opposed to the preoccupation of statesmen with the policy of national aggrandizement. The neglect of the second has meant that the relations of States rest entirely upon force—explicit in war, implicit in diplomacy. Before the end of the nineteenth century national patriotism had become a menace to human welfare. No conception of international justice prevailed. No single state is responsible for this condition; no single state is exempt from the responsibility.

6. Both Marx and Engels were of Jewish origin, life-long friends and most intimate co-workers who agitated for nearly forty years. The three basic principles of Marxian Socialism were: The economic or materialistic interpretation of history, the class struggle, and the inevitable social revolution. Another cardinal teaching of Marx is that the economic movement is not national, but international. The labourers of a given country have far more in common with the labourers of other countries, than they have with the capitalists of their own. All socialists are brothers, whereas not all Germans or Frenchmen or Americans are. All are "Comrades". Class interests have precedence over national interests. The proletarian has no country, only a birth place. "Working men of all countries, unite" such are the closing words of the Manifesto of 1848.

Domestic Policy of Bismarck

Introduction

As noticed in the earlier Chapter, the mutual relations of the states in the period under review were determined by certain universally accepted considerations, *viz.* that the sovereign state existed for the competitive increase of its wealth and power, that between states there was no justice, but only the shifting balance of interests; that the political, social and economic conditions of individuals and classes—groups of individuals—throughout Europe were subordinated to the cumulative or dominant interests of the sovereign states to which they belonged.

Of the continental powers Germany the newest was much the strongest after 1871 when judged by these tests, and in her Chancellor, Bismarck,¹ she possessed the supreme exponent of that "*Real politik*" (practical politics) by which the affairs of nations were and still largely are determined.

Bismarck had settled the internal political question by successfully deflecting the liberal movement² but he was confronted by certain economic, religious, and social difficulties, which required solution before he could elaborate that diplomatic system by which he dominated the Continent for a generation.

(A) Economic difficulties and their solution by Bismarck

The huge French indemnity³ proved in the beginning a "Greek Gift" (a treacherous gift—from Virgil's *Aeneid*⁴, ii. 49) which dislo-

1. See Part I, p.p. 259-260

2. See Part I, p. 246

3. See p. 13 *supra*

4. *Aeneid* is an epic poem, the hero of which is Aeneas.

cated German finance. In 1871, Germany was still predominantly an agricultural, and, therefore, comparatively a poor country⁵. The cheapening of money and the reckless speculation of mushroom companies resulted in a national crisis in 1873-74. The inflation of these years under the prevailing system of practically free trade impoverished the Prussian squirarchy which politically controlled Germany, Bismarck, therefore, decided to abandon the Cobdenite principle, which like most other leading British ideas, had hitherto held sway.

Bismarck and the policy of Protection

The following considerations led Bismarck to give up the policy of Free Trade and adopt that of protection.

(a) *To assist German trade*—Upto 1879 Bismarck's financial measures had been based on Free Trade. But great injury had been done to German trade and agriculture by foreign competition and grave commercial crises occurred in 1873-74, and in the iron trade in 1876. Bismarck felt that Germany "was bleeding to death" under Free Trade. He ascribed the recent development of American industry to protection, and considered that Britain now advocated free trade, which was really the right of the most powerful, only because she had already by protection made herself the most powerful commercial nation in the world.

(b) *To secure Imperial revenue*—Some customs duties had been used for imperial purposes but these proved inadequate and were supplemented by payments from individual states which were raised by direct taxation. The Empire had in consequence to "beg at the door of the states".

Bismarck disliked direct taxation; he feared that recent increases in the contributions of individual states might cause discontent with the new constitution, and thought that the increase in emigration from Germany to the U.S.A. was partly due to resentment at the increase of direct taxes. He asserted that failure to pay taxes led to one million cases of distraint (seizure of goods for non-payment of rent or rates) every year.

(c) *To meet cost of social reforms*—Bismarck hoped that a protective system would not only assist trade and meet imperial requirements but also enable him to meet the cost of his new scheme of social reform.⁶

5. Although in 1871 Germany's population exceeded that of England, her total for trade was less than £ 300 million against £ 500 million of England.

6. See p. 33 *infra*

Germany Adopts the Policy of Protection

Germany hitherto a free trade state became protectionist. In adopting the principle of protection, Bismarck was not influenced, he asserted, by the theories of economists, but by his own observation of facts. In his speech of May 2, 1879, in which he introduced his protection policy, he said that he did not propose to discuss protection and free trade in the abstract. "We hitherto" he said, owing to our policy of the 'Open door' been the dumping—ground for the over-production of other countries. It is this, in my opinion, that he depressed prices in Germany, that had prevented the growth of our industries, the development of our economic life. Let us but close the door, let us raise the somewhat higher barrier which I am now proposing, and see to it that at least we preserve for German industry, the same market which we are now good-naturedly allowing foreigners to exploit...If the dangers of protection were as great as they are pointed by enthusiastic free traders, France would have been a ruined and impoverished country long ago, because of the theories of Colbert.....For the abstract teachings of science in this connection I care not a straw. I base my opinion on experience, the experience of our own time. I see that the protectionist countries are prospering, that free-trade countries are retrograding.

Bismarck believed that Germany must become rich in order to be strong ; that she could only become rich by manufactures ; and that she could have manufactures only by giving them protection. The prodigious expansion of German industry after 1880 is regarded as a vindication by this policy.⁷

7. Germany's amazing success in her industrialization was also due to the fact that she was almost a century behind. Britain in this matter—she could thus profit from mistakes and growing pains of the British economy. Furthermore, she was able to start her modernization with more highly perfected machinery and thus avoid some of the problems of obsolescence.

Besides Germany was endowed richly with national resources. In the enormous coal deposits of the Rhineland—Westphalia district entering in the Rur Basin, and in the large coal areas of Silesia, she had almost the coal wealth of England. An addition there are rich lignite deposits in central Germany. In iron ore she has not been so favoured but the iron deposits of Silesia and of the Saar area are important. After the annexation of Lorraine in 1871 her position was much improved, and conditions became even more favourable as science developed techniques for the extraction of low-grade ores. In other minerals notably potash, Germany was relatively fortunate as well.

Protective Measures

A low duty on imported corn, increased later, assisted agriculture and an import duty on foreign goods protected manufactures. By the Protective Tariff Bill of 1879, Bismarck encompassed the Empire with a high tariff wall against the foreign imports to protect the German farm products and domestic manufactures. The result of this Protective Tariff was that the "infant industries were protected, the royal treasury was filled, and a great impetus was given to the industrial development of the country."

Germany's Economic Development

Between 1871 and 1906 Germany became a great industrial state and the development of industry led to the growth of large towns, and changed Germany from a poor into a rich country; from 1891 to 1906 the value of German trade increased from about £ 300 million to £ 700 million. The story is not quite so rosy on the agricultural side of the German economy although there was progress in the area too owing to protection which greatly assisted the growth of German manufactures.

From 1871 to 1906 the demand for coal rose five times; the production of pig-iron increased ten fold⁸, between 1900 and 1906 German merchant shipping increased 62% and capital invested in shipping was more than doubled. The amount of exports and imports increased enormously.

Comments on Germany's Phenomenal Economic Development

In view of Germany's prodigious economic development, from a pariah land-will-behind her western neighbours, she became an industrial giant exceeded only by the U.S.A. Probably there is no similarly rapid development recorded in history. The only parallels are Japan at about the same period, and the Soviet Union after 1927. This amazing development brought, however, a whole train of problems to Germany as the industrial revolution did in all other countries, problems by no means yet resolved either in Germany or elsewhere.

8. Germany managed to overtake Britain in steel production between 1890 and 1900 and in pig-iron output in the following decade, while France and Belgium were left trailing pitifully behind.

Growth of Population of Germany

A measure of the industrial growth is the growth of the population. During forty years (from 1871 to 1910) the population of Germany increased by more than half,⁹ from just over forty million to almost sixty-five million.¹⁰ Most of the growth was in the towns and cities. In 1871, almost thirty-one per cent of Germans lived in towns; by 1910 fully 60 per cent did. This enormously rapid growth of big cities led in Germany as elsewhere to the introduction of new and serious problems. Perhaps the most urgent was to provide housing for the new arrivals. The industrial slum, with its human tragedy, came into being, in spite of efforts to control the problem, and great building enterprises, the lot of the worker was abject. There were also problems of education, health, and sanitation, recreation parks and transportation, which had to be faced very boldly and suddenly.

Spread of Socialism in Germany

The growth of the industrial proletariat in Germany, as elsewhere, was an important cause of spread of socialism in Germany. As was to be expected there was witnessed a booming membership of the Social Democratic Party¹¹ in Germany which assumed political importance. Bismarck, however, had a weapon up his sleeves to deal effectively with this Party¹².

Industrialization of Germany—An Important Factor Increasing International Tensions Leading to World War I

The industrialization of Germany had far-reaching consequences in political and international spheres. To begin with the vastly increased industrial wealth of the most energetic and intelligent nation in Europe gave to its real ruler—Bismarck—a valuable diplomatic lever.

9. Contrast this with France which between 1876 and 1911 moved from about thirty-seven million to thirty-nine and a half million.

10. During the mid-nineteenth century there was a steady drain on the German population, caused by emigration to the U.S.A. and to South America. By the end of the century this stream was reduced to a trickle, because German industry was able to absorb the increasing population. In fact, by the beginning of the twentieth century Germany actually experienced a labour shortage and came to depend upon transient foreign labour in harvest time.

11. See pp. 33 *infra*

12. See pp. 34 *infra*

By 1890, when Bismarck quitted the German political scene Germany's whole life had been completely changed. In fact the Germany of 1871 was almost legendry to the Germans of 1890. Germany was no longer the backward, step child of the preceding two centuries. She was non-fully competent to compete and keep up with the other great nations of the world. Indeed she was actively doing it. She became a serious industrial rival of Britain and the U.S.A. and thereby a thorn by their side. This fact is important to the understanding of the international tensions leading to World War I.

B. Religious Difficulties Confronting the New German Empire

The German Chancellor was not so successful in his handling of the religious difficulties connected with the so-called "Kulturkampf"¹³ (said by Virchow in 1873 of the conflict between Bismarck and the Catholic Church.) This fierce religious conflict assumed dimensions and tore the new German Empire for quite a number of years, almost immediately on its establishment.

The immediate cause of the conflict was the proclamation by the Vatican Council in 1870 of the new dogma of Papal infallibility, the dogma that the Pope cannot err "when he defines *ex-cathedra* (from the Pope's throne in the Consistory, and in virtue of his apostolic authority any doctrine of faith or morals," a dogma that shocked, liberals under the all-pervading influence of modern scientific spirit, and that seemed to politicians to assert that the Pope was superior to all rulers and had a claim upon the loyalty of the faithful superior to that of their temporal rulers. The conflict between the Church and the State thus began over the new claims put forth by the Papacy in connection with the Declaration of Infallibility in 1870.

In the Vatican Council the German bishops had opposed the new dogma but to no effect, being in a minority. It was now required that all bishops and priests should subscribe to the new dogma; the large majority did so without a demur, but some refused. A leading opponent was Dollinger, a distinguished professor and theologian. When asked to explain the dogma in his university of Munich, he openly attacked the very basis on which it had been proclaimed. "As a Christian, a theologian, an historian and a

13 "Kulturkampf" literally means the war of culture.

citizen I cannot accept this doctrine," he declared. Just to give an idea of the prevailing religious sentiments, it may be mentioned that the Munich University elected Dollinger as its Rector in view of the opinions on the new doctrine held and expressed by him.

Dollinger and his followers had formed Old Catholic Communion which seemed likely to develop into a German Catholic Church independent of the Papacy. Three hundred Old German Communion were represented at a congress held at Munich, (September 22, 1871).

The Catholic bishops and other Catholic professors and teachers who had joined the Old Catholic movement were excommunicated and deprived of their positions as priests or teachers under orders from the Pope. People were forbidden to attend worship in Churches where they officiated, students to attend the lectures of such professors. The Catholics thereupon appealed to the imperial and state governments for protection. The German Government which did not approve of the Vatican Decrees refused to sanction the dismissal of old Catholic teachers.

Bismarck's Attitude

Believing firmly in the omnipotence of the state, Bismarck had long held that the Catholic Church exercised too much power in the Catholic sections of Germany (Catholics constituted one-third of the German population). Moreover, he suspected that Papal Infallibility was the first gun fixed in a Catholic campaign for even greater freedom of the Church from state's supervision, Bismarck was averse to the existence of the Church as a state within the state (*imperium in imperio*).

The bishops protested against the action of the government in not sanctioning the dismissal of the Old Catholic teachers.

Thus the "Kulturkampf" began as a conflict about the limits of Church authority.

A religious war was shortly in progress which grew more bitter every year.

There now ensued a ding-dong battle, keenly contrasted with rapid alternations of success, between Bismarck and the Pope.

December, 1871.—The Reichstag limited the right of the clergy to discuss political questions in their sermons (The Pulpit Paragraph*).

1872.—Pope Pius IX refused to accept as German ambassador to the Papal court Cardinal Hohenlohe who had tried to induce the governments of Europe to prevent the passing of the Varican Decrees.

May 14, 1872.—Bismarck, speaking on the Pope's action declared "Have no fear—to Canossa we shall not go, either in body or spirit", recalling the abject submission of Emperor Henry IV to Pope Gregory on that historic spot in 1077. It was in the course of a debate in the Diet upon the Pope's action that Bismarck spurred into defiance by the encouragement of our almost united assembly used those famous words which were not to return to him void.

Protestant Germany was jubilant and inscribed the words upon many tablets in its public places.

The Pope on his part protested against the persecution of the Catholic Church in Germany.

The Breach with Rome

July, 1872.—The Jesuits were expelled from Germany.

December, 1872.—The German ambassador was recalled from the Vatican and diplomatic relations with the Pope were broken off.

Falk or May Laws

Of all legislation enacted during the struggle, the Falk or May laws of the Prussian legislature were the most important (passed in May of three successive years, 1873, 1874, 1875).¹⁴

The Laws of May, 1873 forbade public excommunication; referred appeals from ecclesiastical decisions to lay tribunals; priests were required to obtain their education no longer in ecclesiastical seminaries; required theological students to take a course in general knowledge in the schools of the state; ordered Church appointments to be notified to the civil authority, and gave the state a veto over them.

14. These laws were carried in the Prussian legislature by Falk, Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Instruction (Kultus minister).

The Laws of May, 1874.—Owing to the failure of bishops to notify appointments such failure was made punishable and provision was made for the administration of vacant bishoprics.

1874.—Obligatory civil marriage was established for the German Empire by imperial decree, the ecclesiastical ceremony becoming purely optional. It was done to reduce the power that priests could exercise by refusing to marry a Catholic and a Protestant and now even Old Catholics.¹⁵ A number of Catholic bishops and clergy were imprisoned for refusing to comply with this law. Pope Pius IX issued the *Bull Quod Nun Quam* which declared the recent laws against the clergy invalid. To enforce them the Government resorted to new laws passed in May 1875. These laws withheld the payment of salaries to bishops and clergy who refused to submit ; dissolved all monasteries in Prussia ; abolished the privileges granted to the clergy by the constitution of 1850.¹⁶

Political Aspect of the 'Kulturkampf'

Bismarck was all for these measures on the ground that the contest was political, not religious, that there must be no state within the state, no power considering itself superior to the established authorities. The state must be lay. Moreover, he considered that the whole movement was conducted by those opposed by German unity. He considered that the unity of the Empire was endangered by the federalism of the centre the Catholic Party in German. He rescued the union of the Centre (the Catholic party in Germany) with the Poles and Alsace-Lorrainers, who were avowed opponent of the empire. But whatever his own views were he received strong support from Protestants who hated Rome, as well as from those who advocated the unqualified assertion of the authority of the state over the church.

Failure of the "Kulturkampf"

Bismarck's policy failed, partly owing to the unswerving hostility of Pius IX but mainly because of the stubborn resistance of German

15. Old Catholic, a body that broke away from the Roman Catholic Church in Germany in opposition to the dogma of Papal Infallibility proclaimed by the Vatican Council in 1870.

16. The Prussian Constitution of 1850 had given a large measure of independence to the Catholic Church, including the control of the clergy and the directing religious instruction in primary schools.

Catholics. Imprisonment failed to weaken the opposition of bishops and clergy. In more than a thousand parishes in Prussia, all religious services were suspended and churches closed. There was no priest to baptize or to marry. Eight out of the twelve bishoprics were vacant. The national life was more and more troubled and the end was not being accomplished. Indeed the resistance of the Catholics only stiffened under what they called this "Diocletian persecution". In the elections of 1877 the Centre (the Catholics party) succeeded in returning ninety-two members and was the largest party in the Reichstag. It was evident that the policy of persecution was a failure.

Moreover the Prussian conservatives opposed the "Kulturkampf"; there was strong opposition to the court, the Emperor was lukewarm, the Empress Augusta definitely hostile.

The End of the "Kulturkampf"

Bismarck realising that the "Kulturkampf" had failed, and desiring to secure new supporters in the Reichstag instead of National Liberals, decided to turn a new leaf. In his eyes other questions of economic and social character were becoming prominent and he wished to be free to handle them. Particularly requiring attention, in his opinion, and that of William I was a new and more menacing party, the Socialist. The death of Pius IX in 1878, and the election of Leo XIII, a more conciliatory and diplomatic Pope, facilitated the change of policy. The only way to placate his Catholic adversaries was to withdraw the anti-clerical legislation. Act on act was therefore cancelled in gradual stages until ten years after the "Kulturkampf" had begun, practically nothing remained of the anti-Catholic laws save obligatory civil marriage.

To put it briefly, the stubborn resistance of the great body of German Catholics and of the Centre, his growing fear of socialism and the loss of the support of most of the National Liberals, had made Bismarck "go to *Canossa*". But the tact of Leo XIII had alleviated the discomforts of the journey.

In return for the conciliatory attitude towards the Catholics measures Bismarck gained the support of the Centre for his confrontation with the Socialists.

The religious conflict lasted fifteen years and was fierce and active during five. Bismarck, who had the elastic mind of a creative statesman, recognized that he could not coerce the church and that he must beat a retreat, and thereby won over the Centre by abolishing most of the May Laws.

Permanent Result of the "Kulturkampf"

The only permanent result of the "Kulturkampf" was to consolidate and strengthen the Centre or Catholic party which was henceforth for many years the strongest party in Protestant Germany. Bismarck's fears in regard to this party proved on the whole groundless, for, although it often exploited political openings afforded by the purely opportunist policy of Bismarck and succeeding Chancellors, the Centre Party in the Reichstag consistently ranged itself with the Conservative "Right."

(C) Bismarck and Socialism

William I and Bismarck rightly saw in the Social Democratic party founded by Lassalle¹⁷ and built by Liebknecht and Bebel upon the Marxian doctrines the natural enemy of the absolutist empire.¹⁸ Liebknecht and Bebel had opposed the North German Confederation, the war with France, the annexing of Alsace and Lorraine. The socialists expressed openly and freely their entire opposition to the existing order in Germany. It was only a question of time when they must clash violently with the man who had helped so powerfully to create that order, and whose life-work henceforth was to consolidate it.

Stringent and Oppressive Measures against the Socialists

Bismarck, naturally enough, was all for making unremitting war upon the socialists, and he was looking for an opportunity to open his broadside against them. He found a convenient occasion to do so after two attempts upon the life of the aged emperor (the first on

17. Lassalle was the founder of National Socialism as Marx was the founder of International Socialism. A champion of the toiling masses, Lassalle was in one sense the founder of the Social Democratic Party. Lassalle like Marx was a Jew.

18. William I regarded Socialism as his personal enemy and considered himself commissioned by God to combat it. Again, the Socialist Party was radically democratic (it was called Social Democratic Party) and Bismarck hated democracy. Both of them therefore considered the party as their enemy.

May 11, and the second on June 2, 1878) had been made which were attributed to his adversaries. Bismarck determined to use this opportunity to crush them irreparably.

In October 1878, a law of great severity, intended to stamp out completely all socialist propaganda, was passed by the Imperial Parliament. It forbade all associations, meetings, and publications having for their object "the subversion of the social order" or in which "socialistic tendencies" should appear. It authorized the police to seize socialist papers and to prohibit or break up socialist meetings. It empowered the government to proclaim Martial Law, which meant that, as far as socialists were concerned, the ordinary courts would cease to protect individual liberties. The law was twice re-enacted and remained in force until 1890. It was severely enforced¹⁹. As Headlam points out, "we find the (German) Government again having recourse to the same means of checking and guarding opinion which Metternich had used fifty years before". The anti-socialist law failed miserably to realize the aims of its sponsors. There was witnessed the "Kulturkampf" once again with a different caste of characters. Persecution of the socialists as that of the Roman Catholics, only made them more resolute and active. Socialist agitation denied the right of public utterance went underground, and won the added attraction, which results from martyrdom, with the result that the Social Democratic Party steadily and rapidly increased. In 1884, the socialist vote numbered 549,000 ; in 1887, 763,000 ; in 1890, 1,427,000, resulting in the election of thirty-five members to the Reichstag. The socialists came out of their contest with Bismarck with a popular and parliamentary vote increased three-fold.

State Socialism

Since socialism flourished in spite of repression, the German government, exactly as in case of "Kulturkampf," came to see the futility of its measures. Bismarck, however, had a second string to his bow. If repressive measures were of no avail, why not gain the ends by adopting a stratagem of reducing the socialists by the bold

19. According to an estimate, during the period the law was in operation, 1,400 publications were suppressed, 1,500 persons were imprisoned and 900 banished. The law forbade the reading the works of Lassalle, for instance, even in a public library.

experiment of adopting some of their own weapons. In fact, Bismarck had at no time intended to rest content with merely repressive measures. He had proposed from the beginning to effect such sweeping reforms in the conditions of the working classes that they would see that the state was their true benefactor, and would rally around it, leaving the Socialist Party stranded, and with no further *raison d'être* (reason for existence). In the very year when the anti-socialist law was enacted, he observed in the Reichstag, "I will further every endeavour which positively aims at improving the condition of the working classes", and he promised to consider "any positive proposal" coming from the socialists "for fashioning the future in a sensible way". In this he and William I were in entire accord, as they had *not* been in the "Kulturkampf." The Emperor in opening the Reichstag in 1879, said "A remedy cannot alone be sought in the repression of socialistic agitation, there must be simultaneously the positive advancement of the welfare of the working classes. And here the case of those work-people who are incapable of earning their own livelihood is of the greatest importance". Two years later (March 8, 1881) he returned to the theme, and said : "that the State should interest itself to a greater degree than hitherto in those of its members who need assistance, is not only a duty of humanity and Christianity — with which state institutions should be permeated — but a duty of state-preserving policy, whose aim should be to cultivate the conception — and that, too, among the non-propertied classes, which form at once the most numerous and the least instructed part of the population — that the State is not merely a necessary but a benevolent institution. These classes must, by the evident and direct advantages which are secured to them by legislative measures, be led to regard the State, not as an institution contrived for the protection of the better classes of society, but as one serving their own needs and interests." Bismarck endorsing these sentiments of William I further said in 1884. "The whole matter centres in the question : Is it the duty of the state or is it not, to provide for its helpless citizens ? I maintain that it is its duty, that it is the duty not only of the Christian state.....but of every state".

Bismarck proposed to improve the condition of the working classes by an elaborate and comprehensive system of insurance against the misfortunes and vicissitudes of life, against sickness, accident, old age and incapacity. He, therefore, introduced the famous Pension

and Insurance Laws. The Reichstag instituted insurance against illness in 1883, against accident in 1884, and against old age and invalidation in 1889. In passing these laws, Bismarck was actuated by his desire that any workingman incapacitated in any of these ways should not be exposed to the possibility of becoming a pauper, but receive a pension from the state". His policy was called State Socialism. In his own words, his aim was to "give the workingman the right of employment as long as he has health, assure him care when he is sick, and maintenance when he is old".

Bismarck wished to have the state bear the entire expense of implementing the system of insurance, without in any way putting an additional financial burden on the working people who were already living hand to-mouth and finding it hard to keep body and soul together. But he was not able to secure the consent of the Reichstag to his proposal. The Reichstag gave as reasons for its opposition the enormous amount of money required, the great centralization of power in the hands of the Government which would arise from a system requiring so many officials and handling such large sums, and the weakening of the sense of self-reliance and personal responsibility with the workingmen.

As finally enacted in the case of accident insurance, the employers were to bear the burden alone. The employer was obliged by law to insure his employees, entirely at his own expense. In the case of sickness insurance, as a rule, the employer must pay one-third and the employee two-thirds of the premium, and in the case of the old age and incapacity insurance, the premiums were to be paid by the employers, the employees, and, to some extent, by the state.

Such was Bismarck's contribution to the solution of the pressing social problem which confronted him. In this matter he was a pioneer. His ideas have been studied widely in other countries, and his example followed in some. Dawson in *Bismarck and State Socialism* calls him for every good reason "the first social reformer of the century".

Bismarck, one changed with changing his opinions to meet the occasion, reported that he had frequently his opinions under changed circumstances. "But I have been faithful to this : the unification of Germany, under the leadership of Prussia. Everything else is acces-

sory". There cannot be two opinions on the point that this system of state insurance by relieving the mental and physical distress of millions of German labourers would strengthen the Empire, as well as benefit humanity, were in his opinion, an additional reason for its adoption."

Comments on Bismarck's State Socialism

Bismarck endeavoured by state action to show that the State was "not only necessary but benevolent". He "accepted the capitalist system of industry and the division of society into rich and poor as a natural and permanent arrangement, but considered it the duty of the state to better the condition of the working people by special laws."

To Bismarck Socialism of the State, controlled by a powerful monarch, was one thing ; Socialism carried through by the people believing in a democratic government, opposed to the existing order in government and society, a very different thing.

The remarkable experiment in State Socialism enumerated above, which belong to the latest years of Bismarck's Chancellorship were extended and elaborated under William II (1888-1918), and the application what Bismarck called "social oil"—(a) the improvement of industrial housing, (b) the grant of regular annual holidays, (c) the indoctrination of the working class through the system of national education, etc ; (d) the amazing expansion of German industry which provided continuous employment, went a long way towards developing in Germany one of the most vigorous bodies of workmen to be found in the world.

One Last Word

Liberals viewed with alarm the extension of state interference ; the insurance laws "mitigated the keenness of social discontent", but socialism continued to spread and the working classes did not, in gratitude, give the government the support which Bismarck had hoped to secure. In other words, through the wage-earners greatly profited from the insurance enactment, they did not have the least inclination to give up their antagonism to the conservative state or to abandon the social Democratic Party.

The Socialists, however, stood solidly behind the government in a national crisis. At the height of the Moroccan crisis in 1913, the spokesmen of the Socialist party in the Reichstag declared that, if Germany was attacked, every socialist would eagerly shoulder a rifle for her defence.

5

Foreign Policy of Bismarck

The mass of the German people became imbued during the second half of the nineteenth century with materialism, and the sense of the growth of an irresistible national power. They began to cherish under the direction of the controlling minority, a policy of "weltpolitik" (world politics), exercised by means of a cynical diplomacy, which would result in a great and, of course, victorious war. Such a war seemed desirable to many and inevitable to all. "If the first half of the nineteenth century" says Dawson, "witnessed in Germany, the reign of the spirit, and of ideas, the second witnessed the reign of matter, of things, and it is this latter sovereignty which is supreme today".

For this attitude of selfish and cynical materialism, Bismarck is largely responsible. He made it the basis of his diplomacy in Germany until 1870, and in the affairs of Europe since he believed that statesmanship consists merely of the increase of national power, which can be measured and exercised only by military force. He imagined that the force so created could be constrained to peaceful ends; he said that since 1871 Germany was 'satiated' (feeling of having had too much) power; he assumed that its destiny and desires could be limited to the control of the Continent; until his hand was forced in 1884-85, he opposed colonial expansion.¹ Within Europe he sought to main-

1. Bismarck was opposed to a policy of colonial expansion, thinking that the pressing problem for Germany was internal consolidation, concentration not dispersion of effort. His main objects were to promote internal development of Germany and maintain peace.

tain supremacy by contriving military alliances under German hegemony, which should cōw other nations into an attitude of fearful peace. But he was merely completing the vicious circle of Machiavellian statescraft.

Leadership of Germany in Europe

The rapid consolidation of imperial Germany was registered in the development of Bismarck's foreign policy, which, within ten years made Germany the arbiter of the Continent. It must be remembered that Bismarck was essentially a diplomatist. His policy after 1871 was conducted upon diplomatic maxims, and was spasmodic and characteristically opportunist.

"A Fanatic for Peace"

If we accept Machiavellian principles upon which international relations have hitherto been based, we must regard Bismarck as their most successful exponent. He welded Germany in the furnace of internecine war, and tempered it in the flame of French jingoism, which he deliberately fanned in 1870. But he would never again submit Germany to the hazard of war.² "From 1871", says Gooch ("Recent Revelations") till his fall in 1890 Bismarck was the pillar of European peace".² Not only had he no desire to initiate further conflicts, but it was his strong arm alone which prevented Austria and Russia from flying at each other's throats.³

Isolation of France

Since France alone could never reverse the verdict of Sedan, Bismarck's policy was to keep her in quarantine (isolation) by understandings with all the other great powers. As pointed out by Gooch, "The governing principle of Bismarck's policy since 1871 was (a) to safeguard his conquests, and (b) to preserve the peace of Europe by keeping France in quarantine". The Emperor or William I watched the performance of his Chancellor with a mixture of admira-

2. Bismarck tried to preserve the peace of Europe not for the sake of Europe but for Germany.

3. Russia wished to break up the Turkish Empire and to secure Constantinople; Austria wanted to maintain the integrity of the Turkish empire, but to obtain Serbia and Salonicka. The policy of Russia and Austria in the Near East was irreconcilable, and, therefore, a potent source of antagonism to both the countries.

tion and terror. "I should not care to be in your skin" he remarked, "you are like a Japanese conjurer who keeps tossing five balls in the air and catches them every time".

To alleviate the mortification suffered by France at "the gap in the voses" (the loss of her frontier provinces of Alsace and Lorraine by the Treaty of Frankfurt, May 10, 1871), Bismarck condescendingly egged on France to a policy of colonial expansion, the ultimate significance of which he failed to foresee. It must be emphasised that in this matter he showed what he showed more frequently than is generally supposed, shortsightedness.

In France herself, Bismarck saw that a Bourbon or a Napoleon on the throne there would find far more sympathy and confidence at Vienna and St. Petersburg than the shifting chief of a Republic, and so he encouraged the Republican government in France.

Policy towards Russia and Austria

With Britain Bismarck maintained gruff friendliness. His main problem lay with Russia and Austria. With the former he tried to perpetuate the traditional amity of Prussian relations. His policy towards Austria was one of ingenious national selfishness. He despised and distrusted her; but "it was my object" he said, writing of the weeks after Koniggratz⁴, in view of our subsequent relations with Austria as far as possible to avoid cause for mortifying reminiscences, if it could be managed without prejudice to our German policy. If Austria were severely injured, she would become the ally of France, and of every opponent of ours" *Reflections*, II/41). So he wrote to his wife, he 'poured water into the foaming wine' of Prussian militarist ambition, and he finally induced the King "to bite this sour apple and accept so disgraceful a peace" which left Austrian territory and power practically intact⁵. From this point developed the situation which eventually led to the Great War in 1914 viz., the Central European rapprochement, which, with the revival of France, inevitably produced its counterpoise.

It is true that the Iron Chancellor sought and ensued peace in his own time; but his policy could not stand still after his fall, and

4. The battle fought at Sadowa (Koniggratz) where the main Austrian army was defeated in the Austro-Prussian War (1866).

See Part I, p. 265

it is difficult to see that the catastrophe of 1914 was due any more to the mistakes of his successors than to the logical evolution of his own system.

Nightmare of Hostile Coalitions

In his later years Bismarck lived in constant dread of hostile coalitions, though these were the logical corollary to his own diplomacy. France could not be kept in disgraced isolation indefinitely. Before Bismarck's death she had created a new colonial empire second only to that of Britain in power and importance, which brought her back into the front rank of Great Powers. His policy of deliberate isolation, therefore, forced her into the arms of Russia.

Magyar's insolence inevitably involved "the ramshackle empire" of the Habsburgs⁶ and its allies in undying hostility with the southern slavs of the Balkans. Bismarck's declaration that "the Balkan question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier" was the self delusion of the man who in 1866 based his future foreign programme upon cooperation with Austria.

Again, Bismarck envisaged only a European policy. He drove French ambitions temporarily overseas. Meanwhile, German industry and commerce advanced at such a rate as to support an annual increase of population of three-fourth of a million. That commerce could be absorbed only by a world-market, in which Germany met France and Britain. German militarism was bound to be baptised. "Our future", declared the Emperor William II (1888-1918) the opening of the Kiel canal in 1895 "lies upon water". "Sea power is world power."

To Sum up the Basic Aims and Leading Features of Bismarck's Foreign Policy

The basic aims of Bismarck's foreign policy after 1871 were : (a) to safeguard and consolidate Germany's newly won position ; and (b) to preserve the peace of Europe. The realisation of these aims as Bismarck clearly saw it involved three conditions, namely : (a) the isolation of France ; (b) the (complete) cooperation of Austria ; (c) the complacency of Russia. The general abstention of Britain from European politics as long as a peaceful balance was maintained was assumed by Bismarck⁷.

6. See Part. I. p. 194

7. Details of how Bismarck seemed to have assured these three conditions will be discussed in Chapter, VII *infra*.

Leading Features of Bismarck's Foreign Policy

Despite definite snags in Bismarck's foreign policy—these have been pointedly brought out above—it was successful at least so long as he was in the saddle. That success was due to his extraordinary diplomatic skill. He saw clearly the end at which he aimed and made skilful use of the opportunities that arose to secure his ends. His piercing vision saw ends so clearly that the question of means often seemed unimportant. Inspired opportunism, clear perception, effective action were among the leading features of his policy which was never hampered by scruple. In one word, his policy was marked by masterly and unscrupulous opportunism.

If, as Rosebery said, "Napoleon was as great as a man be without virtue", we may say that Bismarck was as great a diplomatist as an unsentimental and violent patriot can be in the chaos of competitive nationalism.

6

The Eastern Question (1875-1878)

For one reason or another practically all the great powers of Europe, including Britain, were inextricably connected with the Balkans.¹ This being the case, the future of the Balkan peoples did not depend only on themselves, and their relations to one another and to Turkey ; but also in a great measure on the policy of the interested great powers. On the other hand, the relations of these powers to one another totally affected the course of events in the Balkan peninsula. It would have suited, for example, Austria and Britain to keep Turkey as strong as possible. Thereby the national aspirations of the Balkan races would have been kept within definite bounds, and the immediate control of the Straits would have remained in the hands of a State politically harmless, but predestined by its geographical position to guard this port against Russia as a matter of self-preservation.

It follows, therefore, that every local revolt in the Balkan states which inevitably hastened the disintegrating process in Turkey, and brought the great clash of interested powers within measurable distance, aroused European diplomacy to feverish activity and led to violent political and sometimes to military collisions. From this quarter at any moment the peace of Europe might be imperilled by circumstances impossible to foresee.

In 1875, one more such revolt took place in Herzegovina and Bosnia. As was to be expected, it sent its repercussions through the Balkans, Austria and Russia ; and produced the sympathetic ripples in Britain and France.

1. See Part I, Chapter XXII

The revolt was due to age-old causes : (a) the iniquitous tenure by which the Christians 'rayahis' held land from Mohammedan 'agas' (land-owners), (b) the vicious system of farming the taxes (to grant certain right in return for a portion of yield)—usually to Greeks and Jews, and (c) the failure of the harvest in 1874—in these circumstances always terrible calamity.

Serbia and Montenegro supported the rebels who also had four million sympathetic kinsmen accross Hungarian border.

The Andrassy Note

Andrassy, Minister of Austria—Hungary, recognised the need of immediate action ; and in consultation with Berlin and St. Petersburg he prepared a Note demanding of the Porte² (pronounced port), a redress of the worst abuses in the insurgent provinces.³ In agreement with Britain and France this Note was presented in January, 1875, at Constantinople, and the Porte ultimately promised to execute most of the proposed reforms. Of course such a promise without a sanction, was worthless, as the Turks, the insurgents, and the Continental diplomatists all knew. Turkish irregulars were being massed in threatened areas, and an outbreak of Mohammedan fanaticism throughout the Ottoman Empire reached a crisis in the murder at Salonica of the Prussian and French consult (May, 1876).

Disraeli Wrecked the Consort of Europe

A conference of the Minister of Germany, Austria Hungary, and Russia was assembled at Berlin, and a sterner note—the Berlin Memorandum—was prepared for despatch to Constantinople. The proposed reforms were to be executed by a mixed Commission under the lead of a Christian Herzegovinian and under the surveillance of representatives of the Concert of European Powers. The Memorandum was endorsed by every Power except Britain. So Disraeli destroyed the Concert of Europe, prompted (a) by the old distrust of Russia, (b) by bolstering Turkey in the interest of the Balance of Power, and (c) by the distracting influence of his new conception of British imperialism. (It was in this year that he had Queen

2. See Part I, p. 273, f.n.

3. The Andrassy Note demanded that the Sultan should recognise the equality before the law of Christians and Mohemmedans abolish tax-farming, use direct taxes for local purposes, favour the establishment of pleasant proprietors and institute a local assembly of Christians and Mohammedans in equal numbers to control the administration, and secure the execution of all reforms promised by the Sultan up to date.

Victoria crowned empress of India⁴, and by a brilliant stroke had bought the bankrupt Khedive Ismail's shares (£ 4½ million) in the French Suez Canal Company). The statesman who, according to Fyffe "thought the attempt to establish Italian independence a misdemeanour", and "listened to Bismarck's ideas on the future of Germany and described them as the vapourings of a German baron," was bound to misdirect the foreign policy of Britain, even if his only standard was her material and selfish interest. The Berlin Memorandum was not despatched. Instead, the British Mediterranean Fleet was sent to the entrance of the Dardanelles, where its presence could only mean that Britain lent her countenance to Ottoman savagery.

Quick Changes in the Succession in Turkey

Meanwhile, on May 29, 1876, the Sultan Abdul Aziz was deposed at the instigation of a band of fanatics, who proclaimed his nephew Murad V. But three months later, Murad, too, was spirited off unto captivity, where he died in 1904; and his place was taken by his brother, Abdul Hamid II—"Abdul the Damned", "the Red Sultan",—"the poisonous reptile", who cynically exploited the weaknesses and flouted the decencies of European civilization for thirty-two years, until he too was removed by a conspiracy of hypocrites in the "Young Turk" revolution of 1908. These rapid changes in Constantinople were due to a recrudescence of national and religious fanaticism in Turkey, to a feeling that Turkey should be for the Turks, that she should no longer be the sport of foreign powers, that she should control her own destinies without intervention.

The Bulgarian Atrocities

During these months the peasants of Bulgaria driven by the calculated inhumanity of Turkish officials and soldiery, rose in revolt, only to provoke a master-piece of bestiality. The revenge taken by the Turks was of incredible atrocity. According to the British Commissioner, Baring, during the month of May, 1876, 12,000 Bulgarian Christians were slain with unspeakable barbarity. At Batak alone 5,000 out of a population of 7,000 were destroyed.

4. Philip Guedalla has a caustic remark to make on this action of Disraeli—"Monarchs have often raised their ministers a step in the peerage, but what minister before Disraeli bestowed a step in the monarchy upon his own sovereign".

"When the terrified Christians to the number of over one thousand took refuge in the church, the Bashi-Bazouks (the Turkish Irregulars) fired through the windows, and getting upon the roof tore off the tiles, the threw burning rags dipped in petroleum among the helpless fugitives below". Only one old woman would seem to have escaped from within those desecrated walls; and when more than two months later, the British Commissioner visited the spot, the stench of the unburied corpses was overpowering. "In the streets at every step", wrote Baring, "lay human remains, here a skull of an old woman, there the false tress of some unhappy girl". All this after the Turkish commander had given his word of honour that not a hair of their heads would be touched.

The British Commissioner branded the Bulgarian atrocities as: "perhaps the most heinous crime that has stained the history of the present century".

Gladstone's "Bulgarian Horrors"

The British representatives at Constantinople at this time were pro-Turk, and were reluctant to believe ill of their friends. In England Disraeli for some time scouted the report, asserted that they were coffee-house babble", but when the correspondent of the "Daily News" exposed the facts, which Baring officially confirmed, a revulsion of horror swept England. Gladstone abandoning his biblical studies, and emerging from retirement, denounced "the unspeakable Turks" in a flaming pamphlet "Bulgarian Horrors". "Let the Turks", he wrote, "now carry away their abuses in the only possible way, viz. by carrying off themselves....One and all, bag and baggage shall, I hope, clear out from the provinces which they have desolated and profaned." Even the British Foreign Secretary, Derby, telegraphed to Constantinople that "any renewal of such outrages would prove more disastrous to the Porte than the loss of a battle," and admitted that "any sympathy which was previously felt in Britain for Turkey had been completely destroyed by the lamentable occurrences in Bulgaria". "The Jew and the Jockey" were execrated in England. A strong feeling arose against Disraeli's Turcophil policy; but the Conservatives were firmly entranced in Parliament, and Disraeli with a nonchalance which was certainly admirable, proceeded with his general policy, which, for the first time in his difficult career, was the expression of his own ideas.

International Conference at Constantinople (December, 1876)

In July, 1876 the Czar and the Austrian Emperor, with their ministers, met at Reichstadt, and agreed that, if Russia should free Bulgaria unaided, Austria should preserve benevolent neutrality, and in return should gain possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Czar implored British cooperation, offering guarantees of good faith, but declaring that, if the Porte should continue to flout the conscience of Europe, Russia would act alone. The British Cabinet was divided. Beaconsfield—as Disraeli now was—wished to support Turkey against Russia to the point of war; but his colleagues overbore him and proposed an international conference at Constantinople “on the basis of a common recognition of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, accompanied by a disavowal on the part of each of the Powers of all aims of aggrandisement or separate advantage”.

The Conference was accepted by all the Powers, and Britain was represented by Salisbury and the British Ambassador. It was agreed to press Turkey for a reform of the administration of the Balkan provinces under the supervision of an International Commission supported by a corps of 6,000 gendarmes (military police). But the Turks waved before the Conference the unstultifying rights guaranteed to them by the Treaty of Paris (of 1856),⁵ and the proceedings were interrupted by the roar of salvoes, which Savfet Pasha, the Foreign Minister, explained, celebrated the promulgation of a new democratic constitution of the Ottoman Empire. The Conference had become a tragic farce and dispersed, after having accomplished less than nothing. Russia prepared for war, but the British Government still temporised, and declared its belief that the Turk had turned a new leaf. Another scrap of paper was drawn up—the so-called London Protocol (March 1877), which consisted of rather a weaker version of the Berlin Memorandum, to which was appended a monition to Russia. This was duly submitted to Constantinople, where it was indignantly rejected as an infraction of the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire, solemnly guaranteed by the Treaty of Paris.

The Russo-Turkish War, 1877

Russia tired of long-drawn and insincere negotiations, and the tortuous diplomacy of Abdul Hamid who was strongly opposed to any reforms, declared war against Turkey (April 24, 1877) on behalf of the Christian subjects of the Balkan provinces. The British

government replied to the Russian official intimation of a state of war that the "decision of the Russian Government is not one which can have their concurrence or approval". Of course the new constitution of the Ottoman Empire had already vanished into the thin air, and the clique which surrounded Abdul Hamid accepted the Russian challenge with the consciousness of the diplomatic support of Britain and the hope of something more. (Abdul Hamid had hoped that the serious differences between Russia and Britain as to their Asiatic policy would secure for him the help of Britain).

The Russians advanced to the Danube through Rumania, which after some months activity participated as an ally⁵. After the fall of the fortress of Plevna, which was held with magnificent courage and skill by Osman Pasha from July 19 to December 10, 1877, and the passage of the perilous Shipka Pass—which was completed on January 9, 1878,—the Russians entered Adrianople on January 20. Eleven days later the Turkish envoys signed an armistice at the headquarters of the Russian Commander—the Grand Duke Nicholas—at Adrianople.

Atmosphere of Europe was Clouded with Hatred and Jealousy after the Conclusion of the War

The Russo-Turkish War was concluded but the Balkan chaos was thereby increased. The victorious Russians and Bulgars, during their advance had sated their revenge for the earlier massacres. The atmosphere of Europe was clouded with hatred and jealousy. Austria, fearful lest her pre-war bargain with Russia should be repudiated by the victor, was rapidly concentrating an army on the Cerpathian flank. Rumanians felt slighted by the arrogance of the Russian Generals and suspected that the greed of the pan-slav party inflamed by this dramatic success, would be as disastrous to them as to their mutual foe. The Serbs, who had fought gallantly but unsuccessfully, had nevertheless contained a large Turkish army in the west Balkans, and they were now in danger of being forgotten by their 'liberator'. The Greeks viewed with hostility the exaggerated claims of the Bulgars—backed by Russia—to territorial expansion in Thrace and Macedonia. The opinion of the British Cabinet was hopelessly divided; but Beaconsfield was still breathing war against Russia. Russia herself was in an unenviable condition. The

5. See Part I, pp. 282-83

6. Russia had as allies Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro as was to be expected.

vacillating Czar Alexander II was honest and moderate in his intentions, but was being jockeyed by the militarists and the Pan-Slavs'. The country was exhausted by the attempt at a large and rapid mobilization with an inadequate machinery ; there was an alarming war-debt and heavy taxation, and an ominous undercurrent of revolution. Consequently Russia hurried on peace negotiations with Turkey, and on March 3, 1878, at the little village of San Stefano, near Constantinople, a definitive Treaty of Peace with Turkey was signed. During these weeks, Britain under Beaconsfield's lead was at the very point of war with Russia. Only a series of happy accidents prevented the outbreak of a conflagration, which must have involved most of the nations of Europe.

The Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878)

The Treaty of San Stefano, when its terms became known, raised a clamour throughout Europe. European Turkey was almost entirely dismembered. The autonomy (complete independence) of the allies of Russia in the Russo-Turkish War, namely Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro was recognised by Turkey. She also agreed to pay an indemnity of £141 million, which was reduced to £30 million, in consideration of the cession to Russia of important frontier areas in Armenia. The frontiers of Bulgaria were very liberally drawn, embracing most of the Thrace and Macedonia, and the terms of peace made her practically a vassal state of Russia. Bulgaria's territory was to include nearly all of European Turkey. Gladstone's desire for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe "bag and baggage" was nearly realised. Greek aspirations in Macedonia were ignored, Serbia and Montenegro received inadequate territorial increases, and were deliberately separated by the Sanjak of Novibazar. Rumania was treated almost like a conquered country. She was deprived of Bessarabia, with its genuinely Rumanian population, by her ally, and "compensated" with the unhealthy Dobrudja at the expense of Bulgaria. Austria was to receive the right to administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, but she saw a bloated Bulgaria under Pan-Slav tutelage trust between her and the haven of her desire—Salonica. The fiercely Mohammedan Albanians were separated from Islam, and left to the aggressive ambition of Bulgaria and Serbia.

Opposition of the Treaty of San Stefano

This Treaty, however, was not destined to be carried out. It satisfied no one except Russia and Bulgaria. There was much opposition to it in the Balkan peninsula itself.

To the envious eyes of Austria and Britain, San Stefano meant just one thing—the control of the Balkan peninsula by Russia, and such it constituted an unmistakeable threat to Austrian influence in the Balkans, and to the imperial policy of Britain as conceived by Disraeli.

Britain, fearing Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean, and believing that Bulgaria and the other states would be merely tools of Russia, declared that the arrangements concerning the Balkan peninsula must be determined by the great European powers, that the treaty of San Stefano must be submitted to a general congress on the ground that, according to the international law of Europe, the Eastern Question could not be settled by one nation but only by the concert of powers, as it affected them all. Austria joined in the protest, wishing a part of the spoils of Turkey for herself.

Terms of the Treaty of San Stefano to be Revised by an International Congress

Undoubtedly both Britain and Austria would have gone to war, had not the Czar given way. If Alexander II yielded, it was because he was isolated, and could not count on any power to give him help against the Anglo-Austrian combination.

Russia reluctantly submitted to the demand that the terms of San Stefano should be revised by an international congress, and Bismarck in his detached and arbitral position—"the honest broker" invited the ministers of the Great Powers to Berlin. Bismarck sought to play the role of "the honest broker" quite prudently and disinterestedly so as to avoid an Anglo-Russian or Russo-Austrian war, which would probably have swept Germany into the vortex and ultimately France too.

The Congress of Berlin, 1878

The Congress opened on June 13 and closed on July 13, 1878. But before it opened, Britain had secretly secured Russian consent to her main requirements, and had also entered into a secret defensive agreement with her protege. Turkey, gaining Cyprus as compensation.⁷ Britain was to maintain Turkish interest in Asia. The

7. The secret convention with Turkey by which Britain gained Cyprus—to which she had no more claim than was established by the ephemeral brigandage of Richard I—was conspicuous example of that nefarious diplomacy which passed for successful statesmanship.

secret treaties had settled the main points at issue, and, to a large extent, the Congress was little more than a court of registration.

The cool, ironical figure of Bismarck towered over the notorious Congress. Beside him the bizarre (odd and fantastic) and enigmatic personality of Beaconsfield receded to the proportions of one of the half-real characters of his own novels.

The Settlement

(a) Big Bulgaria was divided; the part north of the Balkans became an independent principality, to be ruled by a prince" freely elected by the population and confirmed by the Sublime Porte, with the consent of the Powers". The province of Eastern Roumelia, South of the Balkans, was to be reduced in size, and replaced under the direct authority of the Sultan, but was to have local autonomy. This was supposed to be a triumph of British statesmanship⁸. (b) Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be occupied and administered by Austria, which thereby became once more a Balkan power. (c) Serbia and Montenegro were recognized by the Powers as sovereign states, and slightly enlarged; but a wedge—the Sanjak of Novibazar—was thrust between the kindred states of Serbia and Montenegro. Moreover, Austria obtained from Turkey the right to maintain garrisons in the Sanjak. Montenegro was forced to hand back the port of Dulcigno to Turkey, whilst Austria was allowed to take Spizza, whose guns commanded Montenegro's only port, Antivari. Through the intervention of Gladstone, a great admirer of the Montenegrins, she regained Dulcigno two years later; but the Habsburg empire controlled the Delmatian coast—to the chagrin of Italy as well as of the Serbs. So these western Slavs were parcelled out by the hucksters of Berlin without regard to their righteous claims and natural aspirations. The eyes of Austria were fixed more greedily than ever upon Salonica. (d) The Greek representatives pleaded for the realization

8. Bismarck refused to believe in the British bogey of a Russified Bulgaria, which, with the spectacle of Prussian advance in Armenia and Turkestan, was the mainspring of Beaconsfield's antagonism, "Liberated nations". Bismarck wrote in his "*Reflections*". "are not grateful but exacting All these races (Greeks Bulgars, Rumans and Serbs have gladly accepted Russian help for liberation from the Turks; but since they have been free they have shown no tendency to accept the Czar as the successor of the Sultan..... Even if the Treaty of San Stefano had been carried out in tact, the fear of the Russian influence in Bulgaria would have proved false."

of natural Greek aspirations in Macedonia and Thrace, but, like the representatives of all other small states most nearly concerned, they were allowed no voice in the determinations of the Congress. Bismarck intervened in the Greek-Bulgar controversy with the ironical comment that, "after having heard the delegates of a nation which claimed the provinces of another state, it would be equitable to listen to the representatives of a country which demanded territories already belonging to it". The Greeks ultimately received limited extension of territory in west Macedonia. (e) Rumania was treated by her ally with a shamelessness, in which the selfish Powers acquiesced, which is almost incredible. Russia had seized Rumanian territory of Bessarabia in 1812, but it had been restored in 1856. She now rewarded her sturdy little ally, who had spent her blood freely especially in the attempt to retrieve the Russian failure before Plevna—by robbing her of a region which was completely Rumanian in population and tradition, compensating her at the expense of Bulgaria with the unhealthy and unwanted Dobrudja, which was Bulgar and Turkish in population. Rumania and her spirited prince never forgot this gratuitous treachery which was licensed by the Concert of Great Powers at Berlin.

Territorial Changes Made by the Treaty of Berlin Statewise

- (a) Turkey lost half of her European dominions.
- (b) Rumania resented the restoration of Bessarabia to Russia.
- (c) Bulgaria brooded regretfully over the spacious boundaries assigned to her by the defunct Treaty of San Stefano.
- (d) Montenegro, though doubled in size, dreamed of the still more generous provisions of the same character.
- (e) Serbia lamented the transference of Bosnia from the nerveless grasp of Constantinople to the tighter grip of the Habsburgs.
- (f) Greece contrasted the nebulous recognition of her claims with the substantial awards to her Balkan rivals.
- (g) Russia was deprived of the spoils of victories by Britain and Austria with the connivance of Germany.
- (h) Austria pocketed Bosnia and Herzegovina as a reward for inglorious neutrality, and
- (i) Britain secured the cession by the Sultan of the island of Cyprus.

To put it succinctly, the main results of the Congress of Berlin were : (a) the division of Big Bulgaria which was called into being by the now defunct Treaty of San Stefano ; (b) the contemptuous and ignorant neglect of the other peoples of the Balkans ; and (c) the cynical maintenance of a still dangerous Turkish power in Europe.

Comments on the Treaty of Berlin

The melancholy story of Turkish misrule in Macedonia and fiendish massacre in Armenia since 1878, is a curious commentary upon the "Peace with Honour" which Beaconsfield announced to a fascinating and applauding multitude at Charing Cross (London) on his return from Berlin.

In one of its most important provisions the Treaty did not endure ten years. The device of separating the Bulgarian north of the Balkans from the Bulgarians south of the Balkans, in spite of the entire racial and spiritual unity of the two, and the wishes of the two, of attempting also to make the latter forget that they were Bulgarians by the childish device of calling their province Eastern Roumelia, endured precisely seven years. In 1885, the Bulgarians took matter into their own hands, declared themselves united under Prince Alexander of Battenberg, and tore up this arrangement of the Congress of Berlin, and the Powers were forced to look on in acquiescence. It should be noted that is united Bulgaria was completely estranged from Russia. That what distinguished united Bulgaria of 1885 from the united Bulgaria under the Treaty of San Stefano.

The other arrangement of leaving Macedonia in the hands of Turkey simply raised another question. Macedonia became a source of constant uneasiness to Europe, a recurrent cause of alarm, frequently threatening a general conflagration. As far as humanitarian considerations were concerned, this disposition of Macedonia was a colossal blunder. The Turks did not carry out the promised reforms and the condition of the people would certainly have been greatly improved had Macedonia been a part of Bulgaria as provided by the Treaty of San Stefano. This determination of the fate of Macedonia, which was the essential difference between the two treaties was one totally deplorable. Owing to the rival ambitions of the Western Powers Macedonian Christians were destined long to suffer an odious oppression from which more fortunate Balkan Christians were free.

Nevertheless the Treaty of Berlin represents an advance in statesmanship over the Paris arrangements. For the first time since confronted with the Balkan confusion the Powers outlined a constructive plan for the Peninsula. The young states, Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania, which had, largely by their own efforts, broken the Ottoman yoke in the course of the recent decades, were, albeit grudgingly, given small increase of territory. Above all, they were freed of the last vestige of their former bondage to the Ottoman Empire and declared free and independent. Greece had already been declared independent half a century before.⁹ The powers handed over to Thessaly to strengthen it.

If we add that by authorising the principality of Bulgaria, the Powers set another Christian people, the Bulgars, on the path of freedom, we are justified in saying that although the Congress once again resuscitated the Ottoman Empire, it at the same time cautiously envisaged a not too distant future in which the Balkan peninsula would be completely taken over by the Balkan peoples.

In other words the benefits assured by the Treaty of Berlin were great and unmistakable. Before the Russo-Turkish war the population of European Turkey was about seventeen or eighteen million. As a result of the Treaty of Berlin, European Turkey was greatly reduced and its population was only about six million. It means that eleven or twelve million people or more had been emancipated from the Turkish yoke.

An Appraisal of the Treaty of Berlin

The treaty provided no permanent solution of the tangled problem of the Balkans, and most of its signatories left the German capital smarting under a sense of disappointment or humiliation which boded ill for the tranquillity of Europe. Far from providing a solution of what was then called "the eternal question of the Balkans," the Treaty was chiefly instrumental in protracting, complicating, and sharpening a problem which was of the utmost importance to the peace of Europe, and not necessarily eternal and insoluble, if it could be attacked co-operatively by the Concert of Powers. All the powers were responsible for this melancholy result, which is a conspicuous example of what Lowes Dickinson calls "the European Archery".

9. See Part I. pp. 275-77.

7

Bismarck's System of Alliances

During his later days the policy of Bismarck was dominated by two fears, *viz.*, (i) the nightmare of hostile coalitions, and (ii) the spread of socialism. He was aware that these two fears were the nemesis of his previous policy. Against the socialists he waged unrelenting warfare, and under the lead of Liebknecht and Bebel they returned his enmity. Bebel had described the Prussian spirit and principles as "the deadliest enemies of democracy", and the German constitution "a piece of sham constitutionalism and naked Caesarism". Both of these strictures have been justified by history.¹

Bismarck's attempt at the homeopathic treatment (the system of treating diseases by small quantities of drugs that excite symptoms similar to the diseases) of Socialism within the Empire was to be reinforced by system of conservative monarchical alliances "If the monarchical governments", he wrote, "have no understanding of the necessity for holding together in the interests of political and social order, but made them subservient to the chauvinistic impulses of their subject, I fear that the international revolutionary and social struggles which will have to be fought out will be all the more dangerous, and take such a form that the victory on the part of the monarchical order will be more difficult". For such reasons he repressed Polish nationalism and maintained an attitude of cynical detachment in regard to the Balkan revolts.²

1. See p. 33 *supra*

2. Bismarck, however, made an exception but for very cogent reasons. He encouraged radical republicanism in France in order to prevent an 'entente' with autocratic Russia. He thought that France would be more likely to seek 'revanche' under a monarchy than under a republic.

1. The "Dreikaiserbund" on the League of Three Emperors, 1872

In 1872, Bismarck contrived the dynastic entente, the "Dreikaiserbund" consisting of Williams I, Francis Joseph, and Alexander II, Emperors of Germany, Austria and Russia respectively. The three Emperors meeting in Berlin in September, 1877, came to an understanding to maintain peace and uphold the "sacred cause of Royalty" against Socialism and Liberalism in France and England. The "Dreikaiserbund" served Bismarck in another way. France was put in quarantine by its formation—a thing very dear to the heart of Bismarck.

No formal alliance was made, but a relation was established of sufficient intimacy and for five years the "Dreikaiserbund" continued in more or less effective existence.

The arrangement marks the beginning of the policy of "competing European alliances" which balanced one combination of states against another, and which played an important part as years rolled by in dividing Europe in two camps.

The "Dreikaiserbund" was, however, severely strained, successively, in 1875, 1876 and 1877, and fatally weakened at Berlin in 1878.

The "Dreikaiserbund" received a rude shock when Alexander and Gortschakoff hurried to Berlin in 1875,³ and in 1876, Gortschakoff rejected the suggestion of a treaty guaranteeing the German possession of Alsace and Lorraine, in return for energetic support of Russian Policy in the Near East.

The Czar also received a rebuff when on the eve of the Turkish war, he asked whether Germany would remain neutral if Russia went to war with Austria. Germany's refusal of neutrality angered Gortschakoff and his master.⁴

3. See p. 14 *supra*.

4. Alexander II bluntly asked if Germany would remain neutral if Russia went to war with Austria. After vainly endeavouring to evade the embarrassing question the chancellor replied that Germany could indeed suffer her friends to win or lose battles, but not that one of them should be so injured as to endanger its position as a great power. This refusal of neutrality angered the Czar and was the begining of a rift between Germany and Russia.

Estrangement of Russia from Germany

At Berlin, in 1878, Germany and Russia came practically to a breaking point. As has been aptly observed, "the outstanding result of the Congress of Berlin in the realm of high politics was the estrangement of Russia from Germany".

Bismarck asserted that he deserved the highest Russian order for his efforts at the Congress, but the Russians thought otherwise. The Treaty of Berlin was a humiliation for Russia and a striking success for Austria, her rival, which was now empowered to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. No wonder that the Russian Chancellor pronounced the Congress of Berlin "the darkest episode in his career". In a letter to the Emperor William in September, 1879, the Czar used the phrase: "Your Majesty's Chancellor has forgotten the promises of 1870".

Germany, the Russians believed, had left them in the lurch. The Congress was conspiracy against them. The Czar shared to the full the anger of his subjects at the substitution of the Berlin compromise for the dictated settlement of San Stefano. He spoke bitterly of the European coalition against Russia under Bismarck's leadership.

By favouring one of his allies at the Congress, Bismarck had alienated the other. In this fact lay the germ of the two great international combinations of the future, the Triple and Dual Alliances,—factors of profound significance in the latter history of Europe.

2. The Austro-German Alliance, 1879

Realizing that Russia was mortally offended at his conduct at the Congress of Berlin, and that friendly understanding with her was over, Bismarck turned for compensation to a closer union with Austria. He approached Andrassy with a proposal of a mutually defensive agreement.

William I Put a Spoke in the Wheel

While Bismarck had reached the conviction that the hour for a new orientation of German policy had struck, William I believed that the rift in the lute was *not* beyond repair. Consequently, when negotiations were progressing with Andrassy, Bismarck found a formidable opponent in the old Emperor William. The Emperor,

now aged eighty-two, had always been a man of very limited intelligence, who wished to govern a great nation according to his personal opinions and dynastic interests and loyalties, of which the Hohenzollern-Romanov⁵ tradition was one of the chief. (Culturally the youthful German empire was attracted to the west, historically to the east)". William now telegraphed to Bismarck: "Consider journey to Vienna impossible", and a few days later he had a personal interview with his nephew, Alexander II at Alexandrovo, in Poland, which confirmed his pro-Russian habit of mind by removing the unpleasant impressions created by Russia during recent months. He then informed Bismarck that "it was unnecessary to change the traditional policy, still less to form a defensive coalition against Russia". William further told Bismarck, "You may speak of the eventuality of disagreement developing into a possible breach, and enter into *pour-parlers* respecting the possible measures to be taken. But I do not authorise you to conclude a convention, much less a treaty".

Bismarck had Good Reasons for Concluding an Alliance with Austria.

But Bismarck had good reasons to fear the revival of the old coalition of the days of Frederick the Great—France, Austria, Russia,—resulting in the isolation of Germany, which would invite a terrible war or revenge, when the chickens of 1864, 1866, 1870 and 1878 would come home to roost.

Bismarck obtained the assistance of King Ludwig of Bavaria, and of Prince Hohenlohe, and the stubborn old Emperor finally gave grudging and conditional consent to continue the negotiations. Even then Bismarck could induce Andrassy to accept to accord a defensive alliance only against Russia, but not against France. When he returned from Vienna with the draft, William wished to communicate it to the Czar; but the threat of the bloc resignation of the Chancellor and ministry brought him to surrender. The Alliance was signed at Vienna on October 7, 1879, and ratified on

5. The respective houses to which the rulers of Germany and Russia belonged.

6. 1864—War with Denmark; 1866—War with Austria; 1870—War with France; 1878—Bismarck antagonised Russia at the Congress of Berlin.

October 16, 1879. "It is the completion of my work of 1866", Bismarck declared.

Terms of the Austro-German Alliance

The preamble asserts that "an intimate accord between Germany and Austria-Hungary can menace nobody"; and the two monarchs promise that their purely defensive alliance should not be allowed to assume an aggressive tendency. Clause I provided that if either empire was attacked by Russia, the other would assist with the whole of its military power and both should conclude peace in common. Clause II provided that if either was attacked a fourth Power the other should maintain benevolent neutrality. But that if Russia joined in the attack, the conditions of Clause I should operate. Clause III provided that the Treaty should remain secret, but that if Russia threatened an attack against either, they should regard it as a loyal obligation to inform the Czar confidentially that any attack on either would be regarded as an attack upon both. Clause IV : It was agreed that the Treaty should bind the two Empires for five years and should then be renewed for a period of three years unless within one year of its expiration either Power should wish to reconsider its terms.

The terms of the Treaty—though not its existence—remained secret until November 5, 1887, when they were disclosed by the "Times". They were officially published on February 3, 1888, as a threat to Russia, who was indulging in a forward policy in the Balkans. It was renewed regularly, and after 1902, automatically.

Why did Bismarck Choose Austria as Against Russia as an Ally in 1879 ?

Of his two neighbours, Bismarck from considerations both of traditional prejudice and strategy, preferred Russia. After 1870 nothing would induce him to contemplate a policy might involve Germany in simultaneous war on her east and west fronts. So he had stood by Russia in the Polish revolution in 1833, and this benevolence was reciprocated by Russia in 1866 and 1870. Bismarck writes in his "Reflections" : "Germany and Russia have no divergences of interest pregnant with such disputes as lead to unavoidable ruptures. On the other hand, coincident claims with regard to Poland, and in a secondary degree, the ancient solidarity which unites their dynasties, in opposition to subversive efforts, afford both cabinets

the bases of common policy". But in 1878 he had to choose between his neighbours and chose Austria. The question naturally arises why did he do so?

Bismarck wished to maintain his creation—the German Empire—in a dominant position on the Continent, and was determined to employ all means solely to that end, trusting to his own skill in manoeuvre. Germany's frontiers were exposed. An overwhelming hostile coalition must be prevented. A Russo-German alliance was traditional, had advantages of common interests, but had also its disadvantages and possible dangers. Bismarck observed: "The sole security of Russian friendship is the personality of the ruling Czar"⁷, a precarious sheet-anchor. A Franco-Austrian counter-alliance had to be avoided. Austria was dominated by fellow Germans and pro—German Magyars. Bismarck was therefore inclining to a rapprochement with Austria, in pursuit of a policy which he had initiated in 1866, but hoped at the same time to effect some sort of a reinsurance with Russia. In all this he had no consideration, except "to limit the range of the possible anti-German coalition", which was the probable consequence of his own previous policy. "The disadvantage of the central and exposed position of the German Empire" and the belief that "a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan and also less harmful for the freedom of others than that of France, Russia or England", led him towards an Austrian alliance.

Bismarck was well aware of the selfish ambitions of Austria, and of the grave difficulties in which they were liable to involve her and her allies. But Bismarck was determined. "We cannot abandon Austria, but neither can we lose sight of the possibility that the policy of Vienna may willy-nilly abandon us".

Reactions to the Austro-German Alliance

Britain approved cordially of this anti-Russian Treaty, in which, for some years, she was regarded almost as a sleeping partner.

When in September, 1879, the Emperor William was allowed to inform the Czar of the formation of an Austro-German entente,

7. Alexander II (1855–1881).

which was to take the place of the old German Confederation, Alexander responded amiably with a suggestion of the renewal of the "Dreikaiserbund". This was quite in line of Bismarck's diplomacy. "The danger to which our union with Austria is exposed..... may be minimised by keeping the strictest possible faith with Austria, and at the same time taking care that the road from Berlin to St. Petersburg is not closedIf we had an irremediable estrangement with Russia, Austria would enlarge her claims.....In the interest of European equilibrium the maintenance of Austria as a strong, independent Great Power, is an object for Germany, for which she might in case of need stake her fortunes with a good conscience ; but Austria should avoid deducing from the alliance claims which it was not concluded to support"⁸ (Bismarck's Reflections").

Alexander's obvious interest in suggesting a renewal of the "Dreikaiserbund" was to secure from the goodwill of his neighbour what he could not extract from his fears and so through Giers and Sabouroff sought what Bismarck called "a warmed up Dreikaiserbund". To their request Bismarck replied : "Nobody wishes to be in a minority. All politics reduce themselves to this formula ; try to be

8. The political situation in the first decade of the twentieth century was a curious fulfilment of Bismarck's fear for Germany of that isolation which temporarily be forced upon France. With their estrangement from Britain and Russia, the Central Powers became almost isolated in Europe. On November 14, 1906, when the Anglo-Russian entente was being consummated, the Chancellor, Bülows in the course of an important, speech in the Reichstag, said : Unless the World Powers were friendly to Germany the "Entente Cordiale" would endanger the peace of Europe. A policy which aimed at encircling Germany in order to isolate and cripple her would be a policy hazardous to the peace of Europe. Pressure begets counter-pressure, and finally explosions can result."

Nothing is more remarkable than the helplessness shown by Germany when Austria undertook moves in the Balkans, which obviously must have been inconvenient for her ally. The action of Aehrenthal (of Austria) in 1908 was in fact almost an insult to Germany. (The Kaiser described the act as "highway robbery" and added, "Vienna will have to answer for her duplicity. They have deceived us shamefully. Perhaps Aehrenthal wished thus to declare Austrian independence, and to repudiate the idea that he was under German tutelage or patronage.

Aehrenthal was able to do this because the continuance of the alliance with Austria had now become absolutely necessary for Germany. Germany could no longer exist as Bülows and Holstein confessed, if Austria were in any weakened, or if Austrian confidence in German support was undermined.

'a trois' (of three) in a world governed by five Powers. I have made an 'entente a' deux', (of two) in order to return thereafter to an 'entente a' trois' if you really wish it".

3. **Secret Agreement between Germany, Austria and Russia, 1881**

After the opposition of Austria had been overcome, a secret agreement was signed in 1881 for a term of three years between Germany, Austria and Russia, ensuring friendly co-ordination of policy between the Central Alliance in Russia, on the understanding that, under no circumstances, was it to prejudice the Austro-German Alliance.

This secret agreement would in Bismarck's words "prevent an Austro-Russian war and a Franco-Russian coalition."

In 1884 this Treaty of Triple Agreement was renewed without modification, and shortly afterwards the three Empires met in amity.

But during the eighties, Russia and Austria were fiercely at odds in the Balkans, and Bismarck was feeling very uncomfortable about their competition. "A war with Russia", he said to Hohenlohe in October, 1883, "in which we should have to side with Austria, would be a misfortune, for we could gain nothing—not even our war expenses".

4. **Re-insurance Treaty with Russia, 1887**

In June 1887, Bismarck concluded that secret and mysterious Re-insurance Treaty with Russia whereby each promised to remain neutral in any war in which the other became involved with two exceptions. Russia need not stay neutral, if Germany attacked France; Germany need not stay neutral if Russia attacked Austria-Hungary. Germany definitely recognized Bulgaria as being within the sphere of Russian influence and allowed Russia to contemplate military measures there; whilst by a further secret protocol, he promised the diplomatic and moral support of Germany, if Russia were 'compelled' to undertake the military occupation of the Straits.

After all his fine words about the solidarity of the Central Alliance and the necessity of keeping Austria intact as a Great Power, the negotiation of this Russo-German secret treaty was a piece of subtle treachery on Bismarck's part.

This Treaty was maintained until Bismarck's fall, and was terminated by his successor, Caprivi. Its very existence was only discovered by Austria in 1893, through Bismarck's own agency. The disgruntled ex-Chancellor angered by the spectacle of France-Russian friendship, which was emphasised by the visit of the Czar to the republican capital, "threw a stone into the duckpond" as he phrased it, by dictating the famous article to the "Hamburger Nachrichten".

Review of Germany's Position in 1881

Nevertheless, in 1881, that is ten years after Frankfurt, Germany, with the Austrian alliance, the entente of the 'Three Emperors, the patent friendship of Britain, and an isolated France, seemed secure. Within the next two years, moreover, three smaller fish were drawn into the net.

5. The Triple Alliance

Italy During the Congress of Berlin both Bismarck and Salisbury had secretly suggested to Waddington, the French representative, that France might offset the British acquisition of Cyprus by assuming freedom of action in regard to Tunis. France accepted this tip in the thieves' kitchen, and in 1881, after a spacious punitive expedition, she declared a protectorate over Tunis. Her action bitterly wounded Italy, who had been looking forward to its acquisition on grounds of sentiment, proximity and economic interest. She was thus driven, as Bismarck foresaw, into the Central camp. After much negotiation, she swallowed her hatred of Austria, and in 1882 joined the Alliance. So was formed the Triple Alliance.

The step was greatly to Italy's advantage, for it really raised her to the status of a great power, ensured her protection against France, and committed her to the support of the Central Powers only if they were engaged in a defensive war ; while she secured the stipulation that the Treaty did not in any case commit her to hostility to Britain. Italy thus obtained great advantages, though she was the petitioner to join the Alliance.⁹

9. Though Italy was the petitioner to join the Alliance, she obtained greater advantages than Austria ; for the latter was bound to aid her against a French attack, while she was not pledged to help her ally against a Russian onslaught.

The Treaty also brought solid advantages to the Central Powers. Bismarck was not only freed from the remote fear that Italy might join France in an attack, but secured an ally in resisting such an attack. Austria, again had no longer to fear a stab in the back if she was engaged in a life and death struggle with Russia, and could count on Italian assistance in repelling a Franco-Russian assault.

The Triple Alliance neither supplanted nor modified the Austro-German Treaty (of 1879), of which Italy had no knowledge.

When the Triple Alliance was renewed in 1887, Italy obtained the inclusion of a further vital condition, namely, that before proceeding to any extension of territory in the Balkans, Austria was bound to obtain the agreement of Italy, and offer compensation.

The terms of the Triple Alliance became fully known only after the Great War.

Serbia—Serbia was essentially Russophil in sentiment, but the action of Russia at San Stefano had alienated her, and under her irresponsible prince, Milan, she gravitated towards Russia's arch enemy, Austria. By a treaty in 1881, she placed herself under Hapsburg tutelage remaining in this relation until 1895.

Rumania—Similarly, Rumania gradually drew towards the Central Powers, and in 1883, entered into a secret defensive alliance with Germany, Austria and Italy, which survived until 1914, when following the lead of Italy, she declared her neutrality; and finally, like Italy—on grounds of national opportunism—she abandoned the Central Alliance in August, 1916, and declared war on Austria-Hungary.

Comments on Bismarck's system of Alliances

To preserve his handiwork, Bismarck built up an elaborate system of political alliances. Austria-Hungary and Italy were bound to Germany by the Triple Alliance, and Russia was kept in good humour by the Re-insurance Treaty. So by a system of alliance and counter-alliance, Bismarck had secured Russian neutrality in case of an attack upon Germany by Austria. Austrian neutrality in case of Russian attack, Italian support in case of French aggression and Italian and Austro-Hungarian support in case of a combined French and Russian attack.

Other Measures Undertaken by Bismarck to Consolidate Germany's Position

Already in 1883, Germany had begun her penetration of Turkey with the remodelling of the Turkish army by Vonder Goltz.

Roping in Britain in the System of Alliance

At the every end of Bismarck's official career, he was negotiating through his son with Salisbury for a defensive alliance with Britain whose friendship he had always striven to cultivate. Already Britain had entered into an agreement with the other partners of the Triple Alliance (Austria and Italy) to maintain the 'status quo' in the Mediterranean, and Bismarck was obviously, anxious, as his advancing age inevitably necessitated his withdrawal from the control of German policy within a few years, to make the defensive position of Germany impregnable by securing the formal inclusion of Britain in his system of alliances. His reasons were, as usual, clear and simple. "Austria, like Germany and England", he wrote to Salisbury, "belong to the 'saturated' powers, as Metternich would say, and therefore to the pacific powers. France and Russia, on the other hand, seem to threaten us. France, true to her traditions and character, and Russia, who now assumes the threatening attitude of Louis XIV and Napoleon".

But Britain was not yet prepared to abandon her splendid isolation. One may reflect that, if Britain had been governed by a less conservative Prime Minister than Salisbury, she could have realised in 1887, as she did realise twelve years later, that the time had come to abandon her policy of isolation, and that a quadruple alliance which included the greatest military power and the greatest naval power could have maintained the peace of the world beyond fear of challenge.

Concluding Comments

Accepting as axiom, complete national selfishness and international mistrust, Bismarck had been forced after the Congress of Berlin to weave a "web of alliances" aimed at "securing peace as long as possible, and, in the event of war breaking out, protecting Germany as long as possible from fighting foreign interests". But it could only succeed if Berlin remained on good terms with Vienna and St. Petersburg and so arranged it that both Powers would turn to Berlin before taking final decisions. The force and finesse of his

diplomacy in the course of his twenty-eight years of office (1862-1890), had completely altered the balance of European politics. His fall marked an epoch. The history of the next quarter of a century was to show the strength of his personality and intelligence, and the weakness of the foundation upon which he created his system¹⁰. It would be a fair estimate of his greatness to assent that, with the principles and circumstances which prevail in the political arrangement of the modern world, what Bismarck could not do, could not be achieved by any other statesman.

10. The subtlety and tortuousness of Bismarck's diplomacy during the last five years of his regime showed clearly that diplomacy in the words of Fuller in "Bismarck's diplomacy at its Zenith" contained no priceless and unique key to imperial Germany's future, irrecoverable once wantonly thrown away. Rather it may be maintained that Bismarck's policy at the Zenith of his power contained all the causes of his empire's downfall.

8

The Scramble for Africa

Till past the middle of the nineteenth century, Africa was almost no man's land, a *terra incognita* (an unknown country). Apart from the British colony in the extreme south, and the more recently acquired French colony in Algeria (1830) the European nations were represented by a few decaying remnants of the history of Portuguese and Spanish imperialism¹. At the end of the First World War the only territories in that vast continent controlled by the indigenous inhabitants were Abyssinia and Liberia; the former only because of the double failure of an Italian attempt at conquest (1885 and 1896), and the latter—a negligible negro republic—only because of the prevalence of a humanitarian sentiment in the U.S.A. and Britain, associated with the abolition of slavery.

The division of the continent has begotten a fierce conflict of the acquisitive instincts of the European nations—particularly Britain and France—which ultimately proved a chief factor in producing the alignment of the great powers in 1914.

1. The reasons why Africa, though so close to Europe, remained so little known up to the middle of the nineteenth century were largely physical. The coasts of the "Dark Continent" are for the most part inhospitable; its interior is a plateau shut off almost everywhere by belts of desert land or by swampy malarious regions along the coast. Even the rivers do not form convenient highways into the interior, because they are mostly unnavigable for any distance from their mouths, on account of falls or rapids and the maze of tropical forest. Moreover, trade with Africa was not considered profitable as its inhabitants, backward as they were, had few wants. No attempts were therefore made to establish trade connections with Africa on any appreciable scale up to the middle of the nineteenth century.

Suez Canal Brought Egypt into European Politics

The scramble began during the sixties with the cutting of the Suez Canal by a French company under the technical direction of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the money coming largely from European investors. The Canal which was—and is—of vital strategic importance, was opened in 1869. This event brought the question of the status of Egypt into the forefront of European policy. Egypt had been for some centuries a semi-independent province of the Ottoman Empire and since the Napoleonic occupation (1798—1801) a sphere of French influence.

Europeanisation of Egypt

The extraordinary increase of the Egyptian debt is the key to the whole later history of that country.

The prodigal recklessness of the Khedive² Ismail since his accession in 1863, began in the seventies to involve the state in his own insolvency, and French and English bond-holders in his numerous loans—who mortgaged the proverbial wealth of Egypt—were becoming alarmed and beginning to clamour for political intervention, in order to regulate Egyptian finance.

British interest was further stimulated by Disraeli's spectacular 'coup' in 1875, when he bought for £ 4½ million Khedive's share in the French Canal Company.³

In 1876 the British and French governments intervened jointly and established a dual financial control. Ismail's recklessness continued unabated, until, in 1878, he was summarily deposed by the Sultan, who appointed his son, Tewfik, in his place. The political position was very confused, for Egypt was still acknowledged to form a rather invertebrate portion of the Ottoman Empire, whose territory was supposed at this time to have been guaranteed by the Concert of Powers at Berlin. But the Egyptian debt had increased to nearly £ 90 million and the interest absorbed more than half of the revenue of the state, which was subject also to the shameless ravages of the Khedivi's place-men and Turkish and Circassian official parasites.

2. The title of the Viceroy of Egypt (1867—1914).

3. See p. 45 *Supra*.

British interests were being watched by Baring—the future Lord Cromer—a member of the famous banking family. After much negotiations between Britain and France, at last in July 1880, a Law of Liquidation was enacted, which rapidly corrected the Egyptian balances. But it could only be effected by the political control of the country ; and the economies of the Commission soon bred violent discontent in the land of Baksheesh, which was directed against the intrusive foreigner, whose money alone they—destined.

Origins of the Nationalist Movement

Resentment at alien rule and of the over increasing number of foreign residents grew into a threatening demand of “Egypt for the Egyptians”. This discontent came to a head under a Turkish officer, Arabi Pasha, who threatened the lives as well as the property of foreigners. The French government at this time was in the hands of the forceful Gambetta, and he induced the British Government to join in the issue of a Note which promised Anglo-French assistance to the Khedive “to restore order and prosperity.” But the Note was resented not only in Egypt, but also by the Sultan.

In the period of confusion which followed in Egypt, Gambetta's ministry was defeated, and he was succeeded by the more cautious Freycinet, who was anxious to establish an Anglo-French Condominium in Egypt. The French government's hands were quite full at the time with the Tunish grab, and extension in West Africa, and Freycinet was concerned to limit the scope of French adventure.

Britain Alone Left as the Dominant Power in Egypt

The Sultan's intervention intentionally confounded the confusion, which resulted in fanatical anti-foreign rioting in Alexandria in 1882. The knot was cut when the British fleet after the ignoring of an ultimatum, bombarded the city. The Sultan, immediately adopted his traditional role of indignation, and Britain sought to regularise her action by seeking from the powers a mandate for joint Anglo-French occupation. When this was refused France drew back, for she had already alienated Italy in the Tunis affair and was fearful of the possible wiles of Bismarck. Freycinet's request for a grant to maintain French policy in Egypt was defeated and he resigned. Britain was thus left to deal alone with Egypt, and she despatched Wolseley, who overwhelmed Arabia at Tel-el-Kebir. Thus,

almost in a fit of absence of mind Britain found herself the dominant power in Egypt.

Bismarck's Attitude

Bismarck was very complacent towards British policy in Egypt. He was in fact only too glad to see Britain and France drifting into a position in regard to that country similar to the Schleswig-Holstein problem in 1864. Moreover, if France occupied Tunis, and Britain Egypt, as Austria had occupied Bosnia, the western powers would be committed to vested territorial interests similar to those of Germany in Alsace-Lorraine, which would allow full scope for Bismarck's diplomatic methods. In any case, Bismarck's policy was regulated by a few simple considerations: the isolation of France, diplomatic friendship for Britain, and indifference to projects of colonial expansion. "The friendship of the British Empire is much more important to us than the fate of Egypt", declared Bismarck.

Britain in Egypt

Meanwhile, in 1883 the British government despatched the very able Marquis of Dufferin to examine and report on the Egyptian situation. His wise recommendations for the establishment of an autonomous system under British surveillance were incorporated in an Organic Decree. The Dual control was formally abolished, and Baring the future Lord Cromer—returned, as Consul-General, to establish a regime, which under his remarkable direction for almost quarter of a century not only restored the political stability of Egypt but introduced an era of universal prosperity such as Egypt had never known before.

But the French were unappeased. They hampered the financial measures by which Baring was steadily liquidating Egypt's foreign debts. They pressed for a definition of the term of occupation, and for international control, and the British Liberal government promised in 1883 to evacuate the country in 1888, if it should be possible "without risk to peace and order". But Northbrook's⁴ Report in 1884 advised that no term to the occupation be fixed and expressed the opinion that the achievement of the very beneficial reforms of administration and finance would be gradual and cumulative.

4. Viceroy of India (1872—1876)

Opposition of France

Various Anglo-French conventions ended in 'impasse'. France even strove to enlist Germany by professing willingness to abandon her dreams of "revanche". But, in the days of Boulanger and the French army increases, Bismarck replied with cynical coldness : "The good-will of France could never make up for the ill-will of England". In 1887, the French Premier declared : "If a great power installed itself definitely in Egypt, it would be a very grave blow at the influence of France in the Mediterranean, and in my opinion France should never accustom herself to the idea". But in 1888, Baring at last balanced the Egyptian budget ; the economic development of the country was being directed with so much skill and foresight, that the British evacuation became an academic question.

Comment of the Opposition on France to the British Occupation of Egypt

The plain fact of the matter was that the French quickly realised that the defeat of Freycinet's ministry in July, 1882 and the consequent refusal to cooperate with Britain had lost for France any hope of maintaining the Dual Control which she could not stomach. The succeeding ministry with Ferry as Foreign Secretary announced that France had resumed "liberty of action" in regard to Egypt and then it was too late. Smarting under a sense of frustration France continued to be bitterly hostile to Britain. This hostility continued unabated until the momentous settlement of 1904.

British Protectorate over Egypt

No British statesman, Liberal or Conservative, at that time contemplated a permanent occupation of Egypt which was still a Turkish province ; but, on the other hand, Britain was determined to secure an absolute guarantee of the security of the Suez Canal, which implied the non-interference of any other power in Egypt and the restoration of administrative and financial order in the country. But in the pursuit of these clear and defensible aims she was led by the hard logic of facts gradually to establish a veiled protectorate which, after the outbreak of World War, in December 1914, she converted by proclamation into a 'de jure' protectorate. This protectorate was destined, however, to end in 1922 when Egypt was recognised as an independent and sovereign state.

British Protectorate over the Sudan

In 1881 a fanatical Sheik, the Mahdi, had revolted against the Egyptian authority in the Sudan which was a subject province of Egypt, and in 1883 annihilated a Falstaffian army led a British soldier of fortune, Hicks. Gladstone's government announced that Britain would assume no responsibility for this distant province. It was determined to abandon the Sudan, withdrawing the European garrisons. For this purpose the Government chose the heroic, but headstrong and adventurous General Gordon. The decision was wise, but the selection of a leader could not have been more ill-advised. "Gladstone's Government", writes Lord Cromer "made two great mistakes in dealing with the Sudan. The sin of omission was that it did not stop the Hick's expedition. The sin of commission was the despatch of Gordon to Khartum". Gordon "threw his instructions to the winds", attempted the impossible, left the request for relief too late, and perished in Khartum on January 26, 1885 with all his force. It was a severe blow to British national pride, but the serious commitment of the country elsewhere left the awful blunder and disgrace unretrieved for thirteen years, when Kitchner reoccupied Khartum in September, 1898, after the Battle of Omdurman, to discover the French flag planted at Fashoda by Major Marchand. An open rupture between Britain and France seemed imminent but wiser counsels prevailed, for France "withdrew her horns" at the last moment. A fierce Anglo-French crisis which had brought the two countries to the brink of war, was thus averted, and Britain found herself with a British protectorate over the Sudan, of which the authority was more definite than in Egypt. The power of Britain in the Sudan vested technically upon a different basis than did its power in Egypt.

OTHER PARTS OF AFRICA

Reasons Why Africa was Little Known to Europe upto Middle of the 19th Century

Lying so close to Europe—almost within sight—the continent of Africa escaped the lust of Europeangreed for colonialism till past the middle of the nineteenth century. Africa was till then for all practical puposes a *terra incognita* (an unknown country). It is one of the most remarkable circumstances in history that so accessible a continent remained so long unexplored.

After Anglo-German negotiations had been protracted for four years. They collapsed for several reasons : (i) The German government was convinced that Germany had achieved a greatness at least equal to that of any other Power, that her greatness was cumulatively increasing so rapidly that she was on the eve of achieving world-dominion, and therefore, that her diplomacy was to be regulated to secure her prestige as arbiter among the Powers, together with the fruits of that function, until she passed through the 'danger—zone' and her dominion was indisputable. (ii) Britain was reluctant to recognise the actual and potential position of Germany, and was prone to assume from her past that history had given a final judgment in her favour. But it is difficult to see that the vehement commercial and industrial competition of Germany induced in the British mind the growing determination to wage a Punic⁸ war against her rival, for it was felt in England that such a colossal clash would result probably (as it did), in mutual enfeeblement. (iii) The relations of the two Great Powers were complicated by the existence of the Dual Alliance. The German reception of British proposals was affected by the temptation to prade them with Russia in the attempt to revive something of the Bismarckian policy and at the same time to bring influence to bear through Russia upon France. Since the accession to the French Foreign Office of Delcasse, moreover French policy was directed to prevent an Anglo-German entente, which would extend to the whole world a hegemony such as Bismarck had maintained for Germany in Europe.

Circumstances, therefore, so conspired that Germany was forced after 1897 to an ineluctable (not to be escaped from) choice between an alliance with Britain and isolation. For, if she refused the British terms, as she did, Britain became at once suspicious that she harboured aggressive designs, and was drawn into a defensive alignment with France, which produced a precarious balance, induced panic armament, and placed the destiny of the two opposed groups too much at the mercy of adventurers who struck diplomatic matches in the midst of those bundles of inflammable material, which lay about Europe, especially in the Balkans.

8. Carthaginian faithless treacherous, deceitful [(as the Romans alleged the Carthaginiams to be).

Bulow's national pride and prejudice were not different from Salisbury's, but German diplomacy was particularly maladroit during a critical period. Germany's policy was too doctrinaire. It was passed upon several assumptions which were quickly and completely falsified: namely, that Russia would defeat Japan and prove a greater menace than ever to Britain; that the enmities of Britain and France were immutable; that Germany could retain the control and direction of the Triple Alliance no matter how the circumstances which surrounded its original establishment were changed. The masters of German policy did not realise, that is, until too late, that if Germany became isolated, Italy was much worse than useless to the Triple Alliance, and that Austria could use her—and did—as a stalking horse (a horse or substitute behind which a sportsman hides while stalking game; any thing put forward so mask plans or efforts) behind which she could pursue her adventures in the Balkans. Indeed during the two decades before 1914 Europe presented the spectacle of that malignant disease which is the product of hypotrophied (the state of over-nourishment) political patriotism.

We turn now to piece together another portion of the European jigsaw, *viz.* the formation of the Anglo-French Entente or the Entente Cordiale.

The Entente Cordiale (1904)

The Background

Despite the fact that there were over fifty changes of government in France between 1871 and 1914, French Foreign Policy remained fairly homogeneous and continuous. This was due to two facts chiefly : (i) the policy of Bismarck of keeping her 'in cold storage ; and (ii) the universal French love of prestige.

Before the Congress of Berlin (1878), France had practically recovered from the debacle of 1870-71. After that Congress by the efforts of such men as Gambetta and Ferry, she sought to recover her prestige by establishing another world-empire, which she achieved in thirty years, first under the condescending patronage of Bismarck. The next step in the programme was to reverse the verdict of the Treaty of Frankfurt (May 10, 1871), to take her revenge. "Never mention it; never forget it", was the watchword which Gambetta gave to the French people. But to take her revenge on Germany she needed powerful allies, which would tilt the balance in her favour.

In acquiring her colonial empire, however, France had earned the enmity of Italy, whom she drove into the Triple Alliance, and of Britain, of whom, during the office of Bismarck, she made practically a sleeping partner of that formidable Alliance. Serious friction with Britain in regard to Egypt, Tonkin, Morocco, the New Herlides (a group of islands in the South Pacific) and other places was the price of her colonial expansion, which Bismarck considered sufficient.

But within a few months of the fall of Bismarck, the denunciation of the Re-insurance Treaty became the prelude to French

emergence from coventry by way of the Russian Alliance, which from the beginning of 1894, was directed by the French desire finally to re-establish the national "amour propre" (self-esteem) by taking complete revenge upon Germany. The Franco-Russian Alliance, however showed little sign of becoming a useful instrument of 'revanche', partly, because of Russian adventures in the Far East—which required a benevolently neutral Germany to keep a leash on Austria in the Near East; partly because of the utter incompatibility of view between a (semi-Oriental) despotism and an unstable and radical democracy; partly because of the chaos and corruption of politics within France itself. The Panama Canal scandals in 1892-93, resulting in the prosecution and imprisonment of Lessepe, Eiffel and others, and the implication of many prominent public men; the Dreyfus case, which began in 1894 and was not finally disposed till 1906, stirring up the depths of anti-Semitism and military corruption;¹ the endemic duel between the clericals and anti-clericals, which

1. The Dreyfus case briefly was : A certain ardently republican Jewish Officer, Captain Dreyfus had been convicted by court-martial of selling confidential documents to the German military attache. From being a minor military scandal, the case became a great political 'cause celebre' (a peculiarly notable trial).

It was alleged that the chief document on the evidence of which Dreyfus had been convicted and punished had in fact been forged ; and that its forger had been protected by the certain "stuffed shirts" (reactionary military authorities), who had seized upon the excuse to expel Jews and Protestants from the armed forces. The great novelist, Emile Zola (1840-1902), published an article "I Accuse" ("J'accuse") in which he deliberately invited legal penalties in order to set out the charges against the army. A whole succession of charges and counter charges meanwhile aroused public excitement to fever pitch, and Zola's trial, in which he was defended by Clemenceau, became a heated political debate. The personal issue of guilt or innocence of Dreyfus was lost sight of, and the issue became one of general principle. It was a clear issue between the military claim, that the honour and prestige of the army mattered more than injustice to any individual, and the Republican civilian claim, that individual justice must triumph over all else. Both sides exaggerated and inflated the issue until no settlement seemed possible. That Dreyfus was a Jew, and his most noisy enemies zealous Catholics, involved the affair in the anti-clerical quarrel. The affair ended with somewhat half-hearted attempts at a "coup d'etat" by extremists of the rights, and eventual pardon and reinstatement of Dreyfus.

The Dreyfus case had been much more than a quarrel about a man. It was made a pretext by all parties for gratifying their animosities. It was utilized by the right against the Republic, by rival republicans against each other, by the military party against the parliamentarians, by the revolutionary socialists against the army, by the clericals against non-Catholics, and by the anti-clericals against the Church. It was, in fact, a symptom of the complicated political condition of France.

The depths of bitterness engendered by the Dreyfus case, and the violence with which each side fought it for several years, made it seem natural even in 1940 for the overthrow of the third Republic by Marshal Petain to be described by Frenchmen as "the revenge of the anti-Dreyfusards."

produced a series of unseemly international crises and reacted rather disastrously upon foreign policy; such a constant succession of unsavoury episodes weakened the Russian Alliance and strengthened the British distrust of French policy.

From 1894 untill 1898 French foreign policy was directed by Hanotaux, who was influenced by bitter jealousy of Britain. For some years the German government had been philandering with France trying to convince itself that the desire for revenge was out of fashion, trying to shepherd France into a Continental alliance against Britain.

Theophile Delcasse at the "Quai d' Orsay"

Warm airs, however, began to blow between Britain and France after 1898, when the relation between Britain and Germany were drifting from bad to worse. The idea of a rapprochement between Britain and France was born on the day of Delcasse's appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs in June 1898. When he took on the robes of his office he is said to have declared, "I will not leave this chair until I have re-established a friendly understanding with England".

A rapprochement between Britain and France was preceded by the reconciliation between France and Italy. A commercial treaty with Italy, in 1898, was followed by the gradual seduction of that country from the solidarity of the Triple Alliance.²

The initiation by the Czar of the First Hague Conference acted as a cold douche upon those in France who saw in the Dual Alliance a weapon of revenge. Consequently, Delcasse handled the Fashoda

2. Even though Delcasse had succeeded in weakening Italy's allegiance to the Triple Alliance, Italy renewed the Alliance without verbal modification in 1902, but Italy made it clear to France that "in the renewal of the Alliance there is nothing directly or indirectly aggressive toward France, no engagement binding us in any eventuality to take part in an aggression against her, no stipulation which menaces her security and tranquility." On receiving this momentous communication, Delcasse expressed to the Italian Ambassador "the deepest gratitude of the French government for Italy's loyal proof of the policy of peace". Delcasse's announcement seemed to the Central Powers to suggest subterranean intrigues but it in no way contravened the letter of the Triple Alliance, which had never pledged Italy to cooperate in an attack on France. The German Chancellor according to his wont, poured oil on the troubled waters wittingly observing that in a happy marriage the husband did not mind his wife indulging in an innocent extra dance. On June 28, 1902, the Triple Alliance was renewed. But henceforth Italy had one foot in each Camp.

crisis with studious regard for British feelings. Gracefully abdicating the French claim, he asserted that in North Africa the Gallic (pertaining to Gaul or France) cook could scratch at ease amid his sand, leaving the British duck to wallow (so roll about) in the Nile-marches. During the Boer War French public opinion was greatly inflamed against England. Even the sober earnest Lavissee (1842 — 1922), who headed a galaxy of historians in France rewriting French history with special concentration of the history of the French Revolution, declared : “England would like to retain the advantages of having been the country of Gladstone when she has become the country of Mr. Chamberlain.” But Delcasse steered the policy of his country adroitly through these difficult months. “You say”, he said to a deputy, “that after finishing with the Transvaal England will turn against us.....Very frankly, I do not think so”. In the Senate he declared on April 3, 1900, that “If by mischance a conflict should break out between these two Powers, it is not to the victor that the chief fruits of victory would go.”

France co-operated with the other Powers in the intervention in China during the Boxer disturbances in 1900, but after the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in 1902, she found herself in a difficult situation between Russia and Britain, which might easily produce another crisis more serious for the scheme which Delcasse had up his sleeves for a rapprochement with Britain than Fashoda. According to the British view, Russia was “creeping over Manchuria behind a foggy cloud of assurances, secretly backed by Germany, openly backed by France, and posing all the time as a friend of China ” We have already seen how, despite the declaration of the solidarity of the Dual Alliance in regard to affairs “beyond Europe”, Delcasse reached a ‘modus vivendi’ (an arrangement or compromise by means of which those who differ may get on together for a time) with England without estranging Russia.

Delcasse's Mind was not an Ease with France's International Position

Delcasse was, however, not satisfied with France's international position. Since his visit to St. Petersburg in April, 1901, and the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in January, 1902, he realised that Russo-Japanese conflict was inevitable, and that its inevitable result would be to weaken Russia as a partner in the

Dual Alliance in European diplomacy. There were still acute colonial questions outstanding with England, *e.g.*, in Egypt, Morocco, Newfoundland, Madagascar, Siam and the New Hebrides. Even though he had succeeded in weakening Italy's allegiance to the Triple Alliance, she had renewed the Alliance without verbal modification in 1902.

Delcasse all out for an Understanding with Britain

Accordingly, Delcasse bent all his energies to the task of reaching an understanding with England along the line of mutual concession, which would prepare the way for a general political agreement, and perhaps lead to the formation of the Triple Entente of Britain, France and Russia which would brighten the horizon of French policy.

The Bagdad Railway

About this time the four leading European Powers became closely involved in the question of the future of Asiatic Turkey. Although throughout the earlier part of the nineteenth century, Britain had occupied a dominant position in Turkey as early as 1888 a German Company had obtained a concession to build a railway from Haidar Pasha (opposite Constantinople) to Angora, and a report by a British official, Major Law, who was sent in 1895 to survey the situation, revealed that Germany had quite replaced Britain in Asia Minor, and that German Companies had gained control of its communications, to the disadvantage of both Britain and France. In November, 1899, Germany obtained from the Sultan a concession to extend the Anatolian Railway to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. Britain at once established a protectorate over Koweit which contained perhaps the only port which could furnish a terminus for the Railway.

Meanwhile, German and French financiers had secretly agreed each to provide 40% of the necessary capital—leaving 20% to be subscribed by other nations - and to divide the control between representatives of the two countries. When this arrangement became known, Russia bristled at the prospect of a peaceful penetration of Asia Minor, which might result, through secret agreement, in a dangerous alteration of the political 'status quo'. Britain, whose negotiations for a political agreement with Germany were approach-

ing a stalemate, and who found herself in the course of the Boer War at fierce odds with the public opinion of both France and Germany, demanded equal consideration in the question of the exploitation of Asia Minor.

French opinion would not allow her ally, Russia, to be overlooked in a matter which so nearly concerned her, and Delcasse was anxious to placate Britain. An embargo was placed upon the negotiation of Bagdad Railway stock in the French bourse (pronounced Boors—an exchange where merchants meet for business) until a satisfactory political arrangement was made.

Early in 1903, it was suggested that Germany, France and Britain should each supply 30% of the capital ; but, when it was found that the enterprise was to be placed completely under German directorship and control, the British Government strenuously opposed it. Lansdowne informed the German government that Britain had no intention allowing any railway to be constructed through Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf, except one of completely international character.

The French Premier, Rouvier, who was banker and had been concerned in the previous negotiations, was still in favour of French participation with Germany ; but when Delcasse pointed out that France would probably be left to provide 60% of the capital, that Germany would retain practically sole administrative control and that Russia and Britain would be alienated by such a project, at the end of 1903 he secured an official embargo upon French participation. Thus the two governments issued from the Bagdad Railway negotiations with a distrust of Germany, which emphasised their tendency to a mutual accord.

Other Favourable Circumstances which Brought Britain and France Closer to one Another

The retirement of Salisbury (1901) removed a figure who, like Hanotianx, had been consistently unfavourable to an Anglo-French entente ; whilst the accession of Edward VII (1901) meant the advent of a powerful friend of France. Delcasse now had a powerful patron, in the King, and two excellent liaison officers, in Sir

Thomas Barclay at Paris³, and M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Edward VII's Visit to Paris

In the spring of 1903, Edward VII, of his own initiative, asked for an initiation to visit Paris, which the French government at once accorded, though it feared a hostile, or at best a cold, reception by the populace. But Edward's tact and bonhomie prevailed. In a speech before the English Chamber of Commerce in Paris he said: "The days of hostility between the two countries are, I am certain, happily at an end. I know of no two countries whose prosperity is more interdependent.....I trust that the friendship and admiration which we all feel for the French nation and their glorious traditions may in the near future develop into a sentiment of the warmest affection and attachment between the peoples of the two countries" with Edward VII's visit to Paris the tension between the two countries which dated from the Fashoda crisis began at once to relax "The English King", says Tardieu, "was the initiator of the rapprochement. He it was who both conceived and facilitated it." Sir C. Dilke wrote to the same effect: "The great and sudden improvement in relations between the English-speaking world and France is largely due to the wisdom and courtesy with which the King made clear to France that there was no ground for the suspicions which prevailed."

Three Months Later French President Loubet Returned the King's Visit

In the summer of the same year (1903), President Loubet returned the King's visit, and was received by genuine enthusiasm.

A Treaty of Arbitration

On October 14, 1903, the two countries signed a Treaty of Arbitration for settlement of all judicial disputes by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. In the French Chamber, this Treaty was supported with the observation: "Thinking people of both countries are agreed that a hostile policy between the two great

3. An excellent account of the transition from hostile into friendship between Britain and France is to be found in Barclay's "Anglo French Reminiscences".

liberal nations, between the country of the 'Habeas Corpus' and the country of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, would be a crime against civilisation."

The Entente Cordiale (April 8, 1904)

The fruit of six years of delicate diplomacy was now ripening for Delcasse, and in the following spring it was plucked. An accord was signed by both governments on April 8, 1904, settling all the outstanding political differences between the two nations, which now became united in the 'Entente Cordiale'.

The Accord

The famous settlement was embodied in three separate treaties :

(i) relating to Egypt and Morocco ; (ii) to Newfoundland and West Africa : and (iii) to Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides.

Settlement Relating to Egypt and Morocco

Britain was particularly anxious to reach an agreement with France in regard to Egypt, where a highly competent and successful administration was being embarrassed by French obstruction. Although France had withdrawn from a dual control there in 1882, the financial administration was still, in 1904, regulated by the Law of Liquidation of 1880 and the London Convention of 1885. The 'Caisse de la Dette (Treasury) had been established to guarantee and liquidate Egypt's foreign debts by placing a lien on her revenues to provide interest. For some years there had been a deficit in the 'Caisse', which was still partly controlled by France. But before the end of the nineteenth century, Lord Cromer had entirely rehabilitated Egyptian government and finance and in the words of Lord Milner "The spectacle of Egypt, with her Treasury full of money, yet not allowed to use that money for an object which, on a moderate calculation, should add 20% to the wealth of the country, is as distressing as it is ludicrous. Every year that passes illustrates more forcibly the injustice of maintaining, in these days of assured solvency, the restrictions imposed upon the financial freedom

of the Egyptian Government at a time of bankruptcy – restrictions justified then, but wholly unjustifiable now.”⁴

On the other side, France felt herself intolerably hampered in regard to Morocco by the jealous obstruction of Britain. As pointed out by Andre Tardieu (1876-1945), “For twenty years Britain has been in Morocco our most redoubtable adversary.”⁵

The most important of the agreements signed on April 8, 1904, was the Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco.⁶

By this Declaration British surveillance of the Egyptian government was henceforth to be unimpeded by France. After effective provision had been made for the guarantee of liquidation of Egypt’s foreign debts, the Egyptian government was to have freedom, under British supervision, to apply the balance of her revenue to national purposes. Britain declared that she had no intention of altering the political status of Egypt—*i.e.*, by proclaiming a protectorate – and France declared that she would not demand a period to the British occupation, nor intervene in any way in its administration. All existing rights of French nationals in Egypt were guaranteed, including the ‘open door in commerce’ and Britain renewed her guarantee of neutrality of the Suez Canal (Suez Canal Convention of 1888).

The British Government, in return, recognised the special interest of French “the preserve order in Morocco, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require”, and undertook not to “obstruct the action taken by French for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Britain enjoys there.” France declared that she had no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. It was stipulated (Art. 7) that no fortifications of strategic works were to be constructed on the Moroccan coast opposite Gibraltar; and (Art. 8) that France was to come to a

4. According to Lord Cromer the immediate origin of the ‘Entente’ was to be found in this situation in Egypt, which had, in fact, become intolerable to Britain.

5. France was therefore no less eager to clear her path in Morocco.

6. In a circular despatch to French Ambassadors in April, 1904, Delcasse wrote: “The principal part of the arrangement just concluded relates to Morocco.”

friendly understanding with Spain as to the distribution of their spheres of interest in Morocco. By Art. 9 the two governments were to "afford to one another their diplomatic support in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration". For European affairs Art. 9 was the most significant. It made Morocco the focus of European disputes during the next decade and the occasion of several German discomfiture.

In short by the Declaration Britain received a free hand in Egypt, and France in Morocco.

Britain formally notified the governments of other powers, particularly Germany, of the agreement so far as it related to Egypt ; but France never informed the German government directly and in the proper diplomatic form. Neither did she inform Spain in the usual way ; though negotiations between France and Spain were set in train in terms of Art. 8 of the Declaration.

So far as the public Declaration of April 8, 1904 was concerned, Britain and France abandoned their traditional policy in regard to Morocco and Egypt respectively ; though the reservation with respect to "the open door" in Morocco—as it affected both Britain and Germany—was equivocated by the French government, which distinguished between "commercial" and "economic" freedom, and intended to exclude all other nationals from contracts for public work, and from the exploitation of mineral wealth of Morocco. The published agreement regarding Egypt and Morocco was to have a tenure of thirty years.

Reaction of Germany to the Accord

The attitude of official Germany towards the Anglo-French Treaty was at first friendly and favourable. Before the Declaration was signed, the North German Gazette, an official organ, stated on March 25 that in view of the "reiterated assurance" that France intended "neither the conquest nor the occupation" of Morocco, German interests were, "so far as can be gathered at present" in no danger. On April 12, in answer to questions in the Reichstag, Bulow stated that there was no reason to believe that the agreement was directed against Germany. "We must protect our commercial interests in Morocco, and shall protect them. We have no reason to fear that they will be so aside or infringed by any Power". It

is important to notice that the German government throughout made no distinction between—'economic' interests and 'commercial' interests in a narrow sense.

Secret Articles

It was first revealed in "Le Temps" in November, 1911, that in addition to the published Declaration of April, 1904, the two governments had also signed five secret articles in which the British government agreed to allow France, if and when she found it desirable, to establish a protectorate over Morocco on three conditions : (i) a guarantee of commercial freedom ; (ii) that the control of the territory, opposite Gibraltar should be in the hands of Spain, which was not allowed to alienate it, or to fortify its coast ; (iii) that France consented to the declaration of a British protectorate over Egypt whenever Britain should consider that step desirable. This in spite not only of Delcasse's statement to the German Ambassador at Paris on March 27, that "we wish to uphold in Morocco the existing political and territorial status", but also of the published Declaration in the Anglo-French agreement that France had no intention of altering the political status of Morocco, which in any case, was guaranteed by the Madrid Convention, signed by the governments of thirteen Powers, including Germany.

It was obviously an utterly dishonest transaction, to which both the British and French governments were parties.

It was thought inexpedient to publish these articles with the rest of the Declaration, so one can surmise, because the Sultan of Morocco might object to even the possibility of a protectorate and Germany might imagine that her interests were being jeopardised.

We have now discussed at some length the transactions regarding Egypt and Morocco which constituted the chief foundation of the 'Entente Cordiale.'

The Other Two Treaties

The other two remaining Declarations signed on the same day (April 8, 1904) can be dismissed more summarily. In the second Declaration, Britain and France defined their spheres of influence in Siam., in Madagascar, Britain abandoned her opposition to the French policy of commercial exclusiveness, receiving a compensating advantage in Zanzibar. Agreement was also reached in regard to the administration of the New Hebrides, which since 1887 had been most unsatisfactorily controlled by a mixed naval commission.

The third Convention, in regard to the Newfoundland fisheries, though it may seem trivial, removed a long standing cause of French bitterness. Newfoundland had been ceded to England by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). Its possession was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris (1763). In 1783, at the Treaty of Versailles, however, a strip of coast, known as the French shore, was reserved exclusively for French fishermen. During the nineteenth century although the number of fishermen from France steadily declined, bitter disputes continued about the purchase of bait and the drying of fish and nets. When the British government signed a convention with France in respect of those conventions in 1857, Newfoundland, which now enjoyed self-government, refused to observe its conditions. When in 1890 the Newfoundlanders found the French fishermen taking lobsters—which, it seems are crustacea (a large class of aquatic arthropod animals) and not fish—in territorial waters, they returned to the attack. At last, in 1904, the vexed question was settled. The French abandoned their drying rights, and for the rest were on equality with British fishermen; the lobster lost its international status. France was compensated in Gambia and Nigeria (Western Africa), gaining the strategically important Iles de Los, better access to Senegambia and Lake Chad—altogether about 140,000 square miles of territory, which greatly improved and consolidated her Western African Empire.

The General settlement of April, 1904 was acclaimed both in Britain and in France, and the two countries from that time entered into an ever closer diplomatic accord, which was destined to have a critical influence on the political fortunes of the world. The Russian government expressed its profound satisfaction at the new entente, and already Russians were to be found who talked of its extension into a new triple alliance.

Comments on the Entente Cordiale

A common distrust of Germany had brought Britain and France together in what may perhaps be called a conspiracy of defence.

The Entente Cordiale settled all claims between the two countries. Some of these claims were old—that of Newfoundland fisheries went back to the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). Others were modern boundary questions. But the fundamental bargain was the surrender of France's special position in Egypt for British recognition of her ambitions in Morocco.

Spain was brought off by a share in Moroccan territory, but Germany was not bought at all, because there was nothing to buy. Germany had no place in Morocco anyway. But the Germans thought differently. So considerable a change in the African *status quo* as the acceptance of French Control in Morocco was not to be permitted except at a price. The French position was weakened by the folly of her ally. Russia had blundered into war with Japan, a war that diverted her military and naval strength to the Pacific, and showed too how overrated that strength had been. Defeat was followed by revolt and France could not count on her ally. The Germans exploited the situation; the Kaiser went to Tangier to declare his interest in the independence of the Sultan of Morocco. The Germans were anxious to break the entente, but Britain stood firm. France, however, was in no position to fight, and the Moroccan question was referred to an international Congress which met at Algeciras (1906),

Significance of the Entente Cordiale

Although the Entente Cordiale was merely a statement of harmony, and not an alliance, it was of great importance in ending Anglo—French rivalry and in bringing about a complete reconciliation of the two Western Powers which he beckoned as Delcasse foresaw a new era in European politics. It was enthusiastically received on both sides of the Channel.⁷ It marked the turning of Britain away from Germany; it removed from Britain the need of dependence upon German support in her Egyptian policy. It caused Italy to consider again her position in the Triple Alliance. It contributed to the adjustment of Anglo—Russian relations at the time when the Russo-Japanese War was putting strain upon them; it cleared the way for the signing in 1907 of the Anglo-Russian Convention which completed the Triple Entente.

7. There was only one dissentient voice that of Lord Rosebury (Prime Minister of England in 1894-95) who observed that as Germany, the strongest military power in Europe, had not been consulted over Morocco the 'Entente' would eventually lead England into a German War.

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The Triple Entente 1907

We have already noticed the unstable position of Russia in European diplomacy at the beginning of the twentieth century. At that time the Dual Alliance had lost much of its original attractiveness for the French. Germany was actively intriguing for Russian friendship, and the vision of a great Continental alliance constantly hovered before William II, involving him in those curious negotiations during the South African War. For Britain, Russia was still the traditional enemy, whose sprawling advance towards Afghanistan, Tibet, the Persian Gulf, and her deep desire for the opening of the Bosphorus, were regarded as a constant menace to the integrity of the British Empire.

British Policy in Regard to the Persian Gulf, Tibet and Afghanistan

In May 1903, Lansdowne made a statement of British policy in regard to the Persian Gulf, which had been an undisputed sphere of British influence for more than a century and a half. While reaffirming the principle of the 'open door', he declared that the military penetration of this zone by any other Power would be regarded as a hostile act. This pronouncement was received with much chagrin both at St. Petersburg and at Berlin. Largely through the initiative of Lord Curzon, who was at the time Viceroy of India, an expedition was despatched under Sir Francis Younghusband in 1903-04 to Lhasa, which opened relations with Tibet, and, by means of a treaty possessing definite sanctions, secured that country as a bulkhead against Russian aggression towards India. Before the Tibetan Treaty was signed in September, 1904, the British Prime Minister Balfour found it necessary to warn Russia in May

was divided into two armed camps and entered on the path which led straight to the catastrophe of 1914.

Concluding Comments on the Franco-Russian Alliance

Bismarck had lived to see the basis of his policy destroyed, and the evanescence of his diplomatic system clearly demonstrated. The Union of Germany had introduced into Europe the strongest military power in its history. The creation of that great barrier—the Central Alliance—across Europe had divided the eastern and western powers, which Bismarck's further policy had sought to keep isolated. He had replaced the old arrangement of a balance of power by a German hegemony, which inevitably provoked the defensive tactics of restoring the balance by a Franco-Russian coalition, and suggested to the defensive powers a policy of encirclement.

The relations of Germany and Britain now became the crucially important factor in European policy. Undoubtedly in his rough Prussian fashion Bismarck had pursued a policy of peace, but it had been a policy in the old Machiavellian manner. "Toujours en vedette". Bismarck had in fact "waged" peace with the weapons of war, and the subtle finesse of his diplomacy had gone almost for nothing.

Nevertheless, as long as Germany remained on good terms with Britain, and convinced her of the desire for peaceful co-operation, the division of the European powers into two armed camps would still constitute a balance and give the island empire her traditional role of make-weight. An Anglo-German entente in these circumstances would guarantee the 'status quo' and the peace of the world. On the other hand, Anglo-German rivalry if pressed by Germany to the point of open enmity, would slowly force Britain into a coalition with France and Russia, which would destroy the delicate balance, release the pent-up chauvinism of France and Russia, and precipitate an unparalleled cataclysm.

It is very necessary therefore, to examine the relations between Germany and Britain since 1890 in the effort to discover why and how Germany forced Britain—whose dominant interest was European peace—into the arms of the exponents of 'revanche' and of the aggressive and reactionary Russia, when the maintenance of the traditional policy of Anglo-German Co-operation would have kept a leash upon the continental rivals.

10

Anglo German Relations after The Fall of Bismarck

Before the close of the nineteenth century, Europe fell into two opposed camps of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the Dual Alliance of Russia and France, which maintained a delicate and perilous balance of power, with Britain swinging between them in the role of a wandering comet attached to neither system. But Britain could not follow the attitude for long.

To understand why Britain veered round towards the Dual Alliance partners, in spite of the fact that for a number of years she was considered to be a sleeping partner of the Triple Alliance, we must examine at length the Anglo-German relations since 1890.

Accession of William II to the Throne of Germany

In 1888 William I, the first ruler of reunited Germany, died at the more than the patriarchal age of ninety-one years. As his son, Frederick, who was already dwelling in the shadow of death at the time of his accession, reigned only for three months, the sceptre passed to Frederick's eldest son, William.

Emperor William II (1888-1918) was an intelligent, active, and nervously unbalanced individual, afflicted with an excessive self-esteem.

The accession of William II seemed at first to be taken no change in the policy of the German Empire. He protested complete faith in the Iron Chancellor whose policy he proposed to continue. But Bismarck soon realised that the Emperor intended to be his

own Chancellor, and the purely personal contest between the two men, ended within twenty-one months in the dismissal of the maker of the German Empire.

Dropping the Plot

The young and restive William chafed under the inherited tutelage of Bismarck, who under the modest, self-effacing William I, had usurped all the functions of sovereign. He felt that the Chancellor's position and the way in which he sometimes advocated his wishes were incompatible with the monarchical dignity or vocation. He wished to appear before the world not only as the power on the throne, but the power behind the throne as well. This and this alone was the real root of the hostility between the two men, not their divergent views on social and political questions, not even the irreconcilable differences in their general outlook ; for the Kaiser had no firm and wide practical outlook, but was swayed by momentary moods and impulses, arising from the prevailing feeling. Even questions of foreign policy played a secondary part in this great conflict. At bottom the question was who should rule Germany, the Kaiser or the Chancellor ? The struggle was for supremacy. Since there was no way in which two persons so self-willed and autocratic could divide power, Bismarck had to go. As he stayed on when he saw that his presence was no longer desired, the Emperor not willing to be overshadowed by so commanding and illustrious a minister, finally demanded his resignation early in 1890, and was most unceremoniously hustled out of the Foreign Office in Berlin. Thus in bitterness and humiliation ended the political career of a man, who according to himself had cut a figure in the history of Germany and Prussia.

Bismarck after his dismissal withdrew his private estate, where he lived for eight years longer surrounded by his family and friends. To be compelled like any other human being, to read in the morning paper the news which he had been in the habit of creating was humiliating, indeed. To relieve the ennui and to indulge his still vigorous combative instincts, he used his time in writing his memoirs, and in carrying on a guerilla war in the news paper with his enemies. He died on July 30, 1898, at the age of eighty-three. Thus melted into history one of the makers of an empire.

Caprivi as Chancellor, 1890-1894

"Within two months of Bismarck's dismissal, there was no one in the Foreign Office (of Germany) who defended the system of foreign policy which he had built up with so much toil, or even showed the slightest grasp of its meaning; a further proof that Bismarck by his arbitrary methods tolerated only tools, and lacked the act of attracting colleagues of independent judgment" (Brandenburg). Apparently Bismarck himself had approved the appointment of General Von Caprivi to succeed him. But the new Chancellor, who had received a purely military training, and had no political experience, at once hastened to depart from Bismarck's complicated policy. In his first speech in the Prussian Diet he declared that he conceived it to be his duty to lead the German people, after the age of great men and great deeds, back to the prose of common life (Gooch).

Baron von Holstein

Caprivi had in Baron von Marschall and Kiderlen-Wachter, two very able ministers; but German foreign policy from this time seems to be controlled by that obscure person Baron von Holstein, who brooded over its problems with a tortuous logic of his own, and secured the execution of his decisions preferably by indirect means. He was one of the most mysterious personage who ever worked behind the scene of German policy. "He often withheld reports from his official superiors.....The more natural and obvious a thing seemed, the greater was his suspicion. He would break off negotiations directly the other party was ready to adopt his wishes. He only desired a thing so long as others did not" (Eckardstein, in Gooch). Holstein's peculiar preference for obscurity was shown when he refused to become Foreign Secretary under Bulow, who believed implicitly in him.

Denunciation of the Re-insurance Treaty

The pillars of Bismarck's policy during his last years of power had been friendship with Russia and Britain. But one of the earliest act of his successor had been to denounce the Re-insurance Treaty with Russia,¹ and thus to remove the last diplomatic deterrent to a Franco—Russian entente.

1. See p. 86 *supra*

Anglo-German relations under Caprivi (1890-94)

Bismarck's desire to maintain friendship of England was emphatic. Under Caprivi who adhered to the Bismarckian tradition in this regard, relations with England, at any rate, continued peaceable. In 1890, soon after he assumed office, an agreement was reached by which colonial boundaries in Africa were defined, and, in return for territorial concessions in East Africa, Heligoland was ceded to Germany. The Kaiser was delighted over the deal, but the retired Bismarck professed to be greatly disgruntled at the method of acquisition, which he himself had sought for some years. In the presence of the Franco—Russian entente, which by the end of 1893, had hardened into the Dual Alliance, the Kaiser maintained studiously friendly relations with England, visiting the country frequently, extolling the British Navy, for which he was an admiral, and glorying in his partly English blood, his mother being, of course, a daughter of Queen Victoria.

Change in German Policy towards Britain

But in the mid-nineteens German policy began definitely to change. Upon the retirement of Caprivi in 1894, the Kaiser appointed as his successor Prince Hohenlohe, a dignified and elderly aristocrat, who had been for some years German Ambassador at Paris, and afterwards administrator of Alsace—Lorraine. He was little more than a figure-head, and the Kaiser now began to take the administration of policy largely into his own hands. He had at last a comparatively free hand, and he was determined to impress his personality and the prestige of Germany upon the world.

German aspirations to a commanding influence in World — Policy date, in fact, from 1894; and the retirement of Caprivi was probably connected with the change in the Emperor's mind. The next four years are the heyday of the Kaiser's personal power, and their confused and the hectic events are consonant with his volatile and grandiose temperament. Despite the fact that the Central Alliance was not confronted by the openly hostile Dual Alliance of France and Russia, and that a sober co-ordination of German and British policy, exercised with cool restraint, was so clearly required. Germany, under a divided and adventurous leadership, involved herself in a series of international 'affairs', which gradually deprived her of British confidence, and finally drove Britain into a defensive

alignment with her opponents. In short, the sky began to darken in the mid-nineties, and Anglo-German relations were never to regain the confidence and intimacy of the opening years of the reign of William II.

There developed a sharp divergence of sentiment and policy between the two countries in regard to Turkey, Sea Power, the Far East, and South Africa, we will now take each one of these regions in turn with a view to examine the manifestation of their antagonism in each one of these fields.

(i) Turkey

A recrudescence of Turkish barbarity in Armenia in 1894-95 provoked both the Liberal government of Rosebery and the Conservative government Salisbury to vehement protest and a series of attempts at purely humanitarian intervention was made in order to protect the Armenians from further massacre. The intrusion of this humanitarian motive into the international policy of Britain had always been suspected and resented by the Continental Powers. On this occasion, although Salisbury was supported unanimously by British public opinion without respect of party, he found himself impotent to restrain the savagery of the Turks because he was confronted by the cynical opposition of the other governments of Europe. By his intervention he had only earned the hostile suspicion of France and Russia, the arrogant contempt of the Turks, and the ironical indifference of Germany and Austria. When Salisbury appealed personally to the Kaiser for German support in his Turkish policy, he met with a curt refusal. The Kaiser in face of all the facts—professed that Turkey was capable of reforming herself, and that intervention—much less the partition at which Salisbury strongly hinted was unthinkable. The Kaiser, in fact, regarded, this diplomatic isolation of Britain as a favourable opportunity to supplant wanning British prestige with the sublime Porte.

In 1897 the Kaiser appointed the very able German Foreign Secretary, Marschall, Germanys' Ambassador at Constantinople where he remained until 1912. The appointment was not without significance, for in 1898 the Kaiser made his famous pilgrimage via Constantinople, to Jarusalem, strewing his path with the flowers of rhetoric ; which expressed a curious mixture of Christian piety, love of Islam and national arrogance. The key-note of this strange

symphony was struck at Damascus, when he declared himself the friend of the nefarious Sultan, Abdul Hamid, and of 300 million Muslims. This speech aroused amazement and profound distrust in Britain, France and Russia. Meanwhile, Marschall, with the active aid of Kaiser, was striving to secure the economic vassalage of Turkey, and particularly was passing on the construction of the Anatolian railway.

A Momentous Change of German Policy

Germany had made a momentous change of policy. Not only had the Kaiser who possessed no Mohammedan subjects, declared a sort of protectorate over Islam; but also Germany had committed herself to the most active economic penetration of Asiatic Turkey, had developed her railway—building enterprises into a vast Berlin—Bagdad scheme; had thereby implicated herself in the Balkans, and by this “*Drang nach Osten*” (eastward thrust) had ranged herself in vigorous competition with Russia, France, and Britain.

On the other hand, Britain, as the result of her Turkish policy between 1844 to 1898, had become conscious of her complete isolation from the Continental Powers. The old feeling of gruff friendliness encouraged by Bismarck, had given place to a new attitude of violent mistrust on the part of the new Germany, which talked more and more of the superiority of her power and her culture, her wealth and her influence in the world, and of her demand for “a place in the sun”, if necessary, at the expense of less gifted nations.

At the same time (1897), Russia and Austria had reached an agreement to respect the “*status quo*,” and in any change in the Balkans to limit their policy by a just recognition of each other’s claims. On the other hand, Britain was still actively opposed to the policy of Russia in the East and of France in Africa. In 1898 she was at the very point of war with France over rival claims to exclusive political influence in the upper basin of the Nile (Fashoda).

In short, these were troubled years, in which the Continental Powers had become divided into two hostile camps, both of which, however, were hostile to Britain, for clearly, since 1894 Germany had decided upon a “forward policy,” in which she no longer felt the need which had appeared fundamental to Bismarck of British friendship, except upon German terms.

(ii) German Sea Power

Another aspect of this critical change in German policy began to become definitely apparent after 1895. In June of that year the Kiel Canal was opened with great pomp, and since then he had become deeply enamoured of the idea of sea-power. From this time his flamboyant utterances upon this theme, both in season and out of season, became more and more frequent and significant. "Imperial power means sea power; the two are inseparable". "I will never rest," he declared, when, despatching his brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, on a small Cruiser to partake in a great naval review at which Britain celebrated Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee in 1897 "till I have raised my navy to the same standard as that of my army." On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the German Empire, January 18, 1896, the Kaiser, in the course of an oratorical flight, declared. "The German Empire has grown into a world empire. Everywhere in distant parts of the earth dwell thousands of our countrymen...Yours is a grave duty to help me bind this greater Germany closer to our Father land". In 1898, he made the famous assertion: "Our future lies upon the water. The Trident (a three-pronged spear, especially that of the sea-god Poseidon or Neptune) must pass into hands."

It was becoming increasingly obvious during these years that such declarations were something more than mere ebullitions of the Kaiser's egotism.

Almost about this time the "Alldeut Scherbund" (Pan-German League) had been formed under the presidency of Karl Peters of East African fame. Although the influence of this League was much exaggerated by Allied propagandists after the outbreak of the World War, it indicated the rise of an aggressive and expensive spirit among certain classes of the German people, and revealed that the influence of Bismarck was already nearly extinct in Germany. Bismarck's phrase, that Germany was a "saturated State," had become obsolete. The German Empire, with its formidable army and its avowed determination to establish an equally formidable navy, declared intention to enter the lists of the World as an aggressive and expensive Power. It is, however, difficult to evade the conclusion that this momentous step was the practical conclusion of the militant policy by which Bismarck had unified "the Germanies".

Germany's Naval Ambition Takes Definite Shape

Two years after the opening of the Kiel Canal the Kaiser's naval ambition took definite shape. In June, 1897, Bulow succeeded Marschall as Foreign Minister. A fortnight earlier, Admiral von Tirpitz had been appointed Minister of Marine. The Kaiser imposed upon them the duty of conducting Germany to her rightful place as a leading World Power (into the realms of "Weltpolith," which entailed the creation of an adequate navy. Bulow and Tirpitz accepted the duty with alacrity.

In November, 1897, Tirpitz introduced the first Navy Bill, which proposed a building-programme for seven years ; and he used every device including the attempt to entist Bismarck—to secure its passage. The Bill was carried in April, 1898. It provided for twelve battleships, eight coastal monitors, ten large and twenty-three small cruisers. So began the challenge to British naval supremacy, which, as it was pressed, bred increasing British hostility to Germany. Despite repeated statements of responsible Germans, that they did not seek a naval superiority similar to their military superiority, "the conclusion can scarcely be avoided that Germany did aspire to the admiralty of the Atlantic, and that she expected to achieve it" (Schmitt). Before examining the development of that naval Competition, which produced in Britain an increasing conviction of German hostility, let us now notice two other fields (the Far East and Africa) of German policy in the mid-nineties, which further clearly indicated her emergence as an aggressive World Power. "The Bismarckian policy", writes Brandenburg, "had always sought to utilise existing circumstances in order to maintain peace and to strengthen Germany's position in Europe ; the aim of the new diplomacy, however, was to develop Germany's colonial empire". If this is so, the policy of Germany during the twenty years after 1894 was conspicuous for its clumsy failure as it had been for its subtle success under Bismarck.

(iii) The Far East

The Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) In 1894, China in contravention of a treaty signed with Japan in 1885, had attempted a military occupation of the weak but independent kingdom of Korea, and refusing to withdraw had found herself at war with Japan. The war was brief and disastrous for China. Japan emerged from the

the war early in 1895 as one of the great military powers of the World, and forced upon China the Treaty of Shimonoseki, (April 17, 1885).

Shimonoseki and its Reactions

By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan was to receive from China the large Island of Formosa, the southern point of the peninsula of Liao-tang-containing the fortified harbour of Port Arthur—and a war indemnity of 30 million. China recognised the complete independence of Korea.

Of the European Powers, Russia was most nearly affected by the dramatic victory of Japan. Since 1891, Russia had been vigorously pushing the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, hoping to establish the terminus at Port Arthur, whence she could dominate the Far East. To be suddenly supplanted by this new Oriental Power was intolerable to her. Russian's ally, France, also, with her rather unstable footing in Indo-China, was perturbed by the territorial acquisitions of Japan within China, which might be the harbinger of a general partition of that decadent empire. Britain had, of course, the predominant commercial interest in the Far East, and, being better informed than any other Power of conditions in this region, she had already, in 1894, accepted Japan into the society of nations by a legal recognition of her sovereign dignity and international status. Of all the great Powers Germany seemed to have the least direct political interest in the Far Eastern Question. When China faced inevitable defeat, she appealed to the European Powers to intervene on her behalf and moderate the Japanese terms. Russia and France at once responded to this request, but the rest of the world was greatly surprised to find Germany closely associated with them. Although Britain had earlier considered the advisability of a general mediation between the two Eastern Powers, she soon afterwards abandoned the idea, and now declined to participate in an attempt "to deprive a friendly Power of the just fruits of victory".

Germany's Attitude towards the Far Eastern Question

Germany's attitude towards the Eastern Question was disquieting and not easily comprehensible. Bismarck described this new Triple Alliance as "a leap in the dark", and attributed it to a

dangerous staining after prestige. It bore also the suspicious suggestion of an anti-British Coalition of the leading Continental Powers. The German attitude in this, as in several other important affairs during the last five years of the nineteenth century, was due to the emergence of an aggressive ambition confused by divided control of policy. Holstein wished Germany to remain detached from the Far Eastern Question but he was induced to support the intervention. The Chancellor, Hohenlohe who possessed Russian estates and connexions—wished to repair the wire to St. Petersburg. The Kaiser had many shifting motives. He was determined to assert and maintain German prestige in her newly adopted role as a World Power; he wished to undo the Dual Alliance; he wished to gain a naval base in China; he had a grandiose idea of establishing a European alliance under German leadership, which should be directed chiefly against England. Again, he wrote in July, 1895, "We must try to nail Russia down in East Asia, so that she may occupy herself less with Europe and the Near East". But amidst this curious mixture of motives the desire for a coaling-station in China was especially strong and definite.

The "Yellow Peril"

At first the Kaiser had been lost in admiration of the military skill and courage of the Japanese, whose training was largely German, and had been favourable to their claims. But suddenly his mood changed. He became obsessed with the spectre of the "Yellow Peril", and ordered the painter Knackfuss to portray symbolically the nations of Europe depending Christian civilisation against Vast Eastern hordes, led by a savage and destructive Buddha. He added the motto. "Nations of Europe guard your holiest possessions"; and sent the picture as a gift to the Czar, who was greatly pleased with it. Thereafter Germany took a leading part in the diplomacy by which Japan was forced to modify the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and abandon her footing on the mainland. The behaviour of the German ambassador was especially brutal. The Japanese submitted to the threat of superior force; but they never forgot this contumely, which not many years after bore fruit in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Japanese attitude in the First World War. Sir Val. Chirol stated that in 1895, Marquis Ito said to him "Japan will never forgive Germany".

Occupation of Kiaochow by Germany

Secret Russo German negotiations continued for some time after the humiliation of Japan, and in November, 1897, the German government, seizing upon the murder of two German missionaries as an excuse, occupied Kiaochow at the entrance of the Gulf of Pechili, on a 99-year lease, and proceeded at once to establish a fortified naval base. The chaotic Chinese government was slow to accede to the high German demands for territory and financial compensation, and accordingly a German squadron was despatched under the command of the Kaiser's brother, Prince Henry of Prussia to whom he gave the notorious admonition ; "Should anyone attempt to affront us or infringe our just rights, then strike with a mailed fist."

Russia Seizes Port Arthur

Within a year the Russians "compensated" themselves for the German occupation of Kiaochow by seizing Port Arthur—that very harbour which the Japanese, after conquering, were forced to cede back to China. Port Arthur had been used occasionally as anchorage for the British China fleet ; but when the British government protested against its alienation to a Russia, the Russian government produced a secret agreement, which had been wrested from China, giving Russia a prior and exclusive claim. Britain then obtained from China a lease of the port of Weihaiwei, as "point d'appui" (point of support) in North China.

Germany's Policy of Active Support of Russia in the Far East

Germany's root idea was that if she stood well with Russia and kept her tied down in Eastern Asia, the former should not have to fear a war of revenge from France, nor from Austria a revolt in the Balkans. The inflammable material was to be withdrawn from the two danger zones in Europe—Alsace and the Balkans—and piled up away in the Far East.

This policy rested on two premises : (a) That the Czar Nicholas II would remain sole master of Russian policy and continue to guide it with logical consistency along the path it had chosen ; and (b) that Russia would ultimately be victorious in Eastern Asia. If the policy of expansion there collapsed Russia would

be sure to attribute to Germany the failure of a policy which had been inspired and abetted from Berlin, which again would further increase the enmity to Germany.

Germany had thus staked everything upon a card which was not even in her hand. The guidelines of Germany's policy in the Far East then laid down were maintained until the Russian defeats in Eastern Asia in 1905 led to the collapse of the entire edifice.

Concluding Comments

Germany had participated in a Triple Alliance with Russia and France in the Far East, partly with the idea of "mailing Russia down" there, and so easing the situation in the Near East. But the aggressive adventurism of German policy at this time under the personal influence of the Kaiser, had produced a new and incalculable enemy for him, in Japan and had made Britain wary and distrustful. The traditional Anglo-German sympathy, which had been one of the anchors of Bismarck's diplomacy had quite disappeared. The critical question now arose, whether the successors of Bismarck had the wisdom and the necessary diplomatic skill to realize before too late the danger of this drift into a policy of adventure, and to avoid it, either by courting Britain out of her isolation into a marriage, *de raison*, or at least by pursuing a policy which would ensure her friendly neutrality. Within the next few years, as we shall see, that question was to receive a very stupid answer from the discordant group which was then directing the destiny of Germany.

(iv) Germany and South Africa

Since their acquisition of large territories in Africa in 1884, the interest of the Germans in colonial development had become intense. From the beginning they had professed strong sympathy with the south African Dutch, as people of kindred race. Probably the promulgation of the Pan-German idea after 1893 stimulated the interest by the suggestion of ulterior motives. Some enthusiasts spoke openly of establishing a German colonial empire in south Africa, which, in their minds, was to include the two Boer republics.

Treaty of Pretoria (1884)

By the treaty of Pretoria (1884) after the first Boer War, the two republics—Transvaal and Orange Free State—were guaranteed internal autonomy, but in their external policy were to remain under

British suzerainty. In the same year (1884), Britain extended her protectorate over Bechuanaland—the territory which separated the two Boer States from German South West Africa, whilst in December, 1884, Britain frustrated a German attempt to establish a settlement at St. Lucia Bay, in Zululand—a good port at the nearest point on the East coast to the Boer States.

Germany challenged the British interpretation of the Treaty of Pretoria, and a visit of President Kruger to Berlin in 1884, clearly suggested that his attitude powered Britain was fortified by German intrigue. There is little doubt that Bismarck either practised or countenanced a steady intrigue against British prestige in the Boer republics.

Germany's support to the Boers : German took a very keen interest in the construction of the railway from Pretoria to Lorenzo Marques, and gratuitously despatched two cruisers to attend the ostentatious festivities which marked its completion in July 1895. The Boer were greatly encouraged in their anti British attitude by these signs of German support, which evoked sharp British protests at Berlin. Marschall replied that Germany was determined to protect existing political conditions and her economic interests in South Africa.

Jameson's "Coup de main"

The discovery of great gold and diamond fields in the Transvaal at this time had attracted large number of British subjects, who were deliberately harassed by Boer officials confident of the secret support of Germany, who mainly sought a colourable opportunity to intervene.

At the end of 1895, the British residents in the Transvaal were at the point of revolt ; whilst just across the border, at Mafeking, Dr. Jameson—an intimate friend of Cecil Rhodes, and a high official of British South Africa Company—had assembled an irregular military force, with which he proposed to attempt a 'coups de main, (a sudden overpowering attack). On December 30, 1895, Jameson crossed the Boer frontier on his mad enterprise.

Germany Swept off her feet by Jameson's Enterprise

Excitement in Germany was intense. The Foreign Minister, Marschall, telegraphed to the German Ambassador at London : "In

the event of your Excellency receiving the impression that this outrage on the right of nations is authorised, your Excellency will demand your passport" Elaborate precautions were taken to protect German subjects and German interests in the transvaal. At the same time Russia and France were approached in the attempt to create a Continental 'bloc' against England.

The Kaiser was hysterical, the Pan-Germans were exultant, and even the cool hard-headed Marschall allowed himself to be carried away by his Anglophobia.

Salisbury Disclaimed all Knowledge of the Raid

The British Prime Minister, Salisbury, immediately disclaimed all knowledge of the raid, of which he disapproved most emphatically, and assured the German Ambassador that he would take the most prompt measures to secure the punishment of its instigators. On January 2, 1896 the raid collapsed.

In the meantime, the Kaiser had written to the Czar fulminating against England. "The Transvaal Republic has been suddenly attacked in a most foul way, as it seems not without England's knowledge. I have used very severe language in London, and have opened communication with Paris for common defence of our endangered interests². I hope you will also kindly consider the question, as it is one of the principles of upholding treaties. I hope all will come right but come what may, I will never allow the British to stamp out the Transvaal".

It is a strange to contrast the Kaiser's profound anxiety for those truculent Boers with his callous indifference at this very time to the Armenians, who were being massacred in thousands.

The Kruger Telegram

On January 2, 1896, the raiders surrendered ignominiously at Krugersdrop. The news was flashed to Berlin, and on the following day was published the Kaisers notorious telegram of congratulations to Kruger. "I express to you" it ran, "my sincere congratulations that, without appealing to the help of friendly Powers, you and your people have succeeded in repelling with your own forces the armed bands which had broken into your country and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign aggression."

2. Although the France Foreign Minister, Hanotau was consistently hostile to England, the German proposals were received coldly.

The Kaiser contemptibly disavowed personal responsibility for the message ; but Hammann's revelation of the exact facts so far as they are discoverable—shows how recklessly adventurous was Germany's policy at this time. An extract from the private diary of Baron von Marschall, first revealed in June 1924, reads as follows: "January 3rd, (1896). At 10 o'clock conference with H.M. (his Majesty), present the Imperial Chancellor, Hollmann (Secretary of State for Navy), Knorr (Commanding Admiral) and Senden (Chief of Naval Cabinet), H.M. unfolded somewhat astonishing projects. A protectorate over the Transvaal, but I talked him out of that at once Mobilisation of the Marine Infantry. The despatch of troops to the Transvaal. And upon the Chancellor's objection ; 'That would mean war with England', H.M. replied, 'yes, but only on land. Then it was resolved to send Scheele (Governor of German East Africa till February, 1895) to the Transvaal to reconnoitre. Also an unfortunate idea. Finally H.M. at my suggestion sent a congratulatory despatch to President Kruger. The joy over England's defeat is universal". Hammann point out that, "although it was Marschall who proposed sending the congratulatory despatch to Kruger, his urgent reason for doing so was to prevent something worse. The Kruger telegram was the way out of a dilemma, an emergency existed, a compromise, (a lightning conductor). What the Kaiser really desired was something far in excess of a mere congratulation". An examination of the private diary of another of those present at the famous cabinet, viz. Baron von Senden, shows that four days later i.e. on January 7 — von Tirpitz, considering this moment of national excitement opportune, sent a petition to the Kaiser to have the naval estimates for 1896-97 increased three-fold to 300 million marks.

The Kruger telegram was greeted with universal indignation in Britain. "The nation will never forget this telegram", wrote the Morning Post in prophetic words, "and it will always bear it in mind in the future orientation of its policy."

The Kruger Telegram Sounded the Death-knell of Anglo-German Friendship.

Indeed, the affair sounded the death-knell of Anglo-German friendship, made Britain suspicious of every future German manoeuvre and prepared the way for Delcasse during his seven years of tenure of French Foreign Office (1898-1905) to alter so critically the distribution of forces in Europe by helping to create the Anglo-French

entente, and preparing for the transformation of the Dual Alliance into the Triple Entente.

Summing up of the Change in the Foreign Policy of Germany after Bismarck's Fall

The outstanding change in the foreign policy of Germany after 1890 was from a unitary policy, based upon the restrained exercise of great power, and regulated by a retrospective view, to a diverse policy, deprived of its stabilising force, impelled by an exaggerated consciousness of national power, and directed by the sanguine prospect of translating the success of Bismarck from the sphere of Germany and Europe to the whole world. During the period from 1890 to 1897, owing to the mediocre capacity of the second and third Chancellors, the capricious interference of a volatile and inexperienced autocrat, the division of direction by subordinates—especially Holstein—released from the repressive control of the Iron Chancellor, and the consequent rise of militarism and bureaucracy from service to mastery, German foreign policy became a confused series of domineering adventures in the conflicting pursuit of which the outlines of Bismarck's policy were almost destroyed.

Not only had Russia been detached from Germany by the denunciation of the secret Re-insurance Treaty, but she had wandered into the orbit of French policy, and had ultimately entered into a military alliance with France. On the other hand, the Central Alliance had shown signs of internal discord. Italy had become an 'unsafe' partner; Austria had shown a distinct tendency to use the alliance to support a policy of adventure in the Balkans, and had drawn from the German Chancellor in 1896 a cold rebuke.

The German attitude in regard to the Near East had undergone a portentous change. Not only had Germany refused to cooperate with Britain in a humanitarian intervention in Armenia; but she had clearly indicated the initiative of a forward policy in Asiatic Turkey. This was to have many repercussions in the immediate future. As it crystallised into the Berlin—Bagdad scheme, it incurred the profound distrust of Russia, France, and Britain; and by placing her in greater dependence on Austria, essentially modified the posture of the Central Alliance.

With the opening of the Kiel Canal in 1895, the Kaiser also became pre-occupied with the project of an expensive naval policy, which took definite shape two years later, with the appointment of Bulow as Foreign Secretary, and Tripitz as Naval Secretary. This double appointment marked the emergence of Germany into "Weltpolitik" (World politics).

In 1895, moreover, German foreign policy had suddenly 'broken out in a new place', when she intervened between Japan and China, with incalculable consequences. Not only did she unwisely earn the enmity of Japan (thus emphasising the wisdom of British diplomacy in the Far East which ripened in 1902 in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance), but she also implicated herself in that curious Triple Alliance of the Far East with Russia and France, which forced Britain to regard her with deeper distrust as a continental mischief-maker.

At the same time Germany inflamed British opinion against her by her clumsy interference in South Africa, which culminated in the affair of the Kruger telegram.

11

Public Opinion in Germany

"From 1896 to the outbreak of the Balkan Wars" writes Schmitt "the tone of public discussion in Germany, as regards relations with England, was consistently bitter; the occasional protests of clear-headed patriots against the folly of chauvinism were like voices in the wilderness". It is not only proposed to examine closely the causes which provoked the development of this attitude, but also to try briefly to indicate its extent and strength in the last decade of the nineteenth century, when it became a determining factor in the shaping of national policy of Germany.

The outstanding facts are clearly indicated by Bulow in his important book, "Imperial Germany", published in 1913 as a contribution to the great work: "Germany under William II", to celebrate the double anniversary, (i) of quarter of the century of the Emperor's reign, and (ii) the centenary of the Battle of Leipzig¹, from which the Germans date their national renaissance.

Let us quote from Bulow's book: "The nation of thinkers, poets and soldiers has become a nation of merchants and shopkeepers of the first rank, and today in the world's markets disputes the prize with England, which was already the first commercial nation of the world when the German outlook was still that of peasants and

1. It was at the Battle of Leipzig (1813) when for the first time the reorganised Prussian army on a national basis took the field Napoleon I was then simply astonished by Prussian military progress. See Part I, pp. 170-171.

artisans". And again : "The forces which animate the Conservative party are those which made Germany great. It was the noblemen and peasants East of the Elbe who, under Hohenzollern princes, primarily achieved greatness for Brandenburg and Prussia. The throne of the Prussian Kings is cemented with the blood of the Prussian nobility".

These two outstanding facts, *viz.* the portentous increase in the population and wealth of Germany since 1871, and Bismarck's establishment of the Prussian military tradition as the basis of the German political system, led inevitably, after the fall of the Bismarck, to the modification and extension of his system into an aggressive World Policy. Such a policy was bound to provoke the enmity of the two great colonial powers, Britain and France.

In these circumstances, the basic fact, from the German viewpoint, was that a rapidly expanding and highly efficient nation was debarred from the achievement of its legitimate ambition by a political ordering of the world which antedated its establishment as a united State. It was quite natural, therefore, that, after Bismarck had guided Imperial Germany through its Herculean infancy, national policy should be steadily directed to secure the redistribution of power in the world by undermining the idea of sovereignty resting upon historical prescription which they considered an anachronism.

The only alternative sanction of political right which came naturally to the German—or rather, the Prussian—mind, was military force, upon which, they argued with much cogency, the prescriptive rights of other nations to territory was originally founded. As an illustration they might well point, as they did, to British policy in the Seven Years War and its results. There is, in fact, no doubt that international policy has consisted of the measuring military power. Bismarck, with his cynical candour, identified 'Real politik' (practical politics) with 'Machtpolitik' both in speech and action.

Distribution of Power and Territory in the World in the mid-Nineties

A survey of the distribution of power and territory in the world in the mid-nineties, revealed Russia expanding without much opposition across Asia, until she became involved first with Britain, and then with the new Power of Japan ; France, with an almost

stationary population, and a colonial—empire second in the world—which was rapidly approaching its final extension in the region of north Africa ; Britain dominant in the world in respect of commerce, colonial territory, and their concomitant, sea-power, anxious only, to remain in undisturbed, peaceful possession of those things ; and finally, decadent Powers, like the Turkish, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese, controlling large and desirable areas, to which their present condition in no way entitled them.

In the arrogance of conscious power, Germany was about to demand a favourable redistribution which—if she could subvert the prescriptive arrangement in favour of the ‘status quo’—she was prepared to seek by the assertion of force.

Germany Recognised Britain the Most Formidable Opponent to her New Ambitions

Germany recognised that Britain would be the more formidable opponent of such a fundamentally disruptive policy, and with Bismarckian directness—but with little of Bismarckian subtlety—in the mid-nineties she began definitely to challenge the position of Britain. One of the ablest and sanest of her apologists, Dr. Paul Rohrbach, admits this. “There can be no doubt in the mind of an impartial political observer,” he writes, “that the idea was not first mooted in England that Germany presents a danger to England, and must be struck down before it is too late, but that, on the contrary, Germany was thinking of attacking England at favourable opportunity, and enriching herself at her expense”. (Schmitt, “Germany and England”).

Steady Indoctrination of the Germans by Their Thinkers

George W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). This attitude was not a sudden growth of the last decade of the nineteenth century, but was due to the steady indoctrination of the Germans by many of their leading thinkers from the time of Hegel with a new and potentially aggressive conception of the State.

For Hegel the State is absolute, ultimate, universal—absorbing and dominating the individual, who finds in its service alone his ‘raison d’ etre’ (reason for existence). Hegel was fascinated by the history and spirit of Prussia, which undoubtedly coloured his political

theory². He finds little place in that theory for international law. He argues that "the state of war shows the omnipotence of the State in its individuality". Such a philosophy made an easy alliance with the policy of Prussian militarism from Frederick the Great to Bismarck, and Hitler. In such a view the State is primarily power, and political questions are therefore, as Bismarck maintained, questions of power and power can only exist in its assertion.

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900)

This conception of the State as the ultimate power, with universal authority, which was promulgated by Hegel and gained such wide acceptance in Germany, was supplemented by the passionate and of rather chaotic ideas of Nietzsche³. Nietzsche based his speculations upon a dual foundation, which he found in the study of ancient pagan literature, *viz.* (i) an essentially aesthetic, non-moral view of the world; and (ii) a belief that men were divided by nature into two classes, masters and slaves. From this dual foundation he developed the conception of the Superman, who realises himself at the expense of the weakling, and enters completely by right of conquest into the fulness of life. He was, of course, a bitter assailant of Christianity—as the defence of a slave morality, and of democracy, as the theory of herd-morality. His Superman, originally—it would seem—an individual, became in his teaching a species of Heroes, for the development of which he conceived an ideal system of Eugenies (science pertaining to race improvement by judicious mating).

Nietzsche's Views on War

According to Nietzsche the will to power is to be asserted by the sword. "Horribly clangs its silvery bow; and although it comes like the night war is nevertheless Apollo the (Greek sun-god) the

2. Locke, Adam Smith, and Spencer, for example, agreed that State is a means to an end, the end being a better life for the individual. Hegel, however, maintained that the State is an end in itself. He belongs to the school of thinkers known as Idealists. According to him, the state is a person and has a will of its own. It has ends of its own divorced from, and superior to, those of individual human beings subjected to its authority. "The State, being an end in itself, is provided with the maximum of rights over the individual citizens, whose highest duty is to be members of the State". The same trend of thought is illustrated in Fascism and Nazism.

3. Nietzsche was a poet as much as he was a philosopher.

true divinity for consecrating and purifying states.....National consumption, as well as individual admits of a brutal cure.....Let the little school girls say : 'To be good is sweet and touching'. You say, a good cause will hallow even war. I say unto you : a good war hallows every cause. War and courage have done greater things than love of your neighbour. (This passage appears on the title-page of Bernhardi's book, "Germany and the Next War"). Against the deflection of the State-ideal into a money-ideal the only remedy is war, and once again war, in the emotions of which this at any rate becomes clear, than in love of Fatherland the State produces an ethical impulse of a much higher destiny."

Nietzsche's teachings since his death, have contributed not a little to the cultivation of that arrogant and aggressive sense of superiority with which the militarists of Germany became inflamed.

Bernhardi's writings, for example, are but a technical application of philosophy of Nietzsche. Incidentally, Nietzsche never tired of expressing his hatred and contempt for the English, 'a nation of consummate cant', 'that fundamentally mediocre species'⁴ etc.

Heinrich von Treitschke

A further stage in the indoctrination of the German people with a view which would justify a deliberately aggressive world-policy, was represented by the teaching of Treitschke. He was originally a hater of the Prussian spirit, but changed his views after Bismarck had wrought his will in true Nietzschean manner, and from 1874 until 1896 lectured upon history at Berlin ; where his later doctrine attracted the approval and attendance of many soldiers and bureaucrats, as well as students. (Tirpitz and Moltke were among his pupils). He was the most prominent and influential of that group of scholars who sought to Prussianize the teaching of history and the theory of politics, in harmony with the aspirations of the dominant class in Germany. The essence of his teaching is to be found in his treatise on Politics, which was based upon lectures delivered by him at Berlin. His cardinal tenet, like Hegel's, is the State is power, and that is no abstract sense.

4. cf. "Mein Kampf".

According to Treitschke, the national State—he always has the Prussianized German Empire in the fore front of his mind—has two prime functions ; to administer law and to make war ; and of these the making of war takes precedence in his mind whereas clause within his great text-book had defined war as the continuation of policy by other means ; Treitschke says : ‘war is politics *par excellence*. War is the healing medicine of sick States. It is the sacrament which binds men to the body politics, through common sacrifice. It is political idealism which begets war, which begets heroism. “What a perversion of morality it were, if one struck heroism out of humanity. But the living God will see that war shall always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity”. (It is not different to see where Bernhardt draws his inspiration when he asserts that ‘War is a biological necessity).’

In his Treitschke’s great work *German History in the Nineteenth Century* “he devoted all the resources of a mordant rhetoric, a pitiless invective and a vitriolic ridicule to making Britain odious and contemptible in the eyes of the generation which heard him with enthusiasm in the class-room ; and read his book as a gospel” (W.T. Arnold, in Schmitt). “More than any other single character in German political life” wrote Cremona in 1914 (“Germany and England”) he is responsible for the anti-English sentiment which blazed out during the Boer War, and still reign in German society and the German press”. He assailed British mastery of the seas as organized piracy ; he railed at her commercialism as the triumph of vulgar materialism over heroism and a sign of national decadence ; he pilloried her policy of maintaining a balance of power in Europe as a hypocritical hoodwinking of the more idealistic peoples of the Continent, and especially, of the German race of heroes.⁵

There is little doubt that the spirit inculcated by Treitschke created in the minds of the governing classes of Germany an aggressive attitude, which was reinforced by the natural arrogance of the Prussian junker, by the tradition of military success bequeathed from the period 1862-1871, and—not a little—by the silent assumption on the part of the British people of a national superiority, strengthened by long historical prescription.

5. To quote Treitschke, “England, the successful burglar, who after amassing a huge fortune, has retired from business, and having broken every law, human and divine, violated every instinct of honour and fidelity on every sea and every continent, desires now the protection of the police.”

The Critical Period (1897-1904)

With the opening of a new and fateful chapter in German foreign policy in 1897, there were clear indications that certain British statesmen had become at last convinced that the continuance of the diplomatic isolation of Britain was fraught with danger.

Russia was threatening the absorption of Manchuria and even the monopoly of political influence in China, which would be injurious to British prestige and trade in the Far East. At the same time Merchand was on his way to the Upper Nile to proclaim French occupation.

Negotiation between Britain and Germany, February, 1898

With the distinct threat of friction with the Dual Alliance, Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, and the most vigorous man of Salisbury's, ministry, approached the German Ambassador, Hatzfeld in February, 1898, with a business-like proposal that the two governments should discuss their colonial differences, and attempt to reach a more general agreement for mutual defence against attack by more than one power. The reference to the Dual Alliance was obvious. The German government was surprised in view of the open enmity of the two peoples which had persisted since the episode of the Kruger telegram.

Negotiation ensued, but Bulow from the outset was sceptical of their success. He harboured an exaggerated view of Germany's power and importance, he had been indoctrinated with opinions of the militarists, and the habitual suspicions of Holstein, and he consequently under-rated the importance of a gesture, which Bismarck would have reciprocated and exploited to the utmost.

Bulow consistently advised the Kaiser to strive equally for Russian and British friendship, "in complete independence of both sides as arbiter mundi' (arbiter of the world)". The flattering suggestion was well received by the Kaiser, who subscribed whole-heartedly to Bulow's "Machtpolitik" of which the first fruits were the recent Navy Bill, (the first verse of Tirpitz's siren song).

In May 1898, the Kaiser, without informing the ministers, wrote to the Czar, giving him a distorted account of the British offer, which according to him, opened the prospect of a brilliant future for Germany, requiring a prompt answer. "Now, my old and trusted friend, I beg you, tell me what you can offer me and will do if I refuse". Four days later he received a reply from Nicholas, saying that his correspondent must himself know what to do in the circumstances, and adding the unexpected news that, three months earlier, Russia had received in writing from England a most advantageous offer of an understanding. Nothing is known of this alleged British offer to Russia, which, on the face of it, was highly improbable. It would seem as if the Kaiser, playing one of his risky lone hands, has been caught in his own trap.

The negotiation between the German and British governments continued for some months blowing hot and cold, and emerged, in October, 1898, in a secret Treaty by which the two governments shared the guarantee of a loan to Portugal secured upon the customs of her African colonies, which were, for the purpose, divided into British and German spheres. The partition was only to be made if Portugal defaulted financially and expressed her desire to sell her colonies. Within a year this secret treaty was rendered nugatory by another between Britain and Portugal (Treaty of Windsor, 1899), which renewed the old British guarantee of Portuguese territorial integrity.

Britain in Deep Waters

The Anglo-German agreement about the Portuguese colonies synchronised with the Fashoda crisis, whilst in the background loomed the Russian aggression in the Far East and Afghanistan, and the truculent hostility of the Boers who were deliberately goading Britain into a war in which they counted upon continental assistance—not without very reasonable grounds—as the event proved.

Delcassee's Missions

Britain was truly in deep waters at this time. But the Fashoda crisis was the first problem which confronted the new French Foreign Minister, Delcassee, who went to the 'Quai d' Orsay (to take the robes of his office) with a mission which he was determined to fulfil. That mission was achieved in April 1904, when the 'Entente Cordiale' became an accomplished fact. Shutting his eyes to the dangerous allurements of a Franco-German pact, directed against England, he yielded to the British demands, recalled Marchand, and, a few months later yielded again, this time forgoing a French protectorate over Muscat, in Arabia, which threatened to neutralise the strategic importance of Aden.

Germany as a Dominating World Power

Since the moment of his appointment to the Foreign office in 1897, Bulow applied himself with single-eyed intensity to the task of guiding Germany into her rightful position as a dominating World Power, a course which, he says, Bismarck did not foresee, nor the details of the problems of this new epoch. In this task of ultimate extension of 'Machtpolitik' he was supported strongly by Tirpitz and more capriciously by the Emperor, who according to Tirpitz, "was the deciding personality on whom the success of the great attempt depended to win for Germany an independent position of her own by the side of Anglo-Saxonism, which was embracing the whole world like a polypus".

A week after the declaration of the Boer War the Emperor, in a characteristic outburst declared: "We are in bitter need of a strong Germany navy. If the increases demanded in the first years of my reign had not been continuously refused in spite of my warnings and continued entreaties, how differently should we now be able to further our flourishing commerce and our interests overseas".

Bulow controlled the foreign policy of Germany from his advent to office with little regard to the Chancellor (Hohenlohe), whom, at the end of three years, he succeeded in 1900. That policy was founded upon the ambition of displacing Britain as the leading world power; its diplomacy was greatly influenced by the promptings of the suspicious, 'half-crazy' Holstein until the latter's resignation in April 1905; and the promulgation of the policy was primarily associated with the establishment of a formidable battle-fleet, of

which the building and equipment was to be the life-work of his able and unscrupulous Naval Secretary, Tirpitz.

Earliest Attempts of Britain to Abandon her Diplomatic Isolation by an Agreement with Germany were foiled by Bulow

In these circumstances, it is obvious that the attempts of the British government at the end of the nineteenth century to escape from isolation by the obvious means of a mutually and universally restraining agreement with Germany, were deliberately nullified by Bulow's government. His motives seem to have been three-fold ; viz. (i) the conviction that the time was ripe for Germany to make herself "arbiter mundi" (arbiter of world) ; (ii) a fear that Germany would be used as a catspaw in the traditional enmity between Britain and Russia ; and (iii) a more fundamental suspicion, implanted or nourished by the nefarious Holstein that every international arrangement which was not proposed by Germany was subtly directed towards her destruction.

Bulow-Tirpitz Policy Denounced in Germany

The imprudence of the Bulow-Tirpitz policy has been nowhere more unsparingly denounced than in Germany. Kiderlen-Wachter—who together with Marschall, was the strongest and ablest German statesman since Bismarck—argued that the basis of German foreign policy should be an open 'rapprochement' with England, and consistently opposed. Tirpitz's aims because he feared that it would war with England. "The army preserves peace" he observed, "the fleet endangers it. "Similarly Admiral Galster, who in 1908 denounced Tirpitz's policy, later recalled his warning. "In Tirpitz's eyes", he wrote "a state which co-operates with England is her vassal. He confounds friendship with patronage. The fleet did not cause the war, but it caused the ranging of the powers against Germany and Austria.....England was not the enemy that Tirpitz pointed. He turned her into one".

Professor Haller is still more pungent : "Germany pursued a policy which tempted fate." The true cause of British hostility was the construction of the battle-fleet, and nothing else. "We never wanted war with England, but we provoked her to fall upon us."

“Bulows sin against the German people was that he allowed his country to drift into a danger zone, regardless of warnings, and that he needlessly incurred the suspicion and enmity of a nation which had no greater desire than to remain a friend”.

Professor Brandenburg, who is a model of impartiality, denounces Bulows attitude most comprehensively : Growing Anglo-German hostility according to him was “due to uneasiness caused by Germany’s attitude, as Arbiter of the World, which Bulow already believed she was”. “Germany acted like some peddling...which a world-wide firm like Britain regarded as an insult”. Through her super-subtlety and her blind disregard of frequent warnings as to the possibility of England coming to an understanding with the Dual Alliance, Germany lost her choice of allies. “If England again renewed her previous efforts (to secure an agreement with Germany), it could not be from any acute danger or from urgent necessity for immediate support, but solely from a desire to find a lasting system of alliances, which would guarantee the peace of the world”. Owing to his morbid mistrust Bulow demanded from Britain guarantees derogatory to the pride of a great nation and unnecessary, as the sequel grimly showed. “Great political understandings, such as are now ‘ententes’, depend only on the firm will to hold together. Where that exists, its application to individual cases develops naturally ; where it does not exist, no paras in a treaty can take its place. The Franco-Russian alliance, later on the Anglo-Japanese and the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliances were all founded on an understanding between the governments, ratified by public opinion in these countries, while the text of the treaties...was couched in general terms and was almost un-committal”. Bulow declared in 1901 : “We ought not to show any uneasiness or anxious haste but just leave hope shimmering on the horizon. In this hope lies our surest protection against England capitulating to Russia”. Such a policy was, of course, an insult to the government of ‘the greatest power in the world’, and a conspicuous example of the vanity and consequent diplomatic obtuseness of the Germans, which was the fatal defeat of their foreign policy since the fall of Bismarck. “They (the English) had offered us their hand and had withdrawn it when we made the conditions of acceptance too onerous for fulfilment. They never came back to us. They went instead to our enemies.”

Contrast of the Diplomacy of Bulow and Delcasse

The contrast of the diplomacy of Bulow and Delcasse during these years heightens the tragic irony of German foreign policy. Germany rebuffed from her threshold an old acquaintance, who came to sup with her ; whilst France enticed an enemy, who entered in and became a firm friend.

Germany's Quest for Naval Stations

Directed by Bulow, Holstein and Tirpitz, German foreign policy was actively adventurous especially in the quest for naval stations as a strategic necessity for a vigorous World Policy. Kiauchou had been gained in North China ; but these men—particularly Tirpitz—were anxious for bases and coaling stations which would command the Pacific. So in 1898, during the course of the Spanish-American War, a squadron was despatched to the Philippines, nominally to protect German lives and property, as in South Africa three years earlier. But in fact the Germans were in communication with the Filipino leader, and their presence was very strongly resented by Admiral Dewey and by the American government. Suspicion was well justified, for, in a letter to Hetzfeldt on August 6, 1898, Holstein wrote : "A coaling-station is naturally expected as a result of our participation in the protection of the Philippines". Foiled there, the German government shortly afterwards purchased from Spain—who wished to liquidate her colonial empire—the Caroline and Marianne Islands, which were under the mandate of Japan under the Treaty of Versailles (1919). These Islands were not really useful for naval purposes. But in 1884 Germany had got a footing, with Britain and the U.S.A. in the Samoa group, which would provide a base in the mid-Pacific, commanding their trade-routes of that Ocean, and she now strove to gain exclusive control of that group. Since 1889 the group had been administered under a tripartite condominium, which had proved quite unsatisfactory ; and at the beginning of 1899, the German government resumed negotiations with Britain in regard to Samoa. The first proposal was that Germany should surrender to England her (Germany's) share of the co-partnership in the Gilbert Islands, British New Guinea and a coaling-station in Malacca on the Malay Peninsula in exchange for the surrender of Britain's share in Samoa. The British cabinet did not like this huckstering, especially as the upset price

was so grotesquely high. The German government accompanied the suggestion with the threat that, if negotiations broke down, the German Ambassador should be withdrawn from London, "as international intercourse is aimless where international treaties are not observed."

The Kaiser Declared a Private War on Salisbury

The Kaiser, urged on by Bulow's presumption of German power and by Holstein's bluff, declared a private war on the British Prime Minister, Salisbury, and used a letter of congratulation to his grandmother, Queen Victoria, on her eightieth birthday to assail her minister. "The Premier seemed to rank Germany with Portugal and Patagonia. Such insulting treatment neither he nor the German nation could allow". Salisbury disregarded this outburst but he resented the prompting which lay behind it. A remark of his to the Duke of Devonshire reveals the maladroitness of German diplomacy and its dangerous effect on the direction of British policy. Salisbury said ironically that he was daily awaiting a German ultimatum "Unfortunately" he said, "it has not yet. If it does not, Germany will lose a first-rate opportunity of getting rid not only of Samoa but of all her colonies, which seem too expensive to her, in a respectable way. And we should then be able to unite with France along the line of colonial compensation". The Boer war broke out, and the German government pressed its temporary advantage. Tirpitz was strongly bent on acquiring Samoa, whose strategic importance, he argued, would be vastly increased with the opening of the Panama Canal; whilst it would also provide a station in the worldwide German Cable system, which he dreamed of in the future. At last after much haggling, an agreement was reached on November 14, 1899. Britain was to haul down her flag in Samoa, which was divided politically between German and the U.S.A., Britain received compensations in Tonga, the Solomons, and Africa. A few weeks before this (October 28), through the agency of Rhodes, an agreement was also reached by which his dream of the establishment of telegraph and rail connection between the Cape and Cairo was made possible by concessions through German East Africa.

The First Huge Peace Conference (1899)

In the midst of this peddling retail trade in colonies, which contrasted so strongly with Delcasse's treatment of similar problems,

there occurred a strange interlude in the international diplomacy of "Machtpolitik". The Czar, Nicholas II, invited the governments of the leading powers to a conference at the Hague for the purpose of securing a progressive reduction of national armaments, and submitting possible causes of war to international arbitration. The various governments accepted, though in a spirit of very like that of Castlereagh's acceptance of the rather similar proposals of Nicholas' ancestor. Alexander I, and the First Hague Peace Conference assembled on May 18, 1899. It was attended by every European state, the United States and Japan. Subsequent revelation of the Czar's Chief motives unfortunately supports the scepticism of his guests¹.

The Attitude of Germany

The German government treated the project with contemptuous suspicion. The German representative was instructed to oppose any suggestion of the international limitation of armaments, and he took the lead in this direction, receiving no support in his deliberate obstruction of a proposal which in fact, other delegates cynically regarded as Utopian. "By patience and self-restraint", comments Brandenburg: "it might have been possible to leave other States to take the initiative and to have spared Germany this odium. Germany now stood forth to many as the strongest opponent of any amelioration of the burdens of war, and roused in her enemies the suspicion, although falsely, that she was harbouring military aspiration".

It was agreed to establish a Permanent Court of International Justice, but Germany again took the lead in opposing the compulsory reference of justifiable disputes to such a court.

Recalcitrance of Britain to Revise her Doctrine of Contraband

On the other hand, when the reform of the usages of war was discussed, both Germany and the U.S.A. pressed for the revision of British doctrine of contraband, which had caused the war of 1812

1. The Conference prompted by the Czar, whose finance minister could not find the money for modernizing Russian artillery, was proposed in order to bring about general disarmament and make provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The proposal was received with the greatest scepticism and suspicion by other governments who detected in it some hidden trick on the part of Russia and even potential dangers to the peace of Europe.

between Britain and the U.S.A.² and which was discussed as an addendum to the Treaty of Paris (1856), and which, within a few months, was to cause acute friction between Britain and Germany in the course of the Boer War ; [but Britain refused to discuss the question or to retract or modify her doctrine.

Some minor but important ameliorations of the conventions of warfare, however, were agreed upon the conference closed on June 25, 1899. Its provision was described by Count Munster, the Chief German delegate, as "a net with large holes".³

The Anglo-Boer War

Two months after the close of the First Hægue Conference, and before the conclusion of the Samoan dispute, Britain found herself at war with the Boer republics. This war revealed two striking facts, *viz.*, British military incompetence and her complete diplomatic isolation. "To hostile eyes", says Gooch, England appeared as the great bully who had already swallowed half the world, and was about to gobble up two peasant republics endowed with unlimited store of mineral wealth. With scarcely an exception the press of Europe sympathised with the Boers ; and Emperor Francis Joseph's observation to the British Ambassador that "In this war I am on the side of England," was the more appreciated in British official circles because it was a voice crying in the wilderness". The English people had no reason to congratulate themselves upon the sentiment of the Austrian Emperor, who was thinking merely of Bosnia and Serbia.

The Kaiser's visit to England

Although a week after the declaration of war, the Kaiser made his famous Hamburg speech, deploring Germany's incapacity through lack of sea-power to take full advantage of the situation, he angled for an invitation to England, which was offered, and in November,

2- See Part I, p. 133.

3. There was another conference at the Hague (the second Hague Conference in 1907, which was prompted by President Theodore Roosevelt) It was even less successful than the First Hague Conference, and from the outset it was clear that no proposals for disarmament were likely to get far. The attendance of representatives of the South American States made the Second Hague Conference nearly a World Conference, representing forty-four states. Britain and the United States disagreed about the question of immunity for private property at sea ("contraband of war") and by backing America, Germany manoeuvred Britain into being an apparent enemy of humane proposals.

1899 he arrived, accompanied by Bulow. They encouraged Chamberlain to repeat and develop his scheme of an Anglo-German agreement to which, if possible, America was to be made a party. Chamberlain thereupon delivered an important speech at Leicester. "We should not remain permanently isolated on the Continent of Europe", he said and "the natural alliance is between ourselves and the great German Empire...At bottom the character of the Teutonic race differs very slightly indeed from the character of the Anglo-Saxon race. If the union between England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in the future of the world". But, despite a series of discussions, Bulow maintained a close reserve.

Germany's Second Navy Bill—The German government was preparing its Second Navy Bill; to pass this Bill through the Reichstag it needed to win popular support in Germany, and at the same time to minimise British mistrust. Very opportunely for their hopes, in December, 1899 British cruisers arrested three German ships off the east coast of Africa, exercising the old British claim to search neutrals for contraband, and one of the vessels—appropriately named 'Bundesrath'—was brought to Durban for examination by a Prize Court. The German Government protested rightfully and very vigorously, and Salisbury ordered that the ship be immediately released and that compensation be made; though he would not retract the British doctrine of the right to search of neutrals at sea by Britain when she was in a state of war. The German government with the assistance of the Kaiser, Tirpitz and Reventlow made the utmost use of this tactless act by Britain to secure the passing of the Second Navy Bill. Tirpitz suggested that a German Order be conferred on the British Commander; the Chancellor, according to the Kaiser, ordered champagne, and "we three drank to the British navy, which had proved such a help". Shortly afterwards the increased naval programme was adopted by the Reichstag.

The episode set back any attempt to secure a real understanding between England and Germany.

The Kaiser Soft-Pedals

Despite his ebullience, the German Emperor personally maintained a detached and peaceful attitude in regard to Britain. He declared to the Austrian Ambassador that "the interests of the

German Empire and the wishes of the German Emperor require not a world war, but the maintenance of the world's peace". When, in March 1900, Russia approached Germany with a proposal of joint European intervention in the South African war, both the Kaiser and Bulow turned to her a politely deaf ear. "The idea of coercive intervention" said Bulow in the Reichstag, "never crossed our minds". When Kruger later visited the Continent, he was received enthusiastically by the French people but politely fobbed off by Delcasse. When he was about to visit Berlin, he was officially forbidden. "We, like other countries, feel sympathy with the Boers", Bulow informed him, "But we are ready to live in peace and friendship with England. We are not called you to tilt at English wind-mills".

The Kaiser's visit to England during the last illness of his grandmother, Queen Victoria, and his conduct at the time of her death (January 22, 1901), enhanced the good relations between the two Governments, though these feelings did not extend to the peoples and moreover, we know that the tactful restraint of Bulow's government was dictated by ulterior motives, and was not intended to lend to close cooperation of the two countries.

The "Boxers" Provided Opportunity for Effective Co-operation between England and Germany, (1900)

Another problem, however, at the time provided opportunity for effective co-operation between England and Germany. The fanaticism of a secret society in China—the "Boxers"—led to a recurrence of chaos in that country. The foreign warships assembled there for the protection of these nationals were bombarded in which the German Ambassador was killed. A concerted punitive expedition was despatched and in July, 1900 there were in North China over 100,000 troops of various European nations. But the question of the appointment of a Commander in-Chief was a problem complicated by national jealousy. The Kaiser, during the same month had made his famous declaration that "the sea is indispensable for Germany's greatness. But the sea proves also that no longer can important decisions upon it, or for beyond it, be made "without the German Emperor". Accordingly he was anxious to have the Chief of the German Staff appointed Commander-in-Chief in China. Ultimately he gained his wish, and Count Waldersee became, in William's grandiloquent

phrase, "World Marshal". The appointment was the result rather of pushful diplomacy than of the unanimity of the Powers.

Upon the departure of a German contingent with Waldersee, the Kaiser was moved to another of his wild utterances. "Set an example of discipline to the whole world", he adjured his soldiers, "You will have to do the battle with a crafty, barbarous foe. If you come upon him, remember that you must give no quarter, take no prisoners". "The excited behaviour of the Kaiser in his Chinese crusade" comments Hammandrily, "was as inglorious as the laurels earned by the 'World Marshal' were scanty". Bulow, who was hoping for the post of Chancellor, had to assume the role, which became so familiar to him, of "shock-absorber" to the Kaiser, whose exposition of German 'discipline' was received without enthusiasm by many civilized people in Germany and elsewhere.

The Yangtse Treaty

Anglo-German co-operation in China was further advanced in October 1900, by an agreement usually called the Yangtse Treaty, by which the two governments undertook to preserve the integrity of China against partition by possible aggressors. In return for German support Britain agreed to maintain the 'Open Door' in the Yangtse-Kiang basin, where she had an economic predominance amounting to a monopoly. The agreement soon proved to be nugatory, for Germany was confronted by the reproaches of Russia that the former had abandoned the Triple Alliance of the Far East, and that the Yangtse Treaty was an unfriendly act to Russia. In the Reichstag Bulow declared that 'we have no intention of acting as a lightning-conductor for any other Power'. The meaning of this phrase was revealed when the German government interpreted the Yangtse Treaty as not applying to Manchuria, but only to those parts of China proper where, according to a phrase of the Treaty, "they can exercise influence".

The Moroccan Dispute between Germany and France

Already, in April, 1900, the German Government had announced its interest in the fate of Morocco, "the nerveganglion of our planet" as Bulow called it, and its fear that France, in defiance of the Madrid Convention of 1880, was surreptitiously reproducing there her policy in Tunis. Bulow rebuffed a British suggestion of an

agreement in regard to the status of Morocco, preferring to bring pressure upon France through Russia. Altogether, then, British attempt to reach a general entente with Germany by way of a series of special agreements—the method pursued so successfully with France four years later—were proving unfruitful, and producing in the minds of British diplomatists a conviction that the German government was deliberately obstructive.

Germany was for an Alliance with Britain but on her own Terms

With the opening of the twentieth century, there appeared definite signs of a change in the attitude of the British policy. After the General Elections, in October 1900, Salisbury, though returned to power, gave up the Foreign Office to Landsdowne, but still retained the premiership. Three months later, on January 22, 1901, Queen Victoria died, and was succeeded by Edward VII. Although the new king was generally considered to be unfriendly to Germany, and Salisbury still clung to historic policy of England, Chamberlain, the strong man of the ministry, at once renewed his attempt to secure an Anglo-German 'entente'. He declared frankly to Eckardstein—who was acting at the time for the Ambassador, Hatzfeldt—that Britain could no longer remain in diplomatic isolation, and that the time had come for her to choose between the Triple and the Dual Alliance. Their London representatives warned the German government and that England was in earnest, and that she was approaching the parting of the ways. Holstein held that the threat to link up with the Dual Alliance was merely a bluff on England's part whilst Bulow informed the Kaiser that it was only "a hideous sceptre conjured up to frighten us." In a telegram to Count Metternich, who was marked down to succeed Hatzfeldt at the London embassy, Holstein declared: "Threat of an understanding with France and Russia absolute humbug. We can wait; time is on our side. England must first be made to realize her serious embarrassment". Bulow and Holstein agreed that an understanding with England was ultimately desirable, but she must be led on a loose rein until it seemed convenient to Germany to conclude an agreement upon her (Germany's) own terms. Meantime the balance between England and Russia must be maintained. "We remain neutral", wrote Holstein, expressing Bulow's view as well as his own, "and only conclude an

alliance when there are actual facts to prove that it is not useful only to England.

Germany's Terms (Unacceptable to England) for an Alliance

Chamberlain and Lansdowne still sought an avenue of approach to understanding. A suggestion was made that England and Germany should form a defensive pact, to which Japan was to be admitted, to maintain the principles of integrity and the "Open Door" in China, despite the impasse in the Yangtse Treaty. But the British negociators dropped this plan when Holstein insisted that the discussion should be initiated in Vienna. The German government then suggested a treaty which should include not only Britain and the Triple Alliance, but also Rumania and Japan. This was rejected by Britain who wished for a separate agreement with Japan, confined to the Far East; and was quite opposed to the inclusion of the polyglot (having or containing many languages) empire of the Hapsburgs, which British statesmen—like many others—were convinced would collapse into chaos at the death of Francis, Joseph.

After much desultory negotiation, the conditions of an agreement were classified. The Kaiser informed his uncle, Edward VII, of the German conditions, *viz.* : a treaty between Britain and the Triple Alliance, with strictly defined terms, sanctioned by an overwhelming majority in Parliament. To this Lansdowne replied that England would consider an alliance with Germany, but not with the Triple Alliance; and that, in the present hostile state for English public opinion, to place the proposal before Parliament and the press before there had been time to convince the country of its advantage and practicability, would be to court certain failure. On the other hand, a secret agreement between the two governments could be used to secure a common line of action in a succession of localized questions, and this would prepare the two peoples for further amicable cooperation, and would make the conclusion of a definite, overt treaty between Germany and England possible in the near future.

Neither side would retract its basic objections "We must await developments with an absolute reserve", wrote Bulow, "and maintain a sphinx-like demeanour We feel ourselves strong enough at present not to need to look around in haste for support."

British Attempt to Secure an Agreement with Germany came to Naught

Chamberlain grew restive at the deadlock, which he attributed to the recalcitrance of the German government. "If they are so short-sighted and cannot see that it is a question of the rise of a new constellation, they are beyond help", exclaimed Chamberlain. The negotiations had been quite secret. Meanwhile the two peoples were actively at enmity. As the South African War proceeded, the scurrilous abuse of England upon the continent (and especially in the German press) intensified, producing in England a storm of retaliatory abuse. In a public speech on October 25, 1901, the hot-headed Chamberlain replied to attacks upon the conduct of British troops in South Africa "that we should never approach what those nations who now accused us of barbarism did in Poland, the Caucasus, Bosnia Tonkin and the War of 1870". Bulow took up the gage and, after, vainly seeking an apology from the British government he declared in the Reichstag: "We may say, as Frederick the Great said of someone who attacked him and Prussian army: 'Let him alone, and do not get excited; he is biting granite'." The simple fact was that the British attempt to secure an agreement with Germany had come to naught.

The Breakdown of Negotiations between Britain and Germany was a Turning Point in European History

A turning-point in the history of Europe had been reached with the break down of these negotiations initiated by four years earlier by Chamberlain.

Why did not Bulow and Holstein Countenance a Separate Alliance with Britain? — The German government had not actually refused an alliance with Britain, but had imposed conditions which British statesmen could not accept. Bulow and his adviser, Holstein, were influenced by a fear that a separate alliance of Germany with Britain would lead at the same time to the breakdown of the Triple Alliance and to the active hospitality of the Dual Alliance. In that case, Germany would have to fight on two fronts, with an improperly projected flank on the south; and would not be able to count upon any appreciable military support from Britain, whose military

incapacity was being demonstrated at that very time by her conduct of the South African War. Moreover, the German government felt that it would be required to assist in the defence of the British Empire without being able to secure any compensating advantage. In a war with the members of the Dual Alliance it was feared that whilst Germany would have to bear the brunt of a terrible struggle on land, Britain could denude France of her colonies and her oversea trade, and then Germany—her only dangerous commercial rival—in the lurch. This appeared to be the basic motive of Bulow's distrust—the fear that perfidious Albion (ancient name of England) would use her powerful ally as a catspaw to draw the Chestnuts from the fire, and then basely desert her. The history of the Triple Entente was to prove an enlightening commentary upon this fear. Alongside his fundamental mistrust of Britain there lay in Bulow's mind another consideration. He was definitely of opinion that England was decadent, that Germany was already more powerful, and that, if he could retain diplomatic freedom of action for a few more years, the growth of German industry and commerce and of her navy would give her the supremacy of the world without the encumbrance of such an alliance. But he was undone by his own excessive subtlety.

Germany was Hoisted with her own Petard

“In trying by means of carefully balanced paragraphs to escape the danger of being exploited by England and then left in the lurch”, says Brandenburg “our political leaders conjured up the far greater peril of driving our natural allies into the arms of our opponents and leaving ourselves isolated”. After 1901, indeed Germany progressively lost that liberty of action, for which her leaders professed to manoeuvre. Within a year Britain abandoned her isolation by entering into the epoch-making alliance with Japan; within three years she aligned herself with France, and in another three years with Russia also. In 1905, at Algeciras Germany was faced with the dilemma of war or diplomatic defeat. “Part of the responsibility for these lost opportunities,” says Hammann “must be placed to the account of Bulow's favourite theory that England always made other nations pull the chestnuts out of the fire for her, and part to Holstein's academic policy and to his dogma that the antagonism of England and Russia was an immutable fact”.

The 'zig-zag' course of Bulow and his adviser, Holstein, controlled by the ulterior purpose of shepherding Germany through the danger zone, until her commerce and her navy should compel other nations to recognise her world-dominance, was based upon the plan of evading binding ties with either of the two powers—England and Russia – which represented, as it were, the poles of her policy. But Bulow's very avoidance of a decision was the chief factor in producing a decision which was fatal to German ambitions. As long as Britain remained isolated Germany, as leader of the formidable Triple Alliance, was in the position of 'tertius gaudens' [the third person (who) takes advantage from a dispute between others]. Whilst Russia threatened Britain in the Far East and France threatened her in Africa ; Germany could act as arbiter between them and even play the part of peace-maker on her own terms. But if Britain emerged from her isolation, the balance would become uncertain, and if she should join the Dual Alliance, Germany would then be forced into the defensive against a superior combination, which could at least contain her on land and dissipate her dream of world dominance by cutting her off from the sea.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902)

Early in February, 1902, Chamberlain remarked to Eckardstein that "there could be no more talk of cooperation with Germany". A few days before this, on January 30, Britain had signed a treaty of alliance with Japan. "History", says Hammann, "Knows of few treaties of alliance that have proved so remunerative for both partners as the Anglo-Japanese."

Ever since the outward outcome of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). Japan had reckoned on having to square accounts with Russia, whose advance in Manchuria and Korea was unpleasant to her. The arrogance of Germany in 1895 had thrown into higher light the friendly attitude of Britain. Since 1895 German policy had rested partly upon the unqualified assurance that sooner or later Russia would crush Japan and emerge a greater menace than ever to Britain in the East. But British diplomacy was far better informed than that of Germany or Russia, and after the resignation of Marquis. Ito who feared that Japan was not equal to a successful war against Russia, the ministry of Viscount Katsura, with Baron Komura as Foreign Secretary, in June 1901 began to prepare for the

inevitable war. At this juncture the Anglo-German negotiations broke down, and so the way was prepared for a quite new direction of British policy. Through the astute Japanese Ambassador at London, Bawn Hayashi, a treaty was soon drafted and mutually approved.

Terms of the Anglo-Japanese Allegiance

(a) It was to have a tenure of five years and was to be renewable by agreement;

(b) It recognised the independence of China and Korea, and acknowledged that Britain had a 'special interest in China, and Japan in Korea ;

(c) If these interests were threatened, either party had freedom of action. But if either became involved, in consequence, in war with a third Power, the other would remain neutral. If however, a fourth power intervened against either, her partner was to come immediately to her assistance. Though no names were mentioned in the Alliance, the third and fourth Powers had reference to Russia and France respectively. Thus by the Alliance the guns of the Dual Alliance were effectively spiked and Japan had opened a breach in the ranks of her rivals. She may now be said to have entered the family of nations.

Comments on the Alliance

It is to be noted that Britain reached an agreement with Japan upon much the same conditions which the former attached to her proposal of an alliance with Germany. Renewed in 1905 and 1911, on terms which first permitted and then sanctioned the Japanese annexation of Korea, the Anglo-Alliance lasted until it was superseded by the "Four-Power" agreement in 1922.⁴

It was the first time that an Eastern empire had been admitted on equal terms to a European alliance, and it gave Japan a standing that no Oriental state had obtained before. On that foundation,

4. A "Four-Power pact in 1922 replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by a regional pact. France, Britain, Japan and the United States entered into an agreement promising to respect one another's interests in the Pacific. In the event of a dispute between any two of the signatories the matter should be referred to a conference of the four.

“Japan has built her subsequent policy of imperialism, which has certainly come to be the supreme menace to the peace of the Far East.”

As far as Britain was concerned, she abandoned her traditional policy of isolation in the most favourable circumstances.

By this Alliance Russia was presented with the certain prospect of a war with an incalculable enemy in a region 6,000 miles from her capital with which it was connected only by a recently completed single-track railway.⁵ In fact it could be maintained that the first result of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was undoubtedly to precipitate the Russo-Japanese War(1904-05), and by preventing France, under threat of war with England, from coming to Russia's help it gave to Japan the predominance at sea which made her victorious.

Reactions to the Alliance

Japan being now free to complete her preparations for a reckoning with Russia, which was pushing on the Trans-Siberian Railway towards the proposed terminus at Port Arthur, the Russian government was naturally much perturbed by the Treaty and vainly attempted to secure a renewal of the Triple Alliance of the Far East, which Bulow firmly refused; but the Kaiser gave the Czar her verbal assurance that, in any complication in the Far East, Germany would guard his rear. Russia then obtained from France a declaration that the Dual Alliance was valid beyond Europe. But Britain gave France a friendly warning that she must fulfil the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and Delcasse, who was angling for an understanding with England, soon made it clear in the French Parliament that there was in fact no intention of extending the Dual Alliance to the Far East.

Germany's Anticipation were Falsified by the Alliance

The relations of the Great Powers rapidly changed within a short time of the final collapse of the negotiations for an understanding between Britain and Germany, and the changes progressively falsified the anticipation upon which German policy was founded. Germany rejected the Russian offer of alliance with much better

5. Within, Russia was threatened at that time by the ominous rumble of a social volcano.

reason than she had rejected the British offer and she was soon to learn that, far from remaining 'arbiter mundi' or 'tertius gaudens' as she had been variously described—she had, in fact, lost her power of choice and her supposed command of the world situation.

In the September, 1902, Chamberlain declared in an interview with Eckardstein that "he had quite given up his earlier plans for an alliance with Germany, as Germany for the time being was apparently convinced that she would gradually succeed in bringing down England and her colonial empire and in taking possession of the whole inheritance for herself..... Any provocation from Germany might lead to a war..... and England could always find allies."

In spring 1903, Anglo-French discussions continued, accompanied by grave warnings to his government, by Eckardstein in London; though Holstein still reiterated in fixed conviction that an understanding between the two Western Powers was a mere figment of imagination.

Anglo-German Naval Rivalry

Whatever the blunders of the Kaiser, it was of decisive importance that Britain and Germany—the greatest world power and the greatest European powers were now engaged in ferocious competition for power at sea. Nothing more quickly and decisively aroused popular emotions in either country than this naval rivalry. The Challenge was first thrown by the German Naval laws of 1897 and 1898 which added 12 ships of the line to the existing 7; 10 large cruisers to the existing 2; and 23 small cruisers to the existing 7. A high seas fleet was needed by Germany only if she intended to use her power outside Europe; and the Navy Law of 1900, which doubled the number of battleships, made the winning of power on the high seas of the world an integral part of German policy.

This challenge was taken up in earnest by Britain from 1903 onward, when she began her programme of naval rearmament. Fearing that the greatest military power in Europe would not embark on so large a project of naval construction unless she aimed at the domination of the world, the British Parliament in July, 1903

6. "Tertius gaudens" literally means the third person (who) takes advantage from a dispute between others.

sanctioned the concentration of a powerful Home Fleet in the North Sea and the construction of a new base of Rosyth. For the first time her disposition of naval power began to face towards Germany rather than France or Russia. Nor could the behaviour of Germany permit of any other interpretation of her intentions.

In 1905 Sir John Fisher, engaged in a technical overhaul of British naval strength since becoming First Sea Lord the year before, laid the keel of the first dreadnought. "The larger and much more heavily gunned vessel—'a new type of floating gun carriage'—made older and smaller ships obsolete. When Germany commenced soon after to build them too, a race began which stirred popular feelings in both countries." "The estrangement of English policy from Germany was complete".

Italy and the Triple Alliance

Let us now turn our attention to the attitude of Italy towards the Triple Alliance.

In summer 1902, the Triple Alliance was due for renewal, and negotiations revealed clear line of cleavage between the interests of Italy and her partners. Already in 1898 Italy had terminated her ten years tariff war with France by entering into a friendly commercial treaty. In July, 1900 the Germanophil King Humbert was assassinated, and succeeded by his son, Victor Emmanuel III, who did not share his father's political sympathies. In December, 1900 a general agreement was reached between Italy and France in regard to the North African question, of which information did not reach Italy's allies till a year later. In April, 1901 the Italian fleet visited Toulon and was received with enthusiasm. Since February, 1901 Italy had in Prinetti the first Francophil Foreign Minister for twenty years, who cooperated with Delcasse through Barrere, the French Ambassador at Rome, in a spirit clearly hostile to the Triple Alliance. When in January, 1902 negotiations were set on foot for the renewal of the Alliance, Prinetti demanded significant modifications in its terms *viz.*, the inclusion of a clause stating that "Italy had undertaken no obligations that could be dangerous to France"; a sanction for the Italian occupation of Tripoli at the

very time when Germany was pressing the Bagdad Railway scheme ; a declaration binding the Alliance to the unconditional maintenance of the 'status quo' in the Near East (Balkans and Dardanelles).

Discussing the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Italian Mediterranean agreement in the Reichstag on January 8, 1902, Bulow compared the Alliance to a happy marriage, in which the husband does not fly into a rage if his wife sometimes has a harmless extra dance with some other man. It was a witticism which must have concealed bitter mortification. After much discussion the Triple Alliance was renewed without alternation on June 28, 1902 for six years, with provision for its extension for another six years. But hence forth Italy had one foot in each camp, and the new orientation was to determine her attitude at the Congress of Algeciras and on even more important occasions.

In spite of the fact that the Triple Alliance was renewed, Italy kept on flirting with France. In November, 1902 the Italian and French governments amplified the agreement of 1900 in regard to North Africa, according each other complete freedom of action in their respective spheres of influence in Morocco and Tripoli. Further they agreed that, if either was attacked by another Power, the other would maintain strict neutrality, even though the party attacked felt obliged first to declare a defensive war against its opponent.

In December 1902, the Chief of the German General Staff notified the Chancellor that, in the event of a Franco German war, the Staff renounced the right which it possessed by the terms of a military convention of 1888 to claim the service on the Rhine front of an Italian army of five corps.

Germany now Making 'Beaux Yeux' at Russia and Professing Friendship with Britain

With the Austrian empire creaking at every joint, the Balkans threatening another eruption, Italy openly intriguing with France and also reserving her neutrality in the event of a war between Britain and the Central Powers, Germany was now making 'beaux yeux' (fine eyes) at Russia, and professing friendship with Britain, with whom

she cooperated in the chastisement of President Castro of Venezuela in 1903⁷.

In February, 1904, the long brewing war broke out between Russia and Japan, and William II wrote to Nicola II, reiterating the moral support of Germany, and presuming that at its conclusion Russia would annex both Korea and Manchuria. But on the eve of the outbreak the Czar had implored England to intervene in order to prevent it, promising to coincide all the Japanese demands. On the advice of Japan, Britain refused to intercede.

In March, 1904, the Kaiser was cruising in the Mediterranean, and Bulow tried to induce him to land at Tangier as a demonstration of the German interest in Morocco and a warning to France and England that no arrangement between them in regard to that country could be made without the cooperation of Germany. But the Kaiser refused to be party to an act that would looklike an ultimatum. During his cruise he called at Gibraltar, and after viewing the fortifications and the British Mediterranean squadron, he wrote to the Chancellor. 'It is sheer madness to assume that he can carry out a world policy without, or still more against England'. Before William II had returned home the Anglo-French Entente had been signed on April 8, 1904. One may well conclude this review of German foreign policy between 1890 and 1904 with the comment of Brandenburg. "With the coming of the Anglo-French Entente Germany's outwardly brilliant position between the two groups of Great Powers had passed for ever".

7. At the opening of the twentieth century, Venezuela, a South American state, was in the grip of President Castro, who showed as little consideration for the subjects of the Great Powers as for the rebels who challenged his despotic rule. In the summer of 1903 Landowners patience was exhausted, and Britain government convinced that Castro would yield to force alone, decided on the blockade. As Germany had similar grievances and similar claims her cooperation was officially invited, and the two governments undertook to support each other's demands. When Castro continued to turn a deaf ear to remonstrance and menace, an ultimatum was presented on December 7, the warships at La Guayra were siezed and the coast blockaded. After a brief resistance the President proposed the submission of a portion of the claims, to arbitration, and the dispute was referred to the Hague tribunal. Though the governments of Britain and Germany cooperated harmoniously, their association was viewed by large sections of British opinion with profound distaste. The unfriendliness was noted in Germany with surprise and resentment.

Summing up of the Chief Factors in Anglo-German Relations from 1897 to 1904

At the outset of this phase, which was marked in Germany by the appointment of Bulow and Tirpitz, the German government deliberately initiated an active 'World Policy', which was signalled by the passing of the Naval Bill early in 1898. This Bill was the forerunner of other supplementary Bills, of which the intention was to create a High Sea battle-fleet, which would of itself prove formidable to British naval ascendancy, and would—in the words of Tirpitz and Bulow—possess an 'alliance value' capable of disturbing the balance of sea-power in the world. The navy was to become, according to Tirpitz : 'the meltingpot of Germanism'.

Despite his recurrent moods of verbose—arrogance, the Kaiser did not favour an aggressively adventurous foreign policy, and the naval expansion of Germany, as it proceeded, evoked much hostile criticism—in Germany than elsewhere—that it amounted to an ineffective and dangerous threat to Britain ; that is, ineffective against Britain, dangerous to Germany.

At the same time, British statesmen were coming to a momentous decision to change the principle to which British policy had so far adhered, by abandoning her isolation from continental diplomacy and seeking to enter into defensive alliance with one or more other Great Powers, that is, taking out an Insurance Policy of world peace. The British Prime Minister, Salisbury, it is true clung to the traditional attitude of 'splendid isolation', interrupted only by intermittent sallies into the Continental field, in order to adjust the balance to the special purposes of Britain, and he never really departed from this view. But the outlook of the British cabinet was modified by the inclusion of Chamberlain, who initiated negotiation with Germany for an entente, which, by a series of reciprocal concessions, would produce uniformity of policy directed to the restriction of armaments and maintenance of world peace. It was felt that a mutually retraining alliance between Britain and Germany—which, perhaps, the U.S.A. might be induced to join,—would be a certain guarantee of peace, whereas any other formidable combination of Power might lead to an opposing combination, to a competition of armaments, and to war.

After Anglo-German negotiations had been protracted for four years. They collapsed for several reasons : (i) The German government was convinced that Germany had achieved a greatness at least equal to that of any other Power, that her greatness was cumulatively increasing so rapidly that she was on the eve of achieving world—dominion, and therefore, that her diplomacy was to be regulated to secure her prestige as arbiter among the Powers, together with the fruits of that function, until she passed through the 'danger—zone' and her dominion was indisputable. (ii) Britain was reluctant to recognise the actual and potential position of Germany, and was prone to assume from her past that history had given a final judgment in her favour. But it is difficult to see that the vehement commercial and industrial competition of Germany induced in the British mind the growing determination to wage a Punic⁸ war against her rival, for it was felt in England that such a colossal clash would result probably (as it did), in mutual enfeeblement. (iii) The relations of the two Great Powers were complicated by the existence of the Dual Alliance. The German reception of British proposals was affected by the temptation to prade them with Russia in the attempt to revive something of the Bismarckian policy and at the same time to bring influence to bear through Russia upon France. Since the accession to the French Foreign Office of Delcasse, moreover French policy was directed to prevent an Anglo-German entente, which would extend to the whole world a hegemony such as Bismarck had maintained for Germany in Europe.

Circumstances, therefore, so conspired that Germany was forced after 1897 to an ineluctable (not to be escaped from) choice between an alliance with Britain and isolation. For, if she refused the British terms, as she did, Britain became at once suspicious that she harboured aggressive designs, and was drawn into a defensive alignment with France, which produced a precarious balance, induced panic armament, and placed the destiny of the two opposed groups too much at the mercy of adventurers who struck diplomatic matches in the midst of those bundles of inflammable material, which lay about Europe, especially in the Balkans.

8. Carthaginian faithless treacherous, deceitful [(as the Romans alleged the Carthaginiams to be).

Bulow's national pride and prejudice were not different from Salisbury's, but German diplomacy was particularly maladroit during a critical period. Germany's policy was too doctrinaire. It was passed upon several assumptions which were quickly and completely falsified : namely, that Russia would defeat Japan and prove a greater menace than ever to Britain ; that the enmities of Britain and France were immutable ; that Germany could retain the control and direction of the Triple Alliance no matter how the circumstances which surrounded its original establishment were changed. The masters of German policy did not realise, that is, until too late, that if Germany became isolated, Italy was much worse than useless to the Triple Alliance, and that Austria could use her—and did—as a stalking horse (a horse or substitute behind which a sportsman hides while stalking game ; any thing put forward so mask plans or efforts) behind which she could pursue her adventures in the Balkans. Indeed during the two decades before 1914 Europe presented the spectacle of that malignant disease which is the product of hypotrophied (the state of over-nourishment) political patriotism.

We turn now to piece together another portion of the European jigsaw, *viz.* the formation of the Anglo-French Entente or the Entente Cordiale.

The Entente Cordiale (1904)

The Background

Despite the fact that there were over fifty changes of government in France between 1871 and 1914, French Foreign Policy remained fairly homogeneous and continuous. This was due to two facts chiefly : (i) the policy of Bismarck of keeping her 'in cold storage ; and (ii) the universal French love of prestige.

Before the Congress of Berlin (1878), France had practically recovered from the debacle of 1870-71. After that Congress by the efforts of such men as Gambetta and Ferry, she sought to recover her prestige by establishing another world-empire, which she achieved in thirty years, first under the condescending patronage of Bismarck. The next step in the programme was to reverse the verdict of the Treaty of Frankfurt (May 10, 1871), to take her revenge. "Never mention it; never forget it", was the watchword which Gambetta gave to the French people. But to take her revenge on Germany she needed powerful allies, which would tilt the balance in her favour.

In acquiring her colonial empire, however, France had earned the enmity of Italy, whom she drove into the Triple Alliance, and of Britain, of whom, during the office of Bismarck, she made practically a sleeping partner of that formidable Alliance. Serious friction with Britain in regard to Egypt, Tonkin, Morocco, the New Herlides (a group of islands in the South Pacific) and other places was the price of her colonial expansion, which Bismarck considered sufficient.

But within a few months of the fall of Bismarck, the denunciation of the Re-insurance Treaty became the prelude to French

emergence from coventry by way of the Russian Alliance, which from the beginning of 1894, was directed by the French desire finally to re-establish the national "amour propre" (self-esteem) by taking complete revenge upon Germany. The Franco-Russian Alliance, however showed little sign of becoming a useful instrument of 'revanche', partly, because of Russian adventures in the Far East—which required a benevolently neutral Germany to keep a leash on Austria in the Near East; partly because of the utter incompatibility of view between a (semi-Oriental) despotism and an unstable and radical democracy; partly because of the chaos and corruption of politics within France itself. The Panama Canal scandals in 1892-93, resulting in the prosecution and imprisonment of Lessepe, Eiffel and others, and the implication of many prominent public men; the Dreyfus case, which began in 1894 and was not finally disposed till 1906, stirring up the depths of anti-Semitism and military corruption;¹ the endemic duel between the clericals and anti-clericals, which

1. The Dreyfus case briefly was : A certain ardently republican Jewish Officer, Captain Dreyfus had been convicted by court-martial of selling confidential documents to the German military attache. From being a minor military scandal, the case became a great political 'cause celebre' (a peculiarly notable trial).

It was alleged that the chief document on the evidence of which Dreyfus had been convicted and punished had in fact been forged ; and that its forger had been protected by the certain "stuffed shirts" (reactionary military authorities), who had seized upon the excuse to expel Jews and Protestants from the armed forces. The great novelist, Emile Zola (1840-1902), published an article "*J'accuse*" ("I Accuse") in which he deliberately invited legal penalties in order to set out the charges against the army. A whole succession of charges and counter charges meanwhile aroused public excitement to fever pitch, and Zola's trial, in which he was defended by Clemenceau, became a heated political debate. The personal issue of guilt or innocence of Dreyfus was lost sight of, and the issue became one of general principle. It was a clear issue between the military claim, that the honour and prestige of the army mattered more than injustice to any individual, and the Republican civilian claim, that individual justice must triumph over all else. Both sides exaggerated and inflated the issue until no settlement seemed possible. That Dreyfus was a Jew, and his most noisy enemies zealous Catholics, involved the affair in the anti-clerical quarrel. The affair ended with somewhat half-hearted attempts at a "coup d'etat" by extremists of the right, and eventual pardon and reinstatement of Dreyfus.

The Dreyfus case had been much more than a quarrel about a man. It was made a pretext by all parties for gratifying their animosities. It was utilized by the right against the Republic, by rival republicans against each other, by the military party against the parliamentarians, by the revolutionary socialists against the army, by the clericals against non-Catholics, and by the anti-clericals against the Church. It was, in fact, a symptom of the complicated political condition of France.

The depths of bitterness engendered by the Dreyfus case, and the violence with which each side fought it for several years, made it seem natural even in 1940 for the overthrow of the third Republic by Marshal Petain to be described by Frenchmen as "the revenge of the anti-Dreyfusards."

produced a series of unseemly international crises and reacted rather disastrously upon foreign policy; such a constant succession of unsavoury episodes weakened the Russian Alliance and strengthened the British distrust of French policy.

From 1894 untill 1898 French foreign policy was directed by Hanotaux, who was influenced by bitter jealousy of Britain. For some years the German government had been philandering with France trying to convince itself that the desire for revenge was out of fashion, trying to shepherd France into a Continental alliance against Britain.

Theophile Delcasse at the "Quai d' Orsay"

Warm airs, however, began to blow between Britain and France after 1898, when the relation between Britain and Germany were drifting from bad to worse. The idea of a rapprochement between Britain and France was born on the day of Delcasse's appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs in June 1898. When he took on the robes of his office he is said to have declared, "I will not leave this chair until I have re-established a friendly understanding with England".

A rapprochement between Britain and France was preceded by the reconciliation between France and Italy. A commercial treaty with Italy, in 1898, was followed by the gradual seduction of that country from the solidarity of the Triple Alliance.²

The initiation by the Czar of the First Hague Conference acted as a cold douche upon those in France who saw in the Dual Alliance a weapon of revenge. Consequently, Delcasse handled the Fashoda

2. Even though Delcasse had succeeded in weakening Italy's allegiance to the Triple Alliance, Italy renewed the Alliance without verbal modification in 1902, but Italy made it clear to France that "in the renewal of the Alliance there is nothing directly or indirectly aggressive toward France, no engagement binding us in any eventuality to take part in an aggression against her, no stipulation which menaces her security and tranquility." On receiving this momentous communication, Delcasse expressed to the Italian Ambassador "the deepest gratitude of the French government for Italy's loyal proof of the policy of peace". Delcasse's announcement seemed to the Central Powers to suggest subterranean intrigues but it in no way contravened the letter of the Triple Alliance, which had never pledged Italy to cooperate in an attack on France. The German Chancellor according to his wont, poured oil on the troubled waters wittingly observing that in a happy marriage the husband did not mind his wife indulging in an innocent extra dance. On June 28, 1902, the Triple Alliance was renewed. But henceforth Italy had one foot in each Camp.

crisis with studious regard for British feelings. Gracefully abdicating the French claim, he asserted that in North Africa the Gallic (pertaining to Gaul or France) cock could scratch at ease amid his sand, leaving the British duck to wallow (so roll about) in the Nile-marches. During the Boer War French public opinion was greatly inflamed against England. Even the sober earnest Lavissee (1842—1922), who headed a galaxy of historians in France rewriting French history with special concentration of the history of the French Revolution, declared : “England would like to retain the advantages of having been the country of Gladstone when she has become the country of Mr. Chamberlain.” But Delcasse steered the policy of his country adroitly through these difficult months. “You say”, he said to a deputy, “that after finishing with the Transvaal England will turn against us.....Very frankly, I do not think so”. In the Senate he declared on April 3, 1900, that “If by mischance a conflict should break out between these two Powers, it is not to the victor that the chief fruits of victory would go.”

France co-operated with the other Powers in the intervention in China during the Boxer disturbances in 1900, but after the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in 1902, she found herself in a difficult situation between Russia and Britain, which might easily produce another crisis more serious for the scheme which Delcasse had up his sleeves for a rapprochement with Britain than Fashoda. According to the British view, Russia was “creeping over Manchuria behind a foggy cloud of assurances, secretly backed by Germany, openly backed by France, and posing all the time as a friend of China.” We have already seen how, despite the declaration of the solidarity of the Dual Alliance in regard to affairs “beyond Europe”, Delcasse reached a ‘modus vivendi’ (an arrangement or compromise by means of which those who differ may get on together for a time) with England without estranging Russia.

Delcasse's Mind was not an Ease with France's International Position

Delcasse was, however, not satisfied with France's international position. Since his visit to St. Petersburg in April, 1901, and the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in January, 1902, he realised that Russo-Japanese conflict was inevitable, and that its inevitable result would be to weaken Russia as a partner in the

Dual Alliance in European diplomacy. There were still acute colonial questions outstanding with England, *e.g.*, in Egypt, Morocco, Newfoundland, Madagascar, Siam and the New Hebrides. Even though she had succeeded in weakening Italy's allegiance to the Triple Alliance, she had renewed the Alliance without verbal modification in 1902.

Delcasse all out for an Understanding with Britain

Accordingly, Delcasse bent all his energies to the task of reaching an understanding with England along the line of mutual concession, which would prepare the way for a general political agreement, and perhaps lead to the formation of the Triple Entente of Britain, France and Russia which would brighten the horizon of French policy.

The Bagdad Railway

About this time the four leading European Powers became closely involved in the question of the future of Asiatic Turkey. Although throughout the earlier part of the nineteenth century, Britain had occupied a dominant position in Turkey as early as 1888 a German Company had obtained a concession to build a railway from Haidar Pasha (opposite Constantinople) to Angora, and a report by a British official, Major Law, who was sent in 1895 to survey the situation, revealed that Germany had quite replaced Britain in Asia Minor, and that German Companies had gained control of its communications, to the disadvantage of both Britain and France. In November, 1899, Germany obtained from the Sultan a concession to extend the Anatolian Railway to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. Britain at once established a protectorate over Koweit which contained perhaps the only port which could furnish a terminus for the Railway.

Meanwhile, German and French financiers had secretly agreed each to provide 40% of the necessary capital—leaving 20% to be subscribed by other nations—and to divide the control between representatives of the two countries. When this arrangement became known, Russia bristled at the prospect of a peaceful penetration of Asia Minor, which might result, through secret agreement, in a dangerous alteration of the political 'status quo'. Britain, whose negotiations for a political agreement with Germany were approach-

ing a stalemate, and who found herself in the course of the Boer War at fierce odds with the public opinion of both France and Germany, demanded equal consideration in the question of the exploitation of Asia Minor.

French opinion would not allow her ally, Russia, to be overlooked in a matter which so nearly concerned her, and Delcasse was anxious to placate Britain. An embargo was placed upon the negotiation of Bagdad Railway stock in the French bourse (pronounced Boors—an exchange where merchants meet for business) until a satisfactory political arrangement was made.

Early in 1903, it was suggested that Germany, France and Britain should each supply 30% of the capital ; but, when it was found that the enterprise was to be placed completely under German directorship and control, the British Government strenuously opposed it. Lansdowne informed the German government that Britain had no intention allowing any railway to be constructed through Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf, except one of completely international character.

The French Premier, Rouvier, who was banker and had been concerned in the previous negotiations, was still in favour of French participation with Germany ; but when Delcasse pointed out that France would probably be left to provide 60% of the capital, that Germany would retain practically sole administrative control and that Russia and Britain would be alienated by such a project, at the end of 1903 he secured an official embargo upon French participation. Thus the two governments issued from the Bagdad Railway negotiations with a distrust of Germany, which emphasised their tendency to a mutual accord.

Other Favourable Circumstances which Brought Britain and France Closer to one Another

The retirement of Salisbury (1901) removed a figure who, like Hanotianx, had been consistently unfavourable to an Anglo-French entente ; whilst the accession of Edward VII (1901) meant the advent of a powerful friend of France. Delcasse now had a powerful patron, in the King, and two excellent liaison officers, in Sir

Thomas Barclay at Paris³, and M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Edward VII's Visit to Paris

In the spring of 1903, Edward VII, of his own initiative, asked for an invitation to visit Paris, which the French government at once accorded, though it feared a hostile, or at best a cold, reception by the populace. But Edward's tact and bonhomie prevailed. In a speech before the English Chamber of Commerce in Paris he said: "The days of hostility between the two countries are, I am certain, happily at an end. I know of no two countries whose prosperity is more interdependent.....I trust that the friendship and admiration which we all feel for the French nation and their glorious traditions may in the near future develop into a sentiment of the warmest affection and attachment between the peoples of the two countries" with Edward VII's visit to Paris the tension between the two countries which dated from the Fashoda crisis began at once to relax "The English King", says Tardieu, "was the initiator of the rapprochement. He it was who both conceived and facilitated it." Sir C. Dilke wrote to the same effect: "The great and sudden improvement in relations between the English-speaking world and France is largely due to the wisdom and courtesy with which the King made clear to France that there was no ground for the suspicions which prevailed."

Three Months Later French President Loubet Returned the King's Visit

In the summer of the same year (1903), President Loubet returned the King's visit, and was received by genuine enthusiasm.

A Treaty of Arbitration

On October 14, 1903, the two countries signed a Treaty of Arbitration for settlement of all judicial disputes by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. In the French Chamber, this Treaty was supported with the observation: "Thinking people of both countries are agreed that a hostile policy between the two great

3. An excellent account of the transition from hostile into friendship between Britain and France is to be found in Barclay's "Anglo French Reminiscences".

liberal nations, between the country of the 'Habeas Corpus' and the country of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, would be a crime against civilisation."

The Entente Cordiale (April 8, 1904)

The fruit of six years of delicate diplomacy was now ripening for Delcasse, and in the following spring it was plucked. An accord was signed by both governments on April 8, 1904, settling all the outstanding political differences between the two nations, which now became united in the 'Entente Cordiale'.

The Accord

The famous settlement was embodied in three separate treaties :

(i) relating to Egypt and Morocco ; (ii) to Newfoundland and West Africa : and (iii) to Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides.

Settlement Relating to Egypt and Morocco

Britain was particularly anxious to reach an agreement with France in regard to Egypt, where a highly competent and successful administration was being embarrassed by French obstruction. Although France had withdrawn from a dual control there in 1882, the financial administration was still, in 1904, regulated by the Law of Liquidation of 1880 and the London Convention of 1885. The 'Caisse de la Dette (Treasury) had been established to guarantee and liquidate Egypt's foreign debts by placing a lien on her revenues to provide interest. For some years there had been a deficit in the 'Caisse', which was still partly controlled by France. But before the end of the nineteenth century, Lord Cromer had entirely rehabilitated Egyptian government and finance and in the words of Lord Milner "The spectacle of Egypt, with her Treasury full of money, yet not allowed to use that money for an object which, on a moderate calculation, should add 20% to the wealth of the country, is as distressing as it is ludicrous. Every year that passes illustrates more forcibly the injustice of maintaining, in these days of assured solvency, the restrictions imposed upon the financial freedom

of the Egyptian Government at a time of bankruptcy – restrictions justified then, but wholly unjustifiable now.”⁴

On the other side, France felt herself intolerably hampered in regard to Morocco by the jealous obstruction of Britain. As pointed out by Andre Tardieu (1876-1945), “For twenty years Britain has been in Morocco our most redoubtable adversary.”⁵

The most important of the agreements signed on April 8, 1904, was the Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco.⁶

By this Declaration British surveillance of the Egyptian government was henceforth to be unimpeded by France. After effective provision had been made for the guarantee of liquidation of Egypt's foreign debts, the Egyptian government was to have freedom, under British supervision, to apply the balance of her revenue to national purposes. Britain declared that she had no intention of altering the political status of Egypt—i.e., by proclaiming a protectorate – and France declared that she would not demand a period to the British occupation, nor intervene in any way in its administration. All existing rights of French nationals in Egypt were guaranteed, including the ‘open door in commerce’ and Britain renewed her guarantee of neutrality of the Suez Canal (Suez Canal Convention of 1888).

The British Government, in return, recognised the special interest of French “the preserve order in Morocco, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require”, and undertook not to “obstruct the action taken by French for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Britain enjoys there.” France declared that she had no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. It was stipulated (Art. 7) that no fortifications of strategic works were to be constructed on the Moroccan coast opposite Gibraltar; and (Art. 8) that France was to come to a

4. According to Lord Cromer the immediate origin of the ‘Entente’ was to be found in this situation in Egypt, which had, in fact, become intolerable to Britain.

5. France was therefore no less eager to clear her path in Morocco.

6. In a circular despatch to French Ambassadors in April, 1904, Delcasse wrote: “The principal part of the arrangement just concluded relates to Morocco.”

friendly understanding with Spain as to the distribution of their spheres of interest in Morocco. By Art. 9 the two governments were to "afford to one another their diplomatic support in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration". For European affairs Art. 9 was the most significant. It made Morocco the focus of European disputes during the next decade and the occasion of several German discomfiture.

In short by the Declaration Britain received a free hand in Egypt, and France in Morocco.

Britain formally notified the governments of other powers, particularly Germany, of the agreement so far as it related to Egypt; but France never informed the German government directly and in the proper diplomatic form. Neither did she inform Spain in the usual way; though negotiations between France and Spain were set in train in terms of Art. 8 of the Declaration.

So far as the public Declaration of April 8, 1904 was concerned, Britain and France abandoned their traditional policy in regard to Morocco and Egypt respectively; though the reservation with respect to "the open door" in Morocco—as it affected both Britain and Germany—was equivocated by the French government, which distinguished between "commercial" and "economic" freedom, and intended to exclude all other nationals from contracts for public work, and from the exploitation of mineral wealth of Morocco. The published agreement regarding Egypt and Morocco was to have a tenure of thirty years.

Reaction of Germany to the Accord

The attitude of official Germany towards the Anglo-French Treaty was at first friendly and favourable. Before the Declaration was signed, the North German Gazette, an official organ, stated on March 25 that in view of the "reiterated assurance" that France intended "neither the conquest nor the occupation" of Morocco, German interests were, "so far as can be gathered at present" in no danger. On April 12, in answer to questions in the Reichstag, Bulow stated that there was no reason to believe that the agreement was directed against Germany. "We must protect our commercial interests in Morocco, and shall protect them. We have no reason to fear that they will be so aside or infringed by any Power". It

is important to notice that the German government throughout made no distinction between—‘economic’ interests and ‘commercial’ interests in a narrow sense.

Secret Articles

It was first revealed in “Le Temps” in November, 1911, that in addition to the published Declaration of April, 1904, the two governments had also signed five secret articles in which the British government agreed to allow France, if and when she found it desirable, to establish a protectorate over Morocco on three conditions : (i) a guarantee of commercial freedom ; (ii) that the control of the territory, opposite Gibraltar should be in the hands of Spain, which was not allowed to alienate it, or to fortify its coast ; (iii) that France consented to the declaration of a British protectorate over Egypt whenever Britain should consider that step desirable. This in spite not only of Delcasse’s statement to the German Ambassador at Paris on March 27, that “we wish to uphold in Morocco the existing political and territorial status”, but also of the published Declaration in the Anglo-French agreement that France had no intention of altering the political status of Morocco, which in any case, was guaranteed by the Madrid Convention, signed by the governments of thirteen Powers, including Germany.

It was obviously an utterly dishonest transaction, to which both the British and French governments were parties.

It was thought inexpedient to publish these articles with the rest of the Declaration, so one can surmise, because the Sultan of Morocco might object to even the possibility of a protectorate and Germany might imagine that her interests were being jeopardised.

We have now discussed at some length the transactions regarding Egypt and Morocco which constituted the chief foundation of the ‘Entente Cordiale.’

The Other Two Treaties

The other two remaining Declarations signed on the same day (April 8, 1904) can be dismissed more summarily. In the second Declaration, Britain and France defined their spheres of influence in Siam., in Madagascar, Britain abandoned her opposition to the French policy of commercial exclusiveness, receiving a compensating advantage in Zanzibar. Agreement was also reached in regard to the administration of the New Hebrides, which since 1887 had been most unsatisfactorily controlled by a mixed naval commission.

The third Convention, in regard to the Newfoundland fisheries, though it may seem trivial, removed a long standing cause of French bitterness. Newfoundland had been ceded to England by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). Its possession was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris (1763). In 1783, at the Treaty of Versailles, however, a strip of coast, known as the French shore, was reserved exclusively for French fishermen. During the nineteenth century although the number of fishermen from France steadily declined, bitter disputes continued about the purchase of bait and the drying of fish and nets. When the British government signed a convention with France in respect of those conventions in 1857, Newfoundland, which now enjoyed self-government, refused to observe its conditions. When in 1890 the Newfoundlanders found the French fishermen taking lobsters—which, it seems are crustacea (a large class of aquatic arthropod animals) and not fish—in territorial waters, they returned to the attack. At last, in 1904, the vexed question was settled. The French abandoned their drying rights, and for the rest were on equality with British fishermen; the lobster lost its international status. France was compensated in Gambia and Nigeria (Western Africa), gaining the strategically important Iles de Los, better access to Sanegambia and Lake Chand—together about 140,000 square miles of territory, which greatly improved and consolidated her Western African Empire.

The General settlement of April, 1904 was acclaimed both in Britain and in France, and the two countries from that time entered into an ever closer diplomatic accord, which was destined to have a critical influence on the political fortunes of the world. The Russian government expressed its profound satisfaction at the new entente, and already Russians were to be found who talked of its extension into a new triple alliance.

Comments on the Entente Cordiale

A common distrust of Germany had brought Britain and France together in what may perhaps be called a conspiracy of defence.

The Entente Cordiale settled all claims between the two countries. Some of these claims were old—that of Newfoundland fisheries went back to the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). Others were modern boundary questions. But the fundamental bargain was the surrender of France's special position in Egypt for British recognition of her ambitions in Morocco.

Spain was brought off by a share in Moroccan territory, but Germany was not bought at all, because there was nothing to buy. Germany had no place in Morocco anyway. But the Germans thought differently. So considerable a change in the African *status quo* as the acceptance of French Control in Morocco was not to be permitted except at a price. The French position was weakened by the folly of her ally. Russia had blundered into war with Japan, a war that diverted her military and naval strength to the Pacific, and showed too how overrated that strength had been. Defeat was followed by revolt and France could not count on her ally. The Germans exploited the situation; the Kaiser went to Tangier to declare his interest in the independence of the Sultan of Morocco. The Germans were anxious to break the entente, but Britain stood firm. France, however, was in no position to fight, and the Moroccan question was referred to an international Congress which met at Algeciras (1906),

Significance of the Entente Cordiale

Although the Entente Cordiale was merely a statement of harmony, and not an alliance, it was of great importance in ending Anglo—French rivalry and in bringing about a complete reconciliation of the two Western Powers which he beckoned as Delcasse foresaw a new era in European politics. It was enthusiastically received on both sides of the Channel.⁷ It marked the turning of Britain away from Germany: it removed from Britain the need of dependence upon German support in her Egyptian policy. It caused Italy to consider again her position in the Triple Alliance. It contributed to the adjustment of Anglo—Russian relations at the time when the Russo-Japanese War was putting strain upon them; it cleared the way for the signing in 1907 of the Anglo-Russian Convention which completed the Triple Entente.

7. There was only one dissentient voice that of Lord Rosebury (Prime Minister of England in 1894-95) who observed that as Germany, the strongest military power in Europe, had not been consulted over Morocco the 'Entente' would eventually lead England into a German War.

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The Triple Entente 1907

We have already noticed the unstable position of Russia in European diplomacy at the beginning of the twentieth century. At that time the Dual Alliance had lost much of its original attractiveness for the French. Germany was actively intriguing for Russian friendship, and the vision of a great Continental alliance constantly hovered before William II, involving him in those curious negotiations during the South African War. For Britain, Russia was still the traditional enemy, whose sprawling advance towards Afghanistan, Tibet, the Persian Gulf, and her deep desire for the opening of the Bosphorus, were regarded as a constant menace to the integrity of the British Empire.

British Policy in Regard to the Persian Gulf, Tibet and Afghanistan

In May 1903, Lansdowne made a statement of British policy in regard to the Persian Gulf, which had been an undisputed sphere of British influence for more than a century and a half. While reaffirming the principle of the 'open door', he declared that the military penetration of this zone by any other Power would be regarded as a hostile act. This pronouncement was received with much chagrin both at St. Petersburg and at Berlin. Largely through the initiative of Lord Curzon, who was at the time Viceroy of India, an expedition was despatched under Sir Francis Younghusband in 1903-04 to Lhasa, which opened relations with Tibet, and, by means of a treaty possessing definite sanctions, secured that country as a bulkhead against Russian aggression towards India. Before the Tibetan Treaty was signed in September, 1904, the British Prime Minister Balfour found it necessary to warn Russia in May

that strategic concentration on the Afghan frontier and plans for strategic railways towards that frontier, would be regarded as "the heaviest conceivable blow against our Indian Empire".

Britain under the Conservative Government did not Move for an Accommodation with Russia

The Conservative government in Britain and certainly not moved in the direction of an accommodation with Russia. The Yangtse Agreement with Germany in October, 1900, had been directed against Russian aggression in North China. The Anglo Japanese Treaty, signed in January, 1902, was a more effective instrument for the same purpose. The Anglo-French Agreement of April, 1904, though the Czar expressed his approval, did not bring the partners of the Dual Alliance and the Entente into a co-operative alignment : for the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War followed in the same year, and, in consequence of a series of dangerous incident to Anglo-Russian tension soon became more acute. Indeed during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), Britain, as the ally of Japan, did everything possible, short of war, to hinder the Russians and bring about their defeat.

The European Tangle Became More Complex

During 1905 Russian defeats on the hands of the Japanese multiplied until, by the intermediation of Theodore Roosevelt, President of U.S.A., supported by the Kaiser—who did not want to see his potential ally utterly exhausted—peace was concluded at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on September 5, 1905¹. But in the meantime the European tangle had become more complex. On August 12, the Anglo Japanese Treaty on January, 1902, was transformed into a more extensive compact. The new Treaty, which was to have a term of ten years, modified the alliance in essential

1. By the Treaty of Portsmouth Japan regained the Liaotung peninsula with Port Arthur, and also the southern half of the northern island of Sakhalin ; a protectorate over Korea, which remained independent of China ; and Concessions in Manchuria which remained technically Chinese. Japan could now claim to be regarded as a Great Power, and in a very real sense the sentinel of Far East. In this clash of two imperialisms it was the Russian which had been worsted.

respects. By Art. 3 "Britain recognises the right of Japan to take such measures...in Korea as she may deem proper". By Art. 4 Japan recognises the right of Britain to take such measures in the proximity of the Indian frontier as she may find necessary". By Art. 2 each party undertook to assist the other in case of attack upon either by a *single* power.² The new Treaty involved the British government in serious commitments as between Japan and U.S.A., and also as between Japan and Germany though the latter was not realised at the time.

'Algeciras' was a German Defeat

Having failed for the time in the personal conduct of German diplomacy towards an agreement with Prussia, the Kaiser now reluctantly consented to the plans of Bulow and Holstein, who sought to force France and England apart by intervention in Morocco. Bulow apparently was more restrained in his aims than Holstein. "If the French wish good relations with us" he wrote to Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador at Paris, on April 27, 1905, "they must first abandon their efforts to isolate us by disrupting the Triple Alliance and by turning England against us". But Holstein wished to procure the fall of Delcasse, to break the 'iron ring', and even to restore the balance to Germany by smashing France. "A surrender" he wrote on April 4, 1905, "would rank with Olmutz and cause Fashoda to be forgotten". So Germany took the road which led to Algeciras. But Bulow steadily diverged from the path suggested by the bellicose Holstein, whose resignation was accepted on April 5, 1905.³

2. The article reads : "If reason of unprovoked attack..on the part of any other Power or Powers either Contracting Party shall be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests...the other Contracting Party, will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and will make peace in mutual agreement with it."

3. Holstein and Delcasse resigned from their respective offices in April and June, 1905, respectively. Delcasse was forced to resign to placate Germany. At a stormy meeting of the cabinet over the Moroccan crisis, Rouvier sacrificed him on June 6, 1905 to appease the German government. Nationalist opinion in France naturally stormed this humiliation, and the apparent pretension of Germany to dictate who might be France's foreign minister rallied British sympathy to the French side.

The defeat of Germany at Algeciras was complete ; Bulow accepted almost the identical terms which in December 1905 he had precluded in advance as constituting a diplomatic triumph for France.

The Treaty of Bjorko (1905)

The Kaiser's heart was never in the Moroccan policy of his government, and Bulow, having parted with the troublous Holstein and having secured the fall of Delcasse, strongly supported William's proposal in the summer of 1905 to inveigle Nicholas into the German net.

One cannot help making a comment before proceeding further that the clumsy and divided policy of Germany during these years was dominated by a terrible anxiety to escape the isolation in which its diplomacy since 1890 was threatening to result.

Bulow feared that conclusion of peace in the Far East would give Edward VII and the British diplomats an opportunity to effect an entente with Russia. So he drafted a treaty proposal, which the Kaiser was to ensnare the Czar into signing. The Kaiser proposed to meet the Czar alone at Bjorko off the coast of Finland. On July 24, after he had hypnotised Nicholas into acquiescence, William drew the 'little agreement' out of his pocket and handed it over to the Czar.⁴

The Kaiser describes the scene in a letter to Bulow : "He (the Czar) read once, twice, thrice, the text which you have received. I prayed that God would guide the will of the young ruler. All was still as death, only the lapping of the water and the sun shining bright and warm in the cosy cabin. Directly before me dazzling white rode the "Hohenzollern" (the German ship), and high in the morning air of fluttered the imperial standard. Just as I read the motto "Gott mit uns" (God with us—Hohenzollern motto) on the black cross, the Czar's voice beside me said :

4. The first article ran as follows : "In the event of one of the two Empires being attacked by a European Power, her ally would help her in Europe by land and by sea with all the forces". The second article excluded any separate peace. The third article was : "The present treaty takes effect from the moment at which a peace is concluded between Russia and Japan and remains in force until it is terminated by one year's notice." Article four bound the Czar to induce France to join them.

'That is quite excellent. I quite agree.' My heart beat so violently I could hear it ; I pulled myself together and said casually : 'Should you like to sign it ? It would be a very nice souvenir of our interview. He glanced over the sheet again, and said 'Yes, I will'...And so the morning of the 24th July, 1905, an Bjorkoe is a turning-point in the history of Europe, thanks be to God".

There was apparently no doubt in the minds of the Kaiser and his Chancellor as to the validity of the treaty, which was to be the preliminary of the fusion of the two great Continental alliances now that—as the rulers of Germany hoped—Delcasse was gone and Delcasseism was dead. "My dear Fatherland" wrote William to Bulow on July 25, "is at last free from the clutch of the Anglo-Russian vice".

This naive reversion to the Russian policy of Bismarck had, however, but a brief tenure. The reception of the treaty by Court Lamsdroff, the new head of the Russian government, and the Grand Duke Nicholas—the only men to whom the Czar showed it before the return of Witte (Russian Minister of Finance and the foremost champion of the Continental policy) from the peace negotiations—set—his mind in a panic, and the blunt Witte at once pointed out that it was quite incompatible with the French alliance, and that France would never accept it. Early in October, the Czar informed the Kaiser that the treaty must remain inoperative until France could be won over. In vain William expostulated : "What is signed is signed ! God is our witness !" The Czar steadily retreated, and by December the notorious Treaty of Bjorko had become a dead letter.⁵ Not only that ; but in his latest correspondence on the subject Nicholas also suggested that Germany should be more accommodating to France in the Moroccan question. "The Coalition is complete", wrote William to Bulow on November 26, "King Edward has handed the thing perfectly".

This nefarious episode in autocratic diplomacy was concluded at the end of 1905, about the time of the change of ministry in Britain. In December, 1905, Balfour's Conservative government resigned, and the liberals, under Sir Henry Campbell—Bannerman

5. It was allowed to remain buried in a pigeonhole among the Czar's private papers.

and then Asquith, entered on their long tenure of eleven years, with Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office.

Policy of the British Liberal Government towards Russia

We have seen that, in accordance with the Conservative tradition, the Salisbury and Balfour governments have maintained a generally hostile attitude towards Russia chiefly on account of the competition between the imperial policies of the two governments. On their accession to office the Liberals were as distrustful, but for different reasons. "It was not so easy", writes Grey, "to create friendship with Russia as with France. Russian despotism was repugnant to British ideals, and something was constantly happening in Russia that alienated British sympathy or stirred indignation". The "something" in Grey's mind was, no doubt at that time, the conduct of the Czarist government during and after the Revolution of 1905. But in 1906, the Liberal government became more sympathetic when the Czar announced that he was about to summon a Duma elected upon a fairly wide suffrage. In these circumstances in April, 1906, Britain participated with France in a great loan to Russia, which was proudly described by Witte as "the largest foreign loan in the history of modern nations".

The Duma was duly elected, and in summer its representatives gathered in London at the meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The Prime Minister, Campbell-Bannerman, was to deliver an address, in which he intended to extend a congratulatory welcome from the oldest parliament to the youngest.

"On the morning of the speech, C.B. was informed that the Czar had suspended the Duma (July 22). The occasion turned from one of the most suspicious to one extremely awkward. The one feature that saved the situation was that the Czar had not abolished the Duma, but only suspended it. C.B. turned the awkward corner by the phrase 'La Douma est morte ; vive la Douma', (Long live the Duma). The next day Benckendorff (the Russian Ambassador in London) came to see me" writes Grey, "and said that the phrase might cause offence at St. Petersburg".

The British Government was anxious to reach a diplomatic accommodation with Russia, but was constantly embarrassed by its abhorrence of the domestic policy of the Russian Government.

"The whole course of the internal affairs of Russia", writes Grey, "rendered the atmosphere very unfavourable to friendly negotiations. The treatment of Poles and Jews in Russia, and kindred matters were often subject of representations to me, and sometimes of questions in Parliament. Our interference could do no good, it would only make matters worse. A British government had once addressed some remonstrance to Russia about internal affairs, and the Russian government retorted with remarks about the state of Ireland". Nevertheless discussion proceeded in 1906 between Grey and Lamsdroff on the vexed question of the conflict of spheres of political interest in Asia, producing great perturbation in German diplomatic circles. "A nice outlook!" comments the Kaiser on the margin of a despatch dated September 19, 1906. "We must bargain in the future with the Franco-Russian Alliance, the Anglo-French Entente and an Anglo-Russian Entente, with Spain, Italy and Portugal as secondary satellites"⁶.

Role of Izvolsky in Bringing Russia and Britain Closer to One Another

When in May, 1906, Izvolsky replaced Lamsdroff at the Russian Foreign office, the discussion went more briskly and more favourably for Britain⁷; for the former was a convinced exponent of the policy of a Triple Entente. Izvolsky was appointed Foreign Minister on the day that the first Duma assembled (May 9). Himself a subtle and by no means dependable person, he served under two

6. A little earlier on May 31, 1906, after the failure at Algeiras Bulow informed the Kaiser that, in this "comparative isolation, our relations with Austria are more important than ever before". Bulow indeed, in 1906 "appreciated the dangers of the situation; once Austria realised the dependence of Germany, the Dual Monarchy would develop an assertiveness which might embroil her ally outside the German field of interest". Therefore, they must cling to Italy, he advised, despite the emptiness of Italian promises. Germany found herself under the circumstances in a very tight corner. She was herself responsible for the embarrassing situation in which she found herself then.

7. King Edward had described Izvolsky as the ablest of the Russian diplomatists and had probably made it a point of enlisting his sympathies by showing him small courtesies which had captivated his vain and susceptible nature. The Kaiser had asked for Izvolsky as Russian Ambassador to Berlin with the evident intention of winning him over to his policy. But when the Czar made him a Minister these plans fell through (Brandenburg).

of the worst representatives of the Old Regime in Russia, *viz.*, Goremykin and Stolypin ; and it was with such men that British Liberal Government were obliged to negotiate, "mariage de convenance" of the two countries. Grey's distaste is shown in a letter to the British representative at St. Petersburg, Sir Arthur Nicolson on April, 1, 1907 : "The real rock ahead is the prospect in Russia itself. If the Duma is dissolved and there is a regime of pogroms and courts martial, feeling here will be very adverse. We could carry a settlement of Asiatic frontier questions in any case, but I don't think we could do more if things were very bad in Russia, for there would be resentment at our choosing this time to make a concession about the Straits. But this would not be the worst consequence of reaction in Russia ; the worst is that things would be said in Parliament, and in our Press, which would mightily offend the Czar and the Russian Government, and might make it impossible for you to make progress at Petersburg".

The Anglo-Russian Convention

In February, 1907, Izvolski persuaded the Russian Council of Ministers to agree to a division of Persia into two spheres of influence, Russia to control the larger sphere of it in the north, and Britain the smaller in the south. He also persuaded the Council to withdraw its opposition to the Bagdad Railway scheme, to abandon plans for a Russian branch-line to the Persian Gulf, and to negotiate an agreement with Germany for compensation.

Finally, on August 31, 1907, the Anglo-Russian Convention on these terms was signed at St. Petersburg. It consisted of three separate agreements, relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet ; and formed a pendant and a counterpart to the Anglo-French agreements of April 8, 1904.

Persia was divided into two spheres of influence, separated by a neutral Zone. The two governments engaged to respect the independence and integrity of Persia, to assist in the preservation of order and the peaceful development of the country, and to preserve the "open door" in her trade.

Afghanistan was recognised as being exclusively within the sphere of British influence ; Britain engaging to maintain its integrity and existing political status, to abstain from intervening in its

internal affairs, and to ensure to Russia equality of commercial opportunity ; while the Russian Government "engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Government ; they further engage not to send any Agents into Afghanistan".

In regard to Tibet, both governments recognised the suzerain rights of China, and the special interest of 'Britain in maintaining the 'status quo' in the external relations of the country. Neither government would send representative to Tibet, nor intervene in its internal administration.

The Anglo-Russian Convention was Received with Mixed Feelings in Both Countries

In Russia it was regarded as a check upon expansion, especially in Persia—which the Pan-Slavs aimed at absorbing—and in Mesopotamia, without any compensation except a possible slackening of the diplomatic tension with Britain during a period of national importance. Moreover, complaint was made that it omitted all reference to the fundamental question of the Straits.

In England it was attacked by the imperialists ; led by Curzon,⁸ as a weak attempt to purchase Russian friendship by making unwarrantable concessions, which were bound to provoke further enmities. The more moderate Conservative leaders, however, regarded it as a diplomatic success purchased at a high material price ; but on the whole justified by the ominous outlook in Europe.

The aftermath

The events of the next few years tended to confirm Curzon's fears. The Amir of Afghanistan refused to ratify the terms relating to his country, which, in fact, became a dead letter. In Persia it was found that the maintenance of British influence could not be guaranteed throughout the whole of the sphere allotted to her, and the region of the upper Persian Gulf had virtually to be abandoned at a time when the project of the construction of the Bagdad Railway was gravely perturbing the government of the four leading Powers of

8. According to Curzon the Settlement was doubtful as regards Afghanistan, bad in Tibet and worse in Russia.

Europe. Moreover, as Grey admitted, "the integrity and independence of Persia, so tenderly cherished in the Preamble, did not in practice exist" and the Russian absorption of north Persia continued, regardless of the convention.

But on the other hand, the Convention was supplemented by a rapprochement between Russia and Japan (July 30, 1907;⁹ supplemented on July 4, 1910) and between France and Japan (June 9, 1907)¹⁰, which constituted a formidable Triple Entente, to which Japan had an organic relation in terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In other words, the reconciliation of Russia and Britain was confirmed by a rapprochement between their respective allies. The two parties—Britain and Japan on the one side, Russia and France on the other—had now made friends.

Reactions of the Anglo-Russian Convention in Germany

The rulers of Germany were aghast at a consummation, the possibility of which Holstein seven years before had described as the delusive nightmare of pessimists. The studied moderation of Bulow's public references to the birth of the Triple Entente failed to conceal his Chagrin at realising that seventeen years after the fall of Bismarck Germany was confronted with the disastrous prospect of isolation amid a diplomatic group, inspired by a common distrust of her, a group which, in any provocation crisis, would be transformed into a hostile alliance. ("The Triple Entente was not an alliance—it was a diplomatic group"—Grey in House of Commons August 3, 1914). "I may be told", Bulow declared in April, 1907, "that I take the Anglo-Russian rapprochement too calmly...That we are surrounded by difficulties and dangers no one is better aware than myself.....We need not be alarmed at ententes in regard to matters which do not directly concern us.... Let us grant to others the freedom of action which we claim for ourselves." This statement was quite inconsistent with the grave advice that he had already given his master, (on May 31, 1906), that "our relations with Austria are more important than ever before". The alliance with Austria was now vital to

9. Russia and Japan agreed to maintain the 'status quo' and to secure respect for it by all pacific means at their disposal. A few months later they signed three agreements which had been settled in principle at Portsmouth, concerning the fisheries, commerce and navigation and the Manchurian railways.

10. France and Japan agreed to respect the independence and integrity of China with economic equality for all nations.

Germany's existence, and had to be maintained at any cost. Beyond that she could contemplate only the mockery of the Italian alliance and a Turkey held in her tutelage.

Concluding Comments on the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907

It is true that there had been nothing more certain or more persistent in world politics than the Anglo-Russian strike. Nevertheless, after long negotiations the Convention of 1907 was signed between the two powers. All outstanding differences were adjusted at least for the time being.

Significance of the Triple Entente

The Entente Cordiale between Britain and France (1904) may be described as one side of a triangle and the Dual Alliance between France and Russia (1894) as another, and it only required a link between Britain and Russia to complete the triangle which came to be known as the Triple Entente. "Although no military alliance was involved, nor menace to Germany implied, in the Triple Entente, it can only be regarded as a defensive combination against the Central Powers. It gave greater security to France, it heartened her chauvinists; and it encouraged perhaps especially after 1911, when great Britain showed her French sympathies so strongly, her *revanche*, for the new generation looked to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine as keenly as the old generation felt its loss. Although Russia could not with certainty count on British support, the understanding gave her greater security, and Russia, checked in Asia, was awaking again to her interests in the Balkans and her rivalry there with Austria. It strengthened Great Britain in her bitter naval competition with Germany.

"To Germany it caused intense disquietude, and a scare which produced something of a hysteria among Pan-Germans, and Navy Leaguers, and Prussian generals. It was not so much that Germany feared Great Britain, although she began to hate her successful imperialism, for her traditional policy of opposing whatever Continental Power was for the time being strongest, it was that she feared the effect of Great Britain's support upon France in Alsace-Lorraine and Russia in the Balkans. 'England was well aware', cries Bethmann-Hollweg (the German Chancellor), "that the eyes of France were

steadfastly fixed upon Alsace-Lorraine, and could hear the deep notes of the *revanche motif* sounding, even through the harmonies of the Russo-French fraternization.' Again, 'the general tension throughout the world originated, indeed, in the certainty of English support enjoyed by a Franco-Russian policy through whose ultimate objects we were endangered.'

"It was from this time that Germany began to bring forward against Great Britain, and particularly against King Edward VII, the repeated charge of 'encirclement,' of a deliberate policy of surrounding Germany with a combine of hostile nations—France, Russia, Great Britain, Japan by affiliation, Italy by seduction from the Triple Alliance (even the United States was asserted to be in the conspiracy)—in order to obstruct her in the free development of her growing powers. It is the most persistent defence of the Kaiser, and of Germany's apologists, for the Great War, the most easily recalled cry in the revived Anglo-German hostility of 1939.

"From 1907 Europe was grouped, somewhat artificially, into two armed camps, watching each other with suspicion and distrust. The political situation was tragically full of menacing possibilities; there were the piling up of armaments by land and sea, and Germany's naval ambitions, which Great Britain would not accept; there was the French desire for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine; there was the periodical emergence of embarrassing incidents like that of Morocco; there were "the continuous counter-activities of Austria and Russia in the Balkans, the restlessness of Balkan states themselves', the 'cloud of uncertainty that hung over the future of Turkey'.

There were the chauvinists of all nations ready to light the fuel that was heaped up. 'We were often conscious,' remarks Lord Oxford, speaking of the years that preceded the Great War, 'that we are skating on the thinnest of ice, and that the peace of Europe was at the mercy of a chapter of unforeseen and unforeseeable accidents.'

"Such a chapter of accident might have developed out of any one of the international crises which recurred with increasing and alarming frequency during the next seven years, to inflame the hostilities of the nations and disturb the dream of peace lovers".

We will now turn our attention to these international crises.

The Moroccan Question (1904-1912)

Between 1878 and 1912 no more disturbing question appeared upon the political horizon of Europe than that of the settlement of Morocco.

It is proposed to examine in this Chapter the development of the Moroccan question from the Anglo-French Agreement of April, 1904, until the Convention of Fez (March, 1912), without interruption merely indicating the influence of certain very important factors in the general European situation, which have to be examined in other connections. But it must be remembered that these factors vitally affected the progress and issue of the question.

It is impossible to isolate the Moroccan Question from the dangerous tangle of European diplomacy during the period 1904-1912

The calamitous defeat of Russia by Japan in 1905 weakened the Dual Alliance, and greatly encouraged the German government in its forward policy, in seeking to gain 'a place in the sun' ('lebensraum') and to humiliate France in Morocco. The "Dogger Bank" incident in October, 1904¹, during the course of the Russo-Japanese War led to secret negotiations between the Kaiser and the Czar for an alliance and the prospects of thus secretly undermining the Dual Alliance was casually connected with the landing of the Kaiser and his speech at Tangier, on March 31, 1905 which highly fomented the Moroccan situation. The German government was

1. Some vessels of Russian fleet in crossing the Dogger Bank fired upon some Hull fishing smacks mistaking them for Japanese torpedo boats. The incident greatly strained for a while the relations between Russia and Britain.

striving to secure the dismissal of Delcasse, who was, in fact, forced to resign on June 6, 1905. Seven weeks later, on July 24, the Kaiser inveigled the weak Czar into signing the secret Treaty of Bjorko, which was utterly incompatible with the Dual Alliance.

Although the secret Treaty of Bjorko was afterwards repudiated by the Czar's government, the apparent success of the Kaiser's secret machinations was one of the chief reasons for his active support of Roosevelt's efforts to conclude the Russo-Japanese War and goes far to explain the intense pressure of the German government upon France to bring the Moroccan question to an international conference, (Algeciras), at which Germany hoped to gain a first class diplomatic triumph. But the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement on August 31, 1907, helped considerably to moderate the German policy in regard to Morocco, which was still further weakened by the Austrian seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the following year.² Russia was humiliated and thrown further into the arms of France ; whilst Italy was alienated, and began actively

2. Bosnia and Herzegovina had been administered by Austria-Hungary since the Congress of Berlin (1878), although the province, were nominally part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1908 taking advantage of a revolution at Constantinople, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Achrenthal and the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolski arranged a deal by which Austria was to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina and Russia to obtain the opening of the Straits to Russian battleships. Unfortunately for Izvolski, the opening of the Straits did not depend upon the goodwill of Achrenthal but upon the good will of Britain, and she was unwilling to abandon her traditional policy of keeping the Straits closed. Austria proceeded on the sly and annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina ; Russia received nothing as compensation. Izvolski was fricked and duped by Achrenthal and stormed against him. The annexation aroused the greatest resentment in Serbia, where ardent Pan-Slavists had been nourishing plans for a "Greater Serbia" to include the South Slavs of Bosnia. For some months war seemed imminent between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Into such a war, Russia would be practically forced by the pressure of her Pan-Slavists and her considerations of prestige. Russia, however, was unprepared for a great war. It was abundantly clear that Germany would side with Austria. The Czar was given to understand that if he were to draw the sword in the Balkan quarrel he must reckon on the opposition of the German Empire. It was a very pointed hint that the big Slav brother had better back down ; and Russia, not being encouraged by France and Britain, and not having recovered from the effects of the Japanese War, had no choice but to do so. The Serbs, unable to obtain Russian support, also backed down. Austro-German diplomacy won a victory. But bitter resentments were left by the crisis. The "Greater Serbia" agitation continued with undoubted vigour ; Russia, outwitted and humiliated, was bent on revenge against Austria.

to plan-seizure of Tripoli, for which she was preparing—with the blessing of France—in the midst of the Agadir crisis at the end of 1911³ (Italy took advantage of the Agadir Crisis to send to Turkey an ultimatum demanding Tripoli. While public opinion in Europe condemned. Italy's sabre-rattling the Powers were in no mood to intervene. This bellicose attitude of Italy was an unmistakable evidence of the fact that her allegiance to Triple Alliance was very flimsy, since Germany was then actively cultivating the friendship of Turkey, and the Italian attack on Turkey was extremely embarrassing for Germany).

The open naval rivalry of Germany during these years greatly increased British hostility to the whole German foreign policy, and at the time of Agadir, Britain was more French than the French. In short, it is impossible to isolate the Moroccan question from the dangerous tangle of European diplomacy during these feverish years as Moral in "Morocco in Diplomacy" attempts. Bearing in mind, then, the main features of the European situation between 1904 and 1912, let us return to the Moroccan question.

Germany Treated very Cavalierly by Delcasse as Regards Morocco

Having purchased 'freedom of action' from Britain, Spain and Italy and relying upon the benevolent disinterestedness of his Russian ally, Delcasse in 1904 determined apparently to treat Germany as a negligible quantity, and to absorb Morocco into the French West African Empire. Between June and October the total Moorish Foreign loan, amounting to about £ 2½ million, was taken over and distributed against a group of French banks. Chaos reigned in

3. Since the Algeciras Conference the French had been steadily pushing their economic penetration of Morocco, and in 1911 they announced that certain towns would be occupied by French troops until 'order' was restored. The Germans immediately suspected that the occupation would be a prelude to French annexation. In order to prevent this and to secure suitable 'compensation' for themselves as a price of their consent, the Germans sent the warship *Panther* to the port of Agadir as a threatening gesture. A serious 'crisis' at once developed. After considerable shaking of the mailed fist on both sides, the matter was adjusted amicably by granting Germany two strips of land from the French Congo return for German consent to the French protectorate over Morocco. Although France got by far the best of the bargain, Chauvinists in the French Senate forced the fall of Joseph Caillaux on the charge that he had been obsequious to Germany.

Morocco at this time. A pretender was in the field ; banditry was rife, and when the bandit Raisuli captured an American citizen and ultimately received not only the ransom which he claimed for him, but also his own appointment as a local governor in the region of his exploit, France has an implicit mandate to intervene. Delcasse drew up a formidable list of demands for the reform of the Moorish government, which were presented by the French representative in February, 1905 at Fez.

Germany now Displayed an active Interest in the Fate of Morocco

The proposed reforms, to be executed under French direction, would certainly amount to a definite alteration of the political, 'status quo'. The German government, had good reasons to be disquieted. It had not been informed in the ordinary diplomatic manner of the arrangements concluded in 1904. It was being assailed at home by the Pan-Germans for its spinelessness. Moreover, the Kaiser's intrigues with Czar—to which Bulow alone seems to have been admitted—strengthened the Chancellor's resolve, abetted by Holstein, to play a big game in Morocco. On March 12, in the Reichstag the Chancellor proclaimed the economic and political interest of Germany in Morocco and induced the Kaiser to pay the momentous visit to Tangier in a blatant challenge to France's encroachment. William seems to have been opposed to making this provoking gesture, which amounted almost to a German ultimatum to the Entente Powers, but he was apparently persuaded by Bulow,⁴ who had been persuaded by Holstein.

The Kaiser's Tangier Speech

To the German merchants at Tangier the Kaiser during his visit to that place, spoke of the importance of Germany's commercial interests in Morocco and promised to protect them and declared that he was "determined to uphold the interests of the Fatherland in a

4. When after Algeciras, Bulow tendered his resignation, William is reported to have written to him : "I have done every thing for you. I have risked a great deal on your behalf. If you leave me now I shall commit suicide.....At your request I risked my life. With my bad arm I rode through the streets of Morocco and made a demonstration, all for you."

free country. The Empire has great and growing interests in Morocco. Commerce can only progress if all the Powers are considered to have equal rights under the sovereignty of the Sultan and respect the independence of the country. My visit is the recognition of this independence." To the Sultan's uncle, in reply to our address of welcome, he addressed these words : "This is the Sultan in his position of an independent sovereign that I am paying my visit to-day. I hope that under the sovereignty of the Sultan a free Morocco will remain open to the peaceful rivalry of all nations, without monopoly or annexation, on the basis of absolute equality. My visit to Tangier has had as its object to make it known that I am determined to do all that is in my power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco, since I consider the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign. It is with him that I mean to come to an understanding as to the proper means of safeguard these interests. As for the reforms which the Sultan intends to make, he seems to me that it is necessary to proceed with great caution, having in regard for the religious sentiments of the population, that the public may not be disturbed."

In a despatch to German embassies on April 12, 1905, Bulow wrote : "Seeing that we must now reckon with the possibility of a French protectorate over Morocco, *i.e.*, to say, with the complete expulsion of non-French enterprises, such as has taken place in Tunis, the interests of foreigners are threatened in their totality and a Conference would seem more than ever desirable."

The Situation Became Very Tense

Germany had become very tense. Germany had been treated very ignored her interests in Morocco, after settling with Britain, Spain and Italy. In France the expansionists talked exultantly of the approaching "Tunisification" of Morocco, as Madagascar had already been 'Tunisified' by the Anglo-French bargain. At the same time the Pan-Germans were clamouring for a strong, aggressive policy. The situation in consequence had become very tense.

Germany throws down the gauntlet

Thus the Tangier speech, coming so quickly on the Russian defeat at Mukden (February-March 1905),⁵ and followed up by a

5. At the end of February, 1905, began the battle of Mukden, which lasted over fourteen days and ended with the complete defeat of Russians at the hands of the Japanese and the evacuation of the larger parts of Manchuria.

stiff campaign for the dismissal of Delcasse and the reversal of French policy in Morocco, was interpreted by the Entente, Powers as a deliberate challenge both to the Dual Alliance and to the Entente and even a stark threat of war.

Political Atmosphere was Turbid with Ultimatums

Britain had become irritated by the navalism of Tirpitz, which was obviously supported by the German government. In February 1905 the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, Lee, in announcing new concentration of the fleet in the North Sea, had explained it as a counter to the new threat from across that Sea, and had said that it would now be possible to strike the first blow before the other party had read the news of war in the papers. The 'Dreadnought', which marked an epoch in naval architecture, was at that time approaching completion ; and its construction was a clear indication of the new British doctrine of naval preparedness in the face of a quite possible peril. On the German side, two facts supported such a fear. Holstein, whose policy in regard to Morocco and elsewhere was founded on the applied psychology of bluff, had developed what was called the 'Hostage Theory,' viz., that if a war with England broke out, the responsibility would rest with France ; and therefore, Germany would wage war swiftly upon France, "bleed her white", and hold her as a hostage in negotiating with England ; since the British fleet could not defend Paris. This doctrine naturally produced a passionate recoil in the French press. Again, very shortly after the Tangier speech Prince Donnersmarck was sent to Paris with an onymous mission. He explained his mission in an interview with the *Gaulois*, published after Delcasse's resignation. "The Emperor and the people (of Germany) are irritated to see this repulse of their effort for relations of courtesy, and a policy of isolating Germany. Is this policy of France, or the personal conception of Delcasse ? If you think that your Foreign Minister has engaged your country in a too adventurous path, show it by separating yourselves from him, and above all by giving your foreign policy a new orientation. The Emperor does not wish for war, but, if you are beaten, you will be bled white." It is little wonder that the political atmosphere was turbid with rumours of ultimatums.

Bulow Pressed for an International Conference

On April 5, Holstein was jettisoned ; but Bulow pressed for a halt in the Moroccan policy of France and an International Conference. It was a dual between Bulow and Delcasse, seconded respectively by the Kaiser and Edward VII.

The French Cabinet was Cowed by the German Threat

The French Cabinet, under Rouvier was cowed by the German threat, and showed a willingness to bargain with Germany on the basis of Delcasse's dismissal and the discussion of French compensations to Germany for a free land in Morocco.

Feeling both in the cabinet and among the public of France was that Delcasse's foreign policy has become too personal and dictatorial, and too recklessly provocative to Germany. On June, 6 he was dismissed without a protest from the rest of the government, and Rouvier himself took over the Foreign Office. (For France the time for firm stand was singularly unpropitious, for Russia had just emerged from the war with Japan bruised, and for the time disabled). The same day the German Chancellor was raised by the exultant Emperor to the rank of a prince. Rouvier that stroke for a settlement by negotiation—Caillaux in Agadir says that Rouvier offered Germany Magador and territory in the Congon basin—but Bulow and the Kaiser insisted upon a Conference.⁶

Such was the position throughout the summer of 1905. Early in December, in Britain the Conservative government of Balfour resigned, and Campbell—Bannerma's Liberal government succeeded, with Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office. C-B at once emphatically proclaimed her adherence to the Entente Cordiale, and Grey entirely endorsed the policy of Lansdowne. "I said to the German Ambassador" wrote Grey shortly afterwards, that "in my opinion, if war was forced upon France on the question of Morocco, public

6. The hot breath of war was in the air at that time and while there were in Germany strong forces working for a catastrophe it is improbable that Delcasse for his part, would have hesitated to accept a decision of arms as an alternative to a conference had the choice rested with him.

opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France." In the end, France reluctantly accepted a Conference. (Rouvier made his acceptance conditional upon a prior understanding between France and Germany on general questions, on the analogy of Russia and Britain in 1878, and to this Berlin assented). But by the end of 1905 Germany was almost completely isolated, and the course of the Algeciras Conference was destined to make this even more apparent.

The Algeciras Conference

The Conference, which was attended by twelve States, besides Morocco, opened on January 16, 1906 at Algeciras, in Spain. The main problems discussed were the police and finance of Morocco. French proposals in regard to both were strongly opposed by the German representatives, whose counter-proposals, which were clearly aimed at the embarrassment of French activity, were rejected by her. In the midst of the deadlock, Rouvier's ministry was defeated on a domestic question, and it was some days before a new cabinet was formed under Sarrien, with Bougeois at the Foreign Office, and Clemenceau Minister for the Interior. The German government seized the chance to press its claims at Algeciras where the aggressive attitude of its representatives was rapidly rallying sympathy to the French. Soon Germany found herself supported only by Austria and Morocco, and was forced to concur in a series of inconclusive compromises. A body of police, under French and Spanish officers and instructors, was to be distributed among the eight chief ports and to carry out its task to the satisfaction of a Swiss Inspector General, who was to report to the Sultan and to the Diplomatic Body at Tangier. A State Bank of Morocco was to be established to regulate all the financial affairs of the Moorish government for forty years under a Moorish High Commissioner, who was to be advised by a board consisting of as many members as there were allotted portions of the capital, and by four Censors to be appointed by the official Banks of France, England, Germany, and Spain. The four Censors were to see that the intensions of the Act were carried out and to make an annual report. A number of minor reforms were also accepted. At a final session, which concluded on April 7, 1906 an Act was drawn up "in the name of God Almighty", "based upon the three-fold principle of the sovereignty and independence of His

Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions and economic liberty without any inequality". The final article (123) of the Act of Algeciras stated that: "All existing Treaties Conventions and Arrangements between the signatory Powers and Morocco remain in force. It is, however, agreed that in case their provisions be found to conflict with those of the present general Act, the stipulations of the latter shall prevail". The Act was ratified by the Sultan on June 18, 1906, and thereupon became the Public Law of Europe in regard to Morocco.

At Algeciras Germany Got a Stunning Diplomatic Defeat

The Moroccan crisis of 1905-06 had not resulted in an outcome on which the directors of German policy had confidently reckoned. At the outset they had a great legal case, which the subsequent revelation of the secret articles of the Anglo-French-Spanish agreements of 1904 retrospectively justified. But the opportunity was so handled that Germany emerged, supported only by Austria, under a strong and general suspicion that she had misused the occasion in order to humiliate France, split the Entente and the Dual Alliance, and demand an exaggerated recognition of her own prestige and arbitral position in World-Politics. Bulow professed to be satisfied with the results of Algeciras." We wished to show that the German Empire does not allow itself to be treated as a negligible quantity, that the basis of an international treaty cannot be displaced without the assent of the signatory Powers, and that I upon a territory so important from an economic point of view...the door must remain open to assure the liberty of foreign competition (Speech in Reichstag, April 5, 1906). Again, in "Imperial Germany" he writes. "The decisions of the Algeciras Conference provided a bell which could ring at any time should France show any similar tendencies again". Such a claim was moderate and justifiable. But the German attitude during the crisis convinced all the disinterested Powers that, under the cover of international legality, the German government actually sought to attain for less defensible and more dangerous ends. The German attitude converted the Entente from "a loose and fragile structure" into a strong defensive alignment against Germany, towards which Russia was drawn in spite of the secret treaty of Bjorko. "On the soil of Algeciras Russia took the first discernible step towards attaching herself to England" (Hammann).

In Germany not only were the Pan-Germans enraged by what they considered a back down from a strong policy ; but also the more moderate were critical of Bulow's tactics. "Today", said Basserman in the Reichstag, during the debate on Algeciras, "The Triple Alliance has no further practical utility. The Italian press and people lean more and more towards France, Austria has been too much praised for this role of 'brilliant second', which she herself declined. The Franco-Russian Alliance remains in tact, and the disposition of France towards us is less friendly than formerly.....We live at an epoch of alliances *between other nations*. Five years later, at Agadir, Kiderlen-Wachter avowed that the motive of his policy was to "wipe out previous failures" Hammann aptly sums up the handling of the Tangier crisis as "an attempt at a Bismarckian policy without Bismarck's judgment of men and things".

The Net Result of the Conference

The net result of the Conference was, along with Germany's naval policy, to widen the division of Europe into two armed camps, to harden and sharpen the Entente and prepare for the inclusion of Russia, to encourage the French penetration of Morocco under the cover of an agreement which was consolidated into a defensive, and steadily approximated to an offensive alliance. In other words, from Algeciras dates the policy which Entente statesmen called a mutual assurance against German aggression, which German statesmen called the policy of encirclement. (The phrase "Einkreisungspolitik" was invented by Holstein, and first used by Bulow in a speech a few months after Algeciras. Although Holstein resigned in 1905, he retained his remarkable influence over Bulow until his death in 1909 the year of Bulow's dismissal from the Chancellorship.

The Aftermath of Algeciras

At Algeciras the German government received a diplomatic check and no compensating advantage. The Emperors' judgment on the question proved much wiser than that of his Chancellor (The

7. The Kaiser telegraphed his thanks to Goluchouski ; the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, for his support at the Conference where he proved himself 'a brilliant second on the fencing floor'.

In the conference the six principals concerned ranged themselves into two camps—France, Spain, Britain and Russia on one side, Germany and Austria on the other. Italy oftener than not gave her vote in favour of France and not of her ally of the Triple Alliance. Italy was, in fact, fettered in advance by her secret arrangement respecting Morocco and Tripoli.

special position of France was more securely recognised ; whilst the clumsiness of the German tactics and the strong suspicion which she generated in the minds of disinterested statesmen that she was seeking ulterior objectives, had neutralised her initial diplomatic advantage). The accession of Russia to the Entente in the following year (1907) seemed to complete the division of Europe into two camps in hostile balance. But the equilibrium was unstable and evanescent. Russia was paralysed by defeat and revolution; France was occupied both with the expensive Moroccan problem and with disquieting internal complication ; Britain, under a pacifist Liberal government, was preoccupied with questions of internal reform. On the other hand Italy's interests and aspirations diverged sharply from those of her allies. But despite the more than doubtful allegiance of her third partner and the invertebrateness of her second-Austria—the policy of Germany was largely affected by the conviction of a powerful group, that she still possessed a dominating arbitral position, which was growing yearly stronger and which should be used at the earliest opportunity to assert her prestige and reap its fruits. Her ambitious naval programme and the sentiments expressed in the Emperor's notorious "Daily Telegraph" interview in 1908⁸ were a clean indication of the prevalence of this conviction. Moreover, the year 1908 marked in the Balkans an epoch which was destined inevitably to disturb the uncertain balance of the two allied groups in Europe.

Chaos in Morocco

For two years after Algeciras the relations of France and Germany with regard to Morocco remained calm. Both knew that Algeciras had settled nothing ; both were waiting and watching.

8. In this interview the Kaiser revealed that early in South African (Boer) War (1899-1902), he had sent to Prince Edward a military plan, prepared with the assistance of the German General Staff, for the successful conduct of the war. It amounted in fact, only to a series of military aphorisms and concluded with some fatherly advice : "If England were not certain whether she would be secure from interference from foreign Powers for a considerable time, and therefore whether she would have free elbow room for the necessary military measures, it would be better to bring matters to a conclusion. Even the strongest football club beaten in spite of the bravest defence, ultimately accepts its defeat with equanimity."

By the way, the Prince of Wales replied that he failed to grasp the comparison of that war for England's position in the world, entailing great sacrifices, with a club football match.

Meanwhile chaos increased in Morocco. In April, 1907 the French occupied the frontier town of Ujda as a guarantee of reparation, for the murder of a French doctor. In July at Casablanca an ugly incident occurred, when, as the result of further alleged provocation, a French squadron bombarded the town and occupied the surrounding territory (district of Shawia). It seemed that the French were beginning, in the phrase of a Frenchman, to "cash the Act of Algeciras". The Sultan's brother Mulay Hafid seized the chance to rebel and depose Abdul Aziz. In the following January (1908) Mulay was proclaimed Sultan at Fez, and was recognised by the 'Powers'.

Episode of the Casablanca

At this time Clemenceau was in power in France, with Pichon—a disciple of Delcasse—at the Foreign Office. The German government now suggested the discussion of an economic agreement regarding Morocco, but while negotiations were proceeding there occurred the episode of the Casablanca deserters from the Foreign Legion⁹. Bulow promptly demanded the release of the German subjects involved, apology and compensation. But the "Tiger" and Pichon coolly rebutted the German version of the affair, and insisted upon referring the case for arbitration to the Hague Tribunal, whose Verdict both as to fact and law proved favourable to France. When the German Chancellor was hectoring Clemenceau for an apology the German Ambassador on Bulow's instructions, announced to the French Premier that "if complete satisfaction is not given to my Government. I am forced by the order of His Majesty the Emperor to ask for my passports". "The best train", replied Clemenceau "leaves for Cologne at 9 o'clock". The headstrong and tactless

9. Some German residents in Casablanca, aided by their consul, had established in 1906 an agency for organizing desertions from the Foreign Legion—a body of foreigners, especially that in the French army organized in 1831—and in September, 1908 it persuaded two Germans, a German naturalized as a French citizen, a Russian, a Swiss and an Austrian to desert. The consul provided them with civilian clothing, hid them in the city for some days, and intended to embark them on a German steamer lying off the port. Early in the morning on September 25 they were accompanied to the harbour by a member of the consulate; but the boat in which they embarked capsized and they were forced to return to the shore. The commandant of the harbour noticed them and gave orders to arrest them. A brief struggle ensued and the German consul loudly demanded the restoration of the three German.

Kiderlen—Wachter shortly after succeeded to the German Foreign Office, but the incident of the Kaiser's "Daily Telegraph" interview, the dangerous imbroglio stirred by Aehrenthal in the Balkans, and the bitter Anglo-German animosity over the German naval programme at this time, dictated a pacific attitude to France in Morocco". In other words, the decision of the German government not to push the Casablanca episode to extremes was in part due to the ferment provoked by the Daily Telegraph interview and to the preoccupation of the Central Powers with the Bosnian crisis.

Economic Agreement between France and Germany in Morocco (February 1909)

Having decided to accept the outcome of the Hague arbitration on the Casablanca affairs the German government continued to negotiate for an economic understanding with France in Morocco, which was reached in a joint Declaration signed on February 8, 1909. The two governments declared that "they will not pursue or encourage any measure of a kind to create [in their favour of any Power an economic privilege". France declared herself "entirely attached to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Morocco" and Germany declared that "the special political interests of France are closely bound up with the consolidation of order and internal peace and resolved not to thwart those interests". Both expressed "an equal desire to facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras". Jules Cambon the French Ambassador at Berlin, exacted from the German government an explanatory letter, which stated (i) that Germany was politically disinterested in Morocco, and (ii) that "in the economic affairs which admitted an association of French and German interests, account should be taken as far as possible of the fact that French interests in Morocco are superior to German interests".

On the face of it the agreement seemed innocent enough, but in its euphemistic verbiage it amounted to the fact that France had purchased freedom of action in Morocco, subject to a German mortgage. The German Chancellor admitted so much to the French Ambassador. "Now" he said, "Morocco is a fruit which is ripening for you and you are sure of picking it ; we only ask one thing of you, that is to be patient and to have regard for German public opinion". The prospect for France seemed to be too good to be true, and a

fairly large section agreed with the constant warning of Jaures : "Pas d'adventures", When one deputy asked him how : "Que va devenir, M. Jaures" ? he replied : "Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes" ("I fear the Greeks, even when bringing gifts").

Breach in the Agreement of February, 1909

The Germans soon showed that, according to their reading of the agreement, they were to share the Moroccan spoil with France, as far as possible excluding the enterprise of all other nationals. Joint undertakings for the construction of railways and public works, and for the exploitation of the great mineral wealth of the country were proposed by German experts. But, as the negotiations proceeded, the French demurred at German participation in the construction of what they considered essentially strategic railways, and the British objected to their exclusion as an infraction of the Act of Algeciras. In the midst of the deal Briand—who had succeeded Clemenceau in July, 1909, fell and was succeeded on March 3, 1911, by Monis, who appointed to the Foreign Office, the incompetent and inexperienced Cruppi, after failing to attract several more suitable men. But the strong man of the new cabinet was Caillaux, Minister of Finance. Already in June, 1909, Bulow had resigned the Chancellorship of Germany to Bethmann—Hollwig and Kiderlen-Wachter had succeeded Schon at the Foreign Office. Already German economic activity in Morocco had far exceeded the limits intended by the French in the agreement of February, 1909. Kinderlen-Wachter was in favour of the most vigorous government support of German penetration of Morocco, or alternatively, of large compensation elsewhere for its abandonment. For him, as for the French Colonial Party, the Act of Algeciras was "a scrap of paper". But Bethmann-Hollwig favoured a policy of moderation. "The Chancellor", reported Cambon, "does not seek adventures in Morocco, and only wishes to maintain German economic interests ; not to the Pan-Germans".

Decision of France to Occupy Fez

Meanwhile, Morocco had relapsed a stage further into political and financial chaos. Her foreign debts in 1910 amounted to more than £ 6½ million, the interest on which absorbed the whole revenue, and then left a deficit. This debt was founded by an international

consortium, in which France took 40%, Germany 20%, and Britain and Spain each 15%.¹⁰

The new Sultan was at his wits' end; the tribes around his capital were in revolt against the exactions necessary to pay the crippling debt, and in April, 1911, the French government "decided to occupy Fez in order to make Morocco habitable for themselves and other Europeans." Of course, the plain man (uninstructed in high politics and averse to political and economic imperialism which appears to him merely the claim of the strong to bully and swindle the weak) may argue that, if, uninvited, the European nations made a happy hunting ground—of Morocco; the European nations could scarcely expect it to be a happy hunting-ground, especially if the sport of hunting the Moor was vexed by the hunters harrying each other.

When the German Chancellor received the news of the proposed expedition to Fez he proposed that it was an overt violation of the Act of Algeciras. Even the more responsible French press regarded it as "a policy of disguised conquest". The Pan-Germans were exultant, and began to make extravagant claims for the partition of Morocco, or for territorial compensation on a scale compatible with Germany's prestige and power. "I thanked heaven when I heard of the march to Fez", said Kinderlain—Wachter to Beyens, the British Ambassador, "a flagrant violation of the Algeciras Act. This drantic proceeding restored to us our freedom of action". The Spanish government took the same view and on the ground of Article 9 of the secret convention of October 1904, landed troops at Larash and occupied the district. There is no doubt that Kiderlen-Wachter regarded the violation of the Act of Algeciras merely as diplomatic pretext, for his interpretation of the Franco-German agreement of 1909 had shown an entire disrespect for the Act, and his brusque intervention in the summer of 1911 was the result of his disappointment with the meagreness of the German advantages gained since 1909. It was for him in 1911 a question of force, not of legality.

10. In France the bonds of 500 francs were nominally offered for subscription at 485; but were actually reserved for a group of banks, which obtained them at 435, although on the afternoon of issue they stood on the hourse at 507. Thus by financial chicanery French bankers made at a single coup nearly £ 400,000 on a floatation of £ 2600,000, (Murel).

The Despatch of the German Gun-boat "Panther" to Agadir

By June there were 100,000 French and Spanish troops in Morocco. At the same time the conversations between Cambon and Kiderlen-Wachter as to the price of German disinterestedness in Morocco reached a deadlock. On July 1, the German government despatched the Gun-boat "Panther" to Agadir. In a despatch to the signatories of the Act of Algeciras, it was explained that this step was taken at the request of a number of German firms established there, for the protection of German lives and property, and that the ship would leave as soon as "the state of affairs has resumed its normal tranquility". But in an interview with the Pan-German leader, Herr Klass, on July 1, Zimmermann, the German Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said: "The German government has sent two 'agents provocateurs' to Agadir, and these have done their duty well. German firms have been induced to make complaints and to call upon the government in Berlin for protection. It is the government's intention to seize the district, and it will not give it up again" (J. Ellis Barker, in *Fortnightly Review*, March 1912: "Anglo-German Relations and Sir Edward Grey" This statement has never been contradicted by the German government and it was given on oath).

Kiderlen-Wachter stated that "We consented to abandon Morocco in return for territory in Africa. This friendly discussion, remaining without result, we sent the "Panther". At a later stage, when the Agadir crisis reached its height, Bethmann stated that he had several times warned the French government of the probably grave consequences of the expedition to Fez. "When German interests were threatened", he said "We sent a warship to Agadir. Never for a moment did we attempt to acquire territory in Morocco. It was not a provocation, but we protect our rights. Morocco was like a festering wound in our relations not only with France, but also with England. The expeditions to Fez led to an acute stage and rendered an operation necessary. He performed the operation in order to heal the wound".

But it is significant that at the time both France and England were occupied with internal difficulties. Just before the despatch of the "Panther" there had been another political crisis in France. The Monis government had fallen, on a domestic question, and

Caillaux had formed a Cabinet on June 23. Caillaux was an acknowledged expert in finance, who had held that portfolio in four previous ministries ; but he had collaborated for some years with leading German financiers in international projects. For the Foreign Office in the midst of the fresh Moroccan deadlock he had chosen de Selves, who for fifteen years had been Prefect of the Seine and Director of Posts and Telegraphs, and totally without experience in Foreign affairs. Even the Germans were surprised at the appointment, especially when Delcasse first reappeared in office in this government, as Minister of Marine.

Kiderlen-Wachter was pressing his 'jack-boot' policy in Morocco "If necessary", he said to Cambon, in the course of a heated interview, "we will go to the bitter end ('jusqu' au bout')". "I understand your menace," replied Cambon (July 20).

Grey's and Llyod George's Outburst

At the same time Britain was preoccupied not only with the Irish Question but also with an impending railway strike. But on July 4 Grey started : "We were of opinion that a new situation had been created by the despatch of a German ship to Agadir. Future developments will affect British interests more directly than they have hitherto been affected, and therefore we could not recognise any new arrangements that might be arrived at without us". The German government did not regard this either as a question or a hint. Grey did not again intervene actively until July 21, when in interview with the German Ambassador, he gravely warned him that Britain was deeply interested in the Moroccan Question, was perturbed by what it could learn of the nature of German demands upon France, and required definite reassurances from the German government that it did not aim at creating a new situation without consulting Britain. "The longer the Germans remained at Agadir", he said, "the greater the risk of their developing a state of affairs which would make it more difficult for them to withdraw and more necessary for us to take some steps to protect Britain interests". The German version of this interview with Count Metternich, gave a strong defence of their policy ; but on the following day the German government despatched the necessary reassurance of its Ambassador to be communicated to Grey. On the evening of July 21, before an

answer to Grey's warning could be received, Lloyd George, with the knowledge and acquiescence Grey and other members of the Cabinet, uttered a vaguely menacing opinion on the situation. In responding to the toast of "the continued prosperity of the public peace" at a meeting of the Bankers' Association at the Mansion House, this statesman, who had hitherto been famous as a social reformer and a pacifist, to whom war was abhorrent, concluded with these words: "I believe that it is essential in the higher interests not merely of this country but of the world, that Great Britain should maintain her place and her prestige among the Great Powers of the world. I would make great sacrifices to maintain peace. But, if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated, when her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure".

For seventeen days the British Government had been almost silent about the Moroccan crisis, while France and Germany were bargaining. France during that time had sent out no distress signal to her partner in the Entente. Suddenly on July 21 Grey intervened apparently without consulting the French government; and before he had time to receive the German reply—which was, in fact, quite satisfactory in form—he connived at Lloyd George's provocative intrusion. It is little wonder that the German government ordered its Ambassador to postpone its placatory reply, and that, as Grey said, "He made to me in regard to that speech a communication which was exceedingly stiff in tone". The Conservative press of Britain and Germany shrieked at each other, and a tense situation existed between the two governments. "If the English government", announced Kiderlen-Wachter, "had intended to complicate the political situation and to bring about a violent explosion. It certainly have chosen no better means than the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer". There appears to be little doubt that in the crisis of July, 1911, as in that of July-August 1914, Grey committed serious errors of judgment, though in both cases he was an apostle of peace. Lloyd George's temperamental outburst was worthy of the Kaiser.

Moderation of Germany's Tone

Nevertheless, the quite unexpected firmness of the British Liberal government, which appears to have acted in no sort of collusion with the weak and vacillating French government at the height of the crisis, came as a shock to the Germans and induced a distinct moderation of their tone to France.¹

On July 27, Grey received the communication from the German government, which was, in his words "extremely friendly", and appealed to "the minister's great loyalty" not to complicate delicate negotiations, which did not touch British interests. The same afternoon in the House of Commons Asquith endorsed the attitude of the Foreign Secretary. "We have thought it right from the beginning", he said, "to make it quite clear that, failing (such) a settlement, we became an active party in the discussion of the situation. That would be our right as a signatory of the Act of Algeciras; it might be our obligation under the terms of our agreement of 1904 with France; it might be our duty in defence of British interests directly affected by future developments".

The Franco-German Convention

The conversation that I had with Herr Kiderlen-Wachter last night 'reported Cambon from Berlin on July 24 "was carried on in an entirely difficult tone from that which marked the two proceedings. My interlocutor manifested towards me, as he has never done up to the present, his desire from an understanding with us". In the interview Kinderlain Wachter said: "Reserving the free export of iron. Germany will let you found his North African Empire which is your objective". But the discussion did not proceed smoothly, nor did Kiderlen-Wachter cease to mutter threats of war. In mid-August a grave deadlock occurred, which synchronised significantly with the Railway strike in England. The strike and the deadlock were soon declared "off", and the bitter haggling over German compensation was resumed. "What the devil is to be done?"

1. Albert Ballin, whom Gooch describes as "the wisest and most disinterested of the Kaiser's friends", observed "He (Kiderlen-Wachter) has played his cards without allowing for England. It is a mercy that the Liberals are in power. If the Unionists were there, we should have a Fashoda or a war...If we only want the open door and a bit of the Congo, why do we send a ship to Agadir and excite the whole world to white heat".

Wrote the Kaiser, "It is sheer farce negotiating and negotiating, and never getting any further. While we are wasting our precious time, the British and the Russians are stiffening up the French". At last, on November 4 an agreement was reached, which satisfied the French, who did not wish to fight. They were forced to cede to Germany more than 100,000 square miles of their Congo territory and imperil their communications by land with their equatorial colony, in return for a free hand in Morocco. The German note accompanying the convention declared that "in the event of the French government deeming it necessary to assume protectorate of Morocco, the Imperial Government would place no obstacle in its way." "It is a real protectorate, that we obtain", wrote Tardieu, "and not a phantom protectorate". "The settlement", according to Gooch, who expresses the general judgment, "was a triumph for France, who rounded off her African empire".

Convention of Fez

In March 1912, by the Convention of Fez the Moorish government accepted a French protectorate, and after the Sultan, Mulay Hafid, had given place to his brother, Mulay Yussuf, the French occupation of Morocco became a universally acknowledged fact and the Concert of Europe in regard to that country quietly vanished.

Agreement between France and Spain

The Franco-German Convention had scarcely been signed, on November 4, 1911, when "Le Matin" published the secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish Convention of 1904, and France entered into negotiations with Spain for the delimitation of their respective spheres in Morocco. A settlement was at last reached in the agreement of November 27, 1912, between France and Spain; though the French felt with some bitterness that they had acted as a catspaw for Spain in Morocco.

Kiderlen-Wachter's Moroccan Policy was not Received Enthusiastically in Germany.

In Germany, despite the great gain of territory, neither the process nor the result of the Moroccan policy of Kiderlen-Wachter was greeted with general enthusiasm. "Like a flash of light", said

Heydebrand, the Conservative leader in the Reichstag, in criticising the whole transaction, "all this has shown to the German people where the enemy is. Now we know, when we wish to expand in the world and have our place in the sun, who it is that pretends to universal domination". Bassermann, the leader of the National Liberal Party, was equally angry, and the Crown Prince applauded every aggressive sentiment, in contrast with his father, who was greatly relieved to be peaceably quit of the "miserable Moroccan Business". In this he anticipated the most considered German opinion. "On the whole", sums up Brandenburg, "it was an ill-conceived action, dictated by the desire for prestige and the wish to blot out the failure of Algeciras". Ballin describes Kiderlen-Wachter as "a man of genius, but dangerous, because unrestrained."

Reaction in France

France breathed again. The British government was relieved. Towards the end of December, the agreement was ratified by the French parliament, and on the same day Caillaux resigned, to the almost universal relief of the French people, and was succeeded by Poincare at the beginning of 1912. "Le Journal des Debats" wrote ironically of the regret which would be felt at Vienna and Berlin at the fall of their great French minister. And the Germans witnessed the renaissance of a dangerous spirit in France, the tendency to wish "enfinir tout de suite" ('enfiner' all at once). Hammann in commenting on the fall of Caillaux observed, "This complete misinterpretation of the ruling spirit in France could not have been more conclusively proved than it was by the fall of the moderate ministry of Caillaux, and by the calling of Poincare, the most obstinate champion of 'la revanche' to the head of the new government".

Concluding Comments on the Agadir Episode

There is little doubt that Agadir was the prelude to a final trial of strength between the two hostile groups of nations into which Europe became cloven; a trial which was to mark the conclusion of the history of the doctrine of balance of power.

The Growth of the German Navy

We have already seen that, throughout his twelve years of office (1897-1909), Bulow set before himself the policy of initiating a new epoch, which he conceived as an historical extension of the phase which Bismarck had developed to the full, within his self-imposed limits. "At first", he wrote in 'Imperial Germany', "Voices were raised in protest when we trod the new paths of world politics, for it was considered a mistake to depart from the approved ways of Bismarck's Continental policy. The fact was overlooked that it was Bismarck himself who pointed out the new way to us by bringing our old policy to a close".

Economic Position of Germany in 1913

Reviewing the economic position of Germany in 1913, Bulow observed that her population had grown from 41 million, in 1871, to more than 56 million, in 1900, and over 68 million in 1913; whilst the population of Britain stood at 41·6 million in 1900 and about 46 million in 1913. The total foreign trade of Germany had grown from £298 million in 1872, to £1,125 million in 1913 compared with £1,350 million of Britain in the same year (Britain had about £575 million in 1872), and £850 million of the U.S.A., "Our vigorous national development", he wrote, mainly in the industrial sphere, forced us to cross the ocean. For the sake of our interests, as well as our honour and dignity, we were obliged to see that we won for our world policy the same independence that we had secured for our European policy. (Our fleet had to be made so strong, and in future must remain so strong, that naval warfare with us is fraught with danger which will imperil the superiority of even the mightiest Sea Power."

Growth of Germany's Sea Power

With the assistance of Tirpitz—whom Davis describes as ‘an estate of the realm by himself’—Bulow began at once to increase Germany's sea power. In 1898 the first of the modern German Navy Bill was passed through the Reichstag, providing for an addition of 12 battleships to the existing 7, besides necessary subsidiary vessels. (At that time Britain possessed 54 battleships).

In the same year (1898) the German Navy League was formed to propagate enthusiasm for the new policy of naval expansion. Two years later, in 1900, a supplementary Naval law was passed, authorising a programme of 20 years, at the end of which Germany would possess 38 battleships with a life of twentyfive years. The memorandum accompanying this Law explained that its purpose was “to protect Germany's sea trade and colonies”. “For this purpose”, it stated, “it is not absolutely necessary that the German battle fleet should be so strong as that of the greatest naval Power.... But...the defeat of a strong German fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of a victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet”. The hand of Tirpitz is very evident in this memorandum. His constant talk of a fleet which would possess “an alliance value”—i.e. a fleet which would be capable of destroying the balance of naval power—was about to be realised. In 1900, Germany entered what Bulow called “the danger Zone”, in her relations with Britain.¹ In that year the total membership of the German Navy League had mounted to 600,000.

In the summer of 1900, the Kaiser made his notorious speech to the soldiers about to embark for China. “As the Huns 1,000 years ago under Attila gained a reputation by which they still live in tradition and history, so let the name of German be known in such a manner in China.”

1. The ‘Bundesrath’ incident had occurred at the end of 1899, and had given Bulow and Tirpitz their chance to carry the Bill. The incident briefly was the ‘Bundesrath’, a German merchantship, was stopped and searched for contraband on the east coast of Africa. The vessel was taken to Durban to a Prize Court and was subsequently released. The repercussion of the incident on German mentality was profound and enduring. It was these January days of 1900, far more than the propaganda of the Kaiser, Tirpitz and the Navy League, which brought home to the German people, their powerlessness at sea. “It is an ill wind that blows no body any good” observed Bulow when the news arrived and Tirpitz suggested that an Order should be given to the British Commander.

British Negotiations for an Alliance with Germany

During these years the British negotiations for an alliance with Germany were proceeding, and by the autumn of 1901, they had reached a critical stage. Germany, in Lansdowne's words to Eckardstein "stood at the cross roads" In August, while he was entertaining Edward VII, the Kaiser wrote to Bulow. The construction of our fleet must be pressed forward as quickly as possible. This will serve as a pleasant surprise for the English, and perhaps it is really aimed at them as much as against anyone".

As we saw, the Anglo-German negotiations broke down about that time, and during the next three years British foreign policy assumed a new and epoch-making direction. Within a few months the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was signed, and a little more than two years after that, came the settlement of the historic differences with France. At the time the Kaiser in letters to the Czar was signing himself "Admiral of the Atlantic". The year 1904 marked the clear beginning of that terrible military rivalry, the doctrine of 'preparedness', which reached its awful extreme between 1908 and 1914. In those six years six leading Powers *added* £600 million to their armament charges.

Modern British Navy Organisation

The modern British navy organisation dates from the Naval Defence Act of 1889. In introducing the Bill the first Lord of the Admiralty said that its object was to "create an establishment on such a scale that it would be at least equal to the naval strength of any two other nations"(Schmitt). At that time, of course, the two Powers in the British mind were the traditional enemies, France and Russia. The agreement with France in 1904, and the German naval programme quite altered the basis of this policy.

At the end of the nineteenth century British Naval preponderance was so obvious that the efficiency of the establishment slackened ; and the three great critical events of the first four years of the twentieth century, — *viz.*, the final rupture of the Anglo-German understanding, the German naval programme, and the improvement of Anglo-French relations-aroused national interest in Britain in this question, so vital to her existence as a Great Power.

By the Cawdor programme in 1903 of four battleships annually the quota of modern battleships was increased, the great base at

Rosyth was authorised, and the concentration of a powerful Home Fleet in the North Sea was begun. During 1904 anxiety became fairly general in Britain. "The Army and Navy Gazette" urged that the British government should prohibit any further German naval increases. "Once before", so ran the article, "We had to snuff out a fleet, which we believed might be employed against us. There are many people both in England and on the Continent who consider the German fleet the only serious menace to the preservation of peace in Europe. Be that as it may, we are content to point out that the present moment is particularly favourable to our demand that the German fleet shall not be further increased."

British Scare of German Fleet.

On February 2, 1905, Arthur Lee, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, made the speech² which aroused such hostile comment in Germany, and "The Daily Chronicle"—a Liberal paper—in applauding Lee's speech, declared: "If the German fleet had been smashed in October, 1904, we should have had peace in Europe for sixty years". These were also the fixed opinions of Sir John Fisher, who was appointed First Sea Lord on October 21, 1904, (Trafalgar Day!), so that the German government and people had some reason to think that they were an expression of British official plans. Fisher talked continuously of the necessity of a preventive war with Germany, and brooded for years over a wild project of "Copenhagening" the German fleet—a scheme which was even more impracticable than it was immoral. In a letter to Edward VII in August 1904, he had written praising his own proposals and declaring that, unless naval reform was "ruthless and remorseless...— we may as well pack up and hand over to Germany."

The Race of Naval Armament between Britain and Germany Began

Fisher began at once to execute his "ruthless reform". He ordered 180 obsolete ships to be scrapped, and early in 1905 he laid down the "Dreadnought", a type of capital ship which he fondly believed could not be built by any other nation. The Germans at once accepted the challenge, for they recognized that this new type of capitalship would become the standard of naval armament, and owing to Fisher's ruthless scrapping of older ships, they could set out on its

2. "If war was declared it would be possible to strike the first blow before the other party read the news in the papers".

construction with less disadvantage. Within a few months of the launching of the "Dreadnought" Tirpitz secured the passage of a new naval Bill, in March 1906, which restored to his programme the six ships refused in 1900, all to be of the "Dreadnought" type, and provided for the enlargement of the Kiel Canal for their passage. In a speech in the Reichstag at the end of the next month (April 1906)—*i.e.* just after the conclusion of the Conference of Algeciras—Bulow refused to consider a British offer of a naval agreement. The race had begun.

At the end of 1906, in an important speech the German Chancellor first showed signs of uneasiness at the possible prospect of the diplomatic isolation of Germany. "The Entente", he said "without good relations of its members to Germany, would be a menace to peace. A policy aiming at encircling Germany, forming a ring of Powers in order to isolate her, indeed would be dangerous.... To my deep regret I am always reading in the Socialist press that our defensive naval measures are the cause of English ill-feeling. The English apprehension of a great fleet not yet in existence is simply unintelligible". Such a speech from the confident of Tirpitz, who had himself spoken of the 'danger-zone' which had to be passed in the construction of a fleet adequate to a world-policy, was obviously insincere.

When at the second Hague Conference in 1907 Germany definitely refused to accept a project of general disarmament, and at the end of that year entered upon a still vaster naval programme, even the pacifist Liberal government in England began to become alarmed. (During 1907 the Kaiser visited England and was well received. Proposals were made for closer Anglo-German co-operation, especially in the construction of the Bagdad railway, but when the British government required the inclusion in this project of France and of Russia with whom Britain had just reached a definitive agreement, the German government terminated the discussion. This further breach was emphasised by the introduction into the Reichstag at the end of the year of a further Navy Bill, which was passed in March 1908, embodying an ominous programme. It was for a period of nine years, and provided for an expenditure of over £ 207 million, nearly half of which was marked for new ships and guns. The annual charge for the German navy,

which stood at about £ 10 million in 1904, was to rise by 1910 to nearly £ 21 million. Four capital ships were to be laid down each year, instead of the three provided by the Bill of 1907 ; and during these years —1906—1908—actually nine German battleships were authorised, as against Britain's eight.

1908 was a Disquieting Year in Anglo-German Relations

In February the German Emperor wrote to Lord Tweedmouth, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, a letter first published in "The Morning Post" in October 1914, which aroused much resentment among those to whom it was communicated at the time. "It is very galling", it ran, "for the Germans to see their country continually held up as the sole danger and menace to Britain by the whole press of the different parties". The Kaiser protested that the practice was "utterly unworthy of the great British nation". The letter produced a bad impression in England ; but nevertheless, the Liberal government laid down only two capital ships that year—the fewest since 1898—to the Germany's four ; and later in the year Edward VII, accompanied by Sir Charles Hardinge, visited the German and Austrian emperors in the attempt to secure limitation of armaments. Hardinge explained frankly to the Kaiser that "the naval rivalry set on foot by Germany was sure to provoke suspicions as to its ultimate intentions, and thus to embitter relations, then perfectly friendly and natural, between the two nations". The Kaiser became very angry, and declared that he would go to war rather than submit to dictation of this question. The visit to the Emperor Francis Joseph had no better result, for Austria needed the support of Germany in the execution of Achrenthal's reckless policy in the Balkans on that time, from which, in fact, developed the chief immediate provocation of the war in 1914.

The Kaiser's Notorious 'Daily Telegraph' Interview

Towards the end of that troubled year (1908—) the year of the "Young Turk" Revolutions of the declaration of Bulgarian independence ; of Austria's 'coup' in Bosnie ; of the incident of the Casablanca deserters—an interview with the Kaiser was published in the "Daily Telegraph" (October 28), which caused a further and greater storm of indignation in England. It was stupid and blundering effusion though the Kaiser was by no means solely to blame for it ; since the manuscript was first sent to Bulow, who did

not trouble to read it, and it was afterwards formally examined and approved by the German Foreign Office. It began by saying that the English were "as much as March hares" not to believe in his friendship for them. But he confessed that "the prevailing sentiment among large sections of the middle and lower classes of my people are not friendly to England". "I am therefore, so to speak, in a minority in my own land". He went on to explain how he had tried to assist the British government with military advice during the South African War, and had opposed a French and Russian proposal of a continental coalition against Britain at that time.

The Interview Raised a Storm in England

The less responsible newspapers in England raucously abused the German Emperor and his people. Such men as Cromer, Roberts and Fisher propagated afresh the doctrine of instant preparedness for war. Even such cool heads as those of Balfour and McKenna were heated ; a naval panic swept the country ; and in the estimates of 1909, eight new capital ships were authorised, including six "super-Dreadnoughts" ; and five in each of the two succeeding years, making eighteen of these new and increasingly costly monsters by 1912. In the midst of the naval crisis of 1909 the proposal (contained in the Declaration of London) to establish an International Prize Court was submitted to the British parliament. The proposed new naval usages would amount to a considerable limitation upon the traditional British doctrine in regard to contraband and blockade of the enemy ports in time of war ; and the Declaration was rejected by the House of Lords. In the course of the debate the German naval menace cropped up once more, embittering feeling and increasing the hostile competition.

Indignation was Equally Intense in Germany

In the Reichstag Bulow admitted the folly and danger of the interview, doing his best to tone down its import and explain away the most damaging statements contained in it, though with little success ; for he was completely involved in the responsibility. "Our aims were misunderstood", he said "and hostile plans attributed to us which never entered our heads. The Kaiser felt pained by the constant attacks and suspicions of his naval plans. The knowledge that the publication has not produced the desired result in England, and has aroused excitement and painful regret in Germany, will lead

him henceforth to observe even in private conversation the reserve which is essential to the unity of our policy and the authority of the Crown. If it were otherwise, neither I nor my successors could carry our burden". So caustic was public comment throughout Germany that the Kaiser wept and talked for a time of abdicating. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrath even considered recommending him to abdicate. Bulow had certainly "let his master down", in a dangerous and undignified situation; and though the Kaiser refused the resignation which he tendered at the time, they became estranged, and seven months later the Chancellor was dismissed.

Throughout the Crisis of 1908—09 Tirpitz Held his Course Undismayed.

The German government was steadily bombarded by the Ambassador in London, Count Wolf Metternich, and his councillor, Eckardotein, with gravest warnings that the only alternatives for Germany were to cease the naval competition with Britain, or to have war with her. Despite these warnings of the Ambassador—which were negated by Widenmann, the naval attache at the German Embassy in London—the Chancellor and the Emperor rallied to the Admiral, and Germany continued her naval expansion. But it is significant that, whereas Llyod George had no difficulty in securing the enormous sum necessary for the construction of the new 'super-Dreads', Bulow was defeated in the Reichstag when he sought new taxes to pay for the naval programme authorised in 1908, and shortly afterwards he resigned.

Effort to Bridge the Gulf between England and Germany Proved Abortive.

On Bulow's resignation in 1909,³ Bethmann-Hollwig, a conscientious but vacillating bureaucrat, succeeded in as Chancellor of

3. The most competent and detached observers of Bulow's policy in Germany are agreed in condemning it out of hands.

In addition to embroiling Germany with Russia in the Balkans and the Near East, and seeking to humiliate France in Morocco, thus tightening and sharpening the Dual Alliance, Bulow at the same time delivered himself up to the alarmists in England by his aggressive naval plans. At his fall he was confronted by the spectacle of a hostile Triple Entente inspired by the dangerous doctrine of 'preparedness'; whilst in Central Europe he beheld the Triple Alliance weakened by the covert apostasy of Italy and led into the Balkan wilderness, as much by German visions of exploitation of Asia as by the desperate scheme of Aehrenthal to scotch the South Slav menace to the tottering Austrian Empire.

Germany. The new Chancellor was anxious to reach an accommodation with England, but failed from the outset to control Tirpitz, the Pan-Germans, and all the tribe of exponents of 'Machtpolitik. "Where differences between the navy and the political direction occurred," Beth. wailed, "public opinion was almost invariably on the side of the former. The weighing of international factors appeared as kowtowing the foreigner". Reventlow belaboured him, Tirpitz despised and deplored him as the exponent of 'a policy of impotence⁴".

Beth. appointed to the Foreign Office Kiderlen-Wachter, who, despite his filibustering policy in Morocco, stood for a strong peace and opposed the needless provocation of England by an aggressive naval policy. He resolutely opposed Tirpitz's constantly expanding programme, and encouraged Beth to approach England in 1909. But the best that Beth. could offer England was a temporary retardation, though no reduction of the German programme of naval construction, in return for which he required an assurance of British neutrality in case Germany should become involved in war with a third Power. In view of British relations with France, Russia and Japan, this demand was preposterous, and though negotiations dragged on through 1910 during which year Edward VII died and the provocative Fisher resigned from the Admiralty, they broke down in March 1911, when the Chancellor made a pessimistic speech in the Reichstag. "I consider" he said, "any control (of armaments) as absolutely impracticable.....Who would be content to weaken his means of defence without the absolute certainty that his neighbour was not secretly exceeding the proportion allowed' to him in the disarmament agreement?.....Any one who seriously considers the question of universal disarmament must inevitably come to the conclusion that it is insoluble so long as men are men and States are States".

Germany Fifth Naval Bill in Fourteen Years

In 1910 Austria entered on a new naval programme, including the construction of four 'Dreadnoughts', bringing the total programme of the Central Powers to sixteen capital ships, as against Britain's nineteen. The indignation aroused in Germany by the

4. Tirpitz wrote : "In so far any German was responsible for the war, it was BH, who sacrificed the interests of national defence for the 'beaux yeux' of perfidious Albion."

Agadir crisis in the following summer was adroitly used by Tirpitz to secure the passing of another naval Bill—the fifth in fourteen years. (The five Navy Bills were passed in 1898, 1900, 1906, 1908 and 1912). In August, 1911, the Kaiser declared his intention of creating such a fleet that “no one will be able to challenge the place in the sun which should rightfully be ours”. And Tirpitz writes that “we had to do what Bismarck did in similar circumstances, *i.e.* to bring in a Defence Bill perfectly quietly and without any provocative accessories”. On November 14, the Kaiser instructed the Chancellor to work the Supplementary Bill into the budget of 1912.

Germany's Naval Programme

At that time German programme provided for fifty-eight large armoured ships, to which Tirpitz proposed to add another six. The strenuous opposition of Beth. and Kid. reduced the number to three, but, in addition to the new construction, the German Navy Bill of 1912 incorporated a new strategic scheme, which would keep more than half of the fleet in full commission and provide for the rapid mobilisation of the remainder. This meant that the British government contemplate the presence in the near future in the North Sea of a fully prepared German striking force larger than that provided for British defence in home waters.

At the beginning of 1912 the “forward school” was in the ascendant in Germany; Kid. was fuming; Beth. was wringing his hands. And on January 10, Count Wolff Metternich, German Ambassador in London, sent another grave warning (he had sent a similar warning in 1809): “A ‘Novelle’ will drive England again to the side of France, and there she will stay. We can no longer hide from ourselves that the English Entente system and her policy towards us rest primarily upon the fear of our growing strength at sea. A naval policy going beyond the Navy law leads in my opinion to war.”

Ominous Rivalry of Naval Armaments

This terrible race of naval armaments was very perturbing to the British Liberal government. In the Mediterranean Austria was building four ‘Dreadnoughts’ and Italy six, whilst Germany was almost keeping pace in the North Sea with British construction. Russia was rendered so uneasy by the German scheme that in the course of this year (1912) she budgeted for a four-year building programme involving an expenditure of £ 80 million.

The Haldane Mission

On February 4, the Kaiser privately informed the British Foreign Office that Germany would modify her latest programme "if...both Powers would agree not to take part in any combination... which was directed against either of them". Four days later (February 8) Viscount Richard Burdon Haldane (1856-1928) arrived in Berlin to discuss the project of limiting this ominous rivalry of armaments' which was rapidly becoming so oppressive that a final explosion in war was beginning to be regarded as inevitable and even likely to be greeted with relief. I would have sacrificed the whole Bill" writes Tirpitz naively, "for a really solid neutrality",

The British point of view was universally understood, and had been put in a nutshell by Grey in 1909. "Our navy is to us what the German army is to them. To have a strong navy would increase their prestige, their diplomatic influence, that power of protecting their commerce ; but it is not the matter of life and death to them that it is to us". Speaking at Glasgow the day after Haldane arrived in Berlin (*i.e.* on February 9) Winston Churchill, then Civil Lord of the Admiralty, put the point more succinctly and less diplomatically when he declared that the German fleet was 'luxury'.

The Prolonged Negotiations between Haldane and the German Government Ended in Failure

Germany spoke with two voices - the voice of Bethmann - Hollwig and the voice of Tirpitz. Ultimately the German condition of limitation proved intolerable to the British government ; for it amounted to forcing her back into that isolation from which she had felt impelled to emerge in 1902. The German price resolved itself into the emasculation of the British understandings with France and Russia, which would have restored German hegemony on the Continent at a time when restraint upon her was imperative ; for the Balkan cauldron was again at the point of bubbling over, and would inevitably scald Austria, to whose preservation Germany was fatally committed.

Beth, in his flabby and impotent way desired peace, which he knew was dependant upon an agreement with England. But he had read Widenmann's exclusive memorandum that it would be beyond England's financial power to build two ships to Germany's one (the only safe ratio) which would have involved a British force of 120 'Dreadnoughts' and 200,000 men. Widenmann calculated that Britain

would have to spend £189 million on capital ships in 'order to maintain the 2-Power standard. And he had been told by Heeringen, the Chief of Naval Staff, that "to be of any real value the German fleet must have a military prospect victory". Yet Beth, vacillated between the pacifists and the jingoes. "Grey only offered us neutrality in an unprovoked attack", he moaned, "and refused our addition 'if war is forced on Germany'. Why should such a strictly limited neutrality formula hurt England's friends? It would merely have shown them they could not rely on her help in an anti-German policy. Ever since 1909 Grey has told me on every occasion of his primary obligation to the Dual Alliance, but in return for his neutrality formula I could not surrender the 'Novelle', England's efforts of reconciliation was sincere, but perhaps we were wrong in underestimating her intimacy with France and Russia". Beth's naivete (natural simplicity and unreservedness of thought) is touching, especially in the light of German policy in 1914.

Causes of the Failure of the Haldane's Mission

The Haldane Mission to Berlin to explore possible terms of conciliation took place in 1912, the year that had, from the outset, been dramatized as "the critical year" when German naval strength might become great enough to challenge British. The Haldane Mission foundered on the German Navy Bill of 1912 (which proposed three new battleships and the creation of a third battle squadron) and on German attempts to insist on political equivalents for any naval limitation. Since such political equivalents seemed to demand detachment from France and Russia, or at least a pledge of British neutrality, amounting to much the same thing, they could not now be conceded by Britain, for they amounted to forcing her back into that isolation from which she had felt impelled to emerge in 1902.

The Aftermath

After the failure of the Haldane Mission Churchill in July, 1912, announced the British naval programme, which reduced the 2-Power standard to a ratio of 16 : 10 to the German fleet, *i.e.*, to a margin of safety of 60%. Twenty-five new capital ships were to be constructed during the next six years. This would give fifty-five ships to the German thirty-five—not quite a 60% margin, for the liberal government reduced the competition to a minimum which the Conservatives considered dangerous to national safety. "Germany is fortunate that the Liberals are in power", wrote the Belgian

Ambassador in London, "When the Conservatives return, they will not be content with a superiority of 60%. For England it is a vital question on which no English party can yield, for the day it loses naval supremacy it will be all up with British power and prestige. This is the pivot of English policy which they do not seem to understand in Berlin". In fact, the conservatives did not return to power before the cataclysm. Churchill attempted to compensate for this restraint in naval armament by entering into a convention with France which allowed the withdrawal of capital ships from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and their concentration in the North Sea. The surrender of British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean hurt the pride of the 'navalists' in England. In February 1913, Tirpitz announced that the 16 : 10 ratio was acceptable to Germany, and Churchill thereupon promptly invited the German government to participate in "a naval holiday". Plans for retardation fall through, but during these two years (1913-14) the two governments agreed to inform each other of their general naval plans, and the tension between the two countries actually relaxed on the eve of the great trial.

The Relative Position of the Two Fleets in 1914

Britain then had 29 modern battleships ; Germany 17. Britain was building 15 ; Germany 11. In other types Britain had 40 ; Germany 20. On the outbreak of War Britain took over two battleships first completed for Turkey ; so that she soon had 46 to Germany's 28. The naval superiority of Britain in the North Sea in August, 1914, was, however, partly accidental. "The last navy estimates before the War were introduced by Churchill on March 17, 1914, where he announced that a general mobilisation of the reserve fleet would take place in July instead of the usual manoeuvres. It was to this decision (which was reached to effect a small saving of money) that the Britain navy owed some part of its readiness for War when the crisis came".

Concluding Comments

In summary it may be said that, according to the prevailing conception of national organisation, a competition for hegemony was inevitable, and could be justified by considerations of population, wealth and military power. Measured by such criteria the German Empire in the twentieth century was entitled to a degree of prestige

and to a territorial field not inferior to that of any other national or imperial State. The Germans felt that the arrangement from historical prescription—which excluded their new empire from a field of political expansion still enjoyed even by such decadent nations as the Portuguese and Spaniards, and by such stationary peoples as the French and Dutch—could not be allowed to oppose their aspirations which were justified by the impressive fact of a vast and increasing population, whose efficiency, wealth and military power far exceeded those of all except one other nation, and yet was confined within a narrow territory. The German dog looked abroad and saw many inferior animals snarling in the most capacious and desirable mangers, whilst the British dog, with much the most capacious and desirable manger, was now snarling in unison with the rest ; and Germany was in the humour for a dog-fight.

The German government had precisely the same justification for her naval policy between 1898 and 1914 as the government has had since 1923.

“Political questions”, said Bismarck, the master of national diplomacy, “are questions of power”. Germany lacked the sea power necessary to achieve her national aspirations. She determined to acquire that sea-power—as she had already acquired the land power—and she judged that it lay within her resources. Her naval policy engendered the same fear in Britain which her military policy had engendered in France and Russia ; and this stimulus of fear and envy, intensified by the conflict of national patriotism, resulted in war. Judged by results, the German policy was a failure. But it was a logical development of the system by which the European peoples had embodied themselves in the form of the acquisitive National State, had extended the imperial grasp of that State over the largest portion of the world, and then had disputed the division in a bitter rivalry either of single States or of temporary groups of States. Perhaps we owe to the systematic mind of the German people our grim gratitude that they finally reduced this process to the Great Absurdity of 1914-18.

Ten Years of the Balkan Tangle

The attention of Europe was again directed strongly to the Balkans by a series of events which occurred in 1903. It is proposed to discuss in this Chapter the happenings in the Balkans from 1903 to 1913.

Military Revolt in Serbia, 1903

In summer of 1903 a military revolt, the plans of which—according to Bogitschevitch in *Causes of the War*—were known to the governments of Austria and Russia, broke out in Belgrade ; and on June 10 King Alexander and Queen Draga, together with all their relations and most powerful supporters of the house of Obrenovitch, were foully murdered ; and chief instigator of the feud, Peter Karageorgevitch (Peter I), ascended the blood-strained throne of Serbia. The new ruler was at first generally supposed to be quite complacent to the Balkan policy of Austria, which since 1895 had been under the control of Goluchowski, a mediocre but competent statesman, who aimed at maintaining the 'status quo', fearing that any violent change would be the prelude to the dissolution of the 'ranshackle Empire'.

Unrest in Macedonia, 1903

At this time Macedonia was seething with unrest, due to the familiar causes : the inequity of Turkish government, which consisted simply of dragooning and tax—gathering ; the ferocious bigotry of the Mussulmans, chiefly the Albanians ; and the perennial rebellion of subject peoples, which was secretly stimulated by the governments of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, and confused by the competing intrigues of Austria and Russia. The last attempt at intervention by the

Concert of Europe, led by England in 1897, had proved nugatory. 'Comitadjis' ('Komitajis'), *i.e.* guerilla bands of Bulgars backed by the Bulgarian Revolutionary Committee in Macedonia, were again very active in 1903. Turkish reprisals on a grand scale were inevitable, and a blaze might spread throughout Europe, involving not only Austria and Russia, but Italy and Germany; for in March 1908, a German syndicate strongly supported by the German government had signed an agreement with the Turkish government for the construction of a large section of the Bagdad Railway.

Programme of Reforms in Macedonia (February 1903)

Early in the year Lamsdroff (Russian Foreign Minister), Goluchowski (Austrian Foreign Minister) and Lansdowne (British Foreign Minister) had agreed to a programme of reforms in Macedonia to be imposed upon Turkey by a European Inspector General, assisted by a group of financial experts and gendarmerie officers. Bulgaria was instructed to call off the 'Comitadjis', and the Sultan accepted the programme. But Abdul Hamid had much experience of the Concert of Europe, and he pursued his usual policy of masterly inactivity.

Austria and Russia's Intervention in Macedonia

In summer the insurgents again took the field, and a carnival of barbarism ensued, from which in the autumn the Turks us usual emerged triumphant. Bulgaria now appealed again to Powers of the Concert, and Lansdowne proposed a more vigorous intervention than that outlined in the so-called "February Programme". He was informed by the Foreign Ministers of Austria and Russia that his proposals practically coincided with a scheme formulated at a meeting of the Czar and the Emperor, accompanied by their ministers at Murzstag early in October. Lansdowne reluctantly accepted the Murzstag Programme, which was to be executed promptly, and on paper would produce a general pacification of Macedonia. The country was mapped out into zones, one of which each of the Powers of the Concert, except Germany, undertook to administer.

After a year 1904—it was found that the gendarmerie reforms had proved a great advantage to the population, but efforts in the direction of judicial, financial and general administrative reform were steadily and successfully obstructed by the Porte.

The general charge of the reform programme had been entrusted to the two most interested powers—Russia and Austria;

but Russia was at this time at war with Japan, and consequently took but a languid interest in Macedonia reform. Fortunately she had a moderate and cautious Austrian Minister to deal with, in Goluchowski.

Lansdowne was dissatisfied with the achievements of the Concert, and at the beginning of 1905 proposed more effective financial measures and a stronger section for the whole programme. It was only after a combined naval demonstration—in which Germany refused to participate—that Abdul Hamid agreed to the new regime in Macedonia.

Important Changes of Government Profoundly Affected the Balkan Policy of the Concert

At the end of 1905 Lonsdowne was succeeded by Grey at the British Foreign Office ; in May 1906 Lamsdroff gave place to Izvolsky ; and in October Goluchowski resigned—perhaps because it was felt that he had played a part too subservient to Germany at Algeciras—and was succeeded by the stormy petrel, Aehrenthal.

Grey's Difficulties

During his first two years in office Grey devoted much time to the question of Macedonian Reform ; but he saw the Murzsteg Programme being steadily whittled down and the country rapidly approaching dangerous chaos. When at the end of 1907 he attempted to secure a more effective supervision of the Concert, he was met by the resolute opposition of the Continental Powers—especially Austria, Russia and Germany. "The various attempts to improve Turkish government in Macedonia", he says, were intolerably wearisome, very disagreeable, and painfully futile --- Macedonian Reforms could only be dealt with in concert with the other Powers. Not one of the other Powers was disinterested ; not one of them believed that Britain was disinterested. Each was conscious of some political motive of its own, and they all invented some political motive that was attributed to us".

1908—a Critical Year in European Diplomacy

In January the Concert of Powers in Macedonia began to disintegrate. Since the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897, by which those two Powers repudiated all idea of conquest in the Balkans and announced their determination to maintain the 'status quo' there,

attempt to achieve reform in Macedonia had been based for some years upon Austro-Russian initiation and co-operation. But from the intervention and Lansdowne in 1903 the Macedonian programme had become more completely international. The disinterested and vigorous action of Lansdowne was continued by Grey, despite his conviction that "the question of Macedonian Reform was like a bog quagmire)". At the end of 1907 he pressed for the much delayed execution of the judicial reforms of the Murzstag Programme, and for the appointment of a Governor-General of Macedonia with an assured tenure, considerable independence of the Porte, and effective support from the Powers of the Concert. This proposal, like Lansdowne's met with obstruction from the other Powers.

Aehrenthal's Thunder Bolt

While negotiation was proceeding, on January 27, 1908 Aehrenthal announced that he had obtained a concession from the Sultan to construct a railway through the Sanjak of Novibazar to Salonika, which, he pompously declared "would constitute a new and important route from Central Europe to Egypt and India". Aehrenthal's action, which destroyed the effectiveness of the Concert by bartering Austria's adherence for a private concession from Turkey, evoked a rebuke from Grey on February 25. He complained of the rebuke as an unfriendly act. "Who could have foreseen", he asked the British Ambassador, "that the Sultan would use the Austrian application for a railway as a weapon to destroy the Concert of Europe". To which Goschen, the British Ambassador, replied, "who put a sword into the hand of a skilful fencer"? Izvolsky was equally indignant at Aehrenthal's act, which amounted to a repudiation of the 1897 agreement; and not even Aehrenthal's prompt acceptance of Izvolsky's counter-proposal for a railway from the Danube through Serbia to the Adriatic, improved the situation.

Policies of Goluchowski and Aehrenthal—a Contrast

Goluchowski, whom Steed describes as no genius, but "a statesman of upright mind, and endowed with a large measure of commonsense", had faithfully observed the compact of 1897 with Russia, and had steadily abstained from adventures in the Balkans. He had refrained from profiting from the debacle of Russia in the Far East in 1904-05, partly on the point of honour, but partly also on account of the internal difficulties of Austria-Hungary at this time, and of Germany's quarrel with France over Morocco. On his

fall in October 1906, he was succeeded by Baron von Aehrenthal, a very different man, who soon gave a new and dangerous aspect to Austrian policy. Tortuous and cynical, utterly opposed to liberalism and to the intrusion of ethical considerations into diplomacy, Aehrenthal respected the Realpolitik of Germany, and sympathized with the ideas of the reactionary clique which controlled Russia; for Britain he had a contempt which was founded in ignorance; but he was more placatory to France, for he regarded her as a weapon by which he could wrest from Germany greater prestige and diplomatic independence for Austria. As ambassador for some years at St. Petersburg he had become intimate with Izvolsky.

Aehrenthal was determined to make Austria a power to be reckoned with, and not a mere satellite of Germany. He was determined to scotch the South Slav menace to the Hapsburg Empire, to realize Austrian ambitions in the Balkans by finally incorporating Bosnia and Herzegovina, crushing Serbia, and controlling west Macedonia.

Aehrenthal's Suggestion of a Quadruple Entente was Negatived by Izvolsky.

At first Aehrenthal hoped to resuscitate the old League of the Three Emperors, but he soon discovered that Izvolsky was bent on achieving a rapprochement with England, and establishing a Triple Entente. In the spring of 1907 Aehrenthal proposed to Izvolsky that Austro-Russian agreement of 1897 should be enlarged to include both France and Germany in a quadruple entente which would secure their mutual advantage; Austria-Hungary would annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia would secure the opening of the Straits, Germany would gain the financial and diplomatic support of France in the Bagdad Railway scheme; and France would get a free hand in Morocco. This proposal—which much resembled William II's dream of a Continental alliance against Britain—if accepted would put an end to the Anglo-French entente, and to the growing intimacy of England and Russia, which Aehrenthal feared as much as Bulow. Izvolsky, however, rejected the proposal as being unacceptable to France; while the question of the Straits could not be solved except by international agreement, to which Britain must be a party. "We came unanimously to the conclusion", wrote Izvolsky, after a discussion with the ambassadors concerned, "that Russia's foreign policy must continue to rest on the indestructible basis of her alliance

with France, and that this alliance should be reinforced by agreements with Britain and Japan."

Austro-Russian Rivalry in the Balkans

From this time the dangerous Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans was renewed, Aehrenthal set his face against the internationalism of Macedonian Reform, as suggested by Grey, and began to pursue that selfishly Austrian policy, of which the first act was the gaining of a concession from Turkey for the Sanjak railway.

Britain and Russia Come Closer to Each Other

Izvolsky supported Grey's proposal for the appointment of an independent Governor-General of Macedonia. Moreover, arrangements were pushed on at this time for the much delayed return visit of the King to the Czar. The visit was paid to Reval, on June 10, 1908, and was regarded as a formal demonstration of the close and friendly cooperation of the two Powers. The Reval visit produced consternation in Germany, Austria and Turkey, precipitating critical action in the two latter countries.

The 'Young Turk' Revolution (1908)

Turkey after the abortive attempt at constitutionalism and reforms between 1861 and 1876 fell for a whole generation under the oriental despotism of Sultan Abdul Hamid II—"Abdul the Damned" "The Red Sultan"¹. Though a man of considerable ability and shrewdness, he had a deep antipathy to everything Christian, Western, and European, especially after his reverses in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, and the further losses exacted from him by the Western Powers at the Congress of Berlin (1878). In revenge he cynically exploited the weakness and flouted the decencies of European civilisation. Inside his own country, he devoted his talents to ensuring his own undisputed rule and to excluding, as far as he could, disturbing Western influences from his dominions. He lived on a huge national debt, but saw to it that the interest on it due to European investors was promptly paid even when his own administrators went unpaid. For some years a conspiracy had been brewing against his guileful and barbarous despotism. As in Russia in 1904-05 a generation of misrule culminated in revolution in Turkey in 1908 brought about by the "Young Turks".

1. See Chapter on the Eastern Question, 1875—78, *supra*.

The Young Turks

The young Turks were Ottoman patriots, ardent supporters of the process of westernization which Abdul Hamid had tried sedulously to exclude from his dominions. Events in Russia after 1904 had repercussions in Turkey. They added to the preoccupations of Russia and still further freed the Balkans from Russian pressure ; and at the same time many of the younger generation of Turkish noble families were inspired by ideas similar to those held by the liberal intelligentsia of Russia. They had come to realize that successful action against the Sultan lay not in isolated acts of terrorism but in winning over of part of his armed forces to their cause. Their aim was to revive the abortive liberal constitution of 1876 which, having bestowed upon Turkey a complete parliamentary system by a stroke of the Sultan's pen, had been by the same means unceremoniously discarded as soon as the moment of danger was past. The ring leaders of this conspiracy, which called itself "The Committee of Union and Progress", carried out relentless propaganda against Abdul Hamid, and by July 1908, won over the ill-paid and discontented Third Army Corps stationed at Salonica. Aided by the Second Army Corps, they proclaimed the constitution revived and marched on Constantinople.

Abdul Hamid's Volte-face

Abdul Hamid, faced with so formidable a military revolt, overnight converted himself into a full-dress constitutional monarch. He ordered the calling a national parliament elected on universal male suffrage and stopped all censorship of the press. The abruptness and completeness of his sudden and complete change in his outlook took every one by surprise, and amid universal rejoicing the Young Turks seized all offices, and elections were held. The Young Turk Revolution was greeted with delight throughout the Ottoman Empire and beyond.

The Balkan Nationalism

"It seemed, for a time, that Balkan nationalism had come full circle, and to the nationalist zeal of subject peoples had suddenly been added the paradox of an Ottoman nationalism ready to embrace Greeks, Rumanians, Bulgars, and Serbs as brethren". The hatreds and conflicts in Macedonia ceased, as if by magic ; and the control by the Concert of Powers, in terms of the Murzstag programme, vanished.

Counter Revolution

Power lay now in the hands of the managing committee of the Young Turks, led by Enver Bey. The new assembly lacked any political experience and was used as a rubber-stamp for Young Turk measures. Abdul Hamid on his part, bided his time, mobilizing against the new regime all the forces of conservatism and all who were disappointed with the amateurishness and selfishness of the new rulers. By April 1909, he felt strong enough to head a counter-revolution, which retook Constantinople and overthrew the government. But at Salonica the Committee of Union and Progress rallied the army once again, and retook the capital, after five hours of ferocious fighting.

Abdul Hamid Deposed in Favour of his Younger Brother

Abdul Hamid was deposed in favour of his younger brother, Mohammed V, and the dreaded "Red Sultan" retired with most of his harem to a comfortable villa in Salonica. Mohammed became a puppet of the Young Turk Committee. He was the ideal figurehead for Young Turkish rule, "reconciling the formalities of legitimist succession with a passive acquiescence in whatever his ministry required".

Liberal and Nationalist Hopes were Dashed to the Ground

At first the Young Turk Revolution had been greeted with universal enthusiasm and relief. Enver Bey had declared rhetorically that "arbitrary government had disappeared". "Hence forth", he declared, "We are all brothers. There are no longer Bulgars, Greeks, Romans Jews, Mussulmans; under the same blue sky we are all equal, we glory in the name of Ottoman".

The leaders of the European government had accepted the Revolution at its face value, but they were soon to learn, as Miller in "The Ottoman Empire and After" says, "that the Young Turk was merely the Old Turk with a varnish of Persian culture and without a belief in religion." The extent to which the Young Turks were to disappoint liberal and nationalist hopes, and to prove no less brutal and tyrannical towards subject nationalists, soon, became apparent.

The counter-revolution had synchronised with an appalling massacre of Armenians at Adana in Asia Minor, in which the Young Turks were as completely implicated as the old. Now that they

were firmly established in power, the Young Turks, under Enver began the ominous policy of settling 'the Macedonian question by "Ottomanising" its non-Turkish inhabitants. "As regards the extermination of alien nationalities in the Empire, "says Guesshoff in "The Balkan League" "The Young Turks showed no improvement on the Old Turks, or even on Abdul Hamid.....Massacres like those of Shtip and Katchani, murders, pillage tortures and persecution's, the systematic ill-treatment of Bulgars in the Turkish army, so increased the number of refugees from Macedonia and Thrace that the most peaceful Bulgarian statesmen were aroused and began to ask themselves if all this was not the result of a deliberate plan on the part of the Young Turks to solve the Macedonian and Thracian problem by clearing those two provinces of their Bulgarian and Christian inhabitants".

International Consequences of the Young Turk Revolution

The aftermath of the 'Young Turk' Revolution was to tempt Turkey's neighbours into looting raids on her territory. Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been given to her "to occupy and administer" by the Congress of Berlin (1878). It was the ambition of both Frances Joseph and Andrassy to convert this "occupation" into complete annexation ; and by the Protocol which accompanied the secret treaty of 1881, constituting the League of the Three Emperors, Austria reserved the right to annex these provinces at whatever moment she might deem advisable. Apparently the chief reason why they were not annexed before 1908 was the reluctance of both the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary to increase the Slav population of the Monarchy. Russian opinion hardened after 1881 against the annexation of the provinces by Austria. On the other hand, from 1881 until 1905 Serbia had seemed little more than an Austrian satrapy. "Since Serbia seemed destined to fall, sooner or later, into Austria-Hungarian hands, there could be no reason to rouse sleeping dogs by pressing for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seemed a sounder policy for Austria-Hungary to prepare a situation such as to bring Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia at one stroke within the confines of the Hapsburg realms" (Steed). Since 1905, however, Aehrenthal had come to the conclusion that it was essential for Austria-Hungary to annex the two provinces as soon as possible, in order to prevent the consolidation of Southern Slav nationalism in the Greater Serbia idea.

Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria

Aehrenthals opportunity came with the Young-Turk Revolution. This event strengthened his anxiety to present Europe with the accomplished fact of the incorporation of the two provinces. His argument was that they must be incorporated in order they might receive complete local autonomy under Austrian protection. The announcement of annexation was made on October 6, 1908.

The annexation was received with an outburst of joy in Austria-Hungary, with almost hostile reserve in Germany, whom Aehrenthal had scarcely consulted, and with indignation in Russia, England, France and Italy. Izvolski had really been beaten by Aehrenthal at his own game. A few days after the Bosnia-Herzegovina coup he visited London in order to obtain the support of Britain for a European Conference, where he might hope to retrieve the situation. If he could obtain the support of several Powers, and especially of Britain, for the opening of the Dardenelles, then he might face a Conference with the prospect of a diplomatic success which would fully balance Aehrenthal's stroke. But Izvolsky found that the British government although strongly favouring a Conference to consider the Austrian violation of the Treaty of Berlin, was very disinclined to force the question of the Straits upon Turkey at such a difficult time for her.

Diplomatic Relations Became Very Strained

Diplomatic relations were, in fact, becoming very strained all round. Relying on the support of Germany, Aehrenthal opposed the plan of a Conference, unless its programme was definitely arranged beforehand, and it referred to the situation in regard to Bosnia—Herzegovina only in order to confirm the accomplished fact. Russian opinion was rapidly hardening against Austria, and she was beginning to mobilise. "In Serbia excitement reached a delirious pitch, and the occupation of Belgrade was daily expected. Had the Serbian army been at the moment of annexation as ready for war as it was at the end of the crisis, the Serbian government would undoubtedly have thrown it into Bosnia-Herzegovina in the hope of raising an insurrection, which, to judge by the precedents of 1878 and 1882, would have created a formidable embarrassment to the Monarchy". Although the Italian Foreign Minister, Tittoni, had bound his government by a secret agreement not to embarrass Austria in this crisis, feeling in Italy was very strong that Austria has sto on a march

on her, had violated the spirit of the Triple Alliance, with no thought of compensation. At the same time Turkish indignation was intense. The Young Turks decreed a boycott of Austrian goods. In his atmosphere of general hostility Aehrenthal retreated from the unbending attitude which he had taken to Turkey, and after some negotiation, on February 26, 1909, he agreed to compensate her for the loss of the provinces. He also abandoned certain Austrian rights over the Montenegrin coast. But he would make no concession of any sort to Russia or Serbia, despite the steady support which they received from Britain.

Aehrenthal and Izvolsky had created a situation intensely dangerous to the peace of Europe. Aehrenthal had presumed upon the importance of Russia, the necessity of Germany—in the presence of the Triple Entente—to support him to any length, and the indifference of Britain and France to Balkan questions, to force a dangerous humiliation on Russia. Grey exercised a steadying influence on the whole situation. He wished to give strong diplomatic support to Russia and Serbia, but to sought peace.

Feeling was highly excited in Russia. "It was considered not only in the press, but also in all classes of society", wrote the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg on March 29, 1909, "that Russia had suffered a deep humiliation, and had renounced the traditional part which she had hitherto played in South East Europe, and in prosecution of which she had made so great concessions in the past".

In short, the situation in March, 1909 was : Serbia and Russia refused to accept the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina ; Russia was still demanding a European Conference to examine the question ; several nations including Turkey, Italy and France, were now prepared to recognise the 'fait accompli' Intervening Germany.

Germany now intervened, recommending Russia to accept the situation without demanding a Conference. After waiting some days and receiving no reply, the German government on March 23 sent what amounted to an ultimatum to Russia, and two days later tried to coerce the British government. Although Grey was not to be brow-beaten like Izvolsky, he counselled moderation to both Russia and Serbia. On March 24, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg telegraphed that "Russia would formally declare her unreserved adherence to the abolition of Art. XXV of the Treaty of Berlin (regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina), in case Austria-Hungary

should apply for Russian recognition of the Austro-Turkish Convention".

Russia retreated ; Serbia was forced to accept an Austrian ultimatum. She engaged to refrain from protest against the annexation, to adopt a less truculent attitude to Austria-Hungary, and to reduce her army.³

Significance of the Bosnian Crisis

The crisis was over ; Aehrenthal had triumphed over Izvolsky and won for himself the title of "the Austrian Bismarck". He had made a breach in a European treaty without submitting the question to a Conference. He had humiliated Russia and trampled on Serbia ; he had forced the hands of his allies ; and this episode in "Realpolitik" pleased the German government after it had recovered from Aehrenthal's brusqueness. "For the first time", said Bulow after his retainment, "The Austro-German alliance proved its strength in a grievous conflict. The group of Powers whose influence had been so much over estimated at Algeciras fell to pieces when faced with the tough problems of Continental policy".

It is true that the episode had revealed the solidity of the Central Alliance, and had discomfited the Entente. But it had bred the deep anger of Russia, it had bound her to Serbia in a policy of revenge. In a speech in the Duma shortly after the crisis Izvolsky advised the Balkan States to federate. Immediately afterwards he associated himself with "the Greater Serbia" policy ; and in December, 1909, a secret military convention was arranged between Russia and Bulgaria of which Art. 5 stated that : "The realization of the high ideals of the Slav peoples in the Balkan Peninsula, which are so close to Russia's heart is only possible' after a fortunate issue of the struggle with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The humiliation of Russia in 1909 proved to be a very short-sighted act. Far from checking the 'encirclement', as Bulow claimed, it tightened the Entente, increased its distrust of the Central Powers, and made a similar retreat in any future crisis improbable.

2. The Kaiser in a typical speech at Vienna in September, 1910 boasted that in the Bosnian crisis he had stood by his Austrian friend and ally "in shining armour". It was unwise to flaunt before the world that only so had peace been kept. There were those in St. Petersburg who vowed that never again, were a similar crisis in the Balkans to arise, would the Kaiser find a Russia so submissive to his will.

"It is impossible", writes Grey "to recount these events of 1908-9, without being struck by an ominous paralleled with the crisis of 1914. In 1908, as in 1914, Austria acted without full consultation with her ally—so the world was told by Von Bulow in the first, and by Bettmann—Hollweg³ in the latter crisis. In 1908 as in 1914, Germany, while deprecating the headstrong character of Austria's action, thought it necessary to support her Ally. In 1908, as in 1914, Russia felt herself challenged to support Serbia. There the parallel ends. In 1909 Russia preferred humiliation, in 1914 she chose war".

Aehrenthal retained his office until his death in February, 1912. After Bosnia—Herzegovina episode "he remained on the defensive, and became by degrees an element of stability in Europe" (Steed). He did not live to see the formation of the Balkan League, and he was succeeded by the reckless and incapable Count Berchtold on the eve of another Balkan crisis. II. The second international consequence of the Young Turk Revolution was the seizure of Libya by Italy in 1911.

Since the French occupation of Tunis in 1881, the Italians had coveted the neighbouring provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, but the failure of their adventures on the Red Sea coast postponed for some years the execution of their designs on Tripoli. During the Tangier crisis, Tittoni, Italian Foreign Minister, reasserted their prior rights in the region, and during the next few years their peaceful penetration of Tripoli led to a series of unpleasant incidents with Turkey. Their allies were made aware of their project; but Germany discouraged an adventure which might become the prelude to the partition of the Ottoman Empire, which they were beginning to contemplate as their own morsel. After the annexation of Bosnia—Herzegovina, the Italians felt that they had received some precedent, and at Racconigi, in October 1909, they secured the acquiescence of the Russian government as a 'quid pro quo' for a benevolent attitude on the question of the Straits.

Further untoward incidents in 1910 convinced the Italian government that it could not safely postpone its 'coup' much longer. Nevertheless, as late as June 1911 the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs declared in the Chamber that his policy was based upon the maintenance of "the territorial 'status quo' and the integrity of the

3. Bethmann-Hollweg succeeded Bulow in July, 1909.

Ottoman Empire" in Africa, as elsewhere. Yet on September 26, in the midst of the Agadir Crisis, the Italian government declared its intention of acting immediately, and three days later declared war on Turkey and landed troops in Libia, as they call it. In November it was placed by decree "under the full and entire sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy". The war dragged on and might have turned against Italy had not the outbreak of another war in the Balkans compelled the Turks to cede Tripoli and make peace by the Treaty of Ouchy or Lausanne (1912). Italy acquired little glory from the war, but yet another portion of the Ottoman Empire had fallen away.

The acquisition of Tripoli by Italy was, of course, an act of international brigandage, especially distasteful to Germany.

"It is an unprovoked war of conquest" declared Schiemann, "and a danger to European peace. The Eastern Question will be reopened in its full scope. Injury to Turkey is injury to our interests" (Quoted in Gooch). This declaration was ominously prophetic. Austria was indignant, the military party pressing for a retributive war against Italy; but they were restrained by Germany. But from that time dates the final alienation of Italy from the Triple Alliance, her place in German interest being taken by Turkey. Izvolsky's successor, Sazonoff, sought to take advantage of Turkey's embarrassment in Tripoli to press the question of the opening of the Straits on the Porte, but supported by Germany and Austria, Turkey refused.

III. The Balkan Wars, 1912-13

The Balkan War of 1912 was a third consequence of the 'Young Turk' Revolution.

Before the Treaty of Lausanne was signed Europe was presented with the unexpected spectacle of a Balkan League, formed under the aegis of Russia for the express purpose of conquering and partitioning European Turkey. Russia's diplomacy for some had been working to the end of forming such a League under her auspices—a weapon which might be used against Turkey on the one hand or Austria on the other. "Russia" writes Sazonoff, "proclaimed and defended the principle of the independence of the Balkan States as fundamentally just, in view of their inalienable right to an independent political existence. In our eyes this principle..... had also a practical value; for not only was it not detrimental to any of Russia's vital

interests, but it indirectly furthered their maintenance. 'The Balkan Peninsula for the Balkan peoples' was the formula which comprised the aspirations and aims of Russian policy ; it precluded the possibility of the political predominance, and still more of the sovereignty in the Balkans, of a foreign power hostile to Balkan Slavdom and to Russia. The Bosnia—Herzegovina crisis revealed with unmistakable clearness the aims of Austro-German policy in the Balkans, and laid the foundation for an inevitable conflict between Germanism and Slavism" ("Fateful years").

It seemed inconceivable that the little Balkan States, who hated one another even more than they did the Turk, could ever form an alliance, but the formation of the Balkan League—a surprising achievement—was rendered possible by the violent maladministration of the Young Turks as also by the emergence of a few men of outstanding political stature—the Greek Venezelos, the Bulgarian Guesshoff and Serbian Pasitch. These three statesmen of unusual ability were able to transcend mutual enmities of their peoples, which for centuries had reproduced in the Balkans the selfish particularism of the Great Powers, and had made the Balkan peoples helpless victims of Turkish barbarism.

After protracted negotiations, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro formed the Balkan League. On October 8, 1912, Montenegro declared war on Turkey and within a week Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia did the same. Viewing the episode broadly, it was Russia's countermove in response to the Austrian victory in the Bosnian crisis.

If the fact of the League was remarkable its success was still more surprising. At every point the Turk was out-generalled and outfaught. In a campaign of six weeks the Balkan League, which had put into the field more than 600,000 men, had practicably destroyed all European Turkey outside Constantinople.

It may readily be imagined how disconcerting to Austria were these extraordinary events. Serbia, the chief source of Austrian apprehension,⁴ came out of this Balkan struggle with her reputation

4. The crisis of 1908 passed without a war but it let loose all the forces which made Serbia the storm-centre in Europe. The annexing Serb population of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria aroused a passion of nationalist resentment in Serbia, who had come to look upon herself as the champion and liberator of South Slavs both in Turkish and Austrian dominions. The Serbian movement was looked upon with great concern by both Austria and Germany. Austria had millions of Slav subjects under her rule and she feared that their

greatly increased, her territories enlarged, her aspiration inflamed. In the Conference summoned to London (December 1912) to settle a new map of the Balkans it was Austria's prime object to thwart the ambitions of Serbia and assumed a most uncompromising attitude. She forced Serbia to evacuate various Adriatic towns which the Serbs had conquered from the Turks. It was Austria who was mainly instrumental in erecting Albania as an autonomous State under a German prince with the object of preventing Serbia from obtaining any outlet to the sea. As Sazanoff says in his "Memoirs" "The establishment of an independent Albania had become a sort of dogma at Vienna". The resolution of Austria to keep Serbia out of Albania was matched by the determination of Russia that the Serbia should be given this access to the sea. Europe was brought to the brink of war by Austria mobilizing a portion of her army, and Russia doing likewise. But the Triple Entente—even Russia in fact was not willing to risk a war over Serbian ambition and when the terms of peace came to be discussed, they accepted the Austrian solution. Nevertheless, the Austro-Serbian feud was greatly intensified and within fifteen months another crisis occurred when Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Austria Emperor, was murdered by a Bosnian Serb at Serajiva, the capital of Bosnia. The crisis precipitated the great conflagration of 1914. The Treaty of London (May 30, 1913) ended the war and restricted Turkey in Europe to a small area covered by Constantinople and Gallipoli.

Not One, but Two Wars

Hardly was the ink dry upon the Treaty of London than an internecine quarrel broke out among the victors and the League collapsed in rancour. The constituent states after much controversy had divided the spoils of victory in advance, but they had not reckoned on Austrian interference; now that Serbia was cheated out of Albania she expected a large share of Macedonia

loyalty would be undermined by Serbia's appeal to Pan-Slavic nationalism. Hence in the interests of the integrity of her empire Austria was determined to crush Serbia. Germany also wanted that Serbia should be weak and docile otherwise the project of the Berlin-Bagdad railway would fall through, since Serbia controlled the main railways. Hencefore it became the prime object of Austrian policy to crush or weaken Serbia, and behind Austria was Germany in "shining armour", strong and ready to defy Europe. To put in a nutshell, Austria was determined, come what might, that Serbia should not expand in the Balkans and nourish her dream of the reconstitution of Stephen Dusan's Kingdom which would give a final impulse to the Katabolic forces within the Hapsburg empire.

than had been stipulated in the Serbia-Bulgarian treaty (1904)⁵. Bulgaria would not yield an inch, however, and a crisis soon developed — vain were Russia's efforts at moderation. Austria had made up her mind to smash the Balkan League, and she deliberately incited Bulgaria against her allies. "We shall let the dogs devour one another", an Austrian official was quoted as saying, "and then we shall dominate the Balkans". On June 29, 1913, Bulgaria treacherously attacked Serbia and made a dash on Salonica. This, "coup de main" was instigated by Ferdinand, king of Bulgaria, without the knowledge of his cabinet. Thus commenced the Second Balkan War, which was described by an eye-witness as "the shortest and most sanguinary campaign entered". The Serbs and the Greeks were prepared for the onset, and, with the Romans also invading from the north, the Bulgarians against such odds experienced a crushing defeat, and in the humiliating Treaty of Bucharest, which they signed with Greece, Serbia and Rumania on August 10, 1913 they paid a price to everyone. Greece kept southern Macedonia; Serbia, northern Macedonia; and Rumania, the southern Dobruja. Turks kept Adrianople, which in the Treaty of London had been given to Bulgaria. In this way all the four States defied the Great Powers and ignored the Treaty of London.

Bucharest and After

The Treaty of Bucharest", says Sazonoff, "was but a plaster on the unhealed Balkan wounds, which were destined to reopen before a year had elapsed".

Bulgaria was despoiled of Adrianople, Kavalla, and Kirk-Kilisse beside nearly 3,000 square miles of the Dobruja ceded to Rumania, who had not fired a shot. "In a single month she had played away the hard-won gains of thirty-five years" (Miller). Bulgaria was thrown into the arms of Austria, and began at once to prepare means of revenge through a treaty with Turkey. So was built the 'land-bridge' through the Balkans, so necessary for the Berlin-Bagdad scheme. Serbia, through triumphant and greatly enlarged, was mortified at the exclusion from North Albania. Greece still cast covetous eyes on the Aegean isles. Rumania, which cherished irredentist claims

5. In 1904 Bulgaria and Serbia had concluded a secret agreement of mutual defence against attack by a third Power. Advantage was taken by their leaders of the confusion of 1911 to resume discussion of the project of close alliance and Guesshoff approached Serbia with the plan of extending the agreement of 1904 into an offensive alliance against Turkey for the partition of Macedonia and Thrace.

in Transylvania, entered the orbit of Russian diplomacy, along with Serbia. The only crumb of consolation was that a European conflict had been prevented ; but the world had not long to wait to know how tiny that crumb was.

Results and significance of the Balkan Wars

Territorially the final results of the two Balkan wars was the practical extinction of the Turkish empire in Europe and the enlargement of the Christian Kingdom's of the Balkan peninsula. The greatest gainers were Serbia and Greece, while Bulgaria came off worst. Turkey lost four-fifths of the former European territory and was reduced to the south-eastern coast of the peninsula.

The Balkan Wars were the Prelude to the Great War

It was felt universally that the conclusion of the Balkan wars consisted mainly of a truce. The result had been a definite blow to the military prestige of Germany, which had been responsible for the condition of the Turkish army. Germany's ally, Austria was as chagrined at the enlargement of Serbia which would certainly encourage her to intrigue for the final realization of the dream of Greater Serbia. Russia was militant for though she had done something to offset the reverse of 1909, she was as far, 'as ever, from the straits.

The second War was a fratricidal one and intensified the national rivalries among the Balkan States. Bulgaria nursed a deep resentment which led to join the Central Powers in the Great War which broke out next year, Russia appeared again in the role of protector of the Balkan States, no longer against Turkey but against Austria.

The Rivalry between Austria and Serbia was Intensified

The victory of Serbia and Greece, and their gains of Macedonia and Salonica, blocked the way of Austrian penetration to the Aegean. The phenomenal increase of Serbian power and prestige produced an outburst of Pan-Serb and Yugo-Slav enthusiasm very disquieting to Austria. The Slavs under Austrian rule looked forward to the day when their free kinsmen in Serbia would liberate them from the hated Austrian yoke. Austria was greatly perturbed by widespread Slav movements and looked upon Serbia as the promoter of subversive propaganda among Slav subjects. So she began to look out for opportunity to crush Serbia.

Serbia in her turn, was highly exasperated by the persistent efforts of Austria to block her expansion in the Balkans. She sought revenge by intensifying anti-Austrian propaganda and by intriguing with the Slav subjects of Austria. It was the strained relations between Austria and Serbia that before long precipitated the Great War.

Balkan Wars Produced Fierce International Rivalries

Turkey and Bulgaria had been weakened, but they were respectively the proteges of Germany and Austria. Serbia, the recent protege of Russia, became the most powerful State in the Balkans. Hence the relations between Russia on the one hand, and Germany and Austria on the other, became highly strained over Balkan affairs. The situation became so very explosive that before long it burst forth into the catastrophic war of 1914.

Let us conclude by quoting David Thomson : "The Balkan wars left the international scene more enigmatic than before. No belligerent believed that decisions about territory would last. Serbia and Montenegro now regarded war against Austria-Hungary, to liberate the Serbs in Bosnia, as inevitable. Bulgaria nursed plans for revenge against her rapacious neighbours, and looked to Turkey and Austria-Hungary as possible allies. Russia, her interest in the Balkans renewed by the evident collapse of Turkey, tended now to side with Serbia and Rumania against Bulgaria. Each State, its appetite whetted by gains or its spirit embittered by losses, remained more warlike than ever. That defiance of the great powers and the contempt for treaties alike deprived them of any expectations for gain or security by any means other than war. For the first time in a generation the never easy relations of the Balkan nations had relapsed into full-scale wars, and these wars had still produced no definitive or accepted settlement. Any resumption of war in this region was more likely to involve even bigger states, for neither Austria-Hungary nor Russia could contemplate, without their participation, the final eclipse of Turkey in Europe."

The Serajevo Crisis, and the Outbreak of the First World War

Murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Serajevo on June 20, 1914

On June 11 to 14, 1914, the Kaiser met the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria, at Konopisch, where they discussed the bearing of the New Eastern Question on the Triple Alliance; and thereafter the Austria-Hungarian Chancellor, Berchtold, drew up a memorandum, embodying a scheme for the alliance of the Central Powers with Bulgaria and Turkey in order to circumvent Russo-Serbian intrigues. The draft was just completed when, on Sunday, June 28, 1914, the Archduke and his morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg were shot and killed as they were riding through the streets of Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia by Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian subject of Austria-Hungary.¹ Berchtold now added to the memorandum a few sentences, in which he stated that this was a final demonstration of the utterly irreconcilable spirit of Serbia. At the same time he drafted an autograph letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph to the Kaiser, which accompanied the memorandum. "The crime against my nephew", it ran, "is the direct consequence of the agitation carried on by Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavists, whose sole aim is to weaken the Triple Alliance and destroy my Empire. Though it may be impossible to prove the complicity of the Serbian government, there can be little doubt that its policy, intent on uniting all Jugo slavs under the Serbian flag, must encourage such crimes... My efforts must be, directed to isolating Serbia and

1. Tried in Serajevo, the assassin got a 20-year sentence instead of death because he was only nineteen and legally not of age. He died of tuberculosis in an Austrian prison in 1918.

reducing her size." Serbia was to be eliminated "as a political factor in the Balkans."

The Kaiser Strongly Advised Austria to Take Stern Action Against Serbia

The Kaiser was presented personally with these documents on July 5, and he replied verbally to the Austrian envoy, Hoyos, that Austria should act peremptorily against Serbia, with the assurance of full German support. A statement by the German Chancellor, and a subsequent autograph reply from the Kaiser to the Emperor confirmed the German attitude, which amounted at the outset to a complete mandate.

Berchtold Out to Pick up Quarrel with Serbia

On July 7, an Austria-Hungarian Crown Council met and recommended that an ultimatum, in terms which the Serbian government could not possibly accept, should be sent to Belgrade, after which Austria-Hungary should declare a punitive war on Serbia and dispose finally of an intolerable situation. The Hungarian premier, Tisza, however, protested that the complicity of the Serbian government was not yet proved and that the proposal, if executed, would provoke a world war. But Berchtold persisted in his course, although an Austrian official sent to Serajivo to investigate the crime reported that "there was nothing to prove or even cause suspicion of the Serbian government's cognizance of the steps leading to the Crime." Berchtold concealed this report. At a second Council on July 19 the text of the note to Serbia was drafted, and Tisza reluctantly agreed on condition that Austria-Hungary disclaimed annexation, but Berchtold insisted that Serbia must be reduced in size and completely humbled.

The Ultimatum

On July 23, the ultimatum was presented to the Serbian government with a time-limit of forty-eight hours, within which it was required to return an unqualified acceptance. It declined that the assassination was planned in Belgrade, and required the immediate publication in the Serbian official journal of a declaration that the Serbian government condemned all attempts on the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, and would punish with the utmost

severity anyone guilty of such attempts. It required the immediate suppression of the "Narodna Odbrana" (the Pan-Serb Societies), the removal of all officials guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary "whose names and deeds the Austria-Hungarian government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the (Serbian) government". It required the Serbian government "to accept the collaboration in Serbia of the representatives of the Austria-Hungarian government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy", and "to take judicial proceedings against the accessories to the plot of June 28 who are on Serbian territory ; delegates of the Austria-Hungarian government will take part in the investigation relating thereto."

The Austria-Hungarian ultimatum was categorical in its demands, relentlessly harsh in tone, and peremptory in its time-limit ; while it constituted a definite attack on Serbian sovereignty. When it was submitted to Grey on July 24, he said that it was "harsher in tone and more humiliating in its terms than any communication of which we had recollection addressed by one independent government to another". As early as July 18 the Councillor of the German embassy at Vienna reported to Herr von Jagow : "Hoyos has just told me that the Austrian demands are such that no State possessing the smallest amount of national pride or dignity could possibly accept them."

Attitude of Other Powers

Russia was determined to protect Serbia from utter humiliation, but adopted a moderating attitude. Sazonoff requested an extension of the time-limit for the Serbian reply, and on July 24 recommended the Serbian government to accept the Austrian demands, save those concerning the sovereign rights of Serbia. Sir Edward Grey similarly sought an extension of the time-limit. He declared that so long as the crisis was confined to Austria and Serbia, Britain was not concerned ; but that, in view of the stiffness of the Austrian ultimatum and its conditions, Russian intervention in protection of Serbia was to be feared ; he therefore invited the prompt mediation of the four Powers not immediately interested. At the same time they urged the Serbian government to guarantee to Austria the utmost possible satisfaction. In Germany it was thought that the crisis could be

localized, and that, with German support, Austria could achieve her aim, as in 1909, without fear of Russia.

Serbia's Reply to the Ultimatum

On the evening of July 25, Pasitch handed the Serbian reply to Baron Giesl, the Austrian Minister at Belgrade. It accepted nearly all the Austrian demands, even the collaboration of Austrian officials on Serbian territory, "so far as it agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure and with good neighbourly relations ; but it refused to allow the participation of Austria-Hungarian agents in Serbian judicial proceedings, "as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure". Finally, it offered to refer the whole question "either to the International Tribunal of the Hague or to the Great Powers who took part in the drawing up of the declaration by the Serbian government on March 31, 1909". Acting under precise instructions, Giesl read the reply, declared it unsatisfactory, broke off diplomatic relations, and left Belgrade within half an hour. The Austrian government neither expected nor desired the integral acceptance of its terms, upon which it insisted. Berchtold's watchword was : "Sadelenda" (Serbia must be wiped out). That afternoon both Powers mobilised.

Grey Repeated his Proposal of Mediation by the Four Powers

The despatch of the ultimatum to Serbia had been postponed for several days until President Poincare who was on a visit to the Czar, had departed from the Russian capital. When he read the news, Saranoff, who was convinced that Austria sought a pretext to attack Serbia proposed direct negotiation with Vienna, and he sought from Grey a definite, similar to that which the French representative had made that Britain would support Russia if general war ensued. But the British government temprised, and Grey refused to give such an unqualified assurance.

On July 26, Grey earnestly repeated his proposal of mediation by the four less interested Powers, and Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, urged upon his government its acceptance. "Every one is convinced", he wrote, "that the key is in Berlin". Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed the British proposal to Vienna, adding apologetically that "he cannot reject the role of mediator and must lay before the Vienna Cabinet the English proposal". The other two Powers (France and Russia) accepted immediately, but Austria declined to negotiate either with the four Powers or with Russia.

Austria declares war on Serbia

At 11 a.m. on July 28 Austria sent her declaration of war by Telegram to Serbia, which further strained the situation. On that morning the text of the Serbian reply was laid before the Kaiser, who had just returned from his holiday cruise. He was astonished at Serbian moderation and commented : "A brilliant result for a truce of only 48 hours". This is more than one could expect. A great moral victory for Vienna, but it thereby removes any cause for war, and Giesl might have remained quietly at Belgrade. I should never have ordered mobilisation after that". He wrote in the same strain to Jagow, but he added that Austria should be supported in taking moderate military measures against Serbia, of occupying Belgrade, once the mobilisation had taken place, to ensure the fulfilment of satisfaction by Serbia.

Austria had partially mobilised on July 25 ; Serbia had immediately done the same and Russia had shown her vital interest in the question by mobilising the units of her southern area—at least—on July 29, after Austria had declared war on Serbia. General Conrad now informed Berchtold, who sent the news to Berlin, that the Austrian army would not be prepared to begin a campaign against Serbia before August 12. On July 28, after the Austrian declaration of war Bethmann had sent a mild warning to Vienna not to turn public opinion against Austria by hasty aggressive action. But, as Brandenburg says : "There was no word in this advice of showing an accommodating spirit in the matter itself, and thus the whole step wore an air of feebleness and vacillation".

July 29, 1914—A Day Notable for Grave Events and Decisions

July 29 was a day notable in the history of Europe for grave events and decisions. On that morning Grey summoned Lichnowsky and through him [invited the German government to suggest any alternative plan of mediation between Austria and Russia if the British proposal of mediation by the four Great Powers was not acceptable. If the German government would secure that Austria, after occupying Belgrade, should advance no further, pending mediation, which should aim at obtaining for her complete satisfaction, he would undertake similarly to restrain Russia. He would agree that Serbia be chastised, provided that Russia was not humiliated. But he ended with a grave warning to Germany : "If

Germany became involved, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests, and I did not wish him (Lichnowsky) to be misled the friendly tone of our conversation into thinking that we should stand aside.....If the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid”.

When the Kaiser read the German Ambassador's grave report, he made his hysterical comment : “The greatest and most unheard of piece of English pharisaism (self-righteousness ; hypocrisy) that I have ever seen ! A regular English idea !.....Actually what Grey says amounts to a threat mingled with ‘bluff’ in order to separate us from Austria, delay our mobilisation, and place on us the quilt of war Mean hound”.

Grey himself by this time feared that attempts on mediation were almost futile. He writes : “There were forces other than Bethmann-Hollweg in the seat of authority in Germany. He was not the master of the situation ; in negotiating with him we were not negotiating with a principal. Yet he was the only authority with whom we could negotiate at all”.

On the evening of July 29, before Lichnowsky's despatch was delivered, a Crown Council was held in Berlin, after which the Chancellor made a diplomatic offer to Britain through the British Ambassador : “If British neutrality were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that Germany aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France. When questioned about the French colonies, he said that he could not give a similar undertaking. It depended on the action of France what operations Germany would be forced to undertake in Belgium ; but when war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. His object had always been to bring about an understanding with England”. Bethmann's statement with regard to Belgium was a deliberate falsehood, for the German ultimatum to Belgium was already in the hands of the German minister at Brussels for delivery on instructions. But in any case Grey indignantly repulsed the offer.

Late on the same evening of July 29, after the Council, came news from St. Petersburg of the Russian mobilisation, avowedly at that stage only of the southern army corps. It was accompanied by

an anxious warning from Pourtales, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, of the heat of Russian feeling against Austria. The telegram was brought by Jagow to the Chancellor, who was in bed. Bethmann's fears arose again, and he immediately re-drafted in a sharpened form the telegram which Jagow had prepared for despatch to Vienna. It ran: "he cannot expect Austria to negotiate with Serbia, since she is at war. But to refuse to exchange views with St. Petersburg would be a grave mistake. We are quite ready to fulfil our duties as allies, but we must decline to allow ourselves to be drawn lightly into world conflagration by Vienna, without consideration of our advice. Please express yourself to Ct. Berchtold with the utmost vigour and earnestness". "This admonition" writes Brandenburg, was sent off on the night of July 29-30. But it arrived too late. Had such language been used in Vienna at the outset more might have been achieved. Even now the decisive word was not spoken *viz.*, that the terms of the alliance were not considered operative if Austria by rejecting intervention, appeared to be aggressor".

Under this German pressure the Austrian government made a show of compromise. Berchtold announced that his government was willing to enter into conversation with St. Petersburg and eventually to accept the mediation of the Four Powers, on condition that military operation against Serbia—which had not yet begun—should not be interrupted, that Russia should immediately demobilise, and that the Austrian demands upon Serbia should be accepted integrally. At the same time members of the Austrian Embassy at London openly discussed the plan of partitioning Serbia. It is little wonder that Bethmann accused the Austrian government of duplicity. Berchtold and his colleagues were determined on a final reckoning with Serbia, and the conditions which they attached to their acceptance of mediation were intentionally impossible.

When on July 30, Lichnowsky brought to Grey the simple intimation that Austria had resumed conversations with Russia, the British Minister grasped the fleeting hope that an eleventh hour intervention might still prevent war. The next morning Grey repeated to the German Ambassador his proposal of mediation, his declaration that "if Russia and France would not accept it, the Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences", and his solemn warning as to the consequences if Germany refused to co-operate with Britain for the maintenance of peace. But "zero" hour

as company officers called it during the war—had already been reached, and the four Great Continental Powers were preparing irrevocably for war.

Germany Declares War on Russia

On July 29 after the Austria declaration of war against Serbia the Czar signed an order to begin military preparations. He was persuaded by the Chief of Staff, Sukhornlinoff, to order a General Mobilisation ; but early in the afternoon he received from the Kaiser a telegraphic appeal to maintain peace. This message, in fact, crossed a similar request from the Czar to the Kaiser. In the afternoon Sazonoff informed the Austria-Hungarian Ambassador that an order had been signed that day for "a fairly wide mobilisation". But, in view of the Kaiser's personal appeal, the Czar later in the day ordered that the mobilisation be restricted to the southern area on the Hungarian border. In the evening another telegraphic exchange took place between the two Emperors. The Czar's reply at 8-20 p.m. thanked the Kaiser for his conciliatory tone, which, he said was inconsistent with that of the German Ambassador ; and concluded : "It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Conference. Trust in your wisdom and friendship" Sazonoff's phrase, "a fairly wide mobilisation", was obviously equivocal ; and the General Staff actually proceeded with a General Mobilisation. On the following day news was received of the Austrian bombardment of Belgrade, and at Sazonoff's request the Czar then ordered a General Mobilisation, which was publicly proclaimed the next day. A Russian secret army order of 1912, which was known to Germany, expressly stated that the order to mobilise was equivalent to a declaration of a state of war. This order had been subsequently cancelled, but the proclamation of July 30, in the circumstances, was met by an immediate order for general mobilisation in Germany and Austria-Hungary. On the afternoon of July 31, a German ultimatum demanded that Russia should cease general mobilisation within twelve hours. This was refused, and on August 1 Germany declared war on Russia. There is room for much debate whether Germany might not have contented herself with a general mobilisation without despatching the critical ultimatum. On the other hand, there is no doubt that a Russian general mobilisation had proceeded uninterrupted since the afternoon of the 29th, unknown to the Czar, and that such a step might be regarded by Germany as an implicit declaration of war.

Attitude of France

During this tremendous crisis the French government had kept in the background. It declared itself convinced that "if the British government announced that England would come to the aid of France, there would be no war". But, after a Cabinet meeting on July 31, Grey announced that the British Government "could not give any pledge at the present time". On the same day Grey telegraphed to the French and German governments enquiring if, in the event of war, they would respect the neutrality of Belgium, and to the Belgian government stating that he assumed that it would defend its neutrality. The French and Belgian governments at once replied affirmatively; but the German Chancellor declined an assurance which might adversely affect German war plans. Grey then warned the German Ambassador that the Chancellor's reply was regrettable and would affect public opinion of Britain. She also refused to state any conditions, beside those already announced, under which Britain would remain neutral in the event of war with France.

Meanwhile France maintained an attitude of studious detachment. The French government on July, 30 withdrew its troops ten km. from the German frontier, and though the next day it ordered a general mobilisation, it replied to several German acts of provocation only by firm protests. On that day the German Ambassador to Paris, Baron Schon, enquired whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, and required an answer within eighteen hours. On the next day the French Prime Minister, Viviani, replied that "France would do that which her interest dictated.". On August 2, the British government informed France that in the event of a Franco-German War, Britain would defend the north and west coasts of France, but could not bind itself to declare war on Germany. The British fleet had been prepared for action since July 27. On August 3, the army was mobilised, and on that day Grey announced the British attitude in the House of Commons. News had first arrived of the delivery of a German ultimatum, demanding facilities for the passage of her army through Belgium. "If true", declared Grey, "and if she accepted, her independence would be gone, whatever might be offered in return. If France is beaten, if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, consider what would be at stake from the point of view of British interests".

Germany Declares War on France

On August 3, at 6-45 p.m. the German Ambassador delivered to the French premier a declaration of war. The next morning the news arrived that a German army had entered Belgium.

British Ultimatum to Germany

The British Government despatched an ultimatum to Germany, which elapsed unanswered at midnight August 4-5, Central European time, (11 p.m. Greenwich). In a despatch (British Blue Book No. 1 No. 160) Sir Edward Goschen describes the presentation of the British ultimatum, and the two interviews which ensued. "In a short conversation (at about 7 p.m.) Hervon Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancallor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then through Great Britain to get closer to France..... I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue which lasted for about 20 minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree ; just for a word—neutrality" a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I know, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable, it was like striking a man man from behind while he was fighting for his life again two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen".

The Official 'Apologia' of the German Government

On August 4 the Reichstag met, and the Kaiser delivered a hollow, rhetorical message, declaiming about German faith and honour and the malavolent conspiracy of their foes. But in one of his marginal notes on that day he wrote more sincerely : "Our allies are falling from us on the eve of war like rotten apples ; total collapse of German and Austrian diplomacy. That might and ought to have been averted."

At about 2 p.m. the Chancellor addressed the Reichstag. He repeated many of his master's banalties, and then proceeded to what

must be regarded as the official 'apologia' of the German government. "We demanded that Russia should demobilise as the last chance of preserving peace. France had refused to promise neutrality, and had crossed the frontier before war was declared. (This was a deliberate mis-statement of fact ; for German troops had several times violated French territory during the forty-eight hours before Germany declared war. French troops had been withdrawn ten km. from the frontier, and the French government had merely despatched restrained protests against the acts of violation. On the other hand, the German Ambassador at Paris had sent orders to demand the evacuation of the key-fortresses of Toulam and Verdun if the French government accepted the humiliating demand to remain neutral during a Russo-German war ensuing on a German ultimatum). Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory. That is a breach of international law. It is true that the French government declared at Brussels that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait ; we could not. A French attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the governments of Belgium and Luxemburg. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. He who is menaced as we are, and is fighting for his highest possession, can only consider how he is to back his way through. I repeat the Emperor's words. "We enter the struggle with a clear conscience'.

The Outbreak of the First World War

On August 5, Austria Hungary declared war on Russia and a week later Britain and France declared on Austria-Hungary. Thus began the First World War—the greatest convulsion that had shaken the world since the French Revolution.

Question of the Immediate Responsibility for the Outbreak of the War

There is much in the sequence of events as narrated above, that is still the subject of controversy. Had Russia the right to interfere (Sazonoff, her foreign minister, had made it perfectly clear that she

would not allow Serbia to be crushed) just because her predominance in the Balkans might be forfeited to the Central Powers ? But assuming that she had no legal or moral right to meddle, were the Central Powers justified in acting in a way which they knew would involve her and bring on war ? Did Germany's subsequent efforts to hold Austria back impress the latter as sincere ? It is evident that a sudden fear that Britain might side with their rivals, coupled with the fear of being looked upon as the aggressor, moved Germany to back-step ; and even Bechtold finally deigned to parley a little with Russia. But by this time the Russian general mobilisation had brought the military party at Berlin into the ascendant. Again did the Russian mobilisation (at first only a partial mobilization and employed as a club on Austria) make war inevitable, or did the German ultimatum of July 31, demanding demobilisation within twelve hours, force the conflict ? The Russian order for general mobilisation, on July 30, though no doubt a tactical blunder from the standpoint of keeping the peace, was necessitated by the fact that anything less was inadequate for the national defence. "In order to counteract its effect, the Czar telegraphed William, promising on his word of honour not to move a man across the frontier as long as negotiations with Austria continued. It was Germany who finally took the formal step of declaring War on August 1."

The Origins of the First World War

A. Immediate Origins of the War

(i) Austro-Serbian Feud Based on Austrian Dynasticism and Serbian Irredentism

The immediate origins of the War are to be found in the firm conviction of the political aristocrats of Austria-Hungary that the Serbs, abetted by the political aristocrats of Russia, were unanimously bent upon the disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire in order to achieve the political integration of the clove in fragments of their own race. The Serbian aspiration was quite natural—Serbia imagined herself a second Sardinia whose mission was to unite the South Slav peoples. Equally comprehensible was the determination of Austria-Hungarian leaders to preserve the identity of their State which had persisted in much the same form since 1520, (when Charles V was chosen holy Roman emperor), retaining the still more ancient tradition of the 'Austrian Mark' as a bulwark of European civilization. In short, Austria-Hungary, though an obsolete State, had to fight for her life against Serbian irredentism.

If Jugoslav (same as Yugoslav one of the southern groups of Slavs consisting of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) propaganda was an expression of the primal instinct of the tribe, as natural as the swarming of bees ; there was an historical argument for the maintenance of that artificial aggregation of peoples—Tutons, Magyars, Slavs, Romans and Italians—constituting the Austria-Hungarian Empire, an argument which has been more clearly apprehended since the War through fear of "the Balkanisation of Europe". But Austria-Hungary was destined to destruction for much the same reason as the ancient Roman Empire, of which, in

form it was an emasculated survival, *viz.*, the lack of an internal principle of genuine political cohesion.

It was thought almost universally that the death of Francis Joseph, who had taken the reins in the midst of one great revolution in 1848, would sound the tocsin of a still greater revolution in which the Hapsburg Empire would collapse. That the Southern Slavs had striven actively during the previous ten years to propagate this belief, which was the necessary antecedent of the Greater Serbia idea is undeniable. From that premise—*viz.*, the assertion of the right of national self-determination—developed the situation which resolved itself in the Great War.

(ii) Russia was Inevitably Concerned in the Relations between Austria and her Southern Neighbours

Russia was bound to the Balkans by racial affinity, by geographical configuration, by the Byzantine tradition expressed in her religion, by the historic trend of her expansion, and by the attractive power of the acquisitive State, which is prone to hypertrophy. The Serbs were the race most closely akin to her own. Their political aspirations, moreover, made them the most obvious buffer against Austrian ambitions in the Balkans.

Since the arrogant diplomatic triumph of Aehrenthal in 1909 Russia had to choose between an uncompromising support of Serbian policy and the final defeat of her imperial ambitions maintained for three centuries. The War with Japan had brought home to her the fact that she had to choose between becoming an Asiatic and remaining a European Power. The settlement with Britain had closed the Middle East to her. The Baltic had become a Teutonic lake. Her only adequate means of access to the open waters of the world lay in the control of Constantinople and the Straits, and to this end her whole policy was bent. Her dearest aim and her deepest pride as a great imperial power were therefore committed to the unequivocal support of Serbia, whose independence meant as much to her as the independence of Belgium meant to Britain.

(iii) In Serajevo Crisis Germany has to Stand by Austria-Hungary as Irrevocably as Russia by Serbia

Germany had created the "Mittel Europa" (Middle Europe) block in 1879 in order to protect her flank against an encircling

coalition. But Bismarck's plan had not achieved its object for there was always the danger that Russia would out flank the Central group on the extreme south. The admission of Italy to the Central Alliance in 1882 had not really strengthened it. It has been said that Italy must always be the enemy or the ally of Austria. It would have been more correct to say that Italy became the ally of Austria in order more safely to await the moment when she could become her enemy. The Franco-Italian enmity created largely by Bismarck in 1881 was an unstable artifice upon which to build a policy. Similarly, the secret Re-insurance Treaty with Russia was a piece of diplomatic sleight-of-hand (jugglery).

In the national competition of Europe, Russia and France were bound by the Triple Alliance of 1882 to gravitate towards each other. Bismarck's confessed dread of the "night mare of coalitions" was an implicit admission that, as a consequence of his Central European 'bloc', a Franco-Russian Alliance—to use his own expression made in another connection "lay in the logic of history". In order to prevent it he adopted three special measures: (i) He deflected French ambition from Europe, and in doing so formented enmity between France and Britain. At the same time he resolutely refrained from colonial dreams himself. (ii) He insisted upon preserving the friendship of Britain by non-interference with her naval and colonial policy, and by discouraging her from all Continental interests except a German alliance, which would finally have consolidated his opportunist diplomacy. (iii) He maintained the character of the Central Alliance as a defensive coalition under German control, and was determined that it should never be employed for any purpose except that for which it had been established. These achievements of Bismarck were indicative of the sanity of his judgment and the restraint of his statesmanship. He accepted the rules of the game and applied them with masterly skill.

The great fault of his successors was their incapacity to continue his practice. They entered the colonial field¹ and instead of seeking a self-contained colonial empire in one part of the world, had challenged France in Morocco, had irritated Britain in Africa and the Pacific, had attempted to exploit Asia Minor, and thus had earned

1. Bismarck, it is important to remember, had carried his 'coup' of 1884 against his own judgment.

the suspicion and finally the enmity of Russia in the Middle East and the Balkans, through which the route to Anatolia and Mesopotamia lay. At the same time they had challenged the naval policy of Britain and had forced upon her a disquieting consciousness of her diplomatic isolation, which had finally forced her into the Entente camp in order to preserve the balance of Europe. The consequence of the crisis of Algeciras, Bosnia and Agadir was that the successors of Bismarck had accumulated all the penalties of Bismarckian diplomacy and had lost all its prizes. Before 1914 Germany stood diplomatically isolated, except for the Austrian alliance, and even in that alliance the initiative had passed to the gamblers who ruled in Vienna. In the Serajevo crisis Germany had to stand by Austria-Hungary as irrevocably as Russia by Serbia. The alternative would have been the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Empire and the exposure of Germany to dangers for greater than during the Seven Year's War,² since she could not reckon on the support or even the benevolent neutrality of Britain, who now moved in the orbit of the Dual Alliance.

(iv) Desire of France to Fish in Troubled Waters

France was definitely bound by the Dual Alliance, which she had so strenuously sought and could not afford in the last resort to sacrifice; though her own interests in the Balkans were as negligible as those of Britain. But she had not the same interest as Britain in preserving peace; for the French government hoped that it could rely ultimately upon the support of Britain in a war, which, if successful, would not only win back her lost provinces, but also destroy the military predominance of Germany.

(v) Britain was Actuated to enter the War Both with Selfish and Altruistic Aims

Britain had nothing to gain, but much to lose by a world war. At the outset she had no sympathy with Serbia, and was willing that she should be humiliated by Austria-Hungary, if the effect of this action could be localised. She employed her influence to restrain Russia; and Sir Edward Grey undertook that his government would

2. In the Seven Years' War, which began in 1756 Germany had Austria in front of her, Russia on one flank, France on the other, and even (for a time) Sweden on the rear

stand aside if Germany similarly restrained Austria. The German attitude towards Belgium, however, aroused in the British government a livelier sympathy with the Russian attitude towards Serbia. The reckless aggression of Austria and the unqualified support of her action by Germany convinced the Liberal government that "in a war in which England took no part, Germany would be victorious and would become master of Europe", and that "they would be forced, if the war could not be prevented, to take sides with France and Russia ; otherwise they would be faced by the very situation, to escape which the 'Entente' had been founded" (Brandenburg). Consequently, as Gooch says, "Sir Edward's assurance on August 3, that our hands were free was correct in form but inaccurate in substance, and his whole speech breathed the conviction that we should be disgraced if we left France in the lurch. Lloyd George was later to describe the relationship as an obligation of honour". Gooch might have added that by her action Britain served her material interest as much as her honour.

B. Behind These More Immediate Origins of the Conflict Lay Conditions which Progressively Made it Inevitable

In view of our previous observation of the form and aims of the sovereign States among which Europe was divided during the second half of the nineteenth century, we can state succinctly the general conditions, on account of which the relations of these States inevitably resolved themselves in war : (i) There had been—there is—no integrating principle capable of uniting the various racial, linguistic and geographically defined groups. The ancient Roman Empire embodied the exploitation of various tribes by a dominant tribe. The Holy Roman Empire was merely a name which won the lip-service of a number of conflicting political groups. The Concert of Europe, since the Congress of Vienna, amounted to a conspiracy of the jealous Greater Powers, who refused to consider lesser States and peoples as ends in themselves. This international anarchy expressed the impossibility of establishing a supranational sanction, which, even after the World War was not sought. The Hague Conferences and Tribunal proved as futile as the Holy Roman Empire. The League of Nations rested upon an antinomy (a conflict of authority). (We shall not talk about the U.N. as it is beyond our scope of study). There is, infact, no natural ground for a belief than an artificial institution with a supranational sanction can eliminate the instinct of selective competition exhibited in the natural world.

(ii) The fundamental condition which conduces to international wars is national selfishness, or patriotism. It exhibits itself as an intense development of the self-preservation, in the form of military—or naval “preparedness”, of material and especially territorial acquisitiveness, and of an aggressive sensitiveness on questions of national prestige, *i.e.*, prejudice. By the end of the nineteenth century national patriotism had become a menace to human welfare.

(iii) No conception of international justice prevailed in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. The mutual relations of the States were determined by certain universally accepted considerations : that the sovereign State exists for the competitive increase of its wealth and power ; that between States there was no justice, but only the shifting balance of interests.

No single State was responsible for this condition ; no single State was exempt from the responsibility.

(iv) The relative value of each State by the end of the nineteenth century was reckoned by the cumulative combatant capacity, as is indicated by the terms Greater and Lesser “Powers”. This growth of militarism was, in fact, on the paths leading to the war.

(v) The World War was largely conditioned by the imperfect form of the sovereign authority in most of the contending States—the exceptions being Britain and France. The governing body in most of the States inadequately represented the wishes and opinions of the majority of their population. The relations between the nations were regulated by cliques far removed from the dispassionate judgment and best wishes of the peoples for whom they acted, and these relations were maintained by the baleful methods of secret diplomacy. It is scarcely speculative to assert that, if the actions of the governments of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany in 1914 had been regulated by the dispassionately informed opinion of the great majority of their respective populations such a war would not have ensued.

Apportionment of Responsibility Among the European Governments for the War

Brandenburg in his “From Bismarck to the World War” has dispassionately treated this subject. One cannot do better than quote him in extenso in this connection.

German policy in the years preceding the War has earned many and heavy reproaches. It can justly be accused of shortsightedness, lack of method, want of forethought and of understanding of the psychology of other peoples ; We can blame Germany's vacillation and her sudden recklessness, as in the Moroccan question, for instance. But no one can maintain with any show of reason that at any given time she either wished for war or strove to bring it about.³ Had Germany really wanted war, no more favourable time could have been found than during and after the Russo-Japanese War. Russia was then incapable of action, France and England inadequately equipped, and the Entente only recently founded. Had Germany wanted a preventive war all the chances were in her favour then and until 1909. The General Staff, as is duty bound, had called attention to that fact. But this possibility was never seriously entertained by the German government, and even in 1909, when Austria was considering our invasion of Serbia, it worked consistently for peace. Perhaps it would have been wiser to attack boldly then, but that was not done because of the desire not to break the peace unless compelled.

As regards England, no one there really wanted war. The view so widely held that Britain engineered the war in order to destroy German economic competition, which was becoming increasingly dangerous to her, has little justification.⁴ But Britain did fear Germany's growing political and military power ; she felt her own supremacy and security threatened by the growth of German battle fleet, and she credited Germany with the intention of seizing the hegemony of the Continent of Europe. In order to secure herself against such possibilities and to prevent Germany from occupying permanently the position of arbiter, the Entente was founded when the alliance with Germany failed. British statesmen intended it to be a means of maintaining the balance of power and of keeping Germany's might and ambition within due bounds ; there is no indication that it was originally intended as an instrument of war. But as Britain was convinced that in a war in which she took no

3. Germany did not plot a European War, did not want one, and made genuine, though belated efforts to avert one."

4. Hayes and Moon have opined that "another cause of war was the nineteenth century revival of the old mercantilist idea that the government of a nation ought to protect and promote the economic interest of its own citizens in dealing with those of other countries."

part Germany would be victorious and become master of Europe, she was forced, if the war could not be prevented, to take sides with France and Russia; otherwise she would be faced by the very situation to escape which the Entente had been founded.⁵ So it was that Britain too was ultimately dependent on the decision of her allies, without wishing it, and without clearly realising it.

With France and Russia the case was different. The great body of the people even in these two countries was desirous of peace. In the ruling circles, both in Paris and St. Petersburg, there were two parties; the one wanted peace if it could be maintained consistently with honour, the other wanted war. In France the latter combined with those who cherished the idea of *revanche*, which had never died out. Poincare and Delcasse were its great protagonists. Since the brush with Germany in Morocco and the founding of the Entente, this party had greatly straightened its influence; and finally, with Poincare as leader it had assumed the real management of affairs. In Russia the Czar was the head of the peace party; for a long time the war party was without any real leader. Wide military circles and all those who favoured Pan-Slav ideas supported the war party at St. Petersburg. Izvolski, after his personal reserve in the Bosnian crisis, they found a zealous champion. As Ambassador in Paris, this vain and vengeful man fell wholly under the sway of Delcasse and Poincare group and rendered it the greatest service by his personal influence. His despatches from Paris show clearly to any one who is not blinded by prejudice, by what cautious and subtle methods Izvolski, in conjunction with Poincare, prepared for the war.⁶ He knew how to get rid of refractory elements like George Louis, the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, how to bribe the press and make use of it, and how to exploit the insatiable vanity of Poincare. It is really difficult to say which of the two led and which followed. There is no doubt as to their close co-operation. Izvolski could not repeat too often what good luck it was that Poincare, and not some other less reliable and less skilful politician, stood at the head of France.

"So far as guilt can be brought home to individual personalities in the world war, these two stand convicted. For long years they had prepared the soil by persistent and deliberate effort, always

5. See p. 234, *supra*.

6. Izvolski said in 1914: "C'est ma Gherro" (It is my war).

careful not to let that real aims appear, but to wait for the time when the armaments were completed and when one of the opposing Powers, through some indiscretion, offered the possibility of being made to appear the aggressor ; for that was necessary not only to win over the opinion of the masses in both countries, but also out of consideration for England, with her cautious Government and, peace-loving people. But the aims which these groups pursued could not be achieved without war. The French wished to recover Alsace-Lorraine from the Germans ; the Russians wished to open the way to the Straits and to the control of the Balkans, and they wished to free the Slavs from the German, Austrian and Turkish domination under which they had hitherto lived, and to absorb them within their own sphere of influence.

“The clever and unscrupulous tunnelling operations of these comparatively small groups prepared the way for the World War. Their leaders were not daunted by the hideous consequences of such a struggle of the nations, for without it they could not reach their goal. They were already waiting their opportunity during the Balkan Wars, and in July 1914, they seized it gladly. The Russian mobilisation, which was the immediate cause of the war, was their work.”

Fay (“Origins of the World War”) on the other hand, is of the opinion that “Austria was more responsible for the immediate origin of the War than any other Power. Since 1904 the Austrian government had become convinced that Germany would inevitably be compelled to support Austria in a policy of adventure in the Balkans. So Austria dragged Germany into an avoidable War in 1914.

Concluding Comments on the Responsibility for the War

Under Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was forced to accept the entire legal and moral responsibility for causing the war—a ridiculous provision since a forced acceptance of any idea can have no weight whatever. The verdict of the victors was the outcome of years of propaganda and hatred.

In the decades following the war, authorities with new materials and a calmer perspective, gradually revised this extreme emotional judgment. It became clear that all the nations had contributed to the conditions that made the war, and that, given these conditions

the conduct of the different statesmen in the crisis of July 1914 could not be condemned or praised on a "black-white" basis. — All the important statesmen made what in the light of later developments we feel justified in calling "mistakes", all of them lived in the atmosphere of Machiavellian statecraft, in which the moral judgments are unrealistic.

"Different historians will appraise differently the various psychological and material forces that led to the catastrophe, but they will not return to the simple view popular on both sides during the war that all the right was on one side and all the wrong on the other."

20

Years of the War

A German army attacked Liege on August 5, 1914, and by August 23 had reduced Namur, the last fortress which blocked its advance through Belgium. Despite the opposition of the British Expeditionary Force at Mons, the German invasion rolled on until on September 5, it had reached the Marne, when it was checked partly by the concentration of French troops on a shortened line, partly by the resistance of Antwerp until October 10, and partly by a hurried invasion of North Prussia by a Russian army. This vast, but ill-prepared Russian army, under Samsonoff, was annihilated by Hindenburg on August 27 at Tannenberg, one of the most important battles of the war.

Japan and Turkey Enter the War

Meanwhile other Russian armies flooded the Galician plain, gaining the outskirts of Cracow and the line of the Vistula ; whilst the Serbian army repulsed the Austrians from their territory. In the middle of August, 1914, Japan, in terms of her alliance with Britain demanded the surrender of Kaio-Chau and the withdrawal of German warships from the East. Upon the refusal of her ultimatum, she proceeded to the reduction of the fortress in partial co-operation of the Allied Powers. On the other hand, Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. On August 1 she had signed a secret treaty with Germany, according to which she would support Germany if the latter were at war with Russia. The refusal of the British government on August 3 to hand over two battleships just completed for the Turkish navy, inflamed the whole Turkish people ; and the escape of the cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" from

the Mediterranean to Constantinople, and their attack, alone with Turkish ships, on Russian transports and ports on October 29-30, led to a declaration of war by Russia on Turkey on October 31 and by Russia's allies shortly after.

In November the British Ambassador at Petrograd informed Sazonoff that the Allies would consent to a Russian occupation of Constantinople and the Straits, and early in 1915 Sazonoff officially set forth the Russian demands, which were accepted on certain conditions by Britain and France. In order immediately to realize this project, which if successful, would have a critical influence on the success of the Allies' strategy, the question of forcing the Straits was discussed by their Governments and Staffs. After heated controversy it was decided on February 16, to despatch the 29th Division from India. On 19th the defences at the entrance of the Straits were unsuccessfully bombarded. There followed a lamentable delay of 65 days until, on April 25, Sir Ian Hamilton landed a British force on the rebenless wilderness of the Gallipoli Paninsula¹. It held its ground, containing a large Turkish force, but failed, despite later subsidiary landings, to gain a strategic success; and between December 18, 1915 and January 7, 1916, it was withdrawn. The heroism displayed by the contingent of British, French, some Indians, and the ever memorable Anzacs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps in the Gallipoli Peninsula has been worthily recorded by John Masefield, English poet laureate.

Italy's 'Sacred Egoism'

At the outset of the War Italy had declared her neutrality, on the ground that the 'casus foederis' (cause of intervention) of the Triple Alliance had not been established, and with Sonnino now in the Foreign Office the Government, in a most favourable position to discharge its trust of 'sacred egoism', proceeded at its leisure to bargain, on the one hand with the Central Powers concerning the territorial price of benevolent neutrality; and on the other, with the Allied Governments as to the price of active military support. Berchtold was utterly uncompromising, but this "most incompetent and shortsighted of Austrian Foreign Ministers" as Gooch describes him

1. Peninsula between Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea.

2. That is, April 25, 1915 so called because on this day Australian and New Zealand troops under Hamilton landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Anzac is coined from initials of Australian-New Zealand Army Corps.

was dismissed on January 13, 1915. His successor, Burian, was more accommodating to the Italians, but dilatory, and was appalled by the elastic Italian demands. Even the appointment of Bulow, a 'persona grate', as German Ambassador at Rome, and the efforts of Giolitti—an opportunist Italian statesman, whose policy was that of a total abstainer at, a price—failed to close the ears of the Italian Government to the honeyed phrases of Allied diplomatists. Severe Franco-British reverses on the Western Front during the early months of 1915 added fresh seduction to their siren song. The Coalition Government under Lloyd George came into office, and on April 28, 1915—three days after the Anzac Day² the Treaty of London was signed. The representatives of Britain, France and Russia came to terms with the land—mongers of Rome. In return for Italy's entry into the war against Austria-Hungary the Allies promised her the Trentino and southern Tyrol, Istria and the city of Trieste, and some of the Dalmatian islands in the Adriatic. If Turkey were partitioned, she was to have, in addition, Adalia in Asia minor; if Britain and France took Germany's African colonies, then Italy would gain colonial territories in Libya and Somaliland.³ Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary in May 1915.⁴ This was ~~not~~ Italy's "Sacred Egoism", Italy's jackal policy—always ready to attack from behind and to prize a part of the booty.

Entry of Bulgaria and Rumania in the War

Italy's decision came too late to relieve the pressure of the Austro-German offensive against Russia, and her contribution proved inadequate to turn Germany's flank on the Austro-Italian frontier. In any case the military gains of her accession were offset in October, 1915, by the entry of Bulgaria on the other side. In August, 1916, Rumania, too entered the fighting after bargaining with France and Russia to gain Transylvania the Bukovina, and the Banat. She proved as much of a liability as an asset, for in November she was overrun by the Germans and Austrians. Her valuable resources of wheat and oil fell into German hands, except for the oil wells hastily destroyed by British agents.

3. This shameful compact was to be kept secret and was defined to provide one of the steps of President Wilson's "initiation into Real politik" at Paris "Gentlemen we are in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law."

4. Italy did not declare war on Germany until August, 1916.

By the End of 1916 the War had Spread Over the Whole of the Balkans and Italy

A further Allied attempt to open up an important fighting front in the Balkans came to disaster. An Anglo-French expeditionary force was landed in Greece at Salonica in October, 1915, and although it stayed there for the rest of the war and tied up nearly a million troops, Serbia was overrun, and the Allies made no important headway. By the end of 1916 the war had spread over the whole of the Balkans and Italy. "The Central Powers in alliance formed a solid continental bloc stretching from Antwerp to Constantinople. The Allies, still however, held the peripheral ring, from the Channel ports eastward to Salonica, and the strangle-hold of the blockade was beginning to reduce the enemy's stamina".

The War at Sea

On the sea Britain maintained her traditional supremacy, despite isolated German successes, as when van Spee from Kaio-chau annihilated an inferior British squadron off Chile on November 1, 1914, only himself to be annihilated by superior British metal at the Falklands on December 8. Apart from two minor engagements off Heligoland in August, 1914 and January 1915, this supremacy above the water was not challenged until May 31, 1916, when the much discussed Battle of Jutland was fought.

The Battle of Jutland.—This extraordinary naval battle the only encounter during the whole war of the main fleet's of the two Powers, seemed to be a minor German success, but proved to be a major British victory. The British Grand Fleet, stationed at Scapa Flow and Rosyth, kept guard over the German High Seas Fleet, at anchor behind mine fields in German North Sea ports. Admirals, unlike Generals, refused to give battle unless they were certain of the initial advantage. The naval deadlock arose because the admirals on both sides waited for this initial advantage, which never came. The Germans relied upon mines, torpedoes, and minor naval actions to weaken the Britain fleet to a point where decisive action might be undertaken with some clear prospect of success. British strategy was guided by the doctrine of "the fleet in being"—that to maintain supremacy at sea was ever more important than defeating the German fleet in battle. Therefore, while no chances were to be lost of inflicting damage, no risks of large-scale defeat could be taken.

The Battle of Jutland was provoked by the German Admiral, von Scheer, under pressure of the tightening blockade, in an effort to destroy at least part of the Grand Fleet. Admiral Hipper was sent with a decoy force. The British Admiralty, enjoying the great advantage of knowing the German signal code since August, 1914, was able to order the Grand Fleet to sea in good time.

On the afternoon of May 31, 1916, a German scouting force of battle and light cruisers under Admiral Hipper made contact with Admiral Beatty's force of comparable strength. Things went badly for the British force, which lost two ships, but the engagement brought the two great fleets under Scheer and Jellicoe rushing to the scene. When after several hours of cautious maneuvering and occasional contacts night fell, the German ships, had inflicted heavier losses than they had suffered. Thereupon the German fleet under cover of a mist withdrew and 'returned' to the Kiel harbour. The German Fleet snatched a technical success, but since the British navy kept the mastery of the sea and the Jutland experiment was not repeated the advantage may be said to lie with Britain.

Naval Blockading of Germany and Submarine Blockade of Britain

The British naturally sought the fruits of naval supremacy by blockading Germany on November 3, 1914. This blockade transgressed the literal conditions of the Declaration of London, which Britain had reluctantly consented to ratify in 1914. Germany retaliated on February 4, 1915, with a submarine blockade of Britain, which increased in intensity with the rancours of war. British governments used the familiar plea that "necessity knows no law". The right of search for, and confiscation of, materials—such as copper and cotton which were declared by Britain contraband, exasperated America; but the indiscriminate extension of the submarine campaign by Germany served a terrible counter-irritant. The destruction without warning of the British liner *Lusitania* on May 7, 1915, and of other passenger ships carrying Americans during the next ten months, evoked a protest approximating to an ultimatum from the U.S.A. in March 1916.⁵ Then followed an abetment of the submarine campaign for ten months. During this time the British

5. President Woodrow Wilson warned Germany that any repetition of such an act would be treated as "deliberately unfriendly".

government on July 7 announced that "they must confine themselves simply to applying the historic and admitted rules of the Law of Nations."

An Attempt to Terminate Hostilities Proved Abortive

Such was the position at the end of two years of the most terrible war on record. Germany had revealed unparalleled military efficiency. She and her allies had established in war a great barrier across Eurasia from the North to Mesopotamia. Immediately after last impressive victory, over Rumania in December 1916, the Chancellor issued a tentative invitation to discuss terms of peace on a basis which represented a slight military superiority of the Central Powers. This was contumeliously rebuffed by the Allied governments. President Wilson now intervened, inviting both alliances to state terms which would make possible a just peace without victory. The U.S.A., he declared in a speech in the Senate on January 22, 1917, would join guaranteeing a peace based upon such foundation. The Allied governments replied with a joint declaration of their war aims, which included the complete reinstatement of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the free establishment of certain subject peoples, such as the Poles, Czechs and Romans. President Wilson regarded these terms as a possible starting-point of negotiations, and was pressing on the German government a similar definite statement, when the project collapsed.

American Declaration of War, April 6, 1917

The militarists of Germany forced the weak Chancellor to approve the resumption, as from February 1, 1917, of unrestricted submarine warfare. Negotiations were at once abandoned, and when on April 2, the U.S. government discovered a German plot to provoke Mexico to go to war with the U.S.A., President Wilson declared war against Germany.

The Background

For three years the U.S.A. kept herself aloof from the European war. President Wilson had shown extraordinary patience in face of great provocations. The reasons for the non-participation of the U.S.A. in the European conflict till 1917, in spite of provocation, are not far to seek. The reasons were : (a) The divided sentiments of the American people, of whom one-fifth were Germans ; (b) the

tradition since the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine (December 1823) to scrupulously avoid participation in European conflicts ; (c) extrangement between Washington and London in the early part of the war due to America's protest against the British blockade. In time of war conflicts between neutrals and belligerents often arise and Britain was accused of exceeding her naval rights in violating neutral rights. Britain, on the other hand, alleged that goods were entering enemy countries, under cover of neutral ships. It was the old quarrel. America also protested against the British blockade of Germany.

Entry of America into the War

But Anglo-American disputes paled before the friction caused by the German submarine warfare. Germany early in 1915, in reply to the British blockade of German coasts, announced a 'war zone' round the British Isles, within which enemy ships would be sunk. International law, however, required that warning should be given and lives of passengers and crews safeguarded. America protested against the establishment of the war zone, and gave warning to Germany that she would be called to account for any American ship sunk or life lost.

In spite of this, however, repeated incidents occurred during 1915. An American ship was sunk, American passengers in British ships were drowned, and in May the *Lusitania* was torpedoed. President Wilson dispatched a strong note denouncing the sinking of the ship as a violation of international law and of the rights of humanity and demanding reparation. Germany, however, replied that she had given warning by an advertisement in the American Newspapers, and that in any case the ship carried munitions of war. Still America was patient.

In 1916 there were further incidents. In March, an English ship, carrying among others seventy-five American passengers, was torpedoed without warning in the Channel. President Wilson immediately protested. Germany denied responsibility, but yielding to the American demands promised that no merchant vessel should be sunk without warning unless she attempted to escape or offered resistance. Then in January 1917, came the announcement of "unrestricted" submarine warfare that all ships, neutral or belligerent, found within the war zone would be sunk at sight. The U-boats (German

submarines (German untersee boats) began to sink all ships at sight. Neutral rights were annihilated.

Factors Which Brought the U.S.A. into the War

In addition to the submarine controversy was the fact that sentiment against Germany had long been growing in the United States as a result of propaganda and the sabotage activities of German agents. The economic interests of many American investors had become identified with the success of the Allied cause and a vague feeling had developed that a German success would threaten the security of the United States and its civilization.

At long last President Wilson in February 1917, broke off diplomatic relations between America and Germany, but he still hesitated to declare war. It was not until April 2, that he gave his famous message to congress, advising the United States to enter the war, "to make the world safe for democracy".

"We shall fight for the things we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for the universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations, and make the world at last free.....The day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness, and the peace which she has treasured."

"Not long before the American people had been incensed by the discovery of a projected alliance between Germany and Mexico, in which the former promised to aid the latter in regaining Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Japan was also to be asked to join this alliance."

On April 6, the United States declared war on Germany, and by the end of May "American warships in the East Atlantic began to affect the issue of the struggle against German submarines. In all spheres American preparations on a large scale went on. In August the land of liberty adopted compulsory military service—a step which few had ever believed possible in the United States—and she declared herself ready if necessary to raise ten million men. Inevitably, however, sometime must pass before any large company of

troops could be equipped, trained, and transported, and it was not until the end of May 1918 that her contingents began to appear in the front fighting-line. From that time her strength began increasingly to affect the situation, and by the date of the Armistice there was over two million American soldiers in Europe, mostly on the French front. Morally the effect of American intervention was hardly less valuable and it was more immediate. During the summer a large number of the republics of Central and South America followed the United States in declaring war upon Germany ; so did, China, Greece, and Siam, until the whole world seemed to be leagued against Teutonism. In short, the entry of the United States into the War, and the promise of increased resources that she brought, gave to the Allied cause the certainty of ultimate victory."

Collapse of Russian Autocracy

The entrance of the U.S.A. into the war almost synchronised with the collapse of the Russian autocracy, which was a prelude to the withdrawal of Russia from the war.

The Beginning of a Revolutionary Movement in Russia

No part of the world in the nineteenth century could long remain immune from outside influence. Even Nicholas I (1825—1855) began to construct railroads (greatest of all devices for the promotion of internal trade), and it was only a question of time when Russia would be linked by rail with the West. From the time of the French Revolution there were liberals even in Russia, and some of those at court nearly coaxed Alexander I (1801—25) into granting a constitution. This group had as their object a revolution from above. They hoped to get the Czars to grant reforms, such as a parliament and local self government, and whenever the press was free (which was not after), they strove to create a public opinion among the nobility favourable to these ideas.

Reform and Reaction under Alexander II (1855--81)

It was through the influence of the liberals with Alexander II that he decided to sanction the following internal reforms : (i) Emancipation of the Serfs (1861), (See part I, pp. 293-296). (ii) Local Administration Reforms—Zemstvos (1864). The administration of local governmental affairs was to be carried on by Zemstvos (assemblies) which were provided for in each Russian district and

province by a decree in 1864. Though under the control of the landlords and possessed of only limited jurisdiction in local matters (such as education, public hygiene, famine relief, etc.), the Zemstvo nevertheless represented a relaxation of the customarily rigid centralization. (iii) Judicial Reforms (1862). A decree in 1862 provided for a system of courts similar to those of the United States to displace the old system of secret and arbitrary courts. Provision was also made for trial by jury, public court proceedings, tenure of office for judges, and codification of the laws.

Reactionary Policy of Alexander II from 1865 to 1881

Alexander's ardour for reforms was considerably cooled by the Polish Insurrection (1863)—see Part I, pp. 296-97. Also, after ten years as Czar, Alexander felt capable of handling the Russian Liberals, and a policy of reaction was begun. The power of the Zemstvos was curtailed, a strict censorship of the press was instituted, and political offenders were exiled. The reactionary policy resulted in considerable opposition of the Czar.

The Rise of 'Nihilism' in Russia

It became evident that a more violent revolutionary movement was called for. Central intellectuals, gaining their inspiration from the extreme followers of Marx rather than from the French and English liberals, organized in Russia the movement known as 'Nihilism'.

According to the definition of a nihilist as given by Turgenev in his novel, "Fathers and sons" he (a nihilist) is a man, "who does not bow down before any authority, who does not take any principle on faith, whatever reverence that principle may be enshrined in". According to Stepniak, "The fundamental principle of nihilism was absolute individualism. It was the negation, in the name of individual liberty, of all the obligations imposed upon the individual by society, by family life, and by religion." Thus Nihilism was an extreme radical movement of the persons bitterly disgusted with the Russian political, social, and even religious system. For a time, defiance of all authority became a creed and the destruction of all existing order a religion for a section of the youth of Russia. The nihilists became anarchists. They wished to destroy almost everything in the existing order. The struggle with autocracy seemed so hopeless that at first they were not concerned with a constructive pro-

gramme. Their method was terrorism, through assassination plots, carefully worked out in secret societies, they hoped to terrorize autocracy into submission. Each official was a marked man, even the Czar himself, while the agents of the police were the commonest victims. Such was the policy of repaying violence with violence. "Obviously each nihilist took his life in his own hands; but there was no flinching in their devotion, and it would be hard to find in history a more earnest and self-sacrificing group than these men and women who struggled to free Russia by the bomb."

In time, however, the nihilists came to the conclusion that in order to win the masses it was necessary to arrive at some really constructive ideal, and to this end they adopted socialism. With the true fervour of missionaries they conducted during the seventies what was known as the "going to the people". They went to the peasant villages, sometimes lived the life of the peasant, and conducted a secret propaganda. But it was an utterly hopeless task, however heroic. There was nothing much more isolated than a peasant village, and the police were only too ready to pounce on any stranger. Moreover the peasant was too thick-headed to get much inspiration from Karl Marx. "Manifestly some likelier material must be found."

The Coming of the Industrial Revolution and Its Significance

The Industrial Revolution did not affect Russia until the latter part of the nineteenth century, and then a marked increase in commerce and industry followed. This increase was due to the presence in the cities of cheap labour now made available by the emancipation of the serfs and the investment in Russia of foreign capital (chiefly French) with which railroads were built (Trans-Siberian Railway, 1891—1905).

With industrialization there emerged in Russia for first time a well-developed middle class comprising mostly of factory workers—urban proletariat. It was this group that was now to be relied on as the cohorts of revolution. And it was not unpromising material. Conditions in Russian factories were as bad as anything in the worst days of the Industrial Revolution; and while anything might have been tolerable to the peasant who had been a serf, a young generation was springing up, less contented with its place in the crowded towns in which he failed. From this class the message of socialism was bound to receive a response.

Foundation of Socialist Parties

(a) In 1897 the Social Democratic Party was founded for pushing the workers' interests. Terrorism had seemed cowed under the harsh rule of Alexander III (1881—94), and even incipient Unions had been crushed : but the effort of this Party for a time was to give the factory workers a greater sense of solidarity and the strength of a common creed.

(b) In 1901, a rural socialist party was also founded, known as the Socialist Revolutionary Party, which, unlike the Social Democratic Party, believed a terrorism as a weapon, though they kept it for the present in reserve.

(c) In 1903, a more radical element in the Social Democratic Party split off from the main body on ground of favouring a stricter party discipline. This body, which came to be known as the Bolsheviks—the name signifies "majority men", for the Bolsheviks were in a majority on the question which caused their succession, though as a party they remained inferior in numbers to the Mensheviks ("minority men"). The Bolsheviks followed a young nobleman, Nicholas Ulianov, alias Lenin, who was destined in course of time to become the leader of the Revolution.

Two Mainstreams

A revolutionary movement had thus shown its head in Russia. There were two main streams, the liberal and the socialist, the aristocratic—bourgeois and the proletarian.

Autocracy of Alexander III

The forces of revolution, it must be pointed out got renewed strength from the policy of reaction followed by one of the most autocratic of the Czars, Alexander III. He had the help of two extremely capable men to maintain autocracy. Konstantine Pobedonostsev (1827—1907) was a champion for reaction. He opposed even the slightest reforms and attacked parliamentary government, secular education, and the press. Plehe (1846—1904), as head of the police, concentrated his efforts on crushing all opposition to the government. His harsh, repressive measures carried out by a ruthless but highly efficient secret policy, made him perhaps the most hated person in all Russia, but he successfully stamped out all articulate revolutionary discontent. The imperial government became more

centralized, and all elements of freedom in local government and secular education were removed. In spite of the efficiency with which the liberal tendencies were thwarted, incompetence and corruption permeated the whole imperialistic government.⁶

Revolutionary Movement under Nicholas II (1894—1917)

The two streams of revolution (referred to above), flowing together, became a torrent in the reign of Nicholas II, the last of the Czars. "He was a man of small mentality and weak will, and by temperament too volatile that he was apt to follow the opinions of the last person who had been with him. He was also very Russian in his fatalism; and disposed to let things drift, feeling that somehow autocracy was part of the divine order of things and that it mattered very little who wants agents."

Nicholas II relied much more than his predecessor upon Pobedonostev and Plehve and, as was to be expected, monarchy became exceptionally oppressive under this weak and vacillating Czar. Incompetence and corruption showed their ugly heads more than ever. To make matters worse news poured in of a succession of disasters suffered by Russia in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05). The War served to reveal depth of corruption and incompetency in the Russian administration. At the tidings of the fall of Port Arthur, students paraded the streets of Russia, crying: "Down with autocracy" and "end the war".

The Revolution of 1905

It was the plight of the government which inspired a revival of the revolutionary movement which was, by and large, not distinguished by terrorism, but came right out in the open, as it were. Nothing could have been more innocent than the demonstration of January 22, 1905 (Sunday), when a huge concourse of strikers headed

6. The Czarist government had been able to maintain autocracy in Russia because of (1) the loyalty of the Tsar's assistants to the central government, (2) the control of the Greek Orthodox Church by the Czar, (3) the administration of education, which was extremely meager, being in the hands of the Church (Russia's illiteracy was greater than that of any other European country), (4) the successful coercion of liberal movements, (5) the peasants' conception of the Czar as a "Little Father", (6) the conservative agrarian group, (7) the history and tradition of the autocracy under leaders like Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, and (8) the prevalent opinion that democracy could not successfully cope with the problems of the Russian people.

by a priest known as Father Gapon proceeded to the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg to hand over the Czar a petition for the redress of grievances.

"Bloody Sunday".—The petitioners who were perfectly peaceful were fired upon for no rhyme or reason by Cossacks. The incident sent a thrill of horror throughout Russia. Discontent increased, labourers struck, and the peasants pillaged and destroyed. But there were even mutinies in the army, and though the War was practically over, it was decided to delay mobilization. The very foundation of Czarism seemed to be crumbling.

The October Manifesto (1905)

The Czar weakened under the continued evidences of dissatisfaction, and announced the coming of a duma, or national assembly, to be consulted in the matter of reforms. This Russian "estates general" was, of course, too slight a concession to please the public. The liberals at once agitated for a legislative body, to be elected on a really broad suffrage. With much more effect the socialists attempted a general strike; and the movement was so far successful that transportation ceased, most of the factories closed, and the nation's economic life was almost paralysed. The Czar decided to make further concessions (for after all, concessions could be so revoked); so in October 1905, he issued what was known as the October Manifesto—the nearest approach Russia had had to a constitution. Certain fundamental rights, like the inviolability of person and freedom of conscience, press and association, were granted. Legislative power was also accorded to the duma which to be elected on a very broad suffrage."

There was great exultation, but it proved to be premature.

Counter-Revolutionary Movement

In December 1905, another great uprising of a desperate character took place in Moscow; about five thousand people were killed before it was suppressed by the troops. It unfortunately helped to bring about a counter-revolutionary movement in the government. The liberal Witte had already been dismissed, and the Tsar's ministers began to divide into two camps, one favouring concession, the other repression. Thus the government spoke with two voices.

Revolutionary Factions

The revolutionaries were also divided. They did not form an organized political party, but were broken up into groups. There were the moderates, or Octoberists, who took their stand upon the October manifesto of the Czar ; there was the more advanced group known as the "Cadets", who advocated the establishment of responsible as well as representative government, and pressed for the bestowal of land upon the peasants by the forced sale of some of the larger estates. The rise of the reactionaries and their organising of the "Union of the Russian People" (1906) instituted a reign of terror to prevent liberal reforms and aided the Czar. Between the counter-revolution which set in the government and the divisions in the ranks of the revolutionaries the cause of reform fell to the ground.

First Duma (1906)

The first Duma was opened with great ceremony on May 6, 1906, by Nicholas II, but it soon became a scene of wrangling between the government and its critics. The Duma had no real power, and when it tried to control the executive it was accused of exceeding its bounds, and was dissolved on July 21, 1906. In bitter disappointment about half the deputies withdrew to Viborg, in Finland, and issued the manifesto which takes its name from that place, exhorting the Russian people not to pay taxes or render military service to a government which had violated its pledges. But the people were not behind their deputies ; the only result was to stiffen the government and to lead to the prosecution of the signatories.

Second Duma (1907)

In March 1907, a second Duma was elected, but, proving even more stormy than its predecessor, it was dissolved before it had sat for four months.

Third Duma (1907-12)

In order to prevent a repetition of what had happened in the first and second Dumas, the Czar by arbitrary decree summoned a third Duma on a revised electoral law, and a considerably reduced franchise. Proving amenable to the government it was allowed to live out its five years, and in 1912 was followed by a fourth Duma (1912-14), even more docile.

Reaction Set in After 1907

After 1907 reaction had set in, autocracy was in the saddle, and the exultation of the reformers had given place to a listless depression. Socialists were tried behind closed doors and sent to Siberia. Conspirators were constantly being hounded and executed. There were in reply recurring murders of officials and police, but on the whole the country "seemed quiescent, and the revolutionary movement abated."

Such was the situation in Russia in 1914.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1917

In trodution

The Russian Empire had represented for more than three centuries superposition of a predatory Asiatic despotism upon a medieval menorial society. The inflexible attempt to maintain this despotism by means of a cumbrous and corrupt bureaucracy, an army of native janissaries, a benighted Church, and a reactionary feudal noblesse, in opposition to the economic and social forces of modern Europe, in which Russia constantly intervened as a political factor, was destined inevitably to result in a violent revolution.

The failure of the first inchoate revolution of 1905 was followed by a period of stupid reaction on the one side, and on the other by desperate preparations for the utter extermination of the existing system by the liberals in Russia.

The Failure of Autocracy in the War as a Paramount Cause of the Revolution

The Great war produced the final crisis by revealing the self-destructive inefficiency of the Russian government.

There was no little enthusiasm and patriotism at the outset and hardly a dissentient voice ; all Russia looked upon the war as a "holy war", requiring the fullest and staunchest effort. But Russia was not equal to a struggle such as this. She was still too backward a nation to vie with the technical efficiency of the West ; her railways were unsuited to the transportation of large armies ; her munition factories were unable to produce the volume of armaments required. Moreover, there was graft in high places. The Ministry

of War gave contacts to men who failed to deliver the goods, they lined their own prospects. In the campaign of 1915, the supply of rifles failed ; they were insufficient shells ; and Russia was badly beaten. There was naturally a public outcry. Pressed by the Duma, which came to be the mouthpiece of the discontent, the Czar dismissed the incompetent Minister of War but it was then too late.

Leading Figures who Guided Russia Then

During the most trying years of the war the Czarist government was dominated by the treacherous Sturmer—"a soapy-mannered man with an overdone smile"—and the loathsome Rasputin—one of the most sinister figures that ever polluted the pages of history. As it was, the Czar consulted the Czarina Alexander—a beautiful and queenly woman—on all political matters. She in turn was influenced by Rasputin.

Who was Rasputin ?

He was a Siberian peasant, who after thirty years of obscurity became a wandering mystic and ultimately acquired the prestige of a saint. "He was a huge, ungainly, uncouth, and filthy profligate with an over-mastering ambition to exercise power." His avenue of approach to the imperial family lay in the fact that he had a reputation for healing (probably he did possess some therapeutic powers), and on one occasion when the little of Czarevitch, the heir to the throne, suffered a terrible attack of his strange malady (he was what is commonly known as a "bleeder"), Rasputin was consulted, and the attack was soon allayed. He came frequently to the palace, and was said to have declared that the fate of the Czar and his family was interwoven with his own. In any case, Rasputin was not content simply to play the role of "court physician". He dabbled in politics, and through the influence for the Czarina he made and unmade ministers. "That he was in traitorous relations with Germany is not yet proved, but he was certainly an avowed pacifist, and his influence was deliberately defeatist". At that critical juncture of the War he was, therefore, certainly a 'fifth columnist' of a sort.

In short after the dismissal of Sazonoff in August 1916, the domination of the Czarist government by the treacherous Sturmer and loathsome Rasputin prepared the tragic 'denouncement'.

The March Revolution (1917)

The terrible military defeats sustained almost steadily from 1914 to 1917, the corruption and incompetence of the Czar's bureaucracy, and the economic collapse of the entire nation combined to wreck the fighting will of the Russian people. A revolution broke out in Petrograd in March 1917, and the Czar's government was driven from control. Thus in March, 1917, the Czarist regime fell.

The November Revolution (1917)

A provincial government in which the leading figure was Kerensky, tried to carry on the war and establish a liberal regime. But the partial reforms proposed failed to satisfy the growing group of revolutionary leaders, while the decision to carry on the war speeded the disintegration of the army. In November the provincial government collapsed, Kerensky fled from the country, and the Bolshevik group of advanced revolutionaries led by Lenin and Trotsky seized the reins. The political revolution of March was superseded by the economic and social revolution of November.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918)

The new leaders were faced with enormous internal difficulties and immediately decided to make terms with Germany at any price. They tried to make peace according to the formula "No annexations and no indemnities," but finally accepted the crushing Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Terms and Significance of Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

Russia renounced her sovereignty over Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, Lithuania, and Poland, whose fate was to be decided by the Central Powers, "in agreement with their inhabitants". The Ukraine was to be organized as an independent republic. Batum, Ardahan, and Kars, in the Caucasus, were permitted "self-determination in agreement with their neighbouring states, especially with Turkey." Finland and Georgia were declared independent. Russia was to pay heavy 'compensation' to the Germans for their losses, and certain economic arrangements were made, favourable to the German Empire. "In all, Russia lost approximately half a million square miles of territory and sixty-six millions of people, representing 34 per cent of her population, 32 per cent of her agricultural land, 85 per cent of her beet-sugar land, 54 per cent of her industrial

undertakings, 89 per cent. of her coal-mines, and all but a fragment of her Baltic coastline.”

“The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was one of the most important events in the War. It enabled Russia to complete the work of revolution and ‘liquidation’ in the old regime. It gave Germany victory on the Eastern Front which, though immediately enabling her to send reinforcements to other fronts, proved in the end to confer entirely illusory benefits. For the expectation of economic supplies from Russia turned out to be vain, and she still found it necessary to guard her eastern boundaries with troops, while the spread of Communist propaganda through Germany by Russian agents seriously impaired her resources at home and hastened the internal revolution of November 1918.

“On the other side, the treaty led to an inter-Allied expedition to Silesia to prevent German penetration into Asia, and this in its turn whetted Japan’s appetite for adventure in the Asiatic continent. Finally, the object-lesson in German ruthlessness which the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk afforded reinforced will to continue the war in America and the Allied countries and discredited a growing mood of pacificism there. So the war went on in the west.”

The Third Year of the War

During 1917, although seemingly results less slaughter continued, the balance tilted somewhat to the disadvantage of the Central Powers. The Germans withdrew their western line ; but a series of incredibly costly British attacks ended in stalemate, whilst a French offensive met overwhelming disaster. The spectacular British conquest of Mesopotamia and Palestine somewhat offset these negative military results.

Meanwhile the Austrian Emperor—Charles I—who had succeeded Francis Joseph in 1916—was convinced these the continuance of the war would prove as destructive of the existing regime as in Russia, and began to negotiate with the French government for peace. At the same time the Pope intervened purpose. Both efforts failed.

On July 10, Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor resigned. A tentative peace proposal failed because of intransigent

7. See map illustrating the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the explanatory note on it, *infra*.

attitude of the German government in regard to Alsace and Lorraine. The General Staff now unusually gained political control. With Russia and Rumania out of the struggle and their own war-front intact from Belgium to Anatolia, the German militarists determined to force a military decision before the U.S.A. could effectively intervene. In October an Austro-German army inflicted on the Italians at Caporetto a colossal defeat, comparable with Tannenberg.⁸

Position at the End of Three Years of War

At the end of more than three years of war the position confronting the Allied governments appeared very grave. In England the idea of a peace by compromise was beginning to be entertained by many, such as Lord Lansdowne. On January 5, 1918, the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, re-stated British war aims in a more moderate tone. The reinstatement of occupied territory, the "re-consideration" of the question of Alsace-Lorraine, self-government of minority races in Austria-Hungary, the leaving to Turkey Constantinople and East Thrace, and the recognition of the separate national aspirations of the subject peoples of Ottoman Empire, were the chief considerations which Britain would demand.

Wilson's Fourteen Points⁹

Three-days later President Wilson enunciated peace aims in the

8. At the battle of Tannenberg, on August 27, 1914, Hindenburg won devastating victory against Russia killing or capturing a quarter of a million Russians.

9. The Fourteen Points were, in brief :

1. Open covenants and no secret diplomacy in the future.
2. Absolute freedom of navigation in peace and war outside territorial waters, except when seas may be closed by international action.
3. Removal as far as possible of all economic barriers.
4. Adequate guarantees for the reduction of national armaments.
5. An absolutely impartial adjustment of colonial claims, the interest of the peoples concerned having equal weight with the claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.
6. All Russian territory to be evacuated, and Russia given full opportunity for self-development, the Powers aiding.
7. Complete restoration of Belgium in full and free sovereignty.
8. All French territory to be freed and the wrong done by Prussia in 1871 to be righted.

famous "Fourteen points". Contrary to popular belief, this programme was concerned less with lofty ideals of humanitarianism than with quite specific proposals to achieve national and international justice by making States more perfect nation-States. The first five points, indeed, outlined general principles of peace-making. The remaining nine points covered all the main territorial changes that seemed to be required for a stable settlement in Europe and they were quite specific.

Ludendorff's Determination to Force a Military Decision on the Western Front

After Caporetto (October 1917), the German General Staff—or in other words General Ludendorff, its brain and will—determined to force a military decision on the Western Front. In March 1918, his blows began against the British line at its junction with the French. He inflicted a grave, almost a disastrous defeat. In May the German avalanche descended on the French front Soissons to Reims, and by the middle of June it had reached the Marne. At the same time an Austrian army attempted to administer the 'coup de grace' (a finishing stroke) to Italy, but it was defeated by the floods and the Italians. In mid-June Ludendorff began his critical stroke against Reims which was intended to open out the German salient and up the Allied flank.

German General Staff Admits Final Defeat

By July 18, the final German attack was definitely held, and General Foch, with hundreds of thousands of American recruits to hearten his war-worn troops, began his counter-stroke. In the

9. The readjustment of Italian frontiers on the lines of nationality.
10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary to be accorded an opportunity of autonomous development.
11. Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro to be evacuated ; Serbia to be given access to the sea, and the relations of the Balkan States to be settled on the lines of allegiance and nationality.
12. The non-Turkish nationalities in the Ottoman Empire to be assured of autonomous development and the Dardanelles to be permanently free to all ships.
13. Poland to be an independent State with access to the sea.
14. A general association of nations to be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

second week of August the German General Staff admitted to the Government final defeat, and advised negotiation. Some weeks before the military collapse of the "will to victory", Kuhlmann had admitted the situation in the Reichstag: "A conclusion by military decision", he announced, "without diplomatic negotiation is improbable".

Austria's Appeal for Negotiations

The Allied advance continued, and at the end of August Austria caved in. The Austrian appeal for negotiations was, however, met by President Wilson with a reference to the Allied terms, which were not subject to discussion.

Unconditional Surrender of Bulgaria

The Austrian appeal on September 15, synchronised exactly with the long-delayed Allied advance from the South Balkans against Bulgaria, which resulted within ten days in the immediate surrender of Bulgaria on September 25.

Unconditional Armistice Signed by Turkey

Rumania was preparing to re-enter the war. The British armies cleared Palestine and Mesopotamia; and during October the Young Turk leaders, Enver and Tolaat, fell. On the last day of that month Turkey signed an unconditional armistice and opened the Straits.

Germany Seeks Peace on the Basis of the "Fourteen" Points (October 5, 1914)

Within a week of the surrender of Bulgaria the Allied armies carried the Hindenburg line and on October 5, the German government asked President Wilson to arrange for peace on the basis of the "Fourteen Points". In this action, the Chancellor, had the support of the first really free parliament of Germany. Then followed a slightly pedantic cross-examination of the German government by President Wilson, in which he dictated the terms of capitulation.

Dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire

While this was proceeding, Austria-Hungary dissolved. On October 23, an Austrian army wilted and fled before an Italian attack in the Battle of Piave. Four days later a newly appointed pacifist ministry, under the admirable Professor Lammasch, notified unconditional surrender. Austria-Hungary had already been declared a federal State; but the Allies had previously recognised the

National Council of Czechoslovakia, under Professor Nasaryk, as a '*de facto*'. On November 1, Charles I abdicated, and Austria was declared a republic; five days later a similar declaration was made in Hungary. The claims of Serbia, Rumania and Italy to residuary legacies from the deceased Empire of the Hapsburg now became effective. The proud boast, "*Austriæ est imperare Orbi Universo*". (It is Austria's part to command the whole world—often A.E.I.O.U.) had now a ring of hollowness about it.

The Finale

This was the beginning of the end of the Central Alliance. On October 27, Ludendorff resigned. The allied blows continued. On November 8, Foch submitted to the German Head Quarters the terms of capitulation approved by the Supreme Council of the Allied Governments, which were accepted on November 11. On that day an armistice was signed between the belligerent leaders, and from eleven o'clock on that memorable day firing ceased over the Western Front. The Germans cancelled the terms of the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, agreed to surrender their fleet and vast quantities of war material, and to retire beyond the Rhine, pending the declaration of peace.

Meanwhile, on November 5, the German fleet had mutined at Kiel and placed under the control of a revolutionary committee, virtually a Soviet. Four days later, despite the moderating attempts of Prince Max, the Chancellor, Republic was declared in Berlin and the Kaiser was induced to abdicate.

Thus approach the 'finale' of the greatest calamity in European history.

The Great War—A Titanic Struggle Involving an Appalling Price in Men, Money, and Human Effort

This war which lasted 1565 days, was the bloodiest and costliest-war that had yet been fought. More than twice as many men were killed in battle during this war as in all the major wars from 1789 to 1913 together, including the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, the Danish War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War, the American War between the States, the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, the Balkan Wars. Estimates of the cost in terms of money vary. But according to reliable estimates the total net direct cost of conducting the war was 186,000 million dollars. To this sum must be added another 84,000 million dollars on account of damage on land, on sea, on war relief and losses to neutrals etc. Thus the total real economic cost amounted to 270,000 million dollars.

The Peace Settlement

The Conference of Paris, 1919

The Conference of the representatives of "the Allies" and "Associated Powers" which assembled in Paris in January, 1919, was a more widely representative body than even the Congress of Vienna in 1814. Crowned heads were now conspicuous by their absence—only King Albert of the Belgians appeared for a short time. Except for President Woodrow Wilson and King Albert, the great powers were represented not by their heads of state but by their premiers and foreign ministers. In all, thirty-two states were represented.

The neutral powers, who had no place at what was technically a peace conference to end the Great War, were excluded, so were the Russians, who were still engaged in civil war and the war of intervention, and the ex-enemy powers—Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. These absences were supremely important for the future, "Whether the absence of neutrals weakened, as has been claimed, the forces of moderation and balance which have made for a more intelligent settlement is doubtful; neutral governments are not notably less self-interested than others. But neutral nations had certainly been profoundly affected by the course of the war and had an undoubted interest in the settlement of the world. The absence of Russia made easier a territorial settlement of eastern Europe which assumed, in many respects, the shape of a "cordon sanitaire" (a sanitary cordon) against the spread of Bolshevism into Europe. The absence of former enemy states, especially Germany,

gave peace in Europe the form of a *Diktat* an imposed arrangement, for the shaping of which Germans felt no kind of responsibility since they had not been consulted, and which they were forced to accept in circumstances humiliating to them new republican government. All those consequences, however, reasonable the exclusion of such powers seemed at the time, were to prove basic weakness in the settlement".

Opening of the Conference

Since the Conference met in Paris, France was in a sense the host and it was Poincare, the French President who formally opened it. Portraying the war as a "crusade of humanity" and proclaiming its results "the victory of right", he wound his address by indicating the direction along which its work should proceed. "This very day", he said, "forty-eight-years ago on the 18th January, 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed by an army of invasion in the Chateau at Versailles. It was consecrated, by the theft of two French provinces. It was thus a violation from its origin and by the fault of its founders was born in injustice. It has ended in oblivion. You are assembled in order to repair the evil that has been done and in order to prevent a recurrence of it. You hold in your hands the future of the world. I leave you, gentlemen to your grave deliberations and declare the Congress of Paris Open".

Clemenceau the French Premier, was then nominated for the President of the Conference. The following day the assembly began the burden of its labours.

A Carthaginian Peace

The first and most urgent of the colossal problems which confronted the artificers who had to reconstruct Europe from the political scrap-heap was the formation of the actual instrument of peace. Was it to be a provisional, or a definitive document? The first could be prepared quickly and supported by effective sanctions for its subsequent modification by the victors. Such a course recommended itself to the best opinion in Britain and the U.S.A.; but it was intrasigently opposed by France, who was supported by all the Allied nations who similarly insisted upon "a Carthaginian¹ peace".

1. Pertaining to Carthage an ancient city of North Africa; founded by Phoenicians about 822 B.C.; destroyed by the Romans in 146 B.C.; rebuilt by the Romans and finally destroyed by the Arabs in A.D. 698.

In short, it was finally decided by the opinion of the majority that the settlement should be made final in an atmosphere of war, not of peace. In other words, it was to be a projection of pre-war diplomacy, rather than the initiation of a new era of political relations. This is the fundamental defect of the Treaty of Versailles and its concomitants.

Views of Persons Who Assembled to Forge the Settlement

The form of the settlement was quickly and inexorably determined by the views of the representatives of the Allies and associated powers who had assembled in Paris. Lloyd George came backed by a parliamentary majority produced by an hysterical election.² The Coalition Election manifesto in Britain had confidently announced that : "the knell of military autocracy has sounded for ever" ; and Lloyd George, accompanied by a train-load of secretaries arrived in Paris to discuss with the other representatives of the Allies and associated powers the arrangements necessary to implement this promise. Just over a hundred years before Castlereagh, setting off to Vienna on a not dissimilar mission, had summarised Britain's objects as "Peace and a just equilibrium in Europe". It would have been as well if Lloyd George's brief had been as severely confined within a vague and harmless generalisation and he had not had his supporters' pledge to "Make Germany Pay" hung around his neck.

Wilson came, not representing American opinion, but with a deep moral resolve to insist upon the rigorous application of the results of half a life-time of political reflection. He frequently reminds us, throughout the negotiations, of Franklin and other framers of the Declaration of Independence. His views on peace were the expression on 'a priori' principles of an ideologist, whose mind was peculiarly opaque to the forces which really control social development ; for these scarcely include academic logic.

Lloyd George and President Wilson met Clemenceau, the incarnation of the historic spirit of France in European politics. For him the "Fourteen Points" were an episode of diplomacy, and the League of Nations a chimera (wild fancy). His attitude was fixed

2. Before the armistice, the British cabinet had decided that there must be an immediate general election, so that the coalition which had won the war should have a mandate from the nation for the peace.

by one inflexible fact : that France, with the assistance of valuable allies who had to be compensated, had defeated Germany ; and by one inflexible resolve : that she should consolidate her victory and give it as much permanence as was possible in the fluidity of international policies.

Among those also present were the two Italian representatives, Orlando and Sonnino, who had come simply to garner the fruits of Italy's "sacred egoism" ; two observers from Japan, who would acquiesce perfunctarily in the political re-arrangement of the European world, but would argue most spiritedly the brief for the prestige of their own nation ; and, among the rest, three unusually able statesmen—Pasitch, Venezolos, and Bratiano who gave their little countries an uncomfortable prominence in the council of Great Powers. For the rest, there was a collection of picturesque figures — such as the Emir Feizul, W.M. Hughes, the spokesmen of Armenia, Belgium—proceeding, in fact, in alphabetic order to the Zionists. The Conference could thus claim, despite its important omissions, to be the first great world peace conference. Some three quarters of the population of the world was represented and the tasks before it surpassed, in scale and importance those of any previous international gathering. There were twenty-seven official delegations—thirty-two if the Dominions and India are counted separately. It included many world figures in addition to the leaders of the "Big Five" (the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan), men such as General Smuts of South Africa, Robert Borden of Canada, Wellington Koo of China and Paderewski the great Polish pianist.

Never had Europe witnessed such a gathering of rulers or rivals, of realists bent on material gains and of idealists striving for a happier world.

The Conference at Work

Clemenceau, who was elected President of the Conference, quickly secured the cleaning of its programme of sentimental verbiage ; and the adoption of a Council of Ten, representing the five Great Powers (Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the U.S.A.)³,

3. It was a modified version of the Supreme war council. This select body comprising two representatives of each of the "Big Five" made all the preliminary and initial arrangements for the conduct of the Conference.

to realize the purposes of France with a minimum of obstruction from his colleagues. One of the sentimental topics *viz.*, the revictualling (furnishing again with provisions) of leagured peoples, was handed over to an American, Hoover, as Director-General of Allied Relief, and to other humanitarian enthusiasts, who would free the Council for the real business of the meeting. But another inconvenient preliminary was the question of Russia. To Clemenceau Russia was now as much without the pale as the Balkan peoples had been to Metternich. The French wished for a brusque solution of the question by means of an Allied punitive expedition under Foch. When this proposal was rejected, he side-tracked the problem ; but he was determined that the capital of victorious France should not be contaminated by the presence of Bolsheviks.

In March the Council of Ten was still further reduced to a Council of four⁴, who promptly attacked the central problems, as they viewed them. It is amazing, and not a little disturbing to reflect on the nonchalance with which this tiny committee, representing the four greatest Powers in the world for the time being, attempted pre-emptorily to settle the issues of the vastest and most confused crisis of European history.

The subjects upon which discussion was concentrated were settled by the traditional diplomatic method of compromise by means of a balance of national interests ; they were not fixed by an impartial consideration of the best means of guaranteeing a just peace. The most important were : (i) the proposal to establish a League of Nations which was staunchly supported by President Wilson and his personal associates at the Conference, and by the representatives ; the official delegates of the other important Powers regarding it with cynical indifference ; (ii) the determination of the frontiers of the enemy states ; (iii) the determination of the reparations to be made by these states ; and (iv) the sanctions of the Treaty.

4. The "Big Four" were Clemenceau, Wilson Lloyd, George, and Orlando the premier of Italy. Japan soon lost interest and stayed away, and by the end of April 1919, Orlando also departed. Most important decisions were taken henceforth taken avowed by as they had previously been substantially by the famous "Big Three" upon whose personal attitudes much of the outcome of the 'Conference ultimately depended.

The Project of the League of Nations

The project of a League of Nations had been voiced in Britain early in the War, and a scheme had been propounded, which had been submitted to Washington shortly after the entrance of the U.S.A. into the Alliance. The plan ultimately adopted was largely the work of Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts. Beyond the Anglo-American group neither the general idea nor the definite scheme had prominent support in Europe, except M. Emile Bourgeois and Venizelos, both of them occupied subordinate places at the Conference. Nevertheless, at the second full session of the Conference a committee under the Chairmanship of Wilson was appointed to draft a Covenant to be approved by the Conference and incorporated in the Treaty. After his committee had been forced by national prejudices to reduce the scope and effectiveness of the projected League in regard to national equality, local territorial doctrines and control of armaments, it was accepted at the fifth full of the Conference, on April 28, 1919, and made an intrinsic—indeed a fundamental—element in each of the treaties of peace. Its perfunctory acceptance cleared the path for the consideration of the problems upon which the representatives of the various European Allies concentrated their real interest.

TERRITORIAL CHANGES

(a) The French Demands

Apart from the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine (a forgone conclusion), the French put forward their claim to establish their eastern frontier on the Rhine, an aim which could not even be achieved by Napoleon. It was unthinkable. When its rejection was certain they proposed the establishment of an independent buffer state west of the Rhine, which should remain virtually a French protectorate, and in any case subject for a long term of years to an Allied occupation dominated by the French interests. This was equally unthinkable; and, after rancorous debate, it was finally agreed that the German provinces west of the Rhine should be occupied by the Allies for fifteen years, and that they should enter into a treaty guaranteeing France against future German aggression. After another bitter struggle the control of this area was vested in a civil, and not a military commission as the French demanded.

Every party was dissatisfied with the compromise ; the French regarding it as a betrayal of their just aspirations to "security", the British and Americans regarding it with suspicion as the possible provocation of renascent Germany to a future war.

In regard to the Saar Basin, the French pressed their claims with all the more vigour after their rebuff concerning the Rhine frontier. Again the French claim to annexation was refused, and again an unsatisfactory compromise was reached, by which the area—of vital economic importance on account of its rich coal and iron deposits—was placed for fifteen years under a Civil Commission to be appointed by the League, at the end of which time its destiny was to be determined by plebiscite. The conduct of the Commission—which had remained completely under French control—engendered bitter and dangerous controversy in 1934.

(b) The Italian Demands

The Italians could expect from the victorious Allies a very liberal interpretation of their aspiration to "Italia Irredenta" ; but the intransigence with which they asserted their utterly unjustifiable claim on North Dalmatia and to the port of Fiume⁵ produced determined opposition. Not only were Austria and Hungary to be sacrificed to Italian greed, but also the Yugoslav peoples, whose natural claims would seem inalienable. The Italian representatives withdrew from the Conference, and were induced reluctantly to return, the question of Dalmatia and Fiume being postponed in face of the urgent need of presenting a treaty to Germany. Its final "settlement"—if such it may be called—bore within it provocation of another war.

(c) The Question of Germany's Eastern Frontiers

The question of Germany's eastern frontiers was equally ominous. The original Polish demands, supported strangely by the

5. It is to be noted that the port of Fiume had not been included in the hail assured to Italy by the secret Pact of London (1915). Fiume was an isolated Italian town in a region that was overwhelming Yugoslav and—what was chiefly important—the natural outlet on the sea for both Hungary and Jugoslavia, commanding a gap between the mountains, and the actual terminal of railway from Hungary and Croatia. It is difficult to say whether there had been any discussion over Fiume in 1915 ; but when, at the Conference of Paris, Italy presented her claims, they included Fiume.

French, were grotesque ; the ultimate settlement was artificial, and must surely prove temporary. The establishment of a narrow corridor, separating Prussian provinces, and making Danzig a Free Port under the League's jurisdiction, but within the Polish Customs Union, were academic solutions, which the evolution of these States seemed certain to render sooner or later nugatory. The provision for a series of plebiscites in the disputed areas in Upper Siberia also laid up trouble for the future.

(d) The Japanese Demands

The Japanese demand of a residuary, legacy of German right in Shantung, in entire disregard of the just national rights of China, was finally conceded, upon a verbal promise that all but economic rights would ultimately be retroceded to China - a promise which none of the official delegates valued highly. The success of the nationalist movement in China in the thirties largely solved this problem.

The question of Reparations

Retributive military demands upon Germany were naturally to be expected, and were executed by the Allied General Staff during the prolonged armistice with much rigour. But the question of "reparations" provoked further bitterness. An attempt—in which the British delegates joined—was made to enforce upon Germany—already diminished and impoverished to the point of desperation—the payment of the *total* cost of the war. This was not demanded in the armistice terms, and was opposed by the U.S.A. Again, after bitter debate, a compromise was reached by which Germany was required to pay £2000 million within two years, and thereafter a sum, to be paid within thirty years, and to be determined by an "Inter-Allied Reparation Commission.

Ludicrous Demand

The utterly ludicrous British demand for the trial of the ex-Kaiser, and the condition incorporated in the Treaty that Germany should acknowledge sole responsibility for the outbreak of the war, scarcely need comment.

The Treaty of Versailles

The Treaty was presented to the German representatives on May 7. German comments produced minor modification, after the

Allies insisted upon unconditional acceptance. Germany submitted to superior force on June 23, and the Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919⁶ (the fifth anniversary of Serajevo).

Comments on the Treaty of Versailles

Numerous commissions and committees had still to complete provisional arrangements, but at last peace with Germany was formally declared in terms of a treaty which had evoked little admiration or enthusiasm. It simply represented the deplorable competition of a group of triumphant and greedy nations, who could not be brought to accommodation their covetousness even to the wisest considerations of national selfishness.

Minor Treaties

A series of minor treaties was shortly afterwards signed. The Treaty of St. German with shrunken Austria on September 10, 1919; the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria on November 27, 1919; the Treaty of Trianon with fallen Hungary on July 4, 1920; and the Treaty of Sevres with Turkey on August, 1920⁷; through the last was never ratified by the Turkish government, and was scrapped owing to the follies of Greece, abetted by Lloyd George, within two years, to the advantage of the Turkish Republic, which enjoyed the able guidance of the enlightened Kemal.

The Aftermath

The American people refused to ratify the actions of its President. The British people learned to regret many of the emotionally excited decisions of its delegate. Germany began to assume a position grotesquely inconsistent with the verbiage of Versailles. France became for a time her successor as the greatest military power in the world. The League of Nations pursued its way along the line of least resistance between the competing interests of the great nations. The peoples of the civilised world began to read just themselves to a changed environment by reaction to forces far deeper and more compelling than those created as sanctions to the Peace Settlement.

6. For territorial changes made by the Treaty of Versailles, see Map and explanatory note on it—*infra*.

7. For territorial changes made by these Treaties see Maps and explanatory notes on them—*infra*.

Concluding Comments

The Treaty of Versailles was an elaborate document of 80,000 words. Its severity makes it unique among treaties imposed by civilised nations as the result of a successful conflict. It was passed when popular passions ran high. "We are well aware", declared the German delegates who went to Paris to receive the terms, "of the weight of hate that is here directed against us". Lloyd George in a speech on another occasion put it differently: "These terms are written in the blood of fallen heroes.....We must carry out the edict of Providence and see that the people who inflicted this (war) shall never be in a position to do so again. The Germans say they will not sign. Their newspapers say they will not sign. The politicians say the same. We say, "Gentlemen, you must sign. If you don't do so in Versailles you shall do so in Berlin."

In short, the victors dictated their own terms. The Treaty represented two main ideas: "a stern and relentless justice on the basis of the assumption of German guilt and a need of protecting Europe against a revival of German ambition".

The Treaty declared Germany solely responsible for the war and justified its harsh measures on this ground. On the score of retributive justice as well as the principle of nationality, she was forced to restore Alsace—Lorraine to France and to relinquish a large block of territory in the east, most of which was handed to Poland while certain other areas were left to be disposed of by plebiscite. She was deprived of her colonies as well as her interests in China and her investment in the Bagdad rail road. In order to prevent the possibility of enlarging her present area, she was forbidden for all time to annex German-Austria, though such a restriction was hardly in accord with the much lauded principle of nationality. In addition to the territorial losses imposed on Germany she was, as far as lay with the victors, to be drained of her economic resources in the present and threatened with a continuation of the drain through an indefinite future. This was over and above the reparations in kind and in money.

The servitudes imposed on Germany in the Treaty were eventually, with few exceptions, abrogated either by agreement, or by lapse of time, or by repudiation on the part of Germany.

How far were the Peace Treaties a Wilsonian Settlement ?

In conclusion let us discuss the extent to which the Peace Treaties bore Wilson's mark.

The new map of Europe was drawn according to that principle of self-determination (a phrase borrowed from the Bolsheviks) which the President had proclaimed as the clue leading through a labyrinth of evils to justice and peace. Over the Poles and their Corridor, as over the Czechs and the Slovaks, he cast his peculiar benediction, perhaps desiring to right the errors of history, but perhaps also recalling how useful was the Polish vote at home, and how numerous and weighty were the Czechs in the city of Chicago. Americans have no right to argue, as some do, that in this fundamental aspect of the peace-making, American idealism was upset by the wickedness of Europe. The new political frontiers of Europe are Wilsonian, and so drawn that three per cent, only of the total population of the continent live under alien rule. Judged by the test of self-determination, no previous European frontiers have been so satisfactory.

"In another important respect the treaties are Wilsonian. But for the American President the Covenant of the League would not have been drafted then, and placed within the framework of the Treaties. The idea of a League of Nations was not original with Wilson, but was an Anglo-Saxon conception, foreign to the Latins, which had germinated during the course of the war in many peace-loving minds both in England and America, and had led to the formulation of definite proposals, the most important of which were drafted by Lord Phillimore and General Smuts. But it is one thing to draft proposals and quite another thing in a vast press of competing claims to carry them into execution. Wilson took the Phillimore-Smuts drafts, insisted on placing the problem of the League in the forefront of the Peace discussions, himself presided over the commission which drew up the Covenant, and with his great authority pushed the work to a conclusion. So resolved was the President to force the Covenant on his Senate by making it an integral part of all the Peace Treaties that two precious months went by before the Conference addressed itself to the real work of peace-making."

"It is not, therefore, true to say that the Peace Treaties are lacking in idealism, or that they are destitute of principle. They

contain an ideal in the Covenant. They follow a principle in self-determination. But the ideal was not one generally shared on the continent : and the principle, albeit just, was full of danger and innovation, for it led to the erection of five new states all of questionable stability, and to large transfers of territory and population at the expense of the Teutonic and Magyar races."

"The war against the German Empire ended in a radical and revolutionary peace drawn up by democratic politicians. It recognized the liberation of nations, canonized new republics, provided for the protection of minorities. The general trend of Europe towards nationalism and democracy, which had made itself felt ever since 1848 with steadily increasing emphasis, seems to culminate naturally in Mr. Wilson's peace."

HISTORICAL MAPS

(With Explanatory Notes)

ILLUSTRATING

- 1. THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR**
- 2. BALKAN STATES AFTER THE TREATY OF BERLIN**
- 3. BALKAN STATES AFTER THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST**
- 4. THE EUROPEAN PARTITION OF AFRICA**
- 5. THE BERLIN-BAGHDAD RAILROAD**
- 6. TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK, 1918**
- 7. TREATY OF VERSAILLES**
- 8. TREATIES OF SAINT-GERMAN AND THE TRIANON**
- 9. EUROPE REMODELLED BY THE PEACE TREATIES**
- 10. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE, 1923**
- 11. FRONTIERS OF POLAND AFTER THE PEACE TREATIES, 1919**
- 12. DANZIG AND THE POLISH CORRIDOR**

I. The Franco-Prussian War

The Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) was the final step in the creation of new Germany and the end of the imperialistic career of Napoleon III.

Fundamentally the cause of the Franco-Prussian conflict was the deep rivalry between the two countries which had revealed itself in 1866. The startling growth of the Prussian power in the unexpected demonstration of her strength had given to Europe, and more specially to France, an unmistakable challenge. Prussian victory in the Austro-Prussian war was a menace to French international prestige, possibly to her national security.

The Austro-Prussian war was only a fore-runner to a war with France. "A war with France, after a war with Austria", so wrote Bismarck, "lay in the logic of history". While Napoleon sought allies, Bismarck tried to isolate France. Russia was still grateful to Bismarck for his help in Polish insurrection, whereas Napoleon III had offended her both at that time and in the Crimean War. The Italians had not forgotten Napoleon's desertion after Villafranca nor the aid of Prussia in obtaining Venetia. The lenient peace of 1866 served to preserve Austria's neutrality. Britain, under the leadership of the pacific Gladstone, and glad to see the humiliation of Napoleon, was not likely to interfere.


With two governments bent upon a war and responsible ministers working for it, the cause and pretext of the conflagration could never be wanting. The immediate cause of the war was found in the question of the succession to the Spanish throne.

By hard work, some luck, and stratagems, which in less sophisticated circles than those of politics, would pass for criminal, Bismarck had actually manoeuvred France into starting the war. Then came about a long pending struggle for predominance in Europe between France and Prussia. Prussia had long foreseen and prepared for the struggle, and France was rotten with financial corruption. The Prussians were confident and prepared, the French were over-confident and unprepared.

It were the Germans who opened the campaign with a swift offensive, the German forces, consisting of 450,000 men, were divided into three armies; the first towards the north under Steinmetz, the "hot blooded 'waster of men', for all his seventy-four years": The second under King William's nephew, Frederick Charles, the "Red Prince", who had already distinguished himself in the Danish and Austrian campaigns; the third, consisting mainly of South Germans, under the Crown Prince. These three armies were to invade France at different points of a line drawn from neutral Luxemburg to the Rhine, along the frontiers of Lorraine and North Alsace.

The French armies were stretched awkwardly upon the same frontier, with Emperor, as became a Bonaparte, in command at

I —THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR



Metz, to the north-west, with MacMahon to the south-east to lead the advance across the Rhine.

The Germans gained decisive victories at Sedan and Metz and resulted in the capture of the Emperor and his Marshal. Desirous of obtaining a complete capitulation, Bismarck did not concede a peace with the French at this time but concentrated on capturing Paris which finally surrendered after a siege that lasted from September 1870 to January 1871. The surrender of Paris and the fall of Strasburg ended the fighting.

On the map the main lines of German advance are indicated.

II. Balkan States after the Treaty of Berlin

The Treaty of San Stefano (1878) which brought to a close the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) provided for the independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania; a new Bulgaria under Russian tutelage was granted autonomy; the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were opened to peaceful commerce at all times. Russia was to get a large part of Armenia, a huge indemnity, and a part of Dobrudja.

The Treaty of San Stefano aroused the British and Austrians against Russian supremacy in the Near East and caused them to insist that this Treaty be ratified by the Powers who had signed the Treaty of Paris (1856). Although Russia objected, a threat of war by Britain and Austria resulted in the Congress of Berlin (1878) for the purpose of revising the Treaty of San Stefano. The Treaty of Berlin (1878) was a compromise on the demands of Britain, Austria-Hungary and Russia.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, Russia obtained the desired territory of Bessarabia (Rumania, most of Dobrudja).

Austria-Hungary was given the privilege of occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina and of maintaining garrisons in Novibazar.

Britain was allowed to occupy Cyprus to insure the Sultan's pledge to institute reforms beneficial to the Christians.

The Bulgaria which Russia had created was divided into Bulgaria (autonomous), East Rumelia (autonomous, but with military and political control by the Sultan), and Macedonia (ruled by Turkey).

The independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania was recognized. Greece was promised additional territory, and in 1881 Thessaly was given to her.

Modifications of the Treaty of Berlin (1885-1913)

In 1885, Eastern Rumelia was added to Bulgaria, which was declared a kingdom (1908). Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908) even though the Treaty of Berlin merely gave her the right to occupy them.

II BALKAN STATES after the Treaty of Berlin



III BALKAN STATES after the Treaty of Bucharest



III. Balkan States after the Treaty of Bucharest

The Balkan Wars (1912-13)

In spite of the insistence of the European powers that the *status quo* of the Balkans must not be changed by a war, the states of Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro joined Bulgaria in a war against Turkey, when the Young Turks refused to grant Macedonia autonomy (1912). The Turks were no match for the Balkan allies, and an armistice was concluded, but the peace conference at London was unsuccessful and actual fighting was resumed. The fall of Adrianople to the Serbs and Bulgars and the surrender of Scutari to the Montenegrins ended the conflict.

Treaty of London (May 1913)

The Treaty of London cut into the last of Turkey's European possessions. Albania was made an autonomous state and Crete was allowed to join Greece. But the victorious allies could not agree to a disposition of the European spoils. Bulgaria's demand of the lion's share was blocked by Serbia. The failure of the powers to agree led to another conflict.

Second Balkan War (July 1913)



The Serbs, Montenegrins and Greeks were joined by Rumania and Turkey in the war against Bulgaria. The Bulgarians found themselves hemmed in on all sides, and as the enemies advanced, the hopelessness of further opposition forced Ferdinand of Saxe-Corube-Gotha, ruler of Bulgaria (1887-1918), to sue for peace.

Treaty of Bucharest (August 1913)

As a result of this Treaty, Bulgaria ceded territory south of the Danube to Rumania; and Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia got most of Macedonia. A later arrangement between Turkey and Bulgaria resulted in Turkey's keeping, Adrianople (Treaty of Constantinople, 1913). In 1914 Albania was recognised as an independent principality with the German prince, William of Wied, at the head.

Results of the Balkan Wars

Territorially the final results of the two Balkan Wars was the practical extinction of the Turkish Empire in Europe and the enlargement of the Christian kingdoms in the Balkan peninsula. The greatest gainers were Serbia and Greece, while Bulgaria came off worst. Turkey lost four-fifths of her former European possessions and was reduced to the south-eastern corner of the peninsula.



IV THE EUROPEAN PARTITION OF AFRICA

IV. The European Partition of Africa

No sooner was the exploration of Africa nearly completed than a scramble for its partition among the European powers began. With regard to the partition of Africa two important features deserve notice. First, it was accomplished without a European war. There were indeed keen rivalries which provoked international crises of greater or less severity but they were all averted by diplomacy. Secondly, the partition was not a slow, gradual process but an extraordinarily rapid development. It began in right earnest in the eighties and was almost completed before the outbreak of the Great War in 1914.

The Course of Partition

It was the Belgian occupation of the Congo Valley that immediately led to the grab for Africa. Belgium, one of the smallest countries in Europe, carved out an empire almost ten times as large as its own size, and embracing the choicest "rubber country" in the Congo region.


The success with which Leopold II of Belgium carried on the game of empire-building in Congo valley aroused the ambition of the other European states and then followed a feverish rush for territory in all regions of Africa.

France led off by seizing Tunis in 1881, and the next year England entered upon her "occupation" of Egypt. Italy, aggrieved by the French seizure of Tunis which she had earmarked for herself, secured a foothold on the western shores of the Red Sea, which developed into the future colony of Eritrea. Germany, a new aspirant to colonial empire, established herself in south-west Africa. Portugal began to enlarge her ancient possessions both in the east and west. Thus before the Berlin Conference met (1884) the scramble for Africa had begun.

After 1884 the activities of the European Powers in exploration and annexation became more earnest than ever. France extended her dominion from Algeria in the north to the Guinea coast in the west, occupying its hinterland, and ambitious of a French empire extending across the Sahara from ocean to ocean. The rapid shrinkage of African territory aroused Britain to a danger of exclusion from vast areas and she began to enlarge her possessions in the south and west. She began to push steadily northwards from Cape Colony, acquiring Rhodesia and seeking to establish an empire stretching uninterruptedly from Cape to Cairo. Germany too bent upon carving out for herself large colonies in Africa busied herself both in the east and west.

By 1914 as indicated on the map the whole of Africa was parcelled out among the European Powers with the exception of Abyssinia and Liberia. The possessions of the various European powers in Africa in 1914 are clearly indicated on the map.

The position of European powers in Africa on the eve of the Second World War in 1939 is indicated on the other map.



V The Berlin-Baghdad Railroad

V. The Berlin-Baghdad Railroad

From the eighties, and still more from the early nineties of the nineteenth century, a new factor began to appear in Turkish and Balkan politics of the deepest importance to the destiny of the world—the new German Empire. For very nearly a century England had held towards Turkey a special position of friend and patron. But from the time of the Congress of Berlin (1878) that relationship had been increasingly strained by the British acquisition of Cyprus, by the Greek Convention of 1881, by the occupation of Egypt in 1882, and still more by the Turkish massacres in Armenia. The growing estrangement between Britain and Turkey left “a vacancy in the Ottoman Empire”, and that void was filled by Germany.

To Bismarck “the whole of the Eastern question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier” but his successors departed from his policy of disinterestedness in the Balkans, and adopted the *Drang nach Osten* (eastward drive).

A number of measures were adopted to increase German influence in the Ottoman Empire—the recognition of the Turkish army by German officers, the penetration to every corner of the Ottoman Empire by German commercial travellers, the establishment in Constantinople of a branch of Deutsche Bank of Berlin. The most startling, however, and as far as the other powers of Europe were concerned—the most menacing demonstration of German ambitions and policy—was in the construction of the Berlin to Bagdad railway.


The bold and enterprising scheme became the keynote of the German system in the East, and was in consequence one of the most serious of international problems from the opening of the twentieth century.

The Berlin-Bagdad Railway was “a grandiose conception, typical of the aspirations of the new German Empire—and new German Emperor”.

Based on concessions granted in 1899 by Turkey to the German company of Anatolian Railways, a railway system was to be constructed right through the heart of the Ottoman Empire in Asia from the Bosphorus to Bagdad and thence to Basra, seventy miles from the head of the Persian Gulf. “Its strategic and political importance was fully realized by all powers in Europe”.

“The German railway train to Bagdad should be the harbinger of distant and extensive empire as surely as the sailing-ship of Columbus or of Cabot”.¹

1. Columbus discovered the New World for Spain (October 12, 1492). Columbus Day, October 12, is a holiday commemorating America's discovery. John Cabot, (1450-98), an Italian navigator in British service, discovered of the American continent, Labrador, 1497. His son, Sabastian, English navigator, (1475-1557) followed in his father's footsteps.



It was certainly realized that the Bagdad railway carried Germany through the Ottoman Empire to the gates of India, that it gave her strategic military control over the Turkish Empire, that it necessitated the adherence of the Balkans to the Kaiser in time of war, and that it menaced the security of the French power in Syria, and of the British empire in the East. It was natural that France and Britain should regard its construction with apprehension. In the Great War those plans were fully realized.

The main route of the Berlin-Bagdad Railroad is indicated on the map.

VI. Map to Illustrate Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 1918

By the end of 1917 it became apparent that Russia after her prolonged ordeal and widespread starvation, could not sustain both war and revolution at the same time. The truth was brought home by the rapid dissolution of the Russian armies. The peasants, hearing that land was about to be redistributed, simply deserted and went home to get it.

Under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky the Bolshevik programme was carried forward. The objectives were : (i) to arrange peace with the Central Powers ; (ii) to make the proletariat supreme ; (iii) to foster economics and social reforms ; (iv) to consolidate Russia ; and (v) to spread communism throughout the world.

As it was impossible for the Bolsheviks to carry out their programme while still at war, they opened peace negotiations with Germany in December 1917. They tried to make peace according to the formula. "No annexations and no indemnities" ; but finally accepted the crushing Treaty of Brest Litovsk (signed on March 3, 1918), which ended the war between Russia and Germany.

By this Treaty Russia surrendered vast tracts of her territory (about one-fourth of her lands to Germany). The territory surrendered included Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, Lithunia, Russian Poland and Ukaraine. New sources of supplies were now available to Germany in the Ukaraine and in other eastern march-lands stripped from Russia at Brest-Litovsk.

Shaded portion on the map indicates the territory surrendered by Russia.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles Germany abrogated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and recognised the independence of all former Russian territories.

VII

Map to illustrate
the

TREATY OF VERSAILLES



VIII

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE TREATIES OF SAINT-GERMAIN AND THE TRIANON



VII. Map to Illustrate Treaty of Versailles

Four years (1914—18) of intense war effort had exhausted the Germans out of hands. The shortage and poor quality of food, the continuous drain of men, the failure of Ludendorff's costly drives, the growing realization that they confronted a world in arms against them finally broke the civilian morale. Austria-Hungary had been weakened throughout the war by the disloyalty of the subject nationalities and was on the brink of revolution. The main German army after the entry of the U.S.A. in the war was being steadily driven back on the western front by the crushing blows of Foch. Thousands of German soldiers who had served on the eastern front and had fraternized with the revolutionary Russians were infected with Bolshevism. The propaganda of the Allies, particularly President Wilson's peace programme set forth in the "Fourteen Points" convinced many Germans that the war was lost and that reasonable terms could be secured if peace was made at once.

On September 29, 1918, the German military leaders informed the government that the war could not be won and demanded the immediate armistice. After considerable negotiations during which the political and military situation greatly deteriorated further for the Germans, the Allies presented their conditions on November 8. The terms were such as to render any resumption of the war on the part of Germany impossible. She was to surrender large quantities of military supplies and to evacuate the whole territory west of the Rhine. The Allied food blockade was to continue. The Germans had no other option but to accept those terms which they did on November 11, 1918.

The peace settlement with Germany was embodied in the Treaty of Versailles signed on June 28, 1919.

Territorial Provisions of the Treaty of Versailles

(1) Alsace-Lorraine ceded to France. (2) Posen and a corridor about sixty miles wide separating Pomerania from East Prussia and fronting the Baltic Sea ceded to Poland. (3) Small districts including the towns of Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnet ceded to Belgium. (4) City of Danzig and surrounding territory (about 700 square miles) organized as a free city under the League of Nations, its foreign relations to be controlled by Poland. (5) City of Memel and strip of territory north-east of River Memel (Nieman) ceded to the Allies (turned over to Lithuania in 1924). (6) Plebiscites to be held in Schleswig, Upper Silesia, and certain districts in East Prussia. (As a result of the plebiscites, the northern part of Schleswig was ceded to Denmark; about 1,500 square miles of Upper Silesia, including the most valuable mines and industries, was ceded to Poland.) (7) All Germany's overseas possessions were surrendered. They were later turned over to Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Japan as mandates of the League of Nations.

The map shows Germany in 1914 and in 1919. Arrows indicate countries to which Germany ceded territory (blackened areas, including Danzig).

IX EUROPE REMODELLED BY THE PEACE TREATIES



VIII. Treaties of Saint-Germain and the Trianon

Treaty of Saint-Germain

This treaty with Austria (signed on September 10, 1919) was on the same lines as the Treaty of Versailles with Germany. It provided (1) the Republic of Austria accept partial guilt for the war and hence liability for reparation ; (2) no union be permitted between Austria and Germany ; (3) the Austrian army be reduced to 30,000 ; (4) her navy be restricted to three police boats on the Danube ; and (5) Austria recognize the independence of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Under the Treaty Austria became a small, impoverished country without access to the sea, surrounded by the customs barriers of the newly arisen hostile state. No other nation suffered such great hardship in the coming years.

Treaty of Trianon

This treaty with Hungary (signed on June 4, 1920) provided (a) that the Slovak provinces be added to Czechoslovakia ; (b) Transylvania be added to Rumania ; (c) Croatia be added to Yugoslavia ; and (d) Banat to Rumania and Yugoslavia. Hungary was thus reduced to an unimportant state of Central Europe. In no other case was the principle of self-determination so grossly violated as in the case of Hungary ; nearly one-fourth of her nationals were assigned to neighbouring hostile states.


On the map shaded portion indicate the former empire of Austria-Hungary

IX. Europe Remodelled by the Peace Treaties

On the map are indicated the boundaries under the Peace Treaties—Versailles with Germany, of Saint-Germain with Austria, of the Trianon with Hungary, of Neuilly with Bulgaria.² To bring out the extent of the territorial changes made by the Peace Treaties, the geographical confines of the German, Austrian and Russian Empires in 1914 are also indicated on the map.

2. Treaty of Neuilly. This treaty with Bulgaria (signed on November 27, 1919) provided that Rumania should get Dobrudja ; Yugoslavia most of Macedonia ; and that Greece should get western Thrace and most of the Aegean coast. Bulgaria's army was to be reduced to 20,000 men, and her navy to be practically scrapped. She was also made liable for reparations.

X MAP OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE 1923



X. Map of South-Eastern Europe, 1923

Peace Settlement with Turkey

Treaty of Sevres


This Treaty with Turkey (signed on August 10, 1920) provided that (1) Hejaz would be controlled by Britain. (2) Palestine, Mesopotamia and the Jordan territory would be mandates of Britain. (3) Syria would be made a French mandate. (4) Spheres of influence would be given to France in Cilicia and to Italy in Anatolia. (5) Greece would obtain Thrace, Adrianople, Gallipoli, the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, and the Dodecause Islands which Italy had occupied, and (6) the Dardanelles would be internationalized.

This Treaty was never ratified by the Turkish National Assembly under Mustapha Kemal Pasha although the Sultan signed it. It remained a dead letter. It was subsequently revised by the Treaty of Lausanne (July 9, 1923).

Treaty of Lausanne

Italy and France, jealous of the privileges conferred upon Britain and Greece in the Treaty of Sevres, concluded separate treaties with Turkey, after the aggressive campaign of the Turkish army had blotted out Armenia and forced the Italians and French out of Anatolia and Cilicia, respectively. Encouraged by Britain, the Greeks precipitated another Greco-Turkish War (1921-22). The army of the Turkish Nationalists was successful. It not only drove the Greeks out of Smyrna but also deposed Mohammed VI and made possible a new settlement of the Near East. The Treaty of Lausanne modified the Treaty of Sevres by giving Turkey control of Anatolia, Cilicia, Adalia, Smyrna, Constantinople, Gallipoli, Adrianople, and eastern Thrace. Turkey was not compelled to reduce her army and navy or to pay reparations. By her successful resistance to the dictated Treaty of Sevres, she obtained independence from international control, and was actually in a better position to develop along national lines than she had been before the war.

XI FRONTIERS OF POLAND



XII DANZIG AND THE POLISH CORRIDOR



XI. Frontiers of Poland after the Peace Treaties, 1919

Poland through the ages passed through strange vicissitudes of fortune. The extent of the frontiers of the kingdom of Poland, and Lithuania in 1569 is indicated on the map. At the end of the eighteenth century the kingdom had, for all intents and purposes, disappeared from the map of Europe, having been partitioned among Austria, Prussia and Russia. But it reappeared in one form or another in the course of the nineteenth century. Napoleon set up a Grand Duchy of Warsaw—its extent in 1810 is indicated on the map. At the Congress of Vienna (1815) the greater part of the Duchy of Warsaw was constituted into a kingdom of Poland and placed under the domination of Russia.

The Polish Question and national spirit, however, were far from dying as was manifested by recurrent national risings in Poland in 1830, 1846 and 1863. The Great War was a blessing in disguise for Poland. As a result of simultaneous defeat of the enemies of Poland *viz* Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany in the War, a new Republic of Poland was brought into being by the Peace Treaties of 1919. The boundaries of Poland as determined by these Treaties are indicated on the map. Poland's eastern frontier was fixed on the so-called "Curzon Line" (1920).

XII. Danzig and the Polish Corridor

One of the thorniest problems which confronted the statesmen who assembled in Paris in 1919 to reconstruct Europe was Danzig. The population of the city was overwhelmingly German: yet, situated as it was on the mouth of Vistula, it was Poland's natural port. The Commission which studied the Polish question for the Peace Conference recommended that Danzig be handed over to Poland outright, but there was sharp divergence of opinion on this recommendation between the "Big Three"—Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George. The result was that a curious compromise was arrived at. Danzig with some territory around it was made into a free state under the general supervision of the League of Nations, which should appoint a High Commissioner as the guardian of its status. To Poland, however, special rights were granted—free use of the harbour, untrammelled trade with the city, and the charge of its foreign relations.

It seemed to be a case of giving Poland her national access to the sea through a belt undisputably Polish (the so-called "Polish Corridor").

Danzig and the Polish Corridor are indicated on the map.

APPENDICES

1. **EUROPE AT A GLANCE (1789—1945)**
2. **THE CHIEF RULERS OF THE PERIOD**
3. **CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES**
4. **SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY**

APPENDIX I

Europe at a Glance (1789—1945)

See Part I, pp. 321-25.

APPENDIX II

The Chief Rulers of the Period

See Part I pp., 326-30.

APPENDIX III

Chronological Tables

A. PRESIDENTS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

Date of Election

- August, 1871. Marie-Joseph-Louis-Adolphe Theirs.
- May, 1873. Marie-Edme-Patrice Maurice de Macmahon, D.
of Magenta, Marshal of France.
- January, 1879. Francois-Paul-Jules Grevy. Re-elected 1886.
Resigned 1887.
- December, 1887. Marie-Francois-Sadi Carnot. Murdered 1894.
- June, 1894. Jean-Paul-Pierre Casimir-Perier. Resigned 1895.
- January, 1895. Francois-Felix Faure. Died 1899.
- February, 1899. Emile Loubet.
- January, 1906. Armand Fallieres.
1913. Raymond Poincare.
1920. Paul Deschanel.
1920. Alexandre Millerand.
1924. Gaston Doumergue.
1931. Paul Doumer.
1932. Albert Lebrun.

B. PRIME MINISTERS OF ENGLAND

- George III, 1760-1820*
 John Stewart, Earl of Bute, First Lord of the Treasury, 1762-63.
 George Grenville, First Lord and Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1763-65.
 Charles Wentworth-Watson, M. of Rockingham, 1766.
 Augustus Fitzroy, D. of Grafton, 1766-69.
 Frederick, Lord North, 1770-82.
 Marquis of Rockingham, 1782.
 William Petty, Earl of Shelburne, 1782-83.
 William Bentinck, Duke of Portland, 1783.
 William Pitt, 1783-1801.
 Henry Addington (Viscount Sidmouth), 1801-04.
 William Pitt, 1804-06.
 William, Lord Grenville, 1806-07.
 Duke of Portland, 1807-09.
 Spencer Perceval, 1809-12.
- George IV, 1820-30*
 Earl of Liverpool, 1812-20, 1820-27.
 George Canning, 1827.
 Viscount Goderich, 1827.
 Duke of Wellington, 1827-30.
- William IV, 1830-37*
 Charles Grey, 1830-34.
 Viscount Melbourne, 1834.
 Sir Robert Peel, 1834-35.
 Viscount Melbourne, 1835-37.
- Victoria, 1837-1901*
 Viscount Melbourne, 1837-41.
 Sir Robert Peel, 1841-46.
 Lord John Russell, 1846-52.
 Earl of Derby, 1852.
 Earl of Aberdeen, 1853-55.
 Viscount Palmerston, 1855-58.
 Earl of Derby, 1858-59.
 Viscount Palmerston, 1859-65.
 Earl Russell, 1865-66.
 Earl of Derby, 1866-68.
 Benjamin Disraeli, 1868.
 W.E. Gladstone, 1868-74.
 B. Disraeli, 1874-80.
 W.E. Gladstone, 1880-85.
 Marquis of Salisbury, 1885-86.
 W.E. Gladstone, 1886.
 Marquis of Salisbury, 1886-92.
 W.E. Gladstone, 1892-94.
 Earl of Rosebery, 1894-95.
 Marquis of Salisbury, 1895-1901.
- Edward VII, 1901-10*
 Marquis of Salisbury, 1901-02.
 A.J. Balfour, 1902-05.
 Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 1905-08.
 H.H. Asquith, 1908-10.
- George V, 1910*
 H.H. Asquith, 1910.
 D. Lloyd George, 1916.
 A. Bonar Law, 1922.
 S. Baldwin, 1923.
 Ramsay MacDonald, January 22, 1924.
 S. Baldwin, November 4, 1924.
 Ramsay MacDonald, June 8, 1929 (National Labour, August 25, 1931).
 S. Baldwin, June, 1935.

*C. CHANCELLORS OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE***WILLIAM I**

P. Otto von Bismarck, 1871-88

FREDERICK III

P. Otto von Bismarck, 1888

WILLIAM II

P. Otto von Bismarck, 1888-90.

C. George Leo von Caprivi, 1890-94.

P. Chlodwig von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, 1897-1900

Count and Prince von Bulow, 1900-08.

Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, 1908.

F. von Michaelis, 1917.

Count Hertling, 1917.

Prince Max von Baden, 1918.

D. KINGS OF ITALY

Victor Emmanuel II, 1862 (1849-78).

Humbert I, 1878-1900.

Victor Emmanuel III, 1900.

APPENDIX IV

Select Bibliography

See Part I pp. 331-334

ERRATA

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Read</i>
9	14 from bottom	larked	lurked
11	11	Austro-Russian	Austro-Prussian
11	12	rejecting	ejection
17	last	was	war
20	11	dangerous indeed	dangerous, and,
20	7	way" again	way". Again,
21	14	at	of
26	11 from bottom	land-will-behind	land-well-behind
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36	4 from bottom	changed	charged
36	3 from bottom	frequently his	frequently charged his
38	15	since he	since. He
42	7	visit	vision
44	21	consult	consuls
46	4	files, the	files, and
46	9	Boring	Baring
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84	14 from bottom	winte	white
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97	5 from bottom	sing	sins
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104	5	Baror	Baron
104	5	revolvedi	revealed in
115	7	Shurting	Shutting
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119	3 from bottom	Huge	Hague
137	19	prade	trade
138	4	passed	based
138	4 from bottom	hypotrophied	hypertrophied
139	5 from bottom	Herlides	Hebrides
153	6	and	had
168	12 from bottom	very ignored	very cavalierly by Delcasse who had ignored

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